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PETITIONER: JYOTI PERSHAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNIONTERRITORY OF DELHI(AND CONNEC

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/1961

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1602            1962 SCR  (2) 125  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1961 SC1731  (13)  RF         1964 SC 600  (54)  R          1965 SC1107  (79,80,87)  D          1966 SC1003  (12)  RF         1968 SC 303  (28,35)  R          1968 SC 317  (13,18)  RF         1968 SC1232  (19)  F          1974 SC1232  (21)  R          1974 SC2009  (14,15)  F          1974 SC2044  (3)  D          1977 SC 265  (7)  RF         1977 SC 789  (7)  RF         1977 SC1825  (51)  F          1978 SC 771  (5,24)  RF         1979 SC 478  (72)  C          1980 SC 350  (9)  R          1980 SC1382  (81)  F          1986 SC1205  (20)  R          1990 SC 560  (13)  D          1991 SC 101  (22,148,226)

ACT: Slum   Areas-Improvement  and  clearance  of Validity   of enactment-Constitutionality-Rent  Control-Operation of  Rent Control  Act  in areas governed by Slum  Areas  Act-Delhi  & Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952  (38  of  1952)-Slum  Areas (Improvement  and Clearance) Act, 1956 (96 of 1956), s.  19- Constitution of India, Arts.  14, 19(1)(f).

HEADNOTE: The petitioner after a prolonged litigation and having  ful- filled  all  the conditions of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act, obtained decrees of ejectment against the tenants. 126 In  the meantime the Slum Areas (Improvement and  Clearance) Act,  956, came into force and the petitioner in  accordance with  s.  s.9  of the said Slum Areas  Act  applied  to  the competent  authority for permission to execute  the  decree, which  permission  was refused inter alia on the grounds  of

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hardship  to the tenants and  the human aspect of the  case. The  appeals therefrom were also rejected.   The  petitioner moved  the Supreme Court for issue of a writ of  certioraris to quash the orders on the ground that (1) s. 19 of the  Act was  invalid  and  unconstitutional  as  violative  of   the petitioner’s  rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f)  of the Constitution, in as much as s. 19 of the Slum Areas  Act was  a super-imposition on the rights of the petitioner  who had  satisfied  the  requirements of the  Rent  Control  Act before obtaining his decree, which amounted to  unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold property guaranteed by the Constitution,  and (2) that S. 19(3) of the Slum  Areas  Act vested an unguided, unfettered, and uncontrolled power in an executive officer to withhold permission to execute a decree which  the  petitioner  had obtained  after  satisfying  the reasonable  requirements of the law as enacted in  the  Rent Control  Act,  (3)  The power  conferred  on  the  competent authority by s. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act was an excessive delegation  of legislative power and  therefore  unconstitu- tional. Held,  that s. 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement  and  Clea- rance) Act, 1956, was not obnoxious to the equal  protection of  laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the  Constitution.   There was enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion under s. 19(1) of the Act.  The  restrictions imposed  by  s.  19  of the Act could  not  be  said  to  be unreasonable. The guidance could be derived from the enactment and that it bears  a reasonable and rational relationship to the  object to  be  attained  by the Act and in fact  would  fulfil  the purpose  which the law seeks to achieve, viz.,  the  orderly elimination  of slums, with interim protection for the  slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. The order of the competent authority in the present case was not open to challenge as it was in line with the policy  and purpose of the Act. So long as the Legislature indicated in the operative provi- sions of the statute with certainty, the policy and  purpose of  the  enactment, the mere fact that the  legislation  was skeletal or that every detail of the application of law to a particular  case, was not laid down in the enactment  itself or  the fact that a discretion was left to  those  entrusted with administering the law, afforded no basis either for the contention  that there had been an excessive  delegation  of legislative  power  as  to amount to an  abdication  of  its functions, or that the discretion vested was uncanalised and unguided so as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. If the power or discretion has been conferred                             127 in a manner which was legal and constitutional the fact that the Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provi- sion, could not be a ground for invalidating the law. The  freedom  to ’hold property’ was not  absolute  but  was subject,  under  Art. 19(5),  to  "reasonable  restrictions" being  A  placed upon it "in the interests  of  the  general public".   The  criteria  for  determining  the  degree   of restriction  on  the right to hold property which  would  be considered reasonable, were by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age to age and should be related to the  adjustments  necessary  to  solve  the  problems  which communities faced from time to time.  If law failed to  take account of unusual situations of pressing urgency arising in the  country  and  of  the social  urges  generated  by  the patterns of thought, evolution and of social  consciousness, it  would  have to be written down as having failed  in  the

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very  purpose  of  its  existence.   Where  the  legislature enacted laws, which in its wisdom, was considered  necessary for   the   solution  of  human  problems,  the   tests   of "reasonableness",  had  to be viewed in the context  of  the issues which faced the legislature.  In the construction  of such laws and particularly in judging of their validity  the courts  had  to  approach  it from  the  point  of  view  of furthering  the social interest which it was the purpose  of the  legislation  to promote, for the courts  were  not,  in these matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of a society which was trying, by enacted law, to solve  its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful  adjustment and  thus furthering the moral and material progress of  the community as a whole. That  the  provisions of the special  enactment,  the  Slums Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, will in respect of  the  buildings in areas declared slum areas  operate  in addition to the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Ramakyishna Dalmia v. justice Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R.  279, Harishankar  Bagla  v.  State of Madhya  Pyadesh,  [1955]  1 S.C.R. 380, M/s.  Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar  Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 803, State of West  Bengal  v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284, Kathi Ratting Rawat  v. State  of Saurashtra, [1952] S.C.R. 435, Kedar Nath  Bajoria v.  State  of  West Bengal, [1954] S.C.R.  30  and  Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 233, discussed.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Petitions Nos. 67, 87  and  130  of 1959. Petitions  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. R.   S. Narula and S. S. Chadha, for the petitioners. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen and  T. M. Sen, for Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 5 (In 128 petition No. 83 of 1959) 1, 2 and 12 (In Petition No. 67  of 1959) and 1, 2 and 4 (In Petition No. 130 of 1959). W.   S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent  No. 3 (In Petn.  No. 83 of 1959). Sardari Lal Bhatia, for respondents Nos. 3a, 4, 5, 6 (a,  b, c,) and 7-10. J.   D. Jain and K. L. Mehta, for the Intervener in Petition No. 67 of 1959 (Phool Chand). 1961.  April 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-These three petitions have been filed  invoking the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of s. 19  and particularly  sub-s. 3, of the Slum Areas  (Improvement  and Clearance) Act 1956 (Central Act 96 of 1956), on the  ground that  it  offends the fundamental right of  the  petitioners guaranteed to them by Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f). To appreciate the grounds on which this contention is sought to  be  sustained it is necessary to set out briefly  a  few facts.    We   might  however  mention   that   though   the constitutional  objection, adverted to is common to all  the three  petitions, it is sufficient to refer to the facts  of the case in Writ Petition No. 67 of 1959 which is typical of the cases before us. The  petitioner-Jyoti  Pershad-is the owner of  a  house  in Delhi  in which respondents 3 to 11 were tenants.   Each  of these nine individuals occupied a single room in this house. As  the  petitioner  considered  the house  to  be  old  and

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required to be demolished and reconstructed, he submitted  a plan  to  the Council of the Delhi Municipal  Committee  and applied  for sanction for the reconstruction of  the  house. The plan was sanctioned and thereafter the petitioner  filed suits  against these nine tenants under s. 13(1)(g)  of  the Delhi  and  Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of  1952  (which  will hereafter  be  referred to as the Rent  Control  Act).   The suits  were resisted by the tenants.  Two matters had to  be proved  under  s.  13(1)(g) of the Rent  Control  Act  by  a plaintiff before he could obtain an order of 129 eviction:(i) that there was a plan which had been sanctioned by  the municipal authorities which made, provision for  the tenants  then in occupation of the house being  accommodated in  the house as reconstructed, and (ii) that the  plaintiff had  the  necessary funds to carry out  the  reconstruction. The  plan  which had been approved by  the  Delhi  Municipal Committee  made provision for the construction of a  double- storeyed  building with twelve rooms which  was,  therefore, more than ample for the nine tenants for whom  accommodation had to be provided.  The plaintiff also established that  he had deposited cash in the State Bank of India sufficient for reconstructing  the  house as sanctioned in  the  plan.   On December 8, 1956 the Civil Court in Delhi passed decrees  in favour  of the petitioner for the eviction of respondents  3 to 11.  Section 15 of the Rent Control Act enacted:               "15.  (1)  The Court shall, when  passing  any               decree  or order on the grounds  specified  in               clause  (f)  or clause (g) of the  proviso  to               sub-section (1) of section 13, ascertain  from               the  tenant whether he elects to be placed  in               occupation  of  the promises or  part  thereof               from  which  he is to be evicted  and  if  the               tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the               election  in the decree or order  and  specify               therein  the date on or before which he  shall               deliver   possession  so  as  to  enable   the               landlord  to commence the work of  repairs  or               building or re-building as the case may be.               (2)If  the  tenant delivers possession  on  or               before  the  date specified in the  decree  or               order, the landlord, shall, on the  completion               of  the  work of repairs or  building  or  re-               building place the tenant in occupation of the               premises or part thereof               (3)If,   after   the  tenant   has   delivered               possession on or before the date specified  in               the  decree  or order the  landlord  fails  to               commence  the work of repairs or  building  or               re-building, within one month of the specified               date  or  fails  to complete  the  work  in  a               reasonable time or having completed the  work,               fails to place the tenant in occupation of the               premises in               17               130               accordance  with  sub-section (2),  the  Court               may,  on  the application of the  tenant  made               within one year from the specified date, order               the landlord to place the tenant in occupation               of  the  premises  or  part  thereof  on   the               original  terms  and conditions or to  pay  to               such tenant such compensation as may be  fixed               by the Court." The  tenants,  however,  refused to  give  up  possessession

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within the three months time granted to them by the  decrees to  vacate  the premises but went up in appeal  against  the orders  of eviction under s. 34 of the Rent Control  Act  to the  Senior  Sub-Judge, Delhi.  These appeals  were  finally disposed  of  against  the tenant-appellants,  some  on  the merits  and  some  by reason of abatement,  by  the  end  of October,  1957.  Under the rules governing the  construction of  houses on plans sanctioned by the Delhi  Municipal  Com- mittee, the sanctioned building had to be completed within a period  of one year from the date of sanction.  As a  result of this rule the sanction obtained by the petitioner  lapsed and  he  had,  therefore, to obtain  fresh  sanction  if  in consequence of his success in the appeals before the  Senior Sub-Judge  he still desired to demolish and reconstruct  the building. Meanwhile,  two  changes  came about in  the  law  governing matters relevant to the present case: The first was that the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 96 of 1956, which will  be  hereafter referred to as the Act, was  enacted  by Parliament  and came into force in the Delhi area.   Section 19 of that Act which is impugned in these petitions runs:               "19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in               any other law for the time being in force,  no               person  who has obtained any decree  or  order               for the eviction of a tenant from any building               in  a slum area shall be entitled  to  execute               such decree or order except with the  previous               permission   in  writing  of   the   competent               authority.               (2)   Every  person  desiring  to  obtain  the               permission  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)               shall  make an application in writing  to  the               competent   authority   in   such   form   and               containing   such   particulars  as   may   be               prescribed.               131               (3)   On  receipt  of  such  application   the               competent    authority,   after   giving    an               opportunity  to the tenant of being heard  and               after  making  such summary inquiry  into  the               circumstances  of the case as it  thinks  fit,               shall  by order in writing either grant’  such               permission or refuse to grant such permission.               (4)   Where the competent authority refuses to               grant  the permission it shall record a  brief               statement of the reasons for such refusal  and               furnish a copy thereof to the applicant." The other change in the law was that due to the enactment of rules   and   regulations  providing   for   a   coordinated development and planning of buildings in the Delhi Area  the type of constructions that could be sanctioned by the  Delhi Municipal  Committee  underwent a radical  alteration  as  a result of which in the area now in question  double-storeyed buildings  were not permitted to be constructed and that  if the petitioner’s house had to be reconstructed it could only have three living rooms making allowance for the size of the rooms and the free space that had to be left on either  side of  the  building in accordance with the  revised  municipal regulations. It would have been noticed that the right of the tenants  to insist  on the landlord providing accommodation for them  in the  reconstructed building guaranteed to them by s.  15  of the Rent Control Act, had ceased by reason of their  failure to  quit  and  deliver vacant possession  of  the  tenements occupied  by them within 3 months fixed by the order of  the

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Civil  Court  (vide s. 15) and hence they had  no  statutory right  under  the  Rent  Control Act  to  be  provided  with accommodation by the landlord. Thus  freed  from obligation to the tenants  the  petitioner filed  on  the strength of these decrees for  eviction  nine applications  under  s. 19 of the Act before  the  competent authority  for  the eviction of the tenants  from  the  nine rooms in the building on the ground that the building had to be  reconstructed  as  it was in  a  dilapidated  condition. These petitions were dismissed by the competent authority by his  order  dated January 13, 1958 on the  ground  that  the sanction to 132 reconstruct  the building which the petitioner had  obtained from  the  municipality  in  1956  had  expired.  The  order recited:               "since   it  may  take  some  time   for   the               petitioner   to  obtain  fresh  sanction   for               reconstruction   and   there   is   also   the               possibility  of  sanction not being  given  at               all, it would be no use continuing with  these               proceedings until it is definitely known  that               the   landlord  has  obtained   sanction   for               reconstruction.   These nine applications  are               accordingly  filed  with  the  option  to  the               petitioner   to  have  them  revived   without               payment  of  extra fee in case he is  able  to               obtain sanction." Thereafter   the   petitioner  applied  to   the   municipal authorities  for  sanctioning a building  plan.   As  stated earlier,  the  building plan approved  by  the  municipality could  permit  only a building consisting of  one  floor  in which  there  were three living rooms and sanction  for  the construction  of  a  building with  such  accommodation  was granted.  With this sanctioned plan, the petitioner  renewed his  application under s. 19 for permission to  execute  the decree  of the Civil Court and evict the tenants.  By  order dated  July 30, 1958 all these applications were  dismissed. The reason assigned for the order was stated in these terms:               "If the decree is allowed to be executed  they               will  be thrown out and it will be  impossible               for   them   to  get  accommodation   in   the               reconstructed building.  They are old  tenants               and  as  stated  above also  very  poor.   The               execution of the decree will involve very real               hardship to them.  They are all occupying only               one  Kothri each and paying rent at Rs. 3  per               mensem,  and  they have no complaint  to  make               about  the condition of their  Kothries.   The               landlord  has four or five other houses  which               he has let out on rent.  The case has a               human  aspect and I disallow the execution  of               the decree against the tenants." The  petitioner preferred appeals against this order to  the Administrator of the Union Territory, Delhi to whom  appeals lay under s. 20 of the Act.  The appeals were dismissed, the appellate authority saying :                             133               "I would have allowed the appellant permission               to  evict the tenants, if the property  itself               was  dilapidated and declared unfit for  human               habitation by a competent authority.  This  is               not  so.  The land lord naturally  desires  to               get a better return from land in the congested               areas  of  the  city by rebuilding  on  it  to

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             better  specifications,  so that  he  can  get               higher rent from it.  But if this tendency  is               permitted  to have an unrestricted play,  then               the  result  will be the eviction of  a  large               number of poor people from slum areas.               In  the  circumstances, the  appellant  should               wait  until  either his property  is  declared               dangerous  by  the Municipal  Corporation,  or               under  a Slum Clearance Scheme he is asked  by               the competent authority itself to demolish  it               or rebuild it in a particular manner." In  these circumstances the petitioner has moved this  Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash these  orders on  the ground already adverted to, viz., that s. 19 of  the Act  is  invalid and unconstitutional as  violative  of  the petitioner’s  rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f)  of the Constitution.  In passing we may observe that we are not concerned with the validity of the particular orders  passed in  the  case but only with the general question as  to  the constitutionality of the impugned s. 19 of the Act. Before  setting out the points urged by Mr. Narula learned Counsel  for  the petitioners-in support of  his  submission that  s.  19 of the Act" was, in so far as  it  enabled  the competent authority to withhold permission to those who  had obtained decrees for eviction from executing their  decrees, unconstitutional, it would be necessary to read the material provisions  of the Rent Control Act, 1952, which  imposes  a restriction  on the right of landlords, inter alia to  evict tenants from the premises occupied by them.  Chapter III  of that Act imposes a control over the eviction of tenants.   A tenant  is defined (Vide s. 2(j)) as meaning "any person  by whom  or on whose account rent is payable for  any  premises including such sub-tenants or others who have derived  title under the tenant 134 under  the provisions of any law before the commencement  of the Act." Section 13(1) enacts:               "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-               tained  in any other law or any  contract,  no               decree or order for the recovery of possession               of  any premises shall be passed by any  Court               in  favour of the landlord against any  tenant               (including   a   tenant   whose   tenancy   is               terminated):". This   blanket  protection  is,  however,  subject  to   the conditions enumerated in the proviso which reads:               "Provided  that  nothing in  this  sub-section               shall  apply to any suit or  other  proceeding               for  such recovery of possession if the  Court               is satisfied-" Then  follow  ten grounds the existence of one or  other  of which  enables  a landlord to obtain a decree from  a  Civil Court  for the recovery of possession from  tenants.   Among the  grounds  thus enumerated it is sufficient to  refer  to grounds  (f), (g) and (1), ground (g) being the ground  upon which  the  petitioner  in the  present  case  obtained  the decrees for eviction and these run:               " (f) that the premises have become unsafe  or               unfit  for human habitation and are bona  fide               required  by  the landlord  for  carrying  out               repairs  which cannot be carried  out  without               the premises being vacated; or               (g)   that the premises are bona fide required               by the landlord for the purpose of re-building               the  premises  or for the replacement  of  the

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             promises  by any building or for the  erection               of other buildings, and that such building  or               rebuilding  cannot be carried out without  the               premises being vacated; or               (1)   that the landlord requires the  premises               in order to carry out any building work at the               instance  of  the  Government  or  the   Delhi               Improvement   Trust   in  pursuance   of   any               improvement scheme or development scheme." The right of the landlord, however, who obtains an order for eviction  under  either  cl. (f) or (g)  above  set  out  is subject to the provisions of s. 15 whose terms have  already been set out, The result, therefore,                             135 would be that in the cases covered by these two clauses  the tenants  would be entitled, if they conform to the terms  of these provisions, to be reinstated in the newly  constructed premises after the reconstruction.  It might be pointed  out that  under s. 38 of the Rent Control Act the provisions  of the  Act  and the Rules made thereunder are to  have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. The argument of the learned Counsel was that the restriction upon  the  rights  of  landlords to  the  enjoyment  of  the property imposed by s. 13 of the Rent Control Act could  not be  open to any objection, legal or  constitutional  because the Legislature has set out with precision the grounds  upon which possession could be recovered, the defenses that might be set up by the tenants and the conditions subject to which the rights either of the landlord or of the tenant could  be exercised.  It is the super-imposition of the provisions  of s.  19 of the Act on the rights of  a  landlord-decreeholder who  had satisfied the requirements of the Rent Control  Act before obtaining his decree that was stated as amounting  to an  unreasonable restriction on the right to  hold  property guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f). This will be a convenient stage at which we might set out in brief outline the argument urged by learned Counsel for  the petitioner.   They were mainly three: (1) Section  19(3)  of the Act vests an unguided, unfettered and uncontrolled power in an executive officer to withhold permission to execute  a decree  which a landlord has obtained after  satisfying  the reasonable  requirements of the law as enacted in  the  Rent Control  Act.   Neither  s.  19 of the  Act  nor  any  other provision  of  the Act indicates the grounds  on  which  the competent  authority might grant or withhold  permission  to execute  decrees  and  the power  conferred  is,  therefore, arbitrary  and offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. (2)  The same point was urged in a slightly different form by  saying that the Power conferred on the "competent authority" by  s. 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of  legislative power and was, therefore, unconstitutional. (3) The 136 vesting of a power in an executive authority to  override-at his  sweet will and pleasure-rights to property without  any guidance  from the Legislature con stituted an  unreasonable restraint  on  the petitioner’s right to  hold  property,  a right  which in the case of the property of the type now  in question would include a right to obtain possession from the tenant  in order either to improve it by  reconstruction  or for  the purpose of his own use.  Apart from  the  objection regarding  the vesting of an unguided power in an  executive authority which is, the common ground of objection urged  in regard to points (1) and (2), learned Counsel submitted that the right vested in an executive authority to prevent for an

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indefinite  and  indeterminate period of time the  right  to enjoy his property was for this further reason excessive and an unreasonable restraint which could not be justified under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. We  shall  proceed to consider these points in  that  order. The  first  ground  alleged  is that s. 19  of  the  Act  is constitutionally   invalid   as  violative  of   the   equal protection  of  the  laws conferred under  Art.  14  of  the Constitution,  in that an unguided and arbitrary  discretion is vested in the "competent authority". The import, content and scope of Art. 14 of the Constitution has  been elaborately considered and explained  in  numerous decisions  of this Court and it is,  therefore,  unnecessary for  us to embark on any fresh investigation of  the  topic, but  it would be sufficient to summarise the principles,  or rather  the rules of guidance for the interpretation of  the Article  which  have  already  been  established,  and  then consider the application of those rules to the provisions of the  enactment  now impugned.  It is only necessary  to  add that  the  decisions of this Court laying  down  the  proper construction  of  Art.  14 rendered up  to  1959  have  been summarised  in  the form of 5 propositions by Das C.  J.  in Ramakrishna  Dalmia  v. Justice Tendolkar (1),  but  we  are making  a summary on slightly different lines more  relevant to  the  enquiry regarding the provision with which  we  are concerned in the present case. (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 279, 299, 301                             137 (1)  If the statute itself or the rule made under it applies unequally to persons or things similarly situated, it  would be  an instance of a direct violation of the  Constitutional guarantee  and the provision of the statute or the  rule  in question would have to be  struck  down. (2)  The enactment or the rule might not in terms enact     a discriminatory  rule of law but might enable an  unequal  or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated.  This would happen when the  legislature vests a discretion in an authority, be it the Government  or an  administrative  official acting either as  an  executive officer   or  even  in  a  quasi-judicial  capacity   by   a legislation  which does not lay down any policy or  disclose any  tangible  or intelligible purpose,  thus  clothing  the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it  to discriminate.               "The  legislature must declare the  policy  of               the law and the legal principles which are  to               control  any  given cases and must  provide  a               standard to guide the officials or the body in               power  to  execute  the  law.   The  essential               legislative    function   consists   in    the               determination  or  choice of  the  legislative               policy  and of formally enacting  that  policy               into a binding rule of conduct."               [Harishankar  Bagla  v. The  State  of  Madhya               Pradesh (1)].               "No  rules have been framed and no  directions               given  on these matters to regulate  or  guide               the  discretion  of  the  licensing   officer.               Practically   the   Order   commits   to   the               unrestrained  will of a single individual  the               power to grant, withhold or cancel licences in               any way he chooses and there is nothing in the               Order which could ensure a proper execution of               the power or operate as a check upon injustice               that  might result from improper execution  of

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             the same".                [Messrs.   Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v.  The               State of Uttar Pradesh (2)].               (1)  [1955]  1 S.C.R. 380,  388.   (2)  [1954]               S.C.R. 803. 813.               18               138 In  such circumstances the very provision of the  law  which enables  or permits the authority to  discriminate,  offends the  guarantee  of equal protection  afforded, by  Art.  14. possibly the best instance of this  type of case is afforded by the legislation under consideration in The State of  West Bengal  v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1), the ratio underlying  which was  thus  explained in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The  State  of Saurashtra (2):               "If  it depends entirely upon the pleasure  of               the    State    Government   to    make    any               classification  it likes, without any  guiding               principle  at  all, it cannot certainly  be  a               proper  classification, which requires that  a               reasonable  relation  must exist  between  the               classification  and  the  objective  that  the               legislation  has in view.  On the other  hand,               if   the  legislature  indicates  a   definite               objective  and the discretion has been  vested               in   the  State  Government  as  a  means   of               achieving  that object, the law itself  cannot               be  held  to  be  discriminatory,  though  the               action   of  the  State  Government   may   be               condemned  if  it offends  against  the  equal               protection  clause,  by  making  an  arbitrary               selection." (3)  It  is manifest that the above rule would not apply  to cases  where  the  legislature  lays  down  the  policy  and indicates the rule or the line of action which should  serve as  a  guidance to the authority.  Where  such  guidance  is expressed  in the statutory provision conferring the  power, no  question of violation of Art. 14 could arise, unless  it be  that  the rules themselves or the policy  indicated  lay down  different  rules to be applied to  persons  or  things similarly situated.  Even where such is not the case,  there might be a transgression by the authority of the limits laid down or an abuse of power, but the actual order would be set aside  in appropriate proceedings not so much on the  ground of  a violation of Art. 14, but as really being  beyond  its power. (4)  It  is not, however, essential for the  legislation  to comply with the rule as to equal protection, that the  rules for the guidance of the designated authority, (1) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 435, 461, 462. 139 which  is to exercise the power or which is vested with  the discretion,  should  be laid down in express  terms  in  the statutory provision itself.               "The  Saurashtra case would seem to  lay  down               the   A   principle  that  if   the   impugned               legislation   indicates   the   policy   which               inspired  it and the object which it seeks  to               attain,  the  mere fact that  the  legislation               does  not itself make a complete  and  precise               classification  of  the persons or  things  to               which  it  is to be applied, but  leaves  tile               selective application of the law to be made by               the  standard  indicated  or  the   underlying

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             policy  and object disclosed is not  a  suffi-               cient  ground for condemning it  as  arbitrary               and, therefore, obnoxious to article 14."               [Kedar  Nath  Bajoria  v. The  State  of  West               Bengal (1) ].               "So  long  as the policy is laid  down  and  a               standard   established   by  a   statute,   no               unconstitutional  delegation  of   legislative               power  is  involved  in  leaving  to  selected               instrumentalities  the making  of  subordinate               rules within prescribed limits and the  deter-               mination  of  facts  to which  the  policy  as               declared by the Legislature is to apply."               [Harishankar Bagla and another v. The State of               Madhya Pradesh (1) ].               Such  guidance  may thus be obtained  from  or               afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light               of   the   surrounding   circumstances   which               necessitated   the   legislation,   taken   in               conjunction with well-known facts of which the               Court  might take judicial notice or of  which               it  is appraised by evidence before it in  the               form of affidavits, Kathi Raning Rawat v.  The               State  of  Saurashtra (3)  being  an  instance               where the guidance was gathered in the  manner               above  indicated, (b) or even from the  policy               and  purpose  of the enactment  which  may  be               gathered   from  other  operative   provisions               applicable   to   analogous   or    comparable               situations or generally from the object sought               to be achieved by the enactment.               "The   policy  underlying  the  Order  is   to               regulate the               (1)  [1934]  S. C. R. 30, 46.   (2)  [1935]  1               S.C.R. 380, 388.               (3) [1052] S.C.R. 435, 461, 462.               140               transport  of cotton textile in a manner  that               will  ensure  an  even  distribution  of   the               commodity in the country and make it available               at a fair price to all.   The grant or refusal               of  a permit is thus to be govern  ed by  this               policy and the discretion given to the Textile               Commissioner is to be exercised in such a  way               as to effectuate this policy.  The  conferment               of such a discretion cannot be called  invalid               and if there is an abuse of the power there is               ample   power  in  the  Courts  to  undo   the               mischief." Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1). In Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India’s case (2) the purpose of  the provision which was administrative  convenience  for enabling  assessments to be made in the manner indicated  by the Income-tax Act was held to afford a sufficient  guidance so  as  to render the provision immune from  attack  on  the ground of violation of Art. 14. In  the circumstances indicated under the fourth head,  just as  in  the  third, the law enacted  would  be  valid  being neither  a  case of excessive delegation  or  abdication  of legislative  authority viewed from one aspect, nor  open  to objection  on  the  ground  of  violation  of  Art.  14   as authorising   or  permitting  discriminatory  treatment   of persons  similarly  situated.  The particular  executive  or quasi-judicial  act would, however, be open to challenge  as already  stated  on  the ground not so much that  it  is  in

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violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed  by Art. 14, because ex concessis that was not permitted by  the statute  but on the ground of the same being ultra vires  as not being sanctioned or authorized by the enactment  itself. The  situation in such cases would be parallel to the  tests to  be  applied for determining the validity of  rules  made under  statutes  which enable the rule-making  authority  to enact  subsidiary legislation "to carry out the purposes  of the  Act".   The  criteria to be applied  to  determine  the validity   of   such  rules  could,  in  our   opinion,   be appropriately  applied  to  determine the  validity  of  the action  under the provisions like the one dealt  with  under the last two heads. (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, 388. (2) [1957] S.C.R. 233. 141 In  the  light of what we have stated above we have  now  to consider  the  point urged by the learned  Counsel  for  the petitioner  that  the  Act  has  vested  in  the   competent authority  the  power to withhold eviction in  pursuance  of orders or decrees of Courts with- out affording any guidance or laying down any principles for his guidance on the  basis of which he could exercise his discretion.  In other  words, that  the  Act  lays no fetters and has  vested  in  him  an arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose the  decree- holders to whom he would permit execution and those to  whom he would refuse such relief.  On the other hand, the learned Attorney-General submitted that the discretion vested in the competent  authority was not unguided and that though s.  19 of  the  Act  did not in terms lay down any  rules  for  his guidance,  the  same could be gathered from the  policy  and purpose  of  the Act as set out in the preamble and  in  the operative provisions of the Act itself. We  consider  that  there  is  considerable  force  in  this submission  of the learned Attorney-General.   The  preamble describes  the Act as one enacted for two purposes: (1)  the improvement  and  clearance of slum areas in  certain  Union Territories,  and (2) for the protection of tenants in  such areas  from eviction.  These twin objects are sought  to  be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment.   Chapter 11  which consists of one sections. 3-provides a  definition of what are "slum areas" and their declaration as such.  The tests  for determining whether the area could be declared  a "slum area" or not briefly are whether the buildings in  the area  are  (a)  unfit for human habitation, or  (b)  are  by reason  of  dilapidation, overcrowding etc.  detrimental  to safety,  health  or morals.  It is in areas so  declared  as "slum  areas" that the rest of the enactment is to  operate. The provisions, however, make it clear that in order that an area may be declared a "      slum  area" every building  in that  area  need not be unfit for human habitation  or  that human  habitation in every building in such area  should  be detrimental to the safety, health or morals of the dwellers. We are making this observation because of a suggestion 142 made,  that the declared purpose of protecting  the  tenants from  eviction was inconsistent with the  policy  underlying the  declaration of an area as a "slum area" and  that  thus the  Act  manifested two contrary or con flicting  ideas  or principles which would negative each other and thus leave no fixed  policy  to  guide "  the  competent  authority"  when exercising  his powers to grant or refuse eviction  when  an application  was made to him in that behalf under s.  19  of the Act. Chapter III is headed ’Slum Improvement’ and makes provision

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for  two types of orders: (1) to require the improvement  of buildings  where  repairs-major  or  minor-would  make  them reasonably  habitable for the slum dwellers (vide ss.  4-6), and  (2) cases where mere repairs or adjustments  would  not suffice but what is required is the demolition of the entire building.  In the latter case certainly the occupants of the building  would have to be evicted and the building  vacated and power is conferred for effectuating this purpose vide s. 7  (1)  and 7 (3).  It might be that the  whole  area  might consist  of dwellings of the type which  require  demolition and it is Chapter IV that makes provision for this  category of   cases   which  is  headed  "Slum  Clearance   and   Re- development".   In  such cases the buildings in  the  entire area  are to be ordered to be demolished, and in that  event the  dwellers  would, of course, have to vacate, but  it  is presumed  that alternative accommodation  would  necessarily have  to  be provided before any such order  is  made.   The process  would have to be carried out in an orderly  fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled and the  policy behind  it,  viz.,  the establishment of  slum  dwellers  in healthier  and more comfortable tenements so as  to  improve the  health and morals of the community, is to be  achieved. Chapter  V  makes provision for the acquisition of  land  in order  to  compass  the re-development of  slum  areas  into healthy  parts of the city, by providing amenities and  more substantial  and  better  accommodation  for  the   previous inhabitants.  It is after this that we have Chapter VI whose terms  we  have  already set out.  This  Chapter  is  headed "Protection of tenants in Slum Areas 143 from  Eviction".   Obviously,  if  the  protection  that  is afforded  is read in the context of the rest of the Act,  it is  clear  that it is to enable the poor who have  no  other place  to go to, and who if they were compelled, to go  out, would  necessarily create other slums in the a  process  and live   perhaps  in  less  commodious  and   more   unhealthy surroundings  than  those from which they were  evicted,  to remain  in  their dwellings until provision is  made  for  a better  life for them elsewhere.  Though therefore  the  Act fixes  no  time limit during which alone  the  restraint  on eviction  is  to operate, it is clear from  the  policy  and purpose  of the enactment and the object which it  seeks  to achieve  that  this restriction would only be for  a  period which  would  be  determined by the  speed  with  which  the authorities are able to make other provisions for  affording the slum dweller-tenants better living conditions.  The Act, no doubt, looks at the problem not from the point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he has sunk in the  house and the possible profit that he might make if the house were either  let  to other tenants or was reconstructed  and  let out,  but rather from the point of view of the  tenants  who have no alternative accommodation and who would be  stranded in  the open if an order for eviction were passed.  The  Act itself contemplates eviction in cases where on the ground of the  house  being unfit for human habitation it  has  to  be demolished either singly under s. 7 or as one of a block  of buildings  under Ch.  IV.  So long therefore as  a  building can,  without  great detriment to health or  safety,  permit accommodation,  the  policy of the enactment would  seem  to suggest  that the slum dweller should not be evicted  unless alternative  accommodation  could be obtained for  him.   In this connection the learned Attorney-General brought to  our attention the provisions of the Delhi Development Act,  1957 (LXI  of  1957) which makes provision for the  design  of  a Master  Plan for the city which, if executed, is  likely  to

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greatly  reduce, if not to eliminate, slums altogether.   It was suggested that taken in conjunction with this  enactment it  would be seen that the power to restrain eviction  under s. 19 of the 144 Act  is one which would not last for ever but to  a  limited period,  though  this  could not  naturally  be  defined  by reference to fixed dates.  We see force in  this  submission as  well.  In view of the foregoing we  consider that  there is enough guidance to the competent authority in the use  of his discretion under s. 19(1) of the Act and we,  therefore, reject  the contention that s. 19 is obnoxious to the  equal protection   of   laws  guaranteed  by  Art.   14   of   the Constitution.   We need only add that it was not, and  could not be, disputed that the guidance which we have hold  could be  derived  from  the  enactment,  and  that  it  bears   a reasonable  and  rational relationship to the object  to  be attained  by the Act and, in fact, would fulfil the  purpose which   the  law  seeks  to  achieve,  viz.,   the   orderly elimination  of slums, with interim protection for the  slum dwellers  until they were moved into better  dwellings.   We are  further of the opinion that the order of the  competent authority  in  the  present case is not  open  to  challenge either, because it would be seen that the grounds upon which he  has rejected the petitioner’s application for  execution is  in  line with what we have stated to be the  policy  and purpose of the Act. Before  leaving  this topic it is necessary  to  consider  a submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner which is of immediate  relevance  to point under examination.   He  said that, no doubt, the decisions of this Court had pointed  out that it was not reasonable to expect the legislature to  lay down  expressly  precise criteria for the  guidance  of  the authorities  who have to administer the law because  of  the difficulty,  if  not impossibility, of  contemplating  every single circumstance and prescribing rules so as to apply  to such  varying situations, and that was the raison d’etre  of vesting a large discretion in the hands of the administering authorities  after  indicating the general  principles  that ought  to guide them.  He however urged that in the  present case  there was no such insuperable difficulty, because  the restriction   provided  for  by  s.  19  of  the   Act   was superimposed on those which were 145 enacted  by  s. 13 of the Rent Control Act,  and  Parliament when  enacting  the Act, could easily  have  indicated  with reference to the several grounds on which eviction could  be had under the Rent Control Act, the additional restrictions, or  further conditions which would be taken into account  by "the competent authority".  If learned Counsel meant by this submission that it was a possible mode of legislation, there is  nothing to be said against it, but if he desired  us  to infer  therefrom that because of the failure to  adopt  that mode,  the  power  conferred  by  s.  19  of  the  Slum  Act contravened the guarantee under Art. 14, we cannot agree. In regard to this matter we desire to make two observations. In  the  context of modern conditions and  the  variety  and complexity  of the situations which present  themselves  for solution, it is not possible for the Legislature to envisage in  detail  every possibility and make provision  for  them. The Legislature therefore is forced to leave the authorities created  by it an ample discretion limited, however, by  the guidance  afforded  by  the  Act.   This  is  the  ratio  of delegated  legislation, and is a process which has  come  to stay,  and  which  one may be permitted to  observe  is  not

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without   its   advantages.   So  long  therefore   as   the Legislature  indicates, in the operative provisions  of  the statute  with  certainty,  the policy  and  purpose  of  the enactment,  the mere fact that the legislation is  skeletal, or  the  fact that a discretion is left to  those  entrusted with administering the law, affords no basis either for  the contention  that there has been an excessive  delegation  of legislative  power  as  to amount to an  abdication  of  its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised  and unguided  as to amount to a carte blanche  to  discriminate. The  second  is  that if the power or  discretion  has  been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more  detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law. The next point argued by learned Counsel for the 19 146 petitioner  was  that the power conferred on  the  competent authority by s. 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative power.  As we have  pointed out earlier, this submission is really another  form, or rather another aspect of  the  objection  based  on the  grant  of  an  unfettered discretion  or power which we have just now dealt with.   It is  needless  to  repeat, that so long  as  the  legislature indicates  its  purpose and lays down the policy it  is  not necessary that every detail of the application of the law to particular  cases  should  be laid  down  in  the  enactment itself.  The reasons assigned for repelling the attack based on Art. 14 would suffice to reject this ground of objection as well. The  last major objection urged by learned Counsel was  that the  power vested in the competent authority "at its  sweet- will and pleasure" to refuse permission to execute a  decree for eviction violated the right to hold property under  Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and that the same was not saved by  Art. 19(5) of the Constitution for the reason  that  the restriction  imposed  on the exercise of the right  was  not reasonable.   If Counsel were right in his  submission  that the petitioner’s right to obtain possession of his  building rested  on  the "sweet-will and pleasure  of  the  competent authority"  there could be some substance in  the  argument. But  as we had already had occasion to point out, it is  not at the "sweet-will and pleasure" of the competent  authority that permission to evict could be granted or refused, but on principles  gather-  able from the enactment,  as  explained earlier.  Learned  Counsel  further  urged that  the  right  to  hold property under  Art. 19( 1)(f) included the right  in  the owner of a building to evict a tenant and enter into  actual or  physical  occupation of the property.  Counsel  is,  no doubt,  right in this submission but the ’freedom’ to  ’hold property’ is not absolute but that, as he himself  admitted, is  subject, under Art. 19(5), to treasonable  restrictions" being  placed  upon  it "in the  interests  of  the  general public".  It was not suggested that slum-dwellers would  not constitute  "the general public" and that if  a  legislation was designed to grant                             147 them  protection,  it could not be justified as one  in  the interests  of  the "general public", because  obviously  the interests  of  such a vast number of the population  in  the country,  their health, well-being and morals, would,  apart even   from   themselves,  necessarily  impinge   upon   and influence, for good or evil, the health, safety,  well-being

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and morality of the rest of the community as well.  The only question  that  is  capable  of  argument  is  whether   the restriction  is reasonable.  A considerable part of  learned Counsel’s argument on the reasonableness of the  restriction was devoted to showing that the vesting of an unfettered  or unguided  power in the competent authority to permit or  not to  permit eviction rendered the  restriction  unreasonable. This,  as  would  be seen, is really  a  different  form  of presenting the case of the objection under Art. 14, and what we have said in dealing with the first point of the  learned Counsel would answer this portion of the objection. There are, however, a few more matters which have  relevance about  the  objection on the score of  the  restriction  not being  reasonable  within  Art. 19(5) and the  tests  to  be applied to determining its reasonableness to which we should refer.    It   has  already  been  pointed  out   that   the restrictions  imposed on the right of the landlord to  evict have  a reasonable and rational connection with  the  object sought  to  be  achieved  by the  Act,  viz.,  the  ultimate elimination  of slums with protection to  the  slum-dwellers from  being  meanwhile  thrown  out  on  the  streets.   The question might still remain whether this restriction on  the rights  of the landlords is excessive in the sense  that  it invades  and trenches on their rights in a manner or  to  an extent not really or strictly necessary to afford protection to the reasonable needs of the slum-dwellers which it is the aim and object of the legislation to subserve.  The criteria for  determining the degree of restriction on the  right  to hold  property which would be considered reasonable, are  by no  means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from  age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to  solve the problems which communities face from time to time.   The tests, therefore, evolved by communities living in sheltered or 148 placid  times, or laid down in decisions applicable to  them can hardly serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of  post-partition  India  with  its  stresses  and  strains arising  out of movements of populations which have had  few parallels  in  history.  If law failed to  take  account  of unusual  situations  of  pressing  urgency  arising  in  the country,  and of the social urges generated by the  patterns of  thought-evolution and of social consciousness  which  we witness in the second half of this century, it would have to be written down as having failed in the very purpose of  its existence.   Where the legislature fulfils its  purpose  and enacts  laws, which in its wisdom, is  considered  necessary for  the solution of what after all is a very human  problem the  tests  of  "reasonableness" have to be  viewed  in  the context  of the issues which faced the legislature.  In  the construction  of  such laws and particularly in  judging  of their  validity the Courts have necessarily to  approach  it from  the  point of view of furthering the  social  interest which  it is the purpose of the legislation to promote,  for the Courts are not, in these matters, functioning as it were in  vacuo,  but as parts of a society which is  trying,  by, enacted  law,  to  solve its  problems  and  achieve  social concord  and  peaceful adjustment and  thus  furthering  the moral and material progress of the community as a whole. Judged  in  the  light of the above, we  consider  that  the restrictions imposed cannot be said to be unreasonable.   As we have already pointed out, the ban imposed on evictions is temporary,  though learned Counsel is right in  saying  that its duration is not definite.  In the very nature of  things the  period  when  slums  would  have  ceased  to  exist  or

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restrictions  placed  upon  owners  of  property  could   be completely   lifted  must,  obviously,  be  indefinite   and therefore   the  indefiniteness  cannot  be  a  ground   for invalidity-a ground upon which the restriction could be held to be unreasonable.  Again, there is an appeal provided from the   orders  of  the  competent  authority  to  the   Chief Administrator.    If  learned  Counsel  is  right   in   his submission  that the power of the "competent  authority"  is unguided and that he had an unfettered 149 and  arbitrary authority to exercise his discretion "at  his sweet-will  and pleasure" the existence of a  provision  for appeals might not impart validity to such legislation.   The reason for this is that the appellate power would be subject to the same vice as the power of the original authority  and the  imposition  of  one "   sweet-will  and  pleasure" over another   of   a   lower  authority,   would   not   prevent discrimination  or render the restriction  reasonable.   But if, as we have held earlier, the Act by its preamble and  by its  provisions  does afford a guidance  to  the  "competent authority"   by  pointing  out  the  manner  in  which   the discretion vested in him should be exercised, the  provision as  to an appeal assumes a different significance.  In  such cases, if the "competent authority" oversteps the limits  of his  powers  or ignores the policy behind the Act  and  acts contrary to its declared intention, the appellate  authority could  be  invoked  to step in and correct  the  error.   It would,  therefore,  be a provision for  doubly  safeguarding that the policy of the Act is carried out and not ignored in each  and  every case that comes up  before  "the  competent authority".   The  procedure laid down by the  Act  for  the hearing by the "competent authority" and the provisions  for enquiry, renders the "competent authority" a  quasi-judicial functionary bound to follow fixed rules of procedure and its orders  passed  after such an enquiry are to be  subject  to appeals to the Administrator.  We consider these  safeguards very  relevant for_judging about the reasonableness  of  the restriction.   In considering these matters one has to  take into account the fact-a fact of which judicial notice has to be  taken-that  there has been an  unprecedented  influx  of population  into the capital, and in such a short  interval, that  there  has  not been time  for  natural  processes  of expansion  of  the city to adjust itself  to  the  increased needs.   Remedies which in normal times might be  considered an  unreasonable restriction on the right to  hold  property would  not bear that aspect or be so considered when  viewed in a situation of emergency brought about by exceptional and unprecedented   circumstances.   Just  as  pulling  down   a building to prevent the 150 spread of flames would be reasonable in the event of a fire, the  reasonableness  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the impugned legislation has to be judged in the light of actual facts  and not on a priori reasoning based on the  dicta  in decisions  rendered  in  situations  bearing  not  even  the remotest  resemblance  to  that which  presented  itself  to Parliament when the legislation now impugned was enacted. Before concluding it is necessary to advert to a few  points which were also urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. First it was said that the impugned s. 19 of the Act imposed a  double  restriction,  a restriction  super-imposed  on  a restriction already existing by virtue of the provisions  of the   Rent   Control  Act,  and  that   this   rendered   it unreasonable.   If by this submission learned Counsel  meant that different results as to constitutional validity  flowed

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from whether the impugned section was part of the provisions of the Rent Control Act, or was a section in an  independent enactment, the argument is clearly untenable.  If,  however, that  was  not  meant,  but  that  in  the  context  of  the restrictions  already imposed by the Rent Control Act s.  19 of  the  Act  was  really  unnecessary  and  therefore.   an unreasonable restraint on the freedom of the landlord,  what we have said earlier ought to suffice to repel the argument. Learned Counsel next drew our attention to s. 38 of the Rent Control Act which reads:               "The  provisions of this Act and of the  rules               made    thereunder    shall    have     effect               notwithstanding     anything      inconsistent               therewith  contained in any other law for  the               time  being  in  force or  in  any  instrument               having effect by virtue of any such law." If this section stood alone, the argument of learned Counsel that by reason of the width and sweep of its language,  even a  special  legislation, such as the  Act  was  comprehended within  the  non  obstante  provision  would  have  required serious   consideration,   but  that   has   been   rendered unnecessary, because even apart from s. 19 of the Act  which opens with the words: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any  other law for tile time being in force", s. 39  of  the Act also                             151 contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as s. 38 of the  Rent Control Act.  The result therefore would  be  that the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in  respect  of the buildings in areas declared  slum  areas operate  in addition to the Rent Control Act.  The  argument therefore that the Act is inapplicable to buildings  covered by  the Rent Control Act is without substance,  particularly when  it is seen that it is only when a decree for  eviction is obtained that s. 19 of the Act comes into play. We  therefore  consider  that none of the  points  urged  in support  of the petition has any substance.   The  petitions fail  and are dismissed.  In the circumstances of  the  case there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.