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PETITIONER: JIWANLAL ACHARIYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMESHWARLAL AGARWALLA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/08/1966

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1124            1967 SCR  (1)  93  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC1417  (6)

ACT: Bihar  Money Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act,  1939 (Bihar  No.  7 of 1939), s. 4-Loan, if  includes  promissory note. Indian Limitation Act (9 of 1908), s. 20-Handing over  post- dated Cheque-Date of payment for purpose of limitation.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent advanced a loan to the appellant  before  he was  registered  as  money-lender in 1952  under  the  Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1939.  On February 4, 1954 the  appellant executed  a promissory note in renewal of this loan  and  on the same day delivered to the respondent a postdated  cheque dated  February 25, 1954 towards part payment of  the  debt. The  cheque  was cashed soon after February  25,  1954.   On February 22, 1957, the respondent filed, a suit for recovery of  the  sum  on  the basis of  the  promissory  note.   The appellant  contended that (i) the suit was not  maintainable under s. 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, because, the suit promissory  note was not a loan within the meaning of s.  4, but  was  really  renewal  of  a  loan  advanced  when   the respondent  was not registered as a money-lender  under  the Act, and (ii) the suit was barred by limitation as the  part payment  was  made on February 4, 1954 when the  post  dated cheque was given to the respondent. HELD  : (i) (Per Full Court) Section 4 of the  Bihar  Money- Lenders  Act  was not a bar to the  maintainability  of  the suit. [195 F] The word ’loan’ used in s. 4 has the same meaning as it  has in  s.  2(f) and includes a transaction on  a  bond  bearing interest executed in respect of past liability. [195 E] Surendra  Prasad  Narain Singh v. Sri Gajadhar  Prasad  Sahu Trust  Estate  and Ors. [1940] F.C.R. 39 and B. S.  Lyle  v. Chappeli, [1932] 1 K.B. 591, relied on. The  promissory note of February 4, 1954 was a  loan  within the meaning of s. 2(f) and it was made after the  respondent had been registered. [195 F] (ii) (Per Wanchoo and Shah, JJ.) The suit was not barred  by limitation.

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Where  a post-dated cheque is accepted conditionally and  it is  honoured  the  payment  for purposes of  s.  20  of  the Limitation  Act can only be the date which the cheque  bears and cannot be on the date the cheque is handed over, for the cheque, being post-dated, can never be paid till the date on the cheque arrives. [197 H] Commissioner  of  Income-tax v. Messrs.  Ogale  Glass  Works Ltd. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 185, Marreco v. Richardson, L.R. [1908] 2  K.B.  584 and Felix Hadley v. Hadley, L.R. [1898]  2  Ch. 680, distinguished. Per Bachawat, J.-The suit was barred by limitation. 191 The doctrine that the payment takes effect from the date  of the  delivery  of  the  negotiable  instrument  is  as  much applicable  to a post-dated cheque and a bill payable  on  a future  date  as to a cheque and a bill payable  on  demand. During the currency of the post-dated cheque or of the  bill payable on a future date, the creditor cannot sue to recover the  original  debt.  The post dated cheque or  the  running bill, if it is duly met operates as payment of the debt from the date of its delivery.  For the purposes of s. 20 of  the Limitation Act, also the date of the payment of the debt  is the  date  when the post-dated cheque was delivered  to  the creditor and not the date which the cheque bare nor the date when it was cashed. [199 G] Commissiner  of Income-tax, Bombay South Bombay  v.  Messrs. Ogale  Glass  Works Ltd.  Ogale Wadi, [1955] 1  S.C.R.  196, Marreco v. Richardson, [1908] 2 K.B. 584 and Felix Hadley  & Co. v. Hadley [1898] 2 Ch. 680, relied on. Kedar  Nath Mitra v. Dinabandhu Saha, (1915) I.L.R. 42  Cal. 1043, .approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 606 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated August  5,  1964  of the Patna High  Court  in  Appeal  from Original Decree No. 362 of 1959. P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. The  Judgment  of  WANCHOO and SHAH, JJ.  was  delivered  by WANCHOO, J. BACHAWAT, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. Wanchoo,  J.  Two questions of law arise in this  appeal  by special leave against the judgment of the Patna High  Court. The facts which have been found by the High Court and  which are necessary for our purposes may be briefly narrated.  The appellant  was  the  defendant  in  a  suit  filed  by   the plaintiff-respondent for recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note for Rs. 10,000 executed on February 4,  1954 by  the  defendant-appellant  in favour  of  the  plaintiff- respondent.  12 per cent per, annum interest was to  run  on the  promissory note which was payable on demand or  to  the order  of the plaintiff-respondent.  The suit was  filed  on February  22, 1957 and was thus obviously beyond  time  from February  4,  1954.  The plaintiff-respondent  relied  on  a payment  by  cheque on February 25, 1954 to bring  the  suit within time. The  two questions raised by the  defendant-appellant  which now  survive for decision arose in this way.  The  appellant claimed  that no money was in fact advanced on  February  4, 1954 and that .the promissory note executed on that date was to pay by renewal a loan for Rs. 4,000 which had been  taken as far back as October 1946.  The sum of Rs. 10,000 included the principal amount

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192 of  Rs. 4,000 and the remainder was towards  interest.   The defendant-appellant  therefore  claimed that  the  suit  was barred  by s. 4. of the Bihar Money-Lenders  (Regulation  of Transactions) Act, No. 7 of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 1939-Act) which lays down that "no court shall entertain a suit by a moneylender for the recovery of a loan  advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such  money lender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act 1938 at  the time when such loan was advanced." It  appears  that the  joint  family  consisting of  the  respondent  and  his brother  was  registered as a  money-lender  sometime  about 1952,  and the case of the defendant-appellant was  that  as the  loan  was  advanced really in 1946 when  there  was  no registration  the suit was barred by s. 4 of  the  1939-Act. The other main defence was of limitation.  The  respondent’s case on that point was simple, namely, that on February  25, 1954  a cheque for Rs. 1,000 was given in part  payment  and therefore  the three years period of limitation would  start from that date.  The appellant’s case on the other hand  was that  it was on February 4,1954 that a postdated cheque  for Rs.  1,000 was given and though the cheque might  have  been cashed  on or after February 25, 1954, the payment  must  be deemed  to have been made on February 4, 1954 and  therefore the three years period of limitation ran from that date  and the suit was out of time. Thus  two  main  questions arose for decision  of  the  High Court, namely, (i) whether the suit was not maintainable  in view  of s. 4 of the 1939-Act and (ii) whether the suit  was barred by limitation.  On the first question the High  Court held  that s. 4 was not a bar to the maintainability of  the suit.   On the facts the High Court held that there  was  no actual  advance  of money on February 4, 1954 and  that  the promissory  note for Rs. 10‘000/- executed on that date  was in lieu of an earlier promissory note for Rs. 8,000 executed on February 21, 1951.  Even so the High court held that  the suit  was maintainable as it was based on a loan alleged  to have  been  advanced  in  1954  which  was  long  after  the respondent’s  family was registered as a money-lender.   The High  Court was of the view that the maintainability of  the suit depended upon the pleadings on which the plaintiff came to  court  and  on the pleadings of the case, s.  4  had  no application.   On the question of limitation the High  Court held  that  the case of the  plaintiff-respondent  that  the cheque  for Rs. 1,000 dated February 25, 1954 was  given  on that  date was not correct.  The High Court was of the  view that the cheque for Rs. 1,000 was given in fact on  February 4,  1954, though it was post-dated to February  25,1954  and was  actually  realised sometime after  February  25,  1954. Even  so the High Court held that the delivery of the  post- dated cheque on February 4, 1954 could not be treated as  an unconditional  payment and that for the purpose of s. 20  of the Indian Limitation Act, 193 No. 9 of 1908, the payment must be held to have been made at the  earliest on February 25, 1954 for the cheque could  not possibly  have been paid before that date.  The  High  Court therefore  held that s. 20 applied as part payment had  been made  on  February  25, 1954 and the cheque  itself  was  an acknowledgment of the payment and was in the handwriting  of the appellant.  The High Court therefore over-ruled both the contentions of the defendant-appellant and after going  into the  accounts  decreed  the suit for  an  amount  which  was slightly   less   than  that  claimed   by   the   plaintiff -respondent.

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In  the  present appeal the same two questions of  law  have been  raised before us, namely-(i) whether the suit was  not maintainable  in  view  of s. 4 of the  1939-Act,  and  (ii) whether  the  suit  was barred by  the  three-year  rule  of limitation. Re. (i). We have already set out s. 4 of the 1939-Act and it does bar a suit by a money-lender for recovery of a loan advanced  by him after the commencement of the 1939-Act unless the money- lender is registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 3 of 1938.   In  the present case it is not in dispute  that  the joint family of which the plaintiff-respondent was a  member was  registered as a moneylender sometime about  1952.   The promissory note on the basis of which the suit was filed was executed in 1954 after the registration and therefore  prima facie s. 4 would not bar the suit for the loan was  advanced after the plaintiff-respondent’s family had been  registered as  a money-lender.  But the appellant’s contention is  that the  High  Court  found  that real loan  of  Rs.  8,000  was advanced in 1951 and that the promissory note for Rs. 10,000 executed February 4, 1954 was only in renewal of that  loan, and therefore s.4 applied. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. It  is  necessary  in  this  connection  to  refer  to   the definition  of the word "loan" in s. 2 (f) of the  1939-Act. " ’Loan’ means an advance, ‘whether of money or in kind,  on interest  made  by  a  money-lender.  and  shall  include  a transaction  on a bond bearing interest executed in  respect of past liability and any transaction which in substance  is a   loan,  but  shall  not  include............   (rest   is immaterial)....."It  will be seen from this definition  that the  word "loan" for purposes of the 1939-Act  includes  not only an actual advance whether of money or in kind but  also a transaction on a bond bearing interest executed in respect of past liability, i.e. an instrument which is in renewal of a past advance of money . It is, however, urged on behalf of the  appellant  that a promissory note is not a  bond,  even though  the  promissory  note in  dispute  might  have  been executed  in  respect of past liability and  bore  interest. Now  the word "bond" has not been defined in  the  1939-Act. It  is true that a bond for the purpose of the Stamp Act  is not the same thing 194 as  a promissory note.  But it appears to us that  the  word "bond" is not used in s. 2 (f) in the special sense in which it has been defined in the Indian Stamp Act.  It appears  to have  been  used in its general sense, that is,  a  deed  by which  one  person  binds himself to pay a  sum  to  another person.   This  was the view taken by the Federal  Court  in Surendra  Prasad  Narain Singh v. Sri Gajadhar  Prasad  Sahu Trust  Estate and others (1) and we respectfully agree  with it.   Sulaiman J. after referring to the definition  of  the word  "bond" in the Indian Stamp Act and the Limitation  Act pointed out that "the essential common feature of these  de- finitions  is  ’any  instrument  whereby  a  person  obliges himself’." He accordingly held that the meaning of the  word "bond"  for  the purpose of the 1939-Act was  an  instrument which itself obliges the obligor to the obligee, that is  to say,  "the language of the instument itself  must  expressly create  the  obligation."  This  view  of  Sulaiman  J.  was apparently  accepted  by  the  other  two  learned   Judges. Theirefore  all that s. 2 (f) requires is that there  should be  an  instrument in writing by which the  obligor  obliges himself to pay the past liability and the instrument  should bear  interest.   These  conditions  are  satisfied  in  the

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present case, for by the promissory note of February 4, 1954 the  defendant-appellant obliged himself to  the  respondent and  it was in respect of past liability and bore  interest. Clearly therefore this transaction of February 4, 1954 was a loan within the meaning of s. 2(f) of the 1939-Act. But  it is urged that when s. 4 speaks of loan, it does  not include  the  inclusive part of the definition given  in  s. 2(f)  of  the 1939-Act and only refers to that part  of  the definition  in  s.  2(f) which says that  a  loan  means  an advance  whether of money or in kind on interest made  by  a money-lender.   It  is true that definitions in s.  2  begin with  the  words  "in this Act,  unless  there  is  anything repugnant in the subject or context" and therefore it may be possible to argue that in s. 4 the word "loan" should not be given  the  meaning which has been given to it in  s.  2(f). But  what learned counsel argues is that it should be  given that  meaning  in s. 2(f), which says that it has to  be  an advance  whether of money or in kind, but it should  not  be given  the extended meaning which it has in s. 2(f)  by  the inclusive  part  of the definition.  We cannot  accept  this contention.   We have to use the definition of "loan"  given in  s.  2(f) in its entirety for the purpose of s. 4  or  we should  not use it at all.  But we cannot say that half  the definition  should be used for the purpose of s. 4  and  not the  other half.  Further we see no reason to hold that  the intention  was that in s. 4 the word "loan" should have  any meaning  other  than that given to it in s. 2(f).   In  this connection  stress  is laid on the words "advanced  by  him" which  qualify the word "loan", and it is said that  when  a promissory  note  is  made in renewal of  a  past  liability arising out (1) [1940] F.C.R. 39. 195 of  an earlier advance, it cannot be said that any loan  was advanced’. when the renewal was made.  There are two answers to this argu-ment.  When a loan is renewed by the  execution of a fresh docu-ment there is no difficulty in holding  that the former loan was repaid by borrowing a fresh loan on  the document  of renewal : (see B. S. Lyle Limited  v.  Chappeli (1).   So the transaction of February 4, 1954 itself can  be treated as a fresh loan for the purpose of s. 4 of the 1939- Act.  Secondly, we are of opinion that there is no reason to lay such emphasis on the word "advanced" in s. 4 as is being done  on  behalf  of the  appellant.   The  word  "advanced" appears to have been used there for convenience of language, particularly  to indicate that the loan must have been  made after  the  commencement  of the 1939-Act.  If  we  were  to substitute the first part of the definition of "loan" in  s. 4,  (for it is not disputed on behalf of the appellant  that the  first part certainly applies to the word "loan"  in  s. 4),  the relevant part of the section will read like this  : "for  the  recovery of an advance whether of nioiley  or  in kind  advanced  by  him".   That will  show  that  the  word "advanced"  was  used  in s. 4  merely  for  convenience  of language  and means no more than what would have been  meant by using the word "made" or "given" in place of  "advanced". It  does  not imply that there should have  been  an  actual advance  whether of money or in kind.  All that it means  is that a loan as defined in s. 2(f) should have been made  and if it was after the commencement of the 1939-Act the  money- lender would have to be registered before he could  maintain a suit.  We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the word  "loan" used in s. 4 has the same meaning as it has  in s.  2(f)  and  includes  a transaction  on  a  bond  bearing interest  executed  in respect of past  liability.   As  the

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promissory  note  of February 4, 1954 is a loan  within  the meaning of s. 2(f) and as it was made after the joint family firm of the respondent had been registered s. 4 is not a bar to  the  maintainability  of the suit.   We  therefore  hold accordingly. Re. (ii). This brings us to the question of limitation.  The facts are not  in  dispute now.  The promissory note was  executed  on February  4,  1954.  On the same date  a  post-dated  cheque bearing  the  date  February  25,  1954  was  given  by  the defendant-appellant   to   the   plaintiff-respondent,   the intention being that on being realised it would be  credited towards  part  payment.   It  was  realised  sometime  after February 25, 1954 and was credited towards part payment, the appellant himself having made an endorsement admitting  this part  payment.   But  it  is  contended  on  behalf  of  the appellant  that  as  the  post-dated  cheque  was  given  on February 4, 1954, that must be held to be the date on  which part payment was made... It has been held by the High  Court that the acceptance of the post- (1) [1932] 1 K.B. 691. 196 dated  cheque on February 4, 1954 was not  an  unconditional acceptance.   Where  a  bill  or note is  given  by  way  of payment,  the  payment may be absolute or  conditional,  the strong  presumption being in favour of conditional  payment. It  follows  from the ’finding of the High  Court  that  the payment  was  conditional,  i.e. that the  payment  will  be credited to the person giving the cheque -in case the cheque is  honoured.  In the present case the cheque  was  realised and  the  question  is what is the date of  payment  in  the ,circumstances of this case for the purpose of s. 20 of  the Limitation Act.  Section 20 inter alia lays down that  where payment  on ac,,count of debt is made before the  expiration of  the  prescribed period by the person liable to  pay  the debt,  a fresh period of limitation shall be  computed  from the  time  when the payment was made.  Where  therefore  the payment  is by cheque and is conditional, the mere  delivery of  the cheque on a particular date does not mean  that  the payment was made on that date unless the cheque was accepted as unconditional payment.  Where the cheque is not  accepted as  an  unconditional payment, it can only be treated  as  a ’Conditional  payment.   In  such a  case  the  payment  for purposes  of  s. 20 would be the date on  which  the  cheque would be actually payable at the earliest, assuming that  it will  be honoured.  Thus ,if in the present case the  cheque which  was  handed over on February 4, 1954  bore  the  date February 4, 1954 and was honoured when presented to the bank the  payment must be held to have -been made on February  4, 1954,  namely, the date which the cheque bore.  But  if  the cheque  is post dated as in the present case it  is  obvious that it could not be paid till February 25, 1954 which  -was the  date it bore.  As the payment was conditional it  would only  be  good when the cheque is presented on the  date  it bears,  namely,  February  25, 1954 and  is  honoured.   The earliest  date therefore on which the respondent could  have realised  the  cheque which he had received  as  conditional payment on February 4, 1954 was the 25th February 1954 if he had  presented  it on that date and ’it had  been  honoured. The  fact  that he presented it later and was then  paid  is immaterial for it is the earliest date on which the  payment could  be made that would be the date where the  conditional acceptance  of  a post-dated cheque becomes  actual  payment when honoured.  We are therefore of opinion that as a  post- dated cheque ’was given on February 4, 1954 and it was dated

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February   25,  1954  and  as  this  was  not  a   case   of unconditional acceptance, the payment for the purpose of  s. 20 of the Limitation Act could only be on February 25,  1954 when  the cheque could have been presented .at the  earliest for payment.  As in the present case the cheque was honoured it  must be held that the payment was made on  February  25, 1954.   It  is not in dispute that the proviso to s.  20  is ,complied  with  in this case, for the cheque itself  is  an acknowledgment  of  the payment in the  handwriting  of  the person giving the cheque.  We are therefore of opinion  that a fresh period of 197 limitation began on February 25, 1954 which was the date  of thepost-dated cheque which was eventually honoured. The decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax  v. Messrs.   Ogale  Glass Works Ltd.(1) does  not  support  the propo-sition that even where the acceptance of a  post-dated cheque  is conditional the date on which payment is made  is the date of acceptance of the post-dated cheque provided  it is honoured.  It is true that there are observations in that case  to the effect that if’ the cheque is  not  dishonoured the  payment related back to the date of the receipt of  the cheque,  and in law the date of payment was the date of  the delivery  of the cheque.  There is nothing to  show  however that this Court was dealing with a post-dated chequein  that case.   The cheques in question in that case were issued  by the  Government  of India and we have no reason  to  suppose that they were post-dated.  The observations therefore  made in that case must in our opinion be read in the light of the fact  that  the cheques in that case were not  shown  to  be post-dated.   Where therefore the cheque bears the  date  on which it is delivered and it is honoured, Ogale’s case  lays down that the payment is on the dateon which the cheque  was delivered.   But it is difficult to accept  the  proposition that  the  same would be the position where  the  cheque  is post-dated, for it is clear that no payment of a  post-dated chequeis  possible before the date which it bears.   Section 20  of the Limitation Act saves limitation from the date  of payment, and if the payment is made by a post-dated  cheque, unless  the cheque is accepted as unconditional payment,  it cannot  be regarded as payment before the due date.  We  see no reason to hold that in such a casealso the payment is  on the date the cheque is delivered. In  the  case of Marreco v. Richardson (2) the  cheque  bore thedate on which it was delivered, though there was an  oral arrangement that it would not be presented for sometime, and it  was in those circumstances that the court held that  the date   of   payment   must  be   the   date   of   delivery, notwithstanding  the  oral  arrangement.That  case  in   our opinion  is  no authority for the proposition  that  if  the cheque is in fact post-dated the payment even though condi-- tional would still have been on the date it was handed over. The  case of Felix Hadley v. Hadley (3) also does not  help, the  appellant as that case did not deal with  a  post-dated cheque.   We  may  however add that  we  are  expressing  no opinion  as  to what would happen in case there was  a  bill payable  on  a  future  date,, for  the  question  does  not directly arise in the present appeal.  But there can in  our opinion  be  no  doubt that where  a  post-dated  cheque  is accepted  conditionally and it is honoured, the payment  for purposes of s. 20 of the Limitation Act can only be the date which, (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 185.     (2) L.R. [1908] 2 K.B. 584. (3)  L.R. [1898] 2 Ch. 680. 198

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the  cheque  bears and cannot be on the date the  cheque  is handed over, for the cheque, being post-dated, can never  be paid  till the date on the cheque arrives.  In  the  present case the cheque was dated February 25, 1954 and was honoured soon after and therefore the date of payment for the purpose of  s. 20 of the Limitation Act would be the 25th  February, 1954.   The  suit was therefore within time and  the  second contention raised on behalf of the appellant must also fail. We  therefore dismiss the appeal, but as the respondent  has not appeared in this Court we make no order as to costs. Bachawat,  J. For the reasons given by Wanchoo, J.  I  agree that  the  suit is not barred by s. 4 of  the  Bihar  Money- Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act No. 7 of 1939, but, in my opinion, the suit is barred by limitation. On  February  4, 1954, the appellant executed  a  promissory note for Rs. 10,000.  On the same date, he delivered to  the respondent  a cheque dated February 25, 1954 and  signed  by him  for  Rs. 1,000 towards part payment of the  debt.   The respondent received the cheque as conditional payment.   The chequewas cashed soon after February 25, 1954.  The suit was instituted .on February 22, 1957.  Under s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, a fresh period of limitation has to be computed from the time when the part payment of the debt was made,  provided an acknowledgment of the payment appears  in the handwriting or in a writing signed by the person  making the payment.  Now, the question is when was the part payment of  the debt made ? Was it made on the date of the  delivery of the cheque or on the date which the cheque bore or on the date when the cheque was encashed ? A  creditor may receive a bill or a cheque as a  conditional payment   of  a  pre-existing  debt,  i.e.  as   a   payment conditional  on  ,the  instrument  being  duly  honoured  on presentation.   If the cheque is honoured, the date  of  the payment  of  the  debt  is the  date  when  the  cheque  was delivered  and  not  the date when  it  was  honoured.   For purposes  of s. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908  also, the cheque is the payment and the date of the payment is the date of the delivery of the cheque.  The cheque also  serves as  an acknowledgment of this payment, see Kedar Nath  Mitra v. Dinabdndhu Saha(1).  When the banker honours the  cheque, the  cheque is paid and discharged but the debt is not  paid over  again  ;  the  debt  was  paid  when  the  cheque  was delivered.   These principles are well settled.  In  Marreco v. Richardson(2), Farewell, L. J. said:               "In the more recent case of Felix Hadley & Co.               v. Hadley(3) Byrne J. held that a cheque or  a               bill  of exchange given in respect of  a  pre-               existing debt operated as a condi- (1) [1915] I. L. R. 42 Cal. 1043,1048. (3) [1898] 2 Ch. 680. (2) [1908] 2 K. B. 584, 593. 199               tional  payment thereof, and on the  condition               being performed by actual payment, the payment               related  back to the time when the  cheque  or               bill  was given.  That is only expressing  the               same  principle in another form, and I  should               prefer to say that the giving of a cheque  for               a  debt is payment conditional on  the  cheque               being  met,  that is, subject to  a  condition               subsequent, and if the cheque is met it is  an               actual payment ab initio and not a conditional               one.  There was only one act of payment  here,               that  on May 10, and that was out of time  for               the  purpose of avoiding the operation of  the

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             statute." In the last case, the cheque was delivered on May 10,  1900. It  was  post-dated May 20, 1900.  It was  agreed  that  the cheque  would  not be presented for payment until  June  20, 1900 on which day it was presented for payment and was  paid by  the  bankers.   It was held that the date  of  the  part payment of the debt was May 10 and not May 20, nor June 20. In   The   Commissioner   of   Income-tax,   Bombay    South Bombay,v.Messrs.  Ogale Glass Works Ltd.  Ogale Wadi(1) this Court held:               "..even    if   the   cheques    were    taken               conditionally,  the  cheques not  having  been               dishonoured   but  having  been  cashed,   the               payment  related  back  to the  dates  of  the               receipt of the cheques and in law the dates of               payment ",ere the dates of the delivery of the               cheques." It  is  to be observed that the Court  made  no  distinction between a cheque bearing the date on which it was  delivered and a postdated cheque.  It is immaterial whether the cheque is  post-dated  or  ante-dated  or  dated  the  day  of  the delivery.  On the cheque being met, the payment of the  debt relates  back to the date of the receipt of the cheque  and, in law, the date of the payment is the date of the  delivery of  the cheque, and not the date which the cheque  bore  nor the date when it was cashed. The doctrine that the payment takes effect from the date  of the  delivery  of  the  negotiable  instrument  is  as  much applicable  to a post-dated cheque and a bill payable  on  a future  date  as to a cheque and a bill payable  on  demand. During the currency of the post-dated cheque or of the  bill payable on a future date, the creditor cannot sue to recover the  original  debt.  The post-dated cheque or  the  running bill,  if  it is duly met, operates as payment of  the  debt from the date of its delivery.  For the purposes of s. 20 of the  Indian Limitation Act, 1908 also, the date of the  pay- ment of the debt is the date when the post-dated cheque  was delivered to the creditor and not the date which the  cheque bore nor (1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 185,196. 200 the  date  when it was cashed.  I cannot  subscribe  to  the novel view that the date of the payment is the date  written on  the  cheque.   In my opinion, the payment  was  made  on February  4,  1954 and not on February 25, 1954 nor  on  the date  when the cheque was subsequently cashed.   It  follows that  the  suit  is  barred  by  limitation  and  should  be dismissed. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, the  decree of  the High Court is set aside and the decree of the  trial Court is restored.                            ORDER In  accordance with the opinion of the majority, the  appeal is dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs. Y.P 201