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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6201 of 2004

PETITIONER: Jyothi Ademma

RESPONDENT: Plant Engineer, Nellore & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/07/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment  rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh  High Court holding that the appellant was not entitled to any  compensation under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923  (in short the ’Act’).  The appeal filed by the respondents under  Section 30 of the Act was allowed by the High Court. The  Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation (in short  ’Commissioner’) had awarded a sum of Rs.61,236/- by award  dated 16.6.2001, which was challenged by the respondents  before the High Court.

       Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

       Mr. J. Venkaiah, the appellant’s husband (hereinafter  referred to as the ’deceased workman’), was working in Nellore  Thermal Station, Nellore.  On 24.9.1994 he died at the work  spot.  Appellant filed an application before the Commissioner  claiming compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-.  Her stand in the  claim petition was that the death was due to stress and strain  closely linked with the employment of the deceased workman  and, therefore, attributable to an accident arising out of and in  the course of employment.  The plea found favour with the  Commissioner who made the award as noted above.  The  respondents filed an appeal under Section 30 of the Act before  the High Court.  The primary stand was that the deceased  workman did not die on account of any injury sustained by  him "in any accident arising out of and in the course of his  employment". The High Court noted that there was no injury  as such, but he died due to heart attack at the work spot.  The  High Court found that the nature of the job which the  deceased workman was doing could not have caused any  stress and strain and, therefore, the death due to heart attack  can not be said to have been caused by any accident arising  out of and in the course of his employment.   

       In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that whenever a person dies as a result of  heart attack at the work spot, it can be said that he died due  to the stress and strain of the working conditions.  He,  therefore, pleaded that the order of the Commissioner should  be restored and that of the High Court be set aside, as the  Commissioner had indicated reasons in support of his  conclusions.  

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       There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents.  

       Section 3(1) of the Act which is relevant for the purpose  of this case reads as follows:- "3. EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY FOR  COMPENSATION. - (1) If personal injury is  caused to a workman by accident arising out  of and in the course of his employment, his  employer shall be liable to pay compensation  in accordance with the provisions of this  Chapter :  Provided that the employer shall not be so  liable - (a) in respect of any injury which does  not result in the total or partial disablement of  the workman for a period exceeding three  days;  (b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in  death or permanent total disablement, caused  by an accident which is directly attributable to  - (i) the workman having been at the time  thereof under the influence of drink or drugs,  or  (ii) the willful disobedience of the workman to  an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly  framed, for the purpose of securing the safety  of workmen, or  (iii) the willful removal or disregard by the  workman of any safety guard or other device  which he knew to have been provided for the  purpose of securing the safety of workmen."  

       Under Section 3(1) it has to be established that there was  some casual connection between the death of the workman  and his employment.  If the workman dies a natural result of  the disease which he was suffering or while suffering from a  particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of wear  and tear, of the employment no liability would be fixed upon  the employer.  But if the employment is a contributory cause  or has accelerated the death, or if the death was due not only  to the disease but also the disease coupled with the  employment, then it can be said that the death arose out of  the employment and the employer would be liable.   

The expression "accident" means an untoward mishap  which is not expected or designed. "Injury" means  physiological injury.  In Fenton v. Thorley & Co. Ltd. (1903) AC  448, it was observed that the expression "accident" is used in  the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an  unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not  expected or designed.  The above view of Lord Macnaghten was  qualified by the speech of Lord Haldane A.C. in Trim Joint  District, School Board of Management v. Kelly (1914) A.C. 676  as follows:   

"I think that the context shows that in  using the word "designed" Lord Macnaghten  was referring to designed by the sufferer".

       In the present case it has been brought on record that  the deceased was suffering from chest disease and was  previously being treated for such disease. The High Court also  noted that the job of the deceased was only to switch on or off  and, therefore, the doctor had clearly opined that there was no  scope for any stress or strain in his duties.  In view of the

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factual findings recorded the High Court’s judgment does not  suffer from any infirmity.   

However, it has to be noted that the amount has already  been paid to the appellants, as stated by learned counsel.

Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, we  direct that there shall be no recovery from the appellant of any  amount paid, though in view of our judgment she is not  entitled to any compensation.     

       The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.