19 April 1994
Supreme Court
Download

JOGINDER SINGH Vs STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION0

Bench: AGRAWAL,S.C. (J)
Case number: Appeal Criminal 159 of 1994


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2  

PETITIONER: JOGINDER SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION0

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1994

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:  1994 SCC  (4) 724

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                            ORDER 1.This  appeal  is directed against the judgment  of  the Designated  Court,  Delhi,  whereby the  appellant  who  was charged  with having committed an offence  punishable  under Section  5  of  the  Terrorist  and  Disruptive   Activities (Prevention)  Act, 1987 (for short TADA) has been  convicted of  the  said  offence and has been  sentenced  to  rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs  1000  and  in  default of payment  of  fine  to  undergo rigorous  imprisonment for another two months.  The  learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the  conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained in view of the decision of  this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab’.  In  the said case R.M. Sahai, J. has construed Section 5 of TADA and has  expressed  his view in the following terms :  (SCC  pp. 766-67, para 460)               "(2) Even though no opinion has been expressed               by  Brother Pandian, J., on Section 51  am  of               the  opinion  that  the  provisions  of   this               section   can   be  invoked  only   when   the               prosecution  is able to establish  that  there               was  some material on record to show that  the               arms  and ammunition mentioned in the  section               were  likely to be used for any  terrorist  or               disruptive activity or that they had been used               as such." It  appears that the other four Judges who  constituted  the Bench  which decided the said case, have not  expressed  any opinion  on  the  construction of Section 5  of  TADA.   The question  is  whether  the aforesaid view of  Sahai,  J.  on interpretation of Section 5 of TADA is to be regarded as the judgment of he Constitution Bench; if not, what is the  true ambit  and  scope of Section 5 TADA.  Having regard  to  the importance of the question which arises in a arge number  of cases, we are of the view that it would be appropriate  that is  question  is considered by a three-Judge Bench  of  this

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2  

Court. 2.The  matter  may  be placed before  Hon’ble  the  Chief Justice of India for suitable directions in this regard. 3.Liberty  is given to the parties to mention for a  date of hearing of the appeal. (1994) 3 SCC 569: JT 1994 (2) SC 423 726