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PETITIONER: JIVABHAI PURSHOTTAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHHAGAN KARSON AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/03/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1491            1962 SCR  (1) 568  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1305  (33)  R          1966 SC1758  (10,11)

ACT: Agricultural Land--Protected tenant--Notice by landlord  for termination    of    tenancy--Amendment    of    enactment-- Applicability--Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands  Act, 1948  (Bom.   LXVII  of 1948), as amended  by  Amending  Act XXXIII of 1952, ss. 34 (2A), 34(1).

HEADNOTE: Sub-section  (2A) of S. 34 of the Bombay Tenancy  and  Agri- cultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended by the Amending Act  of 1952,   applied  from  the  date  when  the  tenancy   stood terminated  on expiry of the notice of ejectment  served  on the tenant by the landlord under S. 34(1) of the Act and not from the date of the notice. The Amending Act could not be said to divest the landlord of any vested right since he could have none till the period of notice terminated and the tenancy came to an end. Consequently,  where the landlord gave notice  of  ejectment under  S. 34(1) of the Act, but the Amending Act  came  into force before the period of notice expired the landlord could be   entitled  to  possession  only  after  satisfying   the provisions of that subsection. Durlabbhai Fakirbhai v. jhaverbhai Bhikabhai, (1956) 58 Bom. L.   R. 85, referred to. Jeebankrishna  Chakrabarti v. Abdul Kader Choudhuri,  (1933) I.L.R. LX Cal. 1037, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 153 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January  9, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in Special  Civil Application No. 2258 of 1955 J.   B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, and Rameshwar Nath,  for the appellant. S.   P. Sinha, M. I. Khowaja and A. C. Dave, for  respondent No. 1. 1961.  March 27.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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WANCHOO J.-This appeal by special leave against the judgment of   the  Bombay  High  Court  raises  a  question  of   the interpretation of a. 34 (2-A) of the 569 Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, No. LXVII of 1948 (hereinafter called the Act).  The brief facts necessary for present  purposes are these: The appellant is  the  landlord and  the respondent a protected tenant.  The appellant  gave notice  of  termination  of tenancy  to  the  respondent  on December  31, 1951, under s. 34(1) of the Act.   The  notice was for one year as required by s. 34(1) and the tenancy was to  terminate  from  after March  31,  1953.   The  landlord therefore  made  an application on April 7, 1953,  under  s. 29(2) of the Act for obtaining possession of the land to the Mamlatdar.   In the meantime, an amendment. was made to  the Act  by  the  insertion  of sub-s. (2-A) to  s.  34  by  the Amending  Act No. XXXIII of 1952, which came into  force  on January  12,  1953.   By  this  amendment  certain   further restrictions  were  placed on the right of the  landlord  to terminate  the tenancy of a protected tenant.  The  relevant part of sub-s. (2-A) is in these terms:-               "If  the landlord bona fide requires the  land               for  any  of the purposes  specified  in  sub-               section  (1) then his right to  terminate  the               tenancy  shall  be subject  to  the  following               conditions, namely-               (1)   The land held by the protected tenant on               lease  stands in the record of rights  in  the               name  of  the  landlord on the  first  day  of               January, 1952, as the superior holder.               (2)   If  the land held by the landlord is  in               area  equal  to the  agricultural  holding  or               less,  the  landlord  shall  be  entitled   to               terminate the tenancy of the protected tenant,               in respect of the entire area of such land.               (3)   If the land held by the landlord is more               than  the  agricultural holding in  area,  the               right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy               of the protected tenant shall be limited to an               area  which  shall,  after  such  termination,               leave  with  the tenant half the area  of  the               land leased.               (4)   The tenancy in respect of the land  left               with  the protected tenant  after  termination               under  this section shall not at any  time  be               liable to be terminated on the ground that the               landlord bona fide               72               570               requires  the  said  land  for  any  of    the               purposes specified in sub-section (1).               Explanation.-The "agricultural holding"  shall               mean  sixteen  acres of jirayat land  or  four               acres  of irrigated or paddy or rice land,  or               lands  greater  or  less  in  area  than   the               aforesaid areas in the same proportion: The restriction contained in sub-s. (2-A) is in addition  to the  restrictions  in sub-s. (2), which lays down  that  the landlord  shall have no right to terminate the tenancy of  a protected  tenant, if the landlord at the date on which  the notice  is given or at the date on which the notice  expires has  been cultivating personally other land fifty  acres  or more  in  area,  provided that if the land  which  is  being cultivated personally is less than fifty acres, the right of the  landlord  to  terminate the tenancy  of  the  protected

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tenant  and  to take. possession of the land leased  to  him shall be limited to such area as will be sufficient to  make the  area of the land which he has been cultivating  to  the extent of fifty acres. When  therefore the landlord applied for possession  of  the land  under  s. 29(2) of the Act, the  tenant  objected  and claimed the benefit of the third clause of subs. (2-A),  and the  question that arose for determination was  whether  the tenant  was  entitled to the protection  contained  in  this clause The Mamlatdar to whom the application under s. 29 (2) was made allowed the application.  The respondent  thereupon appealed  but  his appeal was dismissed.  He  then  went  in revision  to the Revenue Tribunal, which was rejected.   The tenant  then  filed  an application under Art.  227  of  the Constitution  before the High Court and contended  that  the provision  of  s.  34(2-A)  should  have  been  taken   into consideration   by  the  Revenue  Courts  in  deciding   the application  of  the landlord under s. 29(2)  and  that  the revenue  courts were wrong in the view they had  taken  that that  sub-section did not apply to the present  proceedings. The  High  Court  allowed the  application  of  the  tenant, relying  on its previous Full-Bench decision  in  Durlabbhai Fakirbhai  v.  Jhaverbhai Bhikabhai (1), where it  was  held that as the tenancy had (1)  (1956) 58 Bom.  L.R. 85. 571 terminated and the right to obtain possession had accrued to the  landlord  after the coming into force of  the  Amending Act, the Amending Act applied and therefore the landlord, if he  fails  to  satisfy  the  further  conditions  under  the Amending  Act,  would  not be entitled  to  possession.   It further  held  that  the Amending Act  would  apply  to  all proceedings where the period of notice had expired after the Amending  Act  had  come  into  force  and  that  what  tile Amending.   Act did was that it imposed a new limitation  on the  tight of the landlord to obtain possession and  if  the landlord  failed to satisfy the court at the date  when  the tenancy expired and he became entitled to possession that he was so entitled in law as it then stood, he could not  claim relief  from the court.  It is the correctness of this  view which is being challenged before us in the present appeal. The  contention on behalf of the appellant is that s.  34(1) gives  a right to the landlord to terminate the  tenancy  by one year’s notice, which was given in this case in  December 1951 before the Amending Act came into force.  Therefore the notice  having been given before the Amending Act came  into force,  the  further  limitation put on  the  right  of  the landlord  by  subs. (2-A), introduced by the  Amending  Act, would  not  apply to notices given before the  Amending  Act came  into force.  The appellant further contends  that  the right  to terminate a tenancy having arisen when the  notice was  given, the law to be applied, in case of notices  given before  the Amending Act came into force, would be  the  law existing on the date of notice. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. If  we  look  at the words of  sub-s.  (2-A),  it  provider, certain  conditions subject to which the right to  terminate the  tenancy  shall be exercised.  It may be that  s.  34(1) requires  one year’s notice in order to exercise this  right to terminate, but flubs. (2-A) imposer, restrictions on  the landlord’s right to terminate the tenancy and does not speak of  any notice at all.  Therefore, when we have to  look  to the application of sub-s. (2-A) it is the date on which 572 the  tenancy  terminates which determines  its  application.

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The restriction by sub-s. (2-A) is on the right to terminate the tenancy and this restriction would come into play on the day  on which the landlord’s right to terminate the  tenancy is perfected, namely, the day on which the tenancy  actually terminates in consequence of the notice given to  terminate, it.  A notice under s. 34(1) is merely a declaration to  the tenant  of  the intention of the landlord to  terminate  the tenancy; but it is always open to the landlord not to  carry out  his intention.  Therefore, for the application  of  the restriction under sub-s. (2-A) on the right of the  landlord to  terminate the tenancy, the crucial date is not the  date of  notice  but  the date on which the  right  to  terminate matures,  that,  is, the date on which  the  tenancy  stands terminated.   It  is on ’,-$hat date that the court  has  to enforce the right of the landlord arising out of the  notice of  termination and therefore the court has to  see  whether the  termination  is  in accordance  with  the  restrictions imposed  by  subs.(2-A)  on  the date the  right  is  to  be enforced. Nor are we impressed by the argument that by applying sub-s. (2-A)  to notices issued before the Amending Act  came  into force  we  would  be taking away the  vested  right  of  the landlord.  As we have already pointed out, the notice  under s.  34  (1)  is merely a declaration to the  tenant  of  the landlord’s intention to terminate the tenancy and no further proceedings  may  be taken by the  landlord  in  consequence thereof It is only when the period of notice has expired and the  tenancy  has terminated that the  landlord  acquires  a vested  right to obtain possession of the land.   Therefore, the  Amending  Act did not affect any vested  right  of  the landlords  till the tenancy actually stood terminated  after the  expiry of the notice.  Consequently, the provisions  of the  Amending Act which came into force before  the  tenancy stood  terminated by the notice will have to be  taken  into consideration  in determining the right of the  landlord  in the  matter of the termination of tenancy, for the  Amending Act  put certain fetters on this right of  termination.   In the circumstances, we are of opinion 573 that the view taken by the High Court is correct and  sub-s. (2-A) would apply to all cases where notices might have been given  but  where the tenancy had  not  actually  terminated before the coming into force of the Amending Act. This  view,  which appears to us to be plain enough  on  the words  of  sub-s.  (2-A), is  further  enforced  by  another consideration, even if there is any doubt as to the  meaning of  sub-s. (2-A).  That consideration is that  the  Amending Act  is  a  piece of beneficent legislation  meant  for  the protection  of  tenants.  Therefore, if there is  any  doubt about  the  meaning  of sub-s. (2-A) that  doubt  should  be resolved  in  favour of the tenant, for  whose  benefit  the Amending  Act was passed.,. In this view it is obvious  that the legislature could not have intended that the benefit  of this beneficent measure should not be extended to tenants in whose  cases  the  tenancy had not  yet  terminated,  though notices  had been given, when the further restrictions  were being put on the right to terminate the tenancy. Learned counsel for  the appellant has drawn our  attention in  this  connection to Jeebankrishna Chakrabarti  v.  Abdul Kader  Chaudhuri (1).  In that case, the Bengal Tenancy  Act was  amended and the amendment provided that a tenant  would be liable to ejectment on one year’s notice by the landlord. The  earlier law provided for a notice of ejectment but  did not provide that the notice should be for one year; it  pro- vided  no period of notice whatsoever and it was  sufficient

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under  it  to  give  notice expiring  with  the  end  of  an agricultural  year in order to effect  ejectment,  howsoever short might be the period of notice.  The question therefore arose  whether the amendment applied to notices given  under the  old law, and the Calcutta High Court held that  it  did not.  The circumstances under which that decision was  given are entirely different from the circumstances of the present case.   In  that case the contents of notice  were  changed; while  formerly what was required was a notice  without  any particular  period, the amendment required a notice  of  one year.  There was no provision in the (1)  (1933) I.L.R. LX Cal. 1037- 574 Amending  Act making notices which were in  accordance  with the  previous law ineffective.  In these  circumstances  the Calcutta High Court was right in holding that the  amendment did  not  affect notices already given.   No  such  question however arises in the present case.  The period of notice is the same before and after the amendment in the present case, and what we have to see is whether the crucial date for  the application of the new sub-section (2-A) is the date of  the notice  or the date of the termination of the  tenancy.   We have  already  held that that date must be the date  of  the termination of the tenancy. In the circumstances the  appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.                                      Appeal dismissed.