http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil)  242 of 1997

PETITIONER: John Vallamattom and Anr.                                        

RESPONDENT: Vs. Union of India                                                   

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/07/2003

BENCH: CJI

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

V.N. KHARE, C.J.I.

In this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India we are  concerned with the constitutionality of the provisions of Section 118 of the  Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).  

Petitioner No. 1 is an Indian citizen and is a Christian Priest belonging  to the religious denomination of Roman Catholics.  The second petitioner is  also a member of the Christian community.  The petitioners are aggrieved by  the discriminatory treatment meted out to the members of the Christian  community under the Act by which they were practically prevented from  bequeathing property for religious and charitable purposes and that has led  them to file this writ petition.

       The history of Section 118 of the Act can be traced to an ancient  British statute of 1735 known as ’Charitable Uses Act, 1735’ [hereinafter  referred to as "1735 Act"].  1735 Act provided that gift by Will after 24th  June, 1736 of land for charitable purposes were void as a general rule.  1735  Act was repealed by Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888.   Part I of  Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888 prohibited assurance of land to  charitable corporations by providing that land shall not be assured to or for  the benefit of or acquired by  or on behalf of any corporation in Mortmain  otherwise than under Royal Licence or statutory authority was provided for  and if so assured shall be forfeited to the Queen.  As per the Mortmain  statute the expression "assurance" included gift, conveyance, appointment,  lease, transfer, settlement, mortgage, charge encumbrance, devise, bequest  and every other instrument by deed, will or other instrument.  The said  statute also provided that the land may be assured by Will to or for the  benefit of any charitable but unless the recipient charity was authorized to  retain land by the court or the Charity Commissioner, the land must,  notwithstanding any contrary direction contained in the Will, be sold within  one year from the testator’s death or such extended period as may be  determined.  If the land is not sold within  the appointed  period, the land  will vest in the official Trustee of charity lands and Charity Commissioner  was required to take steps to enforce the sale.  The further restriction  provided that every assurance of immoveable property for any charitable use  is void unless it is executed within a period of twelve months before two  witnesses and enrolled in Chancery within six months before the death.  The  said Act was enacted with a view to prevent persons from making ill- considered death-bed bequests under religious influence.  Amending Act  1891, further provided that the land may be assured by Will to or for the  benefit of any charitable use; but in such case it was required to be sold, as a  rule,  within one year from the testator’s death.   

       Even though the statute of Mortmain created severe restrictions on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

assurance of land for charitable purposes, it provided exemption in respect  of assurance of land of any quantity for a public park, museum, universities,  colleges or to any local authority, assurance by Will not exceeding 20 acres  for a public park or two acres for a museum, etc.  In this respect it is relevant  to mention that while borrowing the restrictive clauses for Mortmain Statute  at the time of enacting Section 118 of Indian Succession Act, the Indian  Legislature omitted to include the exemptions in favour of the various  charitable uses as provided in the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888.   The consequence is that as per the impugned provision  the testamentary  disposition of property in relation to all forms of religious and charitable  purposes is subject to the same restriction as contained in Section 118 of the  Act.   

       Ultimately, on account of the harshness and unreasonableness of  Mortmain Statutes, the same were repealed by the British Parliament by an  Act known as Charities Act, 1960.  The consequential provision of repeal is  provided hereunder:  

"No right or title to any property shall be defeated or  impugned and no assurance or disposition of property  shall be treated as void or voidable, by virtue of any of  the enactment  relating to mortmain on 29th July, 1960  the possession was in accordance with that right or title  or with assurance or disposition and no step has been  taken to assert a claim by virtue of any such enactment."

       The Indian Succession Act, 1925 was enacted in the year 1925, by  reason whereof, the Indian Succession Act, 1865 was repealed.  Section 3 of  the Act confers power on the State Government to exempt any race, sect or  tribe residing therein from the purview of Sections 5 to 49, 58 to 191 and   212.  Testamentary succession has been  dealt with in Part VI of the Act.   Section 58 provides that the provisions of Part VI would not apply to the  testamentary succession to the property of any Mohammedan, Hindu,  Buddhist, Sikh or Jain.  Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind  not being a minor may dispose of his property by Will.  Chapter VII of the  Act deals with void bequests.   

       Section 118 is contained in the said chapter which reads as follows :

"Sec. 118. Bequest to religious or charitable uses â\200\223  No man having a nephew or niece or any nearer  relative shall have power to bequeath any property  to religious or charitable uses, except by a will  executed not less than twelve months before his  death, and deposited within six months from its  execution in some place provided by law for the  safe custody of the will of living persons."

       The said provision, thus, postulates that a person having a nephew or  niece or any nearer relative cannot bequeath his property for religious or  charitable use unless  : (i) the will is executed not less than twelve months  before the death of testator; (ii) it is deposited within six months from its  execution in some place provided by law for the safe custody thereof; and  (iii) it remains in such deposit till the death of the testator.

 The section plainly means that to the extent to which the bequest is  for religious or charitable uses, the application of this section is attracted  despite the fact that the bequest may be for only a part of the property or  some interest in the property.   

The question as to who are the near relations for the purpose of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

Section 118 is to be determined according to the Table of Consanguinity, as  per Section 28 read with Schedule I of the Act.  The term ’any nearer  relative’ includes father, mother, son, daughter, grandfather, grandmother,  grandson, granddaughter, brother or sister.  The word ’relative’ means  legitimate relative and has no application to any relationship by marriage.  It  includes adopted son also.  So a Christian testator having a nephew or niece  or nearer relatives must execute the Will at least 12 months before his death,  and deposit it within six months, otherwise the bequest for religious or  charitable use would be void.  

       It is urged that having regard to the fact that the impugned provision  owes its origin to the statute of Mortmain which is repealed in England  cannot be any reasonable justification for retaining the same in the Indian  statute books particularly in view of the fact that  upon coming into force   the Constitution of India, the pre-constitution statute could remain valid only  if the same conforms to the provisions contained in Part III thereof.    Further according to the petitioners the said provision is violative of  Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it :   a)      discriminates against a Christian vis-Ã -vis non-Christians; b)      discriminates against testamentary disposition by a Christian vis-Ã - vis non-testamentary disposition; c)      discriminates against religious and charitable use of property vis-Ã - vis all other uses including not so desirable purposes; d)      discriminates against a Christian who has a newphew, niece or  nearest relative vis-Ã -vis Christian who has no relative at all; and e)      discriminates against a Christian who dies within twelve months of  execution of the Will of which he has no control.  

       It was submitted that a citizen of India is also entitled to live with  basic human dignity and, thus, has a right to effectuate his wishes according  to his own discretion by having a freedom to choose his legatee under the  Will as well as the purpose of bequest.   

       It was also submitted that the said provision is violative of  Article 1  of the Vienna Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the  World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 and Article 18 of the United  Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.   

       The petitioners have further raised a plea that it is an essential and  integral part of Christian Religious Faith to contribute for religious and  charitable purpose as has been prescribed in the Canon Law of the Code of  Canons of the Eastern Churches and the teachings of the Holy Bible, the  impugned provision violates Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.

        The contention of the respondent, however, is that the Indian Succession  Act, 1925 being a pre-constitution enactment having regard to Article 372 of  the Constitution of India, continues to be in force within the territory of  India.  The respondent would not deny or dispute the legislative history of  the said provision but contends that the Indian Parliament is not bound by  any legislative changes or development in this behalf in England or any  other foreign country.  Further, contention of the respondent appears to be  that the Indian Christians form a separate and distinct class and in that view  of the matter they cannot be treated on equal footing to Muslims or Hindus  in the matter of bequeathing  property for religious or charitable purposes.   The respondent contends that marriage, succession and like matters of  secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under  Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution of India.                         

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

       Before proceeding further I may notice that a Division Bench of the  Kerala High Court in Preman vs. Union of India [1998 (2) KLT 1004] held  the said provision to be unconstitutional. A special leave petition filed there  against by a private party was, however, dismissed by a Bench of which I  myself as I then was, was a party stating :-

"Permission to file SLP is granted. Delay condoned.

We find that the Special Leave Petitions are  at premature stage.  Whatever grievance the  petitioner may have, may be agitated in the  hierarchy of proceedings in petitioner’s appeal.   The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed."

It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that clause 1 of Article 13 of the  Constitution of India in no uncertain terms states that all laws in force in the  territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution,  in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III there, shall, to  the extent of such inconsistency, be void.  Keeping in view the fact that the  Act is a pre-constitution enactment, the question as regards its  constitutionality will, therefore, have to be judged as being law in force at  the commencement of the Constitution of India [See Keshavan Madhava  Menon vs. The State of Bombay - 1951 SCR 228].  By reason of clause 1 of  Article 13 of the Constitution of India, in the event, it be held that the  provision is unconstitutional the same having regard to the prospective  nature would be void only with effect from the commencement of the  Constitution.  Article 372 of the Constitution of India per force does not  make a pre-constitution statutory provision to be constitutional.  It  merely  makes a provision for the applicability and enforceability of pre-constitution  laws subject of course to the provisions of the Constitution and until they are  altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent  authorities.

The equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of  India is of wide import.  It guarantees equality before the law or the equal  protection of the laws within the territory of India.  The restriction imposed  by reason of a statute, however, can be upheld in the event it be held that the  person to whom the same applies, forms a separate and distinct class and  such classification is a reasonable one based on intelligible differentia  having nexus with the object sought to be achieved.   

The underlying principle contained in Section 118 of the Act  indisputably was to prevent persons from making ill-considered death-bed  bequest under religious influence.  It is beyond any cavil of doubt that the  restrictions imposed thereby have a great impact on a person who desires to  dispose of his property in a particular manner which would take effect upon  or after his death.

The concept of ownership of a person over a property or a right  although is a varying one includes right to dispose of his property  by Will.  

The Indian Succession Act confers such a right upon all persons  irrespective of caste, creed or religion he belongs to.  Section 59 of the Act  provides that every person of sound mind and who is not a minor is entitled  to dispose of his property by Will.  Thus all persons who have sufficient  discretion and free will are capable of disposing of their property by Will.   Section 51 provides that a Will, the making of which is caused by fraud or  coercion or by such opportunity which takes away the free agency of the  testator is void.  Section 63 deals with execution of unprivileged Wills  providing that the Will shall be signed by the testator and it shall be attested  by two or more witnesses each of whom should have seen the testator sign  or affix his mark to the Will.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

Section 118 of the Act imposes a restriction only on the Indian  Christians.  The said restriction is not applicable to the citizens belonging to  other religions including Parsis.  The short question, therefore, which arises  for consideration is as to whether the said restriction imposed by Section 118  of the Act is a reasonable one.   

The right to own or dispose of a property mainly arises either by  operation of law or by reason of some act or event.  An Indian Christian in  terms of the impugned provision is forbidden from making any bequest  excepting in the manner provided for therein.  Such bequest is prohibited  only in the event the testator has a nephew or a niece or any nearer relative.   Indisputably, a wife of  a testator, in terms of  definition as contained in  Section 28 read with the First Schedule of the Act would not be a near  relative, although an adopted son would be.  It is difficult to appreciate as to  why a testator would, although, be entitled to bequeath his property by way  of charitable and religious disposition if he has a wife but he would be  precluded from doing so in the event he has a nephew or a niece.   

Furthermore, a charitable disposition of property for the benefit of the  public in the advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce, health, safety,  or any other object beneficial to the mankind has specifically been  acknowledged not only in different religious texts but also in different  statutes.  Section 18 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that  restrictions  in Sections 14, 16 and 17 shall not apply in the case of a transfer  of property for the benefit of public in the advancement of religion,  knowledge, commerce, health, safety, or any other object beneficial to  mankind.  The Indian Succession Act does not define as to what would be a  charitable disposition, but the transfers to which it refers are the same as  those described in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as trusts  created for a public purposes of a charitable or religious nature.  The  illustration appended to the impugned provision gives a list of bequests for  religious or charitable uses which is of wide import.  It is really baffling that   no protection has been given to the near relatives against death-bed gifts for  non-religious or charitable purpose.  Furthermore, there is no restrictive  provision with regard to gift intervivos.  It is really strange as to how a  statute may permit death-bed gifts to any other person for any purpose  whatsoever including illegal or immoral purposes but restriction has been  imposed on testamentary disposition for religious or charitable uses.    

It may be seen that as per Section 118 of the Act bequest of  property  for religious and charitable use fails if for any reason the testator suffers  from the misfortune of death within twelve months of execution of Will or if  it is not deposited in the place provided by law within 6 months.  Since  as  per the impugned provision the testator who lives beyond the statutory  period of twelve months is not able to execute his wishes in relation to his  property, the impugned provision defeats the object of the Will. In this view  of the matter, such a provision is unreasonable and arbitrary.   

The matter may be examined from another angle.  Assuming that the  purpose of Section 118 of the Act is to prevent bequest of property under  religious influence, there is no justification in restricting testamentary  disposition of property for charitable purpose.  Charitable purpose includes  relief to poor, education, medical relief, advancement of objects of public  utility, etc.  As the aforesaid charitable purposes are philanthropic and since  a person’s freedom to dispose of property for such purposes has nothing to  do with religious influence, the impugned provision treating bequests for  both religious and charitable purposes is discriminatory and violative of  Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, it may be seen that there is no  rationale behind limiting the survival of the testator to a period of twelve  months in order to give effect to his wishes.  There is also no rationale in the  classification between a testator, who survives beyond twelve months, and a  testator, who does not survive beyond the same period, in declaring the will  of the former as void and that of the latter as valid.  Apart from the fact that  the period or duration of life of a testator has no relation with the purpose of  Will, there appears to be no reason behind fixing twelve months’ period.  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

Testators constitute a homogeneous class and they cannot be divided  arbitrarily on the basis of duration of their survival which is unrelated to the  purpose of executing a Will.  In that view of the matter, the period of twelve  months has no nexus with the object of performing a philanthropic act.   Thus, the impugned provision is violative  of Article 14 of the Constitution.        The provision relating to making of testamentary disposition by the  citizens of India vis-Ã -vis those professing the religion of Christian must be  judged on the touch-stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of  India.  It is  true that they form a class by themselves but ex facie I do not find any  justifiable reason to hold that the classification made is either based on  intelligible differentia or the same has any nexus with the object sought to be  achieved.  In fact, the respondent have failed to show that there exists any  such object.  Once it is held that the underlying purpose for enacting the said  provision was merely to thwart influence exercised by people professing  religion resulting in death-bed disposition, having regard to the fact that such  a contingency has adequately been taken care of in terms of Section 51 of  the Act,  the purport and object of the Act must be held to be non-existent.  It  may be true that the Indian Parliament is not bound to take note of and  amend its statutory enactments keeping in view the amendments made in  England.  But there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that while interpreting a  restrictive statute, one may consider not only the past history of the  concerned legislation but the manner in which the same has been dealt with  by the legislature of its origin.  A right of transfer of land indisputably is  incidental to the right of ownership and must be construed strictly. [See M/s  DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational  Charitable Trust vs. State of  Haryana and Others â\200\223 2003 (2) SCALE 145].  The constitutionality of a  provision, it is trite, will have to be judged keeping in view the interpretive  changes of the statute effected by passage of time. [See Kapila Hingorani vs.  State of Bihar â\200\223 2003 (4) SCALE 712].

For the aforesaid reasons, I find that Section 118 of the Act being  unreasonable is arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, violative of  Article 14 of the Constitution.  

Furthermore, India being a signatory to the Declaration on the Right  to Development adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights and  Article 18 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  1966, the impugned provision may be judged on the basis   thereof.   Article  1 of the aforementioned declaration reads thus :-

"The right to development is an inalienable human  right by virtue of which every human person and  all people are entitled to participate in, contribute  to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and  political development, in which all human rights  and fundamental freedom can be fully realized.

The human right to development also implies the  full realization of the right of people to self  determination, which includes subject to the  relevant provisions of both International  Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their  inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their  natural wealth and resources."

Article 18 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights 1966 provides as follows  :   

"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of  thought, conscience and religion.  This right shall  include freedom to have or adopt a religion or  belief of his choice, and freedom, either

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

individually or in community with others and in  public or private, to manifest his religion or belief  or belief in worship, observance, practice and  teaching.

Freedom to manifest ones own religion or beliefs  may be subject only to such limitations as are  prescribed by law and are necessary to protect  public safety, order, health, or morals or the  fundamental rights and freedom of others."

The impugned provision must, therefore, also be judged having regard  to the aforementioned treaties and covenants.  [See Kapila Hingorani (supra)  at para 47].

It is trite that having regard to Article 13(1) of the Constitution, the  constitutionality of the impugned legislation is required to be considered on  the basis of laws existing on 26th January 1950, but while doing so the court  is not precluded from taking into consideration the subsequent events which  have taken place thereafter.  It is further trite that the law although may be  constitutional when enacted but with passage of time the same may be held  to be unconstitutional in view of the changed situation.  

Justice Cardoze said :

"The law has its epochs of ebb and flow, the flood  tides are on us.  The old order may change yielding  place to new; but the transition is never an easy  process".

Albert Campus stated :

"The wheel turns, history changes".  Stability and  change are the two sides of the same law-coin.  In  their pure form they are antagonistic poles; without  stability the law becomes not a chart of conduct,  but a gare of chance: with only stability the law is  as the still waters in which there is only stagnation  and death."            In any view of the matter even if a provision was not unconstitutional  on the day on which it was enacted or the Constitution came into force, by  reason of facts emerging out thereafter, the same may be rendered  unconstitutional.  The world has witnessed a sea-change.  The right of  equality of women vis-Ã -vis their male counterpart is accepted worldwide.  It  will be immoral to discriminate a woman on the ground of sex.  It is  forbidden both in our domestic law as also international law.  Even right of  women to derive interest in a property by way of inheritance, gift or  bequeath is statutorily accepted by reason of Hindu Succession Act, 1956  and other enactments.  This Court, therefore, while considering  constitutionality of Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, is entitled to  take those facts also into consideration.

I, however, am not oblivious of the fact that a restriction to make  testamentary disposition of the property to some extent is prevalent under  the Mohammedan law but therein the purpose is to protect the near relation  which cannot be said to be the sole purpose underlying Section 118 of the  Act.

I may notice that the a Division Bench of this Court in Clarence Pais  & Others vs. Union of India  [JT 2001 (3) SC 82] while considering the  constitutionality of the provisions of Section 213 of the Indian Succession

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

Act did not consider the applicability of various decisions cited  before it  including Preman (supra) on the ground that the said provision applies to  Christians as also non-Christians stating:

"â\200¦However, in the light of the above conclusion,  it is unnecessary to refer to those decisions though  some of them may have bearing in analyzing and  understanding the scope of the provisions which  are made applicable exclusively to Christians as it  happened in the case of Section 118 of the Act or  in the case of the Indian Divorce Act.  Therefore,  we have not adverted to any one of these  provisions.  If Christians alone had been  discriminated against by treating them as a  separate class, we think the argument could have  been understood and merited consideration."

 So far as the second argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is  concerned, it is suffice to say that Article 15 of the Constitution of India may  not have any application in the instant case as the discrimination forbidden  thereby is only such discrimination as is based, inter alia, on the ground that  a person belongs to a particular religion. The said right conferred by clause 1  of Article 15 being only on a ’citizen’, the same is an individual right by  way of a guarantee which may not be subjected to discrimination in the  matter of rights, privileges and immunities pertaining to him as a citizen.  In  other words, the right conferred by Article 15 is personal.  A statute, which  restricts a right of a class of citizens in the matter of testamentary disposition  who may belong to a particular religion, would, therefore, not attract the  wrath of clause 1 of Article 15 of the Constitution of India.    Coming to the last argument raised by the petitioners’ counsel it may  be stated that in the instant case, this Court is not concerned with the right of  a person to freedom of conscience but is only concerned with a question as  to whether by reason of Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act the right  of Christians to profess, practise and propagate religion is violated.  Article  25 is subject to the other provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution  of India.  What was thought of by the Constitution makers while conferring  right to profess, practise and propagate religion was that freedom of  conscience be supplemented by freedom of unhampered expression of  spiritual conviction.  Article 25 provides freedom of ’profession’ meaning  thereby the right of the believer to state his creed in public and freedom of  practice meaning his right to give it expression in forms of private and  public worships [See Stainislaus Rev. Vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1975 MP  163)].  A disposition towards making gift for charitable or religious purpose  may be a pious act of a person but the same cannot be said to be an integral  part of any religion.  It is not the case of the petitioners that the religion of  Christianity commands gift for charitable or religious purpose compulsory or  the same is regarded as such by the community following Christianity.  The  petitioner has not been able to place any material to show that disposition of  property for religious and charitable purposes is an integral part of Christian  religious faith.   Disposition of property for religious and charitable purpose is  recommended in all the religions but the same cannot be said to be an  integral part of it.  If a person professing Christian religion does not show  any inclination of disposition towards charitable or religious purposes, he  does not cease to be a Christian.  Even certain practices adopted by the  persons professing a particular religion may not have anything to do with the  religion itself. Article 25 merely protects the freedom to practise rituals and  ceremonies etc. which are only the integral parts of the religion.  Article 25  of the Constitution of India will, therefore, not have any application in the  instant case. For the self-same reasons, Article 26 may also not have any  application in the instant case.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

Before I part with the case, I would like to state that Article 44  provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform  civil code throughout the territory of India.  The aforesaid provision is based  on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religious and  personal law in a civilized society.  Article 25 of the Constitution confers  freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of  religion.   The aforesaid two provisions viz. Articles 25 and 44 show that the  former guarantees religious freedom whereas the latter divests religion from  social relations and personal law.  It is no matter of doubt that marriage,  succession and the like matters of a secular character cannot be brought  within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.   Any legislation which brings succession and the like matters of secular  character within the ambit of Articles 25 and 26 is a suspect legislation.   Although it is doubtful whether the American doctrine of suspect legislation  is followed in this country.  In Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and  others vs. Union of India and others [1995 (3) SCC 635], it was held that  marriage, succession and like matters of secular character cannot be brought  within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.    It is a matter of regret that Article 44 of the Constitution has not been given  effect to.   Parliament is still to step in for framing a common civil code in  the country.  A common civil code will help the cause of national integration  by removing the contradictions based on ideologies. For the reasons aforementioned, this writ petition is         allowed and Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act is declared  unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of  India.  The parties shall, however, pay and bear their own costs.