19 December 1974
Supreme Court
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JIWAN SINGH Vs RAJENDRA PRASAD AND ANR.


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PETITIONER: JIWAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJENDRA PRASAD AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/12/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BHAGWATI, P.N. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  412            1975 SCR  (3)  58  1975 SCC  (2) 171  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC1525  (9)  E          1980 SC 206  (22)

ACT: U.P. Act 3 of 1947-S.7(1) (a) and rule (4)-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  first  respondent entered into possession  of  the  two disputed  shops  on  19th September 1966  with  the  express consent of the landlord and made an application to the  Rent Control Officer for allotment of the shops to him.  On  15th November  1966, the landlord, however, revoked  his  consent and  informed  the Rent Control Officer  that  the  previous tenant  had  not vacated them.  On 20th  December  1966  the landlord  intimated  the Rent Control Officer that  the  two shops had fallen vacant.  The appellant’s application  dated 21st January 1967 to the Rent Control Officer for  allotment of  the  shops  to him was granted.   The  first  respondent applied for cancellation of the allotment order but that was rejected.   Proceedings were taken under s. 7A of  the  U.P. Act  (3  of 1947) to eject, the first respondent,  who  then instituted  a  suit  for  declaration  that  the  order   of allotment  in favour of the appellant was illegal and  ultra vires.   The Addl.  Munsif held that the order of  allotment was  illegal.  On appeal the Small Cause Court held that  in view of the intimation of the landlord under s. 7 (1) (a) of the  Act  the Rent Control Officer was obliged  to  )ass  an order in favour of nominee of the landlord under rule 4  and as  he did not pass the order within 30 days of  intimation, the order of allotment in favour of the appellant was valid. On  further  appeal  the  High Court  held  that  since  the landlord  did  not intimate in writing to the  Rent  Control Officer  about  the  vacancy within  seven  days  after  the accommodation became vacant the Rent Control Officer was not entitled to act under rule 4 of the Rules and, therefore, he committed  an error of jurisdiction in making the  order  of allotment  to  the  appellant.   The suit  was  held  to  be maintainable. Under  s. 7 (1) (a) the landlord is required to give  notice in writing to the District Magistrate of the vacancy  within seven  days after the accommodation became vacant.   Rule  4

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states that if the landlord receives no notice from the Dis- trict  Magistrate he may nominate a tenant and the  District Magistrate shall allot the same to his nominee. Allowing  the appeal in part and remitting the case  to  the Rent Control Officer, HELD  : The High Court was right in holding that  the  order was  ultra vires the power of Rent Control Officer and  that the  proceedings to evict the first respondent under s. 7  A were incompetent.  Notice in writing within the time  speci- fied in s. 7(1) (a) is a condition precedent to the exercise of  jurisdiction  under  rule 4.  The  landlord  could  not, without  complying with the provisions of s. 7(1)(a),  claim that  the Rent Control Officer shall allot the  premises  to his  nominee. it is clear that the Rent Control Officer  was wrong  in  thinking  that rule 4 obliged him  to  allot  the premises  to the nominee of the landlord as he did not  make the  allotment within 30 days of the receipt of the  notice. [61H; F-G] In  the  instant case the landlord did not  give  notice  in writing  about  the  vacancy within  seven  days  after  the accommodation became vacant.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.-Civil Appeal No. 999 of 1971. Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated the 14th December 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 67 of 1970. S.C. Manchanda, Urmila Kapoor and Kamlesh Bansal for  the appellant. V. N. Ganpule and P. C. Kapoor for Respondent No. 1. Mohan Prasad Jha and S. N. Singh for Respondent No. 2. 59 The judgment of the: Court was delivered by MATHEW,  J.-This  is  an appeal, by special  leave,  from  a judgment, and decree of the High Court of Allahabad, setting aside  a  decree  passed by the  Small  Causes  Court  Agra, reversing  the  decree  passed  by  the  Additional  Munsiff holding  that  the  order of allotment of  the  premises  in question to the appellant was illegal and ultra vires. The facts of the case are these.  There are two shops  owned by  one  Genda Puri (hereinafter called the  ’landlord’)  in Agra City.  One Kedarnath Tandon (’Tandon’ for short) was  a tenant of these shops till September 1966.  Tandon intimated to  the  Rent  Control and  Eviction  Officer,  Agra  ("Rent Control Officer" for short) on 12-9 1966 that he has vacated the  shops  and  delivered possession of  the  same  to  the landlord.  The rent of the shops was also paid by Tandon  to the landlord upto that date sometime before 20-9-1966.   The 1st  respondent who got into possession of the  shops  after Tandon  vacated  the  same,  made  an  application  in   the prescribed form with the express consent of the landlord  to the  Rent  Control Officer for allotment to him of  the  two shops on 19-9-1966.  On 15-11-1966, the landlord revoked his consent for allotment of the shops to the 1st respondent and intimated  to the Rent Control Officer that Tandon  had  not vacated  the shops.  Thereafter on 20-12-1966, the  landlord intimated to the Rent Control Officer that the accommodation had  fallen  vacant.  On 61-1967, the Rent  Control  Officer passed   an   order  fixing  2-2-1967  as   the   date   for consideration  of the application for allotment made by  the 1st  respondent.  On 21-1-1967 the appellant applied to  the Rent  Control Officer for allotment of the shops to him  and the  landlord consented to have them allotted to  him.   The

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Rent Control Officer passed an order alloting the two  shops to the appellant as a nominee of the landlord on  27-1-1967. The 1st respondent applied for cancellation of the allotment order passed in favour of the appellant.  That was rejected. Thereafter,  proceedings were taken under section 7A of  the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the  Act) to  eject the 1st respondent, and notice was issued  to  the 1st respondent   to show cause why he should not be ejected. The   1st  respondent  then  instituted  the  suit   for   a declaration  that the order of allotment dated 27-1-1967  in favour  of  the appellant was illegal and  ultra  vires  and praying that the appellant may be restrained by a  permanent injunction from interfering with his possession. The  suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2, namely ,  the appellant and the landlord.  Their main contention was  that the  order  dated 27-1-1967 allotting the two shops  to  the appellant  ’was proper as, under rule 4 of the Rules  framed under  the Act, if the Rent Control Officer failed to  allot the  shops within 30 days’ of the intimation of  vacancy  by the landlord, the officer was bound to allot the same to the appellant  as  the  nominee of the landlord.   It  was  also contended that   1st respondent came into possession of  the shops  clandestinely  by entering into an  arrangement  with Tandon,  the previous tenant, and that the,  landlord  never inducted the 1st respondent into possession or accepted  him as his tenant. 60 The  Additional  Munsiff  found that  Tandon,  the  previous tenant,  delivered  possession  of  the  two  shops  to  the landlord  on  12-9-1966  who  on  22-10-1966  put  the   1st respondent  in  possession  of the same  and  that  the  1st respondent became the tenant of the shops.  He further found that  the Rent Control Officer committed an error of law  in not  allotting  the  shops  to the  1st  respondent  as  the landlord  had given his consent for allotting the  shops  to the 1st respondent although he revoked the consent later  on and  hence  the  allotment order passed  in  favour  of  the appellant  was  in contravention of the  rules  and  without affording a reasonable opportunity to the 1st respondent  of being heard.  He, therefore, passed a decree in a favour  of the 1st respondent holding that the order of allotment dated 27-1-1967  was illegal and restraining the appellant  by  an injunction  from  disturbing  the  possession  of  the   1st respondent. On  appeal by the appellant the Judge, Small  Causes  Court, reversed  the  decree passed by the Additional  Munsiff  and dismissed the suit. The  learned Judge, Small Causes Court, held  that  landlord having intimated to the Rent Control Officer under section 7 (1)  (a)  of the Act on 20-12-1966  that  the  accommodation became vacant, the Rent Control Officer was obliged to  pass an  order  of  allotment in favour of  the  nominee  of  the landlord  under  rule  4, as he did not  pass  an  order  of allotment within 30 days of the intimation, and,  therefore, the order of allotment in favour of the appellant passed  on 27-1-1967  was valid and no occasion arose  for  considering the application of the 1st respondent for allotment, nor was there  any  necessity  to hear the 1st  ’respondent  on  his application.  He, therefore, set aside the decree passed  by the Additional Munsiff. The  High  Court reversed this decree on the, basis  of  its finding  that the shops became vacant when Tandon  delivered possession  of  the same to the landlord  on  12-9-1966  and since  the landlord did not intimate in writing to the  Rent Control  Officer about the vacancy within 7 days  after  the

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accommodation  became vacant, the Rent Control  Officer  was not  entitled to act under rule 4 of the Rules framed  under the  Act which alone obliged him to allot the shops  to  the nominee of the landlord in preference-to the 1st  respondent and,  therefore,  he  committed a  jurisdictional  error  in making the order of allotment to the appellant and the  suit was therefore ’maintainable. In  order  to  appreciate  the  question  which  arises  for decision. it is necessary to read s. 7 (1) (a) of the Act as well  as rule 4 made under the rule-making  power  conferred under s. 17 of the Act.  Section 7(1) (a)  reads :               "Every landlord shall, within seven days after               an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing               to occupy it, or by the tenant vacating it, or               otherwise   ceasing  to  occupy  it,   or   by               termination  of  tenancy or  by  release  from               requisition   or   in   any   other    manner.               whatsoever,  give  notice of  the  vacancy  in               writing to the District Magistrate",               61               Rule 4 provides as under               "Landlord’s  right  to  let-If  the  landlord,               receives   no   notice   from   the   District               Magistrate  of  the intimation  given  by  the               landlord  under s. 7(1)(a), the  landlord  may               nominate a tenant and the District  Magistrate               shall  allot the accommodation to his  nominee               unless, for reasons to be recorded in writing,               he forthwith allots the accommodation to other               person." The  point for consideration is whether the notice given  by the  landlord  on 20-12-1966 can be said to be a  notice  as provided in s. 7(1) (a)  of   the   Act  and   whether   the provisions of rule 4 were attracted to the   facts  of   the case. Section 7(t) (a) would show that the landlord was obliged to give  notice  in writing to the District Magistrate  of  the vacancy within 7 days after the accommodation became vacant; and rule 4 can come into play only on the fulfilment of that obligation  by the landlord under s. 7(1)(a).   The  learned Additional Munsiff found that the accommodation fell  vacant on  12-9-1966.   In appeal, the Small Causes  Court  assumed that Tandon vacated the shops on 20-9-1966.  Whichever  date is  taken  as  the date on which  the  accommodation  became vacant,  the landlord did not give notice in  writing  about the vacancy    within  seven  days after  the  accommodation became  vacant as the notice was given only  on  20-12-1966. It  is only if the landlord gives the notice in  writing  of the  vacancy within the time specified in s. 7(1)  (a)  that rule 4 would come into operation.  In other words, notice in writing within the time specified in s. 7(1) (a)  intimating that  the  accommodation has become vacant is  a  condition- precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under rule 4.  The landlord cannot, without complying with the provisions of s. 7  (1 )(a), claim that the Rent Control Officer shall  allot the premises to his nominee.  It is therefore clear that the Rent  Control  Officer went wrong in thinking  that  rule  4 obliged  him  to allot the premises to the  nominee  of  the landlord as    he did not make the allotment within 30  days of  the receipt of the notice.  As the Rent Control  Officer allotted  the  premises to the appellant on the  basis  that rule  4 obliged him to do so, and, as we hold that rule  did not come into play since the landlord did not give notice in writing  within  seven days after the  accommodation  became

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vacant,  the  Rent  Control Officer committed  an  error  of jurisdiction in allotting     the premises to the  appellant by   his  order  dated  27-1-1967.   The  High  Court   was, therefore, right in holding that the order was, ultra  vires the  power  of  the  Rent  Control  Officer,  and  that  the proceedings to 62 evict  the 1st respondent under s. 7A were incompetent.   In these circumstances we would direct the Rent Control Officer to  consider the application filed by the 1st respondent  on 19-9-1966  for  allotment of the shops to him  as  also  the application  of  the appellant for the same  purpose,  after giving  them  an opportunity of being heard,  and  pass  the proper  order;  and  in the light of  that  order  take  any proceedings, if necessary under S. 7A of the Act. In the result, we modify the decree of the High Court to the extent  indicated  and allow the appeal to that  extent  but dismiss it in other respects.  We make no order as to costs. P.B.R.                           Appeal allowed in part. 63