JITENDRA KUMAR SINGH Vs STATE OF U.P..
Case number: C.A. No.-000074-000074 / 2010
Diary number: 11542 / 2007
Advocates: SIDDHARTHA CHOWDHURY Vs
GUNNAM VENKATESWARA RAO
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.74 OF 2010 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1952 OF 2008)
JITENDRA KUMAR SINGH AND ANR. ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ……RESPONDENT(S)
WITH Civil Appeal No.75 /2010 (@ SLP (C) No. 1967 of 2008)
WITH Civil Appeal No.79 /2010 (@ SLP (C) No. 1959 of 2008)
WITH Civil Appeal No.80 /2010 (@ SLP (C) No. 7739 of 2008)
WITH Civil Appeal Nos.76-78 /2010 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 14078-14080 of 2008)
WITH Civil Appeal No.81 /2010 (@ SLP (C) No. 19100 of 2009)
J U D G M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
Civil Appeal Nos…………………………… of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C)Nos.1952, 1959, 1967 & 7739 of 2008
1. Leave granted.
2. These Appeals are directed against the common Division
Bench judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
dated 22.12.2006. By the aforesaid judgment, the High Court
decided number of Appeals directed against the common
judgment of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
No.25328 of 2001 and a number of other connected writ
petitions.
3. The appellants had assailed the judgment dated 22.5.2002 of
the learned Single Judge to the extent that the Writ Petition
Nos.25328, 26847, 36411, 28836, 26177, 34039, 4630, 32763,
27849, 27060, 29069 of 2001 and 47528 of 2002 had been
dismissed whereby the petitioners-appellants were seeking a writ in
the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to send them for
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training to the post of Sub Inspectors. In some of the writ petitions,
a prayer had also been made for quashing the entire select list
which was also declined by the learned Single Judge. In Special
Appeal No.592 of 2006, the appellant who was respondent had
assailed the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge only to
the extent the Single Judge had issued a writ in the nature of
mandamus to the respondent-appellants to fill up vacancies against
2% Sports Quota from the aforesaid selection itself. In Special
Appeal No.1285 of 2002, the original petitioner had challenged the
judgment dated 01.10.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge
(R.K.Agarwal, J.) dismissing the writ petition no.47528 of 2002
following the judgment dated 22.5.2002 of Ashok Bhusan, J. in
writ petition no.25328 of 2001 and other connected matters (supra).
In Special Appeal No.910 of 2005, the original petitioner had
assailed the judgment dated 19.7.2005 of Sunil Ambwani, J.
dismissing writ petition no.29383 of 2001 again following the
judgment dated 22.5.2002 of Ashok Bhusan,J (supra).
4. The dispute between the petitioners and the respondents
revolves around the issue of reservation of posts for Backward
3
Classes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Women Candidates
and Sportspersons.
5. We may notice here the relevant facts before we advert to
controversy in detail.
6. An advertisement was issued on 4.5.1999 for direct
recruitment on the post of Sub Inspectors in Civil Police (hereinafter
referred to as “SICP”) and Platoon Commanders in PAC
(hereinafter referred to as “PC”). According to the respondents, the
break down of the posts was 1379 Posts for SICP and 255 posts
for PC. Out of these posts, 2% posts were reserved for outstanding
Sportspersons. The recruitments to these posts were to be made by
a separate advertisement. Apart from above, 10% of the posts were
reserved for women.
7. The procedure for selection included a Preliminary Written
Test consisting of 300 marks. Candidates were required to secure at
least 50% marks for being declared successful and entitled to
participate in further test. This was followed by a Physical Test
consisting of 100 marks. Again the candidate had to secure at least
50% or more marks. The marks obtained in the Preliminary Written
Test and the Physical Test were, however, not to be included for
4
determination of final merit. Candidates who qualified in the
Preliminary Written Test and the Physical Test were required to
appear in the Main Written Test consisting of 600 marks, having
two papers i.e. General Hindi, General Knowledge and Mental
Aptitude Test. Here again a candidate who secured 40% or more
marks could only be declared successful. The written test consisted
of two papers- (i) Hindi language and Essay consisting of 200
marks and (ii) General Knowledge and Mental Aptitude Test
consisting of 400 marks. Thereafter, the candidate was to appear
for interview which consisted of 75 marks. There were, however, no
qualifying marks for the interview.
8. It is common ground that in response to the advertisement,
more than 50,000 candidates applied for the posts. The result for
the Preliminary Written Test which was held on 6.2.2000, was
declared on 22.9.2000. 7325 candidates were found successful.
Physical Test was held from 29.10.2000 to 6.11.2000 and 1454
candidates were found successful. The Main Written Test was held
on 29.4.2001 wherein 1178 candidates were declared successful.
The final result of the interview was declared on 6.7.2001, wherein
1006 candidates were declared successful. The number of persons
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who were selected in different categories finally and have been sent
for Training is as under:-
1. General (Male) for the post of Sub Inspectors 608 2. General (Female) for the post of Sub
Inspectors (This included one dependent of freedom fighter) Note: 163 OBC, 19 Scheduled Castes and 1 Scheduled Tribes candidates having secured more than the last general candidate, were selected against general vacancies.
15
3. OBC (male) for the post of Sub Inspectors 168 4. OBC (female) for the post of Sub Inspectors 9 5. SC (male) for the post of Sub Inspectors 25 6. SC (female) for the post of Sub Inspectors 1 7. ST (male) for the post of Sub Inspectors 3 8. General (male) Platoon Commander in PAC 125
9. All the petitioners-appellants who applied pursuant to the
aforesaid advertisement had participated in the entire selection
process. However, the names did not figure in the merit list of the
selected candidates.
10. The selection was challenged in a number of writ petitions by
candidates who were not included in the select list. According to
the High Court, the selection was challenged on the following
grounds:-
1.The selection has been made by adopting pick and
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choose method.
2.More than 600 posts are still vacant yet the petitioners have not been declared successful.
3.There was no guideline or criteria for interview.
4.The number of candidates appeared for main examination and interview being less than the total number of vacancies, therefore, the petitioner- appellants could not have been unsuccessful.
5.Several candidates having inferior educational record have been declared successful.
6.Certain persons having Roll Nos.0492198, 520570, 0492263, 760146, 480612, 492353, 7706166, 790658, 790519 and 790035 did not find place in the result after main examination yet have been shown as selected finally in the final merit list which shows serious irregularities and bungling in the selection.
7.Keeping large number of vacancies unfilled although successful candidates are available is a motive for extracting illegal demand.
11. The writ petitions were opposed by the State Government by
filing a detailed counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No.26177 of 2001.
The aforesaid counter-affidavit was said to have been read on behalf
of the State in all the cases. It was explained by the State
7
Government that in response to the advertisement, total 53780
application forms were received. It was further explained that 1178
candidates had qualified in the main written test who appeared in
the interview which was held between 18.6.2001 to 1.7.2001. It
was further explained that vide Government order dated 3.2.1999,
2956 posts of SICP were sanctioned, out of which 50% posts were
to be filled by direct recruit and 50% posts by promotion.
Therefore, 1478 posts came to be filled in by direct recruit. Since
99 posts were filled under the Category of “Dying in Harness” Rules,
only 1379 posts remained to be filled. Separate selection was to be
held on the 2% vacancies reserved for Sportspersons through a
separate advertisement. Therefore, as a matter of fact, actual
recruitment was made i.e. only for 1350 posts of SICP and 255
posts of PC. The break-up of the posts was as indicated above.
12. Upon consideration of the entire matter, Ashok Bhusan, J.
delivered common judgment dated 22.5.2002 in CMWP No.25328
of 2001 (Narendra Partap Singh vs. Director General of Police, UP
and others). All the writ petitions were disposed of with the
following observations:-
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“In view of the foregoing discussions none of the contentions of the petitioner can be accepted except the contention regarding 2% reservation for sports men. Relief claimed by the petitioner cannot be granted except the direction to the respondents to recalculate the number of posts of general category candidates by applying 2% reservation for sports men horizontally and adding 2% posts of sports men also while calculating the total number of vacancies of general category candidates. If after applying 2% reservation horizontally any post in general category candidates quota remains vacant the same shall be filled up by the general category candidates next in merit. It is, however, made clear that by the said exercise the selection already made will not be affected in any manner.
All the writ petitions are disposed of with the aforesaid directions”
13. This judgment was subsequently followed in the separate
judgments delivered by R.K.Agarwal, J. and Sunil Ambwani, J. All
the three judgments were challenged in appeals before the Division
Bench, which have been decided by the common judgment dated
22.12.2006.
14. The Division Bench noticed the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties in detail and formulated seven
issues which arose in the appeals. The issues were as under:-
“1. What is the extent of selection of a reserve category candidate against unreserved
9
seats and in what circumstances he can be considered against unreserved vacancies besides reserve seats. The relevant factors, shades and nuisances for such adjustment also need to be identified, if any.
2. Whether Section 3 (6) of Act of 1994 would apply where a candidate of reserve category though has availed relaxation meant for reserve category candidates namely fee and age but in all other respect, in the selection test, has completed with general category candidates and has secured more marks than the last selected general category candidate. In other words whether relaxation in age and fee would deprive and outsource him from competing against an unreserved seat in an open competition with general candidates.
3. Whether selection of reserve category candidates against reserved and unreserved constituting more than 50% is unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to law.
4. Whether reservation of seats for women is violative of Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India.
5. Whether seats reserved for women can be carried forward in case suitable candidates are not available or the reservation being horizontal and applicable to all categories, the unfilled vacancies are to be filled by suitable male candidates.
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6. Whether keeping 2% sports quota separate from the selection in question is illegal.
7. Whether selection in question is otherwise vitiated on account of any alleged irregularity or bungling.
15. The Division Bench noticed the historical background in
which the provisions with regard to reservation came to be
incorporated in the Constitution of India. The Division Bench also
noticed the entire history with regard to the various government
orders making reservation for different categories. The Division
Bench notices that the matter of reservation has been dealt in detail
by this Court in numerous cases. Therefore, the Division Bench
has confined itself to the problem as, faced and countered, in the
State of U.P; particularly with reference to the category of the
candidates belonging to ‘O.B.Cs.’ The Division Bench also noticed
the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Public Services
(Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1994
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1994”). The High Court
considered issues no.1, 2 and 3 together.
11
16. The Division Bench has concluded that the various
Government orders and the Act of 1994 provide reservation in State
services with the intent to achieve the goal of adequate
representation of Backward Classes of Citizens in service. It notices
that reservation under Article 16(4) has to be made keeping in view
the provisions contained in Article 14, 16(1) and 335 of the
Constitution of India. It is also held that there are various modes
and methods of providing reservation. The extent and nature of
reservation is a matter for the State to decide considering the facts
and requirements of each case. In this case the Legislature has
empowered the State to extend concessions limited to fee and age to
OBCs, besides keeping reservation of seats to the extent of 27%.
The prime objective, obviously, is to provide adequate
representation to these classes, which in the opinion of the
Legislature are not adequately represented in the services under the
State. The Division Bench also concluded that the State
Government has not conducted any indepth study to find out as to
whether adequate representation has been given to any particular
Backward Classes as a result of successive provisions for
reservation. Therefore, a direction has been given to the State
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Government of U.P. to undertake an indepth study to find out the
representation of various Backward Citizens in Public service and to
find out whether any Backward Class citizens have achieved the
constitutional goal of adequate representation in service or not.
Thereafter, the Government is to review the policy in the light of
facts, figures and information received pursuant to such study. The
exercise is to be undertaken by the State Government within six
months and a compliance report is to be submitted to the Court.
17. With regard to the manner, mechanism and inter-relationship
of various concessions and reservations, the Division Bench
observed that it is permissible for the State to provide concessions
to achieve the goal under Article 16(4) without keeping the seats
reserved for any backward class of citizens. When certain seats are
reserved, it would not result in making unreserved seats
compartmentalized for General Category candidates i.e. unreserved
candidates. There is no reservation for General Category
Candidates. It is also held that a reserved category candidate, in
addition to the reserved seats, can always compete for unreserved
seat. The Division Bench has further held that the reserved
category candidate can also compete against the unreserved seats
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under a criteria which is uniformly applicable to all the candidates.
In case the selection criteria is lowered for the reserved category
candidate, then such difference in standard or criteria would
disentitle the reserved category candidate to compete in the general
category. After analyzing the law laid down by this Court in
numerous judgments, the Division Bench has concluded that the
conflicting claims of individuals under Article 16(1) and the
preferential treatment given to a backward class under Article 16(4)
of the Constitution has to be balanced, objectively. The Division
Bench then considered as to whether the concession or relaxation
in the matter of fee and age would deprive a reserved candidate of
his right to be considered against an unreserved seat. Can it be said
that such a candidate is not a person who has competed with the
general category in an open competition. It is noticed that under
GOs (Government Orders) dated 11.04.1991, 19.12.1991 and
16.04.1992 and the clarification dated 19th October, 1992, it was
provided that a reserved category candidate cannot compete with
the open category candidate(s) after availing preferences which
result in lowering of the prescribed standards. Such a candidate
would only be considered against seat/post for the reserved
14
category. However, after the promulgation of the 1994 Act and
issuance of the Instructions dated 25th of March, 1994, the State
Government has not treated relaxation in age and fee as relaxation
in the standard of selection. Therefore, even if a candidate has
availed concession in fee and or age limit, it cannot be treated to be
a relaxation in standard of selection. Therefore, it would not deny a
reserved category candidate selection in Open Competition with
General Category candidates. Such concessions can be granted by
the State under Section 8(1) of the Act. The Division Bench has
also held that a relaxation in age and concession in fee are
provisions pertaining to eligibility of a candidate to find out as to
whether he can appear in a competitive test or not and by itself do
not provide any indicia of open competition. The competition would
start only at a stage when all the persons who fulfill all the requisite
eligibility qualification, age etc. are short listed. The candidates in
the zone of consideration entering the list on the basis of aforesaid
qualifications would thereafter participate in competition and open
competition would commence therefrom. Therefore, concession
granted under Section 8 would not disentitle a reserved category
candidate of the benefit under Section 3 sub-Section (6).
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18. In view of the above legal position, it has been held that if a
reserved category candidate has secured marks more than the last
General Category candidate, he is entitled to be selected against the
unreserved seat without being adjusted against the reserved seat.
According to the Division Bench, merely because 183 candidates,
belonging to the reserved category, have been successful against
unreserved seats would not result in reverse discrimination, as
apprehended by the petitioners. This is particularly so as selection
of such reserved category candidate against the unreserved seats
would not be material for the purpose of applying the principle of
reservation being limited to a total of 50%.
19. The Division Bench has also held that the reservation in
favour of women is constitutionally permissible and is valid. On
issue No.5 it has been held that in view of the GO dated 26.02.1999
(para 4), the 52 vacancies of general category kept reserved for
women candidates have been illegally carried forward for the next
selection instead of filling in from the general category male
candidates. However, since the posts remained vacant, the same
had to be filled from the general category male candidates and
could not be carried forward.
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20. Reservation in favour of sportspersons quota (2%) has also
been upheld. It was held that the aforesaid reservation has to
operate horizontally, therefore, the 29 vacancies which remained
unfilled could not have been carried forward. The observations
made by the Single Judge on this issue have been approved. A
direction has been issued as follows:-
“We direct the respondent-authorities to fill in the unfilled vacancies reserved for women candidates and sportsmen from suitable candidates of respective category on the basis of merit list and send them for training and provide all other benefits, if any as per rules. However, we may add here, since the respondents did not hold recruitment for sports persons in the present selection and we are informed that a separate selection was held, therefore, we provide that the vacancies remain unfilled from the separate selection held for sportsmen against 29 vacancies separated from the impugned selection, only those remaining vacancies shall be made available to the respective candidates of this selection.”
21. The aforesaid findings of the Division Bench have been
challenged in these appeals by the unsuccessful candidates as well
as the State of U.P.
22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
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23. Mr. L.N. Rao, learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants submitted that the cardinal issue raised in these appeals
is whether the reserved category candidates who had taken the
benefit of age or fee relaxation, are entitled to be counted as
general category candidates. According to the learned Sr.Counsel,
the Division Bench has erred in law in concluding that relaxation in
age and fee cannot be treated to be relaxation in standard of
selection and shall not deny a reserved category candidate's
selection in Open Competition with General Category candidate.
According to learned Sr. Counsel, the benefit of reservation under
Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India is a group right whereas
under Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of India, it is an individual
right. It is emphasized that reservation under Article 16(4) of the
Constitution of India will take into its fold concessions. Once a
candidate falls within the reserved category, he/she can only exit
the Group i.e. from the benefit of Article 16(4) of the Constitution
of India to Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India on fulfillment of
two circumstances, namely, (a) imposition of a creamy layer and (b)
merit selection. That is where there is a level playing field in respect
of the selection process, without any benefit under Article 16(4) of
18
the Constitution of India. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, a
level playing field would be of candidates who have not availed of
any concessions or relaxation. All things have to be equal for all the
candidates.
24. According to learned Sr. Counsel, there is a distinction
between relaxation and concession which pertain to a particular
selection process and mere support mechanism (such as General
Coaching) independent of a criteria for a particular selection.
25. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, selection process would
include all stages. There can be no distinction that relaxation in age
and fee can be treated as provisions pertaining to eligibility i.e. to
bring a candidate within the zone of consideration. According to the
learned Sr. Counsel, it is hair splitting to divide the selection
process into further parts. Each undermines the concept of “level
playing field”. Learned Sr. Counsel further submitted that the
Division Bench has misinterpreted Section 3 of the Act of 1994. It
has to be read as a whole. Section 8 is in nature of exception to
Section 3 (6), because it creates a non-level playing field.
26. In order to emphasize that reservation under Article 16 (4) of
the Constitution of India is a group right, and includes preferences,
19
concessions and exemptions, Mr. L.N. Rao relied on certain
observations of this Court made in the case of Indra Sawhney and
others vs. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (3) Supreme
Court Cases 217. According to him, the fact that only age and fee
relaxations were given does not take the reserved category
candidates out of the group category. He has also relied on the
judgment rendered in the case of Post Graduate Institute of
Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh and others vs.
K.L.Narsimhan and another, 1997 (6) SCC 283 in support of the
submission that once a candidate takes advantage of relaxation in
the eligibility criteria, he/she has to be treated as a reserved
category candidate.
27. With regard to the interpretation to be placed on the Act of
1994, Mr. L.N.Rao submitted that Section 3 preserves the definition
of the group throughout. According to him, Sections 3 (6) and
Section 8 are to be read together in the following way i.e. in Section
3(6), the term “gets selected on the basis of merit in an open
competition” denotes a level playing field in Open Competition
permitting exit from the group into the merit category. Section 8
lowers the level playing field “for any competitive examination” and
20
clubs three categories together- (a) fees, (b) interview and (c ) age
limit. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, the invocation of
Section 8 wholly excludes the operation of Section 3 (6) to which
Section 8 is an exception. He further submitted that relaxation and
concessions may be of various kinds. Each is a part of Article 16 (4)
of the Constitution of India and could have egalitarian
consequences. In support of the submissions, reliance is placed on
observations of this Court made in paragraph 743 in the case of
Indra Sawhney (supra). According to the learned Sr. Counsel,
there is a distinction between social support mechanisms prior to
an examination, (which are also a part of Article 16 (4) of the
Constitution of India) and the relaxations/concessions which relate
to the selection process itself. According to the learned Sr. Counsel,
supplemental and ancillary provisions to ensure full availment of
provisions for reservation would be a part of reservation under
Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the
selection process has to be seen as a whole. It cannot be split up
into different parts. Section 8 is an exception to Section 3(6). In
view of the above, according to the learned Sr. Counsel, the Division
Bench has erroneously held that in view of Section 8 of the Act of
21
1994, reserved category candidates can be permitted to compete
with the General Category candidates. Learned Sr. Counsel has
also submitted that the learned Single Judge has wrongly
distinguished the judgment in the case of K.L.Narsimhan (supra)
on the basis that it was over-ruled by a larger five Judges Bench in
the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education &
Research, Chandigarh vs. Faculty Association and others,
(1998) 4 SCC 1. The aforesaid judgment was over-ruled only on
one particular point raised in the review application. The
aforesaid judgment had decided three appeals in a common
judgment. Review was filed only in one. Therefore, the judgment in
other cases is not over-ruled. It has in fact been subsequently
referred to in Dr.Preeti Srivastava and Anr. V. State of M.P. and
Ors., 1999(7) SCC 120, Bharati Vidyapeeth and Ors v. State of
Maharashtra and Anr., 2004 (11) SCC 755 and State of Madhya
Pradesh and Ors. V. Gopal D.Tirpathi and Ors., 2003 (7) SCC 83.
Therefore, according to Mr. L.N.Rao, the reasoning given therein is
still relevant. Learned Sr. Counsel then relied on the judgment in
the case of Union of India and another v. Satya Prakash and
others, JT 2006 (4) SC 524, in support of the submission that
22
only a candidate who has been selected without taking advantage of
any relaxation/concession can be adjusted against a seat meant
for General Category Candidate. Learned Sr. Counsel then
submitted that the vacancies which are reserved for Women
candidates remained unfilled, and therefore, ought to have been
filled from the men candidates belonging to the General Category.
Even these vacancies have been illegally carried forward. The
reservation in favour of women is referable to Article 15 (3) of the
Constitution of India and not Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, it is horizontal reservation in which carry forward
rule would not be applicable. Even with the carry forward rule
which is applicable only to vertical reservations, 50% cap as
approved in Indra Sawhney case (supra) cannot be permitted to
be breached.
28. In fact in the present case, the reserved category candidates
have occupied one third of the posts meant for the General
Category. If the argument of the State is accepted in addition to the
quota of 50% (with carry forward), another 183 out of 1014 (18%)
would be added. Learned Sr. Counsel reiterated that the purpose
of reservation is not to distribute largesse, but to create
23
empowerment among the disadvantaged. The test is, therefore,
“adequacy”, not mechanical over-empowerment, which must be
constantly maintained. Learned Sr. Counsel also emphasized that
the provisions contained in Article 16 (4) (a) and (b) of the
Constitution of India are all enabling provisions and subject to (a)
creamy layer, (b) 50% cap (c ) compelling reasons and (d)
proportionality. In the present case, the State has failed to give any
details with regard to adequacy of representation. Finally, learned
Sr. Counsel submitted that reservation in favour of women is even
otherwise violative of Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India.
29. On the other hand, Mr. Dwivedi, learned Senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that in fact no
cause of action has arisen in favour of the appellants. All of them
are qualified candidates who did not make it to the final select list
on the basis of comparative merit. He then submitted that in fact
the selected candidates who are likely to be affected, have not been
made parties. It has also been submitted that in any case, no relief
can be granted to the appellants, at this stage as all the posts had
already been filled. Therefore, the submissions made by the
appellants are merely an academic exercise. According to him, the
24
Division Bench has correctly interpreted Section 3 of the Act of
1994. He further submits, by the suggested interpretation, the
appellants seek to add the words from Section 8 to sub-section (6)
of Section 3. There is no relaxation in the qualifications. The
concession is only in the matter of fee and the age which pertains
only to eligibility of a candidate to apply for the post. The criteria for
selection for all the candidates is identical, which has not been
lowered, by the concessions/relaxations in fee and age. Under
Section 3(6), the candidate even though belonging to a reserved
category is entitled to be treated as a General Category Candidate.
According to Mr. Dwivedi, the Division Bench has correctly observed
that taking advantage of fee concession or age relaxation would not
be a bar for the reserved category candidates to be treated as
general category candidates. They can be taken out of General
Category only as an exception i.e. if their standard is lowered. On
the other hand, if by relaxation, the reserved category candidate
gets no advantage, he cannot be compartmentalized. The judgment
relied upon by the appellants in K.L.Narsimhan (supra) has been
over-ruled in the subsequent judgment of this Court in the case of
Faculty Association (supra). Once the judgment is over-ruled, it
25
cannot be argued that it is only partly over-ruled. Learned Senior
counsel also submitted that the particular sentence relied upon by
learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in the
case of K.L.Narsimhan (supra) is a stray observation and cannot
be treated as an authoritative pronouncement or a precedent. In
any event, according to him, in the case of K.L.Narsimhan (supra),
the issue of relaxation in age or fee was not considered. In the case
of Satya Prakash (supra), it has been clearly held that
candidates who have been recommended without resorting to the
relaxed standard shall not be adjusted against the vacancies
reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other
Backward Classes. According to the learned Senior counsel, even
Indra Sawhney case (supra) only lays down the meaning of
“Reservation” in terms of Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India.
30. SLP (C ) Nos.14078-80 of 2008 have been filed by the State of
U.P. challenging the common final judgment of the Division Bench
dated 22.12.2006 and the final order dated 18.12.2007 declining to
modify or recall the earlier judgment dated 22.12.2006. In support
of the appeals, Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Sr. Counsel submitted
that the learned Single Judge of the High Court had taken notice of
26
the fact that total posts of SICP were 1231 (male) + 148 (female).
2% posts were reserved for sports persons. Therefore, 29 posts of
SICP and 5 posts of PC were earmarked for Sports Quota. Since 608
male candidates belonging to the General Category were selected,
67 posts of General category were available for women. However,
only 15 candidates had been selected. Therefore, 52 posts were
filled up on merit from male candidates in accordance with the
Government Order dated 26.2.1999. Therefore, it was noticed by
the learned Single Judge that no post in General Category was
vacant. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Single
Judge had wrongly issued the directions in the final paragraph of
the judgment to recalculate the number of posts of General
Category candidates by applying 2% reservation for Sportsmen
horizontally and adding 2% posts of sportsmen also while
calculating the total number of vacancies of General Category
candidates. This direction had been challenged by the State and
the Director General of Police in Special Appeal Nos.910 of 2005
and 592 of 2006. In spite of the aforesaid categoric finding of the
learned Single Judge, that there were no vacant posts, the Division
Bench concluded that the vacancies which were left unfilled were
27
carried forward for next selection, instead of filling in from the
General Category of male candidates. In fact Government Order
dated 26.2.1999 was fully complied with. According to the learned
Sr. Counsel, the direction issued by the Division Bench to fill up the
unfilled vacancies reserved for women candidates and sportsmen
from suitable candidates of respective categories has been issued
without taking into account that all the vacant posts have been
filled, in accordance with the Government Order. The Division
Bench has failed to appreciate that no unfilled posts reserved for
women and the Sportsmen quota have been carried forward.
31. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned Sr. Counsel reiterated the
submissions made by Mr.L.N. Rao. According Dr.Dhawan the
judgment in the case of K.L.Narsimhan (supra) has only been
partly over-ruled in one case. The aforesaid judgement had decided
three appeals by a common judgement, therefore, the reasoning of
the judgment is still intact and would be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. Since the reserved category
candidates have been given relaxation in the age and the fee, the
same would fall within the group right of reservation under Article
16 (4) of the Constitution of India. Learned Sr. Counsel reiterated
28
that once a candidate takes advantage of reservation/concessions
under Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India, he/she cannot be
permitted to be appointed against the seat meant for the General
Category. According to the learned Sr. counsel, all parts of Section
3 of the Act of 1994 talk of group rights. There cannot be an exit
from reservation, once a benefit is taken. In other words, a
candidate covered under Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India
cannot also be a candidate under Article 16 (1) of the Constitution
of India.
32. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties.
33. The core issue in the writ petitions was with regard to filling
up the General Category posts by candidates belonging to the
reserved category candidates on their obtaining more marks than
the last candidate in the General Category. The submissions made
by the learned counsel for the appellants are all over-lapping.
Reference to case law is also common. In our opinion, it is not
necessary to consider the larger issues raised by the learned
counsel for the parties with regard to the nature and extent of
reservation. These issues have been dilated upon by this Court in
29
numerous judgments. The Division Bench in the impugned
judgment has traced the history of reservation at considerable
length. It has also distinguished between vertical and horizontal
reservations. It has also correctly concluded that in case of
horizontal reservation, the carry forward rule would not be
applicable. All these issues are no longer res integra, in view of the
authoritative judgment rendered in the case of Indra Sawhney
(supra). It can also be no longer disputed that reservation under
Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India aims at group
backwardness. It provides for group right. Article 16 (1) of the
Constitution of India guarantees equality of opportunity to all
citizens in matters relating to employment. However, in
implementing the reservation policy, the State has to strike a
balance between the competing claims of the individual under
Article 16(1) and the reserved categories falling within Article 16(4).
A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indra Sawhney
case (supra), this Court reiterated the need to balance the
Fundamental Right of the individual under Article 16(1) against the
interest and claim of the reserve category candidates under Article
16(4) of the Constitution.
30
“It needs no emphasis to say that the principal aim of Article 14 and 16 is equality and equality of opportunity and that Clause (4) of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the very same objective. Clause (4) is a special provision – though not an exception to Clause (1). Both the provision have to be harmonized keeping in mind the fact that both are but the restatements of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. The provision under Article 16(4) – conceived in the interest of certain sections of society – should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Clause (1) of Article 16 which is a guarantee held out to every citizen and to the entire society. If is relevant to point out that Dr. Ambedkar himself contemplated reservation being “confined to a minority of seats” (see his speech in Constituent Assembly, set out in para 28). No. other member of the Constituent Assembly suggested otherwise. It is thus, clear that reservation of a majority of seats were never envisaged by the found Fathers. Nor are we satisfied that the present context requires us to depart from that concept.”
34. In PGI MER vs. Faculty Association (supra in para 32 the
same principle was reiterated as under:-
“32. Article 14, 15 and 16 including Articles 16(4), 16(4-A) must be applied in such a manner so that the balance is struck in the matter of appointments by creating reasonable opportunities for the reserved classes and also for the other members of the community who do not belong to reserved classes. Such view has been indicated in the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Balaji case,
31
Devendasan case and Sabharwal case. Even in Indra Sawhney case the same view has been held by indicating that only a limited reservation not exceeding 50% is permissible. It is to be appreciated that Article 15(4) is an enabling provision like Article 16(4) and the reservation under either provision should not exceed legitimate limits. In making reservations for the backward classes, the State cannot ignore the fundamental rights of the rest of the citizens. The special provision under Article 15(4 [sic 16(4)] must therefore strike a balance between several relevant considerations and proceed objectively. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in State of AP vs. USV Balram and A Rajendran v. Union of India, it has been indicated in Indra Sawhney case that Clause (4) of Article 16 is not in the nature of an exception to Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 but an instance of classification permitted by Clause (1). It has also been indicated in the said decision that Clause (4) of Article 16 does not cover the entire field covered by Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16. In Indra Sawhney case this Court has also indicated that in the interests of the Backward clauses of citizens, the State cannot reserve all the appointments under the State or even a majority of them. The doctrine of equality of opportunity in Clause (1) of Article 16 is to be reconciled in favour of backward clauses under Clause (4) of Article 16 in such a manner that the latter while serving the cause of backward classes shall not unreasonably encroach upon the field of equality.”
35. These observations make it abundantly clear that the
reservations should not be so excessive as to render the
32
Fundamental Right under Article 16(1) of the Constitution
meaningless. In Indra Sawhney (supra), this Court has observed
as under:-
“In our opinion, however, the result of application of carry-forward rule, in whatever manner it is operated, shall not result in breach of 50% rule.”
36. Therefore, utmost care has to be taken that the 50% maximum
limit placed on reservation in any particular year by this Court in
Indra Sawhney case (supra) must be maintained. It must further
be ensured that in making reservations for the members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the maintenance of the
efficiency of administration is not impaired.
37. It is in this context, we have to examine the issue as to
whether the relaxation in fee and upper age limit of five years in the
category of OBC candidates would fall within the definition of
“reservation” to exclude the candidates from open competition on
the seats meant for the General Category Candidates. Taking note
of the submissions, the Division Bench has concluded by
considering questions 1, 2 and 3 that concession in respect of age,
fee etc. are provisions pertaining to eligibility of a candidate to find
33
out as to whether he can appear in the competitive test or not and
by itself do not provide any indicia of open competition. According
to the Division Bench, the competition would start only at the stage
when all the persons who fulfill the requisite eligibility conditions,
namely, qualification, age etc. are short-listed. We are of the opinion
that the conclusion reached by the Division Bench on the issue of
concessions and relaxations cannot be said to be erroneous.
38. The selection procedure provided the minimum age for
recruitment as 21 years and the maximum age of 25 years on the
cut off date. Relaxation of age for various categories of candidates in
accordance with the Government Orders issued from time to time
was also admissible. This included five years’ relaxation in age to
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and
dependents of Freedom Fighters. Relaxation of age was also
provided in case of Ex-servicemen. The period of service rendered
in Army would be reduced for computing the age of the Ex-Army
personnel. After deducting the period of service they had rendered
in the Army, they would be deemed eligible. These were mere
eligibility conditions for being permitted to participate in the
selection process. Thereafter, the candidates had to appear in a
34
Preliminary Written Test. This consisted of 300 maximum marks
and the candidates were required to secure 50% or more marks to
participate in the further selection process. Thereafter, the
candidates had to undergo physical test consisting of 100 marks.
Again a candidate was required to secure at least 50% or more
marks. It is not disputed before us that the standard of selection in
the Preliminary Written Test and the Physical Test was common to
all the candidates. In other words, the standard was not lowered in
case of the candidates belonging to the reserved category. The
Preliminary Written Test and the Physical Test were in the nature of
qualifying examinations to appear in the Main Written Test. The
marks obtained in the Preliminary Written Examination and the
Physical Test were not to be included for determination of final
merits. It was only candidates who qualified in the preliminary
written test and the physical test that became eligible to appear in
the main written test which consisted of 600 marks. As noticed
earlier, this had two papers- General Hindi, General Knowledge and
Mental Aptitude Test. A candidate who secured 40% or above
would be declared successful in the written test. Thereafter, the
candidates were to appear for interview of 75 marks. The final merit
35
list would be prepared on the basis of merit secured in the main
written test and the interview. Candidates appearing in the merit
list, so prepared, would be declared selected. It is common ground
that more than 50000 candidates appeared in the preliminary
written test. Upon declaration of the result on 22.9.2000, only
3,325 candidates were found successful. Thereafter, the physical
test which was conducted from 29.10.2000 to 6.11.2000 reduced
the successful candidates to 1454. It was these 1454 candidates
who sat in the main written test held on 29.4.2001. Upon
declaration of result, 1178 candidates were declared successful.
The candidates who were successful in the written test were
subjected to an interview between 18.6.2001 to 1.7.2001. The final
result published on 6.7.2001 declared only 1006 candidates
successful.
39. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the considered opinion
that the submissions of the appellants that relaxation in fee
or age would deprive the candidates belonging to the reserved
category of an opportunity to compete against the General Category
Candidates is without any foundation. It is to be noticed that the
reserved category candidates have not been given any advantage in
the selection process. All the candidates had to appear in the
same written test and face the same interview. It is therefore quite
apparent that the concession in fee and age relaxation only enabled
36
certain candidates belonging to the reserved category to fall within
the zone of consideration. The concession in age did not in any
manner tilt the balance in favour of the reserved category
candidates, in the preparation of final merit/select list. It is
permissible for the State in view of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 38 of the
Constitution of India to make suitable provisions in law to eradicate
the disadvantages of candidates belonging to socially and
educationally backward classes. Reservations are a mode to achieve
the equality of opportunity guaranteed under Article 16 (1) of the
Constitution of India. Concessions and relaxations in fee or age
provided to the reserved category candidates to enable them to
compete and seek benefit of reservation, is merely an aid to
reservation. The concessions and relaxations place the candidates
at par with General Category candidates. It is only thereafter the
merit of the candidates is to be determined without any further
concessions in favour of the reserved category candidates. It has
been recognized by this Court in the case of Indra Sawhney (supra) that larger concept of reservation would include incidental and
ancillary provisions with a view to make the main provision of
reservation effective. In the case of Indra Sawhney (supra), it has been observed as under:-
“743. The question then arises whether clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the topic of reservations in favour of backward classes. Before we answer this question, it is well to examine the meaning and content of the expression “reservation”. Its meaning has to be ascertained having regard to the context in which it occurs.
37
The relevant words are “any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts”. The question is whether the said words contemplate only one form of provision namely reservation simplicitor, or do they take in other forms of special provisions like preferences, concessions and exemptions. In our opinion, reservation is the highest form of special provision, while preference, concession and exemption are lesser forms. The constitutional scheme and context of Article 16 (4) induces us to take the view that larger concept of reservations takes within its sweep all supplemental and ancillary provisions and relaxations, consistent no doubt with the requirement of maintenance of efficiency of administration—the admonition of Article 335. The several concessions, exemptions and other measures issued by the Railway Administration and noticed in Karamchari Sangh are instances of supplementary, incidental and ancillary provisions made with a view to make the main provision of reservation effective i.e., to ensure that the members of the reserved class fully avail of the provision for reservation in their favour.….”
40. In our opinion, these observations are a complete answer to
the submissions made by Mr. L.N. Rao and Dr. Rajiv Dhawan on
behalf of the petitioners.
41. We are further of the considered opinion that the reliance
placed by Mr.Rao and Dr.Dhawan on the case of K.L.Narsimhan
(supra) is misplaced. Learned Sr. Counsel had relied on the
following observations:-
38
“5......Only one who does get admission or appointment by virtue of relaxation of eligibility criteria should be treated as reserved candidate.”
41. The aforesaid lines cannot be read divorced from the entire
paragraph which is as under:-
“5.It was decided that no relaxation in respect of qualifications or experience would be recommended by Scrutiny Committee for any of the applicants including candidates belonging to Dalits and Tribes. In furtherance thereof, the faculty posts would be reserved without mentioning the specialty; if the Dalit and Tribe candidates were available and found suitable, they would be treated as reserved candidates. If no Dalit and Tribe candidate was found available, the post would be filled from general candidates; otherwise the reserved post would be carried forward to the next year/advertisement. It is settled law that if a Dalit or Tribe candidate gets selected for admission to a course or appointment to a post on the basis of merit as general candidate, he should not be treated as reserved candidate. Only one who does get admission or appointment by virtue of relaxation of eligibility criteria should be treated as reserved candidate.”
42. These observations make it clear that if a reserved category
candidate gets selected on the basis of merit, he cannot be treated
as a reserved candidate. In the present case, the concessions
39
availed of by the reserved category candidates in age relaxation and
fee concession had no relevance to the determination of the inter se
merit on the basis of the final written test and interview. The ratio
of the aforesaid judgment in fact permits reserved category
candidates to be included in the General Category Candidates on
the basis of merit.
43. Even otherwise, merely quoting the isolated observations in a
judgment cannot be treated as a precedent de hors the facts and
circumstances in which the aforesaid observation was made.
Considering a similar proposition in the case of Union of India &
Ors. vs. Dhanwanti Devi and others, 1996(6) SCC 44, this Court
observed as follows:-
"9......... It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio
40
and not every observation found therein. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution."
44. In the case of State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Md. Illiyas reported
in 2006(1) SCC 275, the Supreme Court reiterates the law, as
follows:-
"12............. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament."
45. We may now examine the ratio in Narasimhan case (supra)
keeping in view the aforesaid principles. On 16.11.1990 an
advertisement was issued by Post Graduate Institute of Medical
Education and Research (hereinafter referred to as ‘PGI’) relating to
41
recruitment to the post of Assistant Professor; out of 12 posts, 8
was reserved for Scheduled Caste and 4 posts were reserved for
Scheduled Tribes. Since all the available posts were sought to be
filled on the basis of reservation, the same were challenged in two
writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh.
Both the writ petitions were allowed by the learned Single Judge. It
was held that the post of Assistant Professor in various disciplines
is a single post cadre; reservation for Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes would amount to 100% reservation; accordingly,
it is unconstitutional. The said writ petition pertained to admission
to Doctoral courses and Ph.D. programme. This was also allowed
by the learned Single Judge on the ground that admission to the
aforesaid courses on the basis of reservation, undermines efficiency
and is detrimental to excellence, rendering it unconstitutional.
Appeals against the judgements of the learned Single Judge were
dismissed by the High Court. Therefore, three appeals had been
filed in this Court. Two issues involved therein were (a) whether
reservation in appointment to the post of Assistant Professors in
various disciplines in the PGI is violative of Article 14 and 16(1) of
the Constitution of India; and (b) whether there could be reservation
42
in admission to the Doctoral courses and Ph.D. programmes. A
number of posts of Assistant Professor in diverse disciplines had
been advertised. It was not in dispute that the post of Assistant
Professor in each Department was a single post cadre, but carried
the same scale of pay and grade in all disciplines. It was also not
disputed that the posts in different specialties/super-specialties
prescribed distinct and different qualifications. The posts were also
not transferable from one specialty to another, however, the PGI
had clubbed all the posts of Assistant Professor for the purpose of
reservation in view of the fact that they are in the same pay scale
and have same designation. The High Court had allowed the writ
petition by relying on judgement of this Court in Chakradhar
Paswan (Dr.) vs. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 214. The ratio in
the aforesaid judgement was distinguished on the basis of the
judgement in Union of India vs. Madhav, (1997)2 SCC 332. The
aforesaid judgement was reviewed by a larger Bench of five Judges
of this Court in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical
Education and Research, Chandigarh vs. Faculty Association
and others (1998) 4 SCC 1. On behalf of the review petitioners it
was contended that judgement in Narasimhan case (supra) cannot
43
be supported as in Madhav case (supra) the ratio in the decision of
Arati Ray Chaudhary vs. Union of India 1974 (1) SCC 87 was
wrongly appreciated and the ratio was wrongly stated. On the other
hand, it was submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the
judgement in Madav case (supra) indicated the correct principle by
giving very cogent reasons. Therefore, no interference is called for
against the decision in Madhav case (supra) and the other decisions
rendered by following the decision. Upon consideration of the rival
submissions, it was observed as follows:-
“29. In Madhav case in support of the view that even in respect of single post cadre reservation can be made for the backward classes by rotation of roster, the Constitution Bench decision in Arati Ray Choudhury case has been relied on. We have already indicated that in Arati case the Constitution Bench did not lay down that in single post cadre, reservation is possible with the aid of roster point. The Court in Arati case considered the applicability of roster point in the context of plurality of posts and in that context the rotation of roster was upheld by the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench in Arati case had made it quite clear by relying on the earlier decisions of the Constitution Bench in Balaji case and Devadasan case that 100% reservation was not permissible and in no case reservation beyond 50% could be made. Even the circular on the basis of which appointment was made in Arati Ray Choudhury case was amended in accordance with the decision in Devadasan case. Therefore, the very
44
premise that the Constitution Bench in Arati case has upheld reservation in a single post cadre is erroneous and such erroneous assumption in Madhav case has been on account of misreading of the ratio in Arati Ray Choudhury case. It may be indicated that the latter decision of the Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal case has also proceeded on the footing that reservation in roster can operate provided in the cadre there is plurality of post. It has also been indicated in Sabharwal decision that the post in a cadre is different from vacancies.
46. From the above it becomes evident that the very premise on
the basis of which Madhav case was decided has been held to be
erroneous. Thereafter it is further observed in paragraph 30 that
“it also appears that the decision in Indra Sawhney case has also not
been properly appreciated in Madhav decision.” The conclusion of
the judgement is given in paragraph 37 which is as under:-
“37. We, therefore, approve the view taken in Chakradhar Case that there cannot be any reservation in a single post cadre and we do not approve the reasonings in Madhav Case, Brij Lal Thakur case and Bageshwari Prasad case upholding reservation in a single post cadre either directly or by device of rotation of roster point. Accordingly, the impugned decision in the case of Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh is, therefore, allowed and the judgment dated 2.5.1997 passed in Civil Appeal No.3175 of 1997 is set aside.”
45
47. Since the judgment and reasoning in Narasimhan case (supra)
were based on the reasoning in Madhav case (supra), we are unable
to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants
that the reasoning in the aforesaid judgement is still intact, merely
because review was filed only in one appeal out of three. The
judgment in Narasimhan case (supra) having been set aside, we are
unable to accept the submissions of the learned Senior counsel that
the reasoning would still be binding as a precedent.
48. Mere reference to the judgement in the cases of Dr. Preeti
Srivastava; Bharati Vidyapeet; and Gopal D. Tirthani and others
(supra) would not re-validate the reasoning and ratio in
Narasimhan case (supra) which has been specifically set aside by
the larger Bench in Faculty Association case (supra). We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the reliance placed upon the
observations in Narasimhan case (supra) is wholly misconceived.
49. In any event the entire issue in the present appeals need not
be decided on the general principles of law laid down in various
judgments as noticed above. In these matters, we are concerned
with the interpretation of the 1994 Act, the instructions dated
46
25.03.1994 and the GO dated 26.2.1999. The controversy herein
centres around the limited issue as to whether an OBC who has
applied exercising his option as a reserved category candidate, thus,
becoming eligible to be considered against a reserved vacancy, can
also be considered against an unreserved vacancy if he/she secures
more marks than the last candidate in the general category.
50. The State Legislature enacted the UP Public Service
(Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1993
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1993’). It was soon replaced by
the UP Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Ordinance, 1994.
This was to provide a comprehensive enactment for Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs. The Ordinance was replaced
by the Act of 1994 which came into force w.e.f. 11.12.1993.
Section 2 (c ) of this Act defines public service and posts as the
service and post in connection with the affairs of the State and
includes services and posts in local authority, cooperative societies,
statutory bodies, government companies, educational institutions
owned and controlled by the State Government. It also includes all
posts in respect of which reservation was applicable by Government
47
Orders on the commencement of the Act. Section 3 of the Act of
1994 makes provisions with regard to the reservation in favour of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
Section 3 of the Act of 1994 provides as under:-
“3.Reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes- (1) In Public Services and Posts, there shall be reserved at the stage of direct recruitment, the following percentage of vacancies to which recruitments are to be made in accordance with the roster referred to in Sub-section (5) in favour of the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes of citizens.
(a) in the case of Scheduled Castes Twenty-one percent;
(b) in the case of Scheduled Tribes Two per cent;
(c) in the case of other backward Twenty Seven percent;
Classes of citizens
Provided that the reservation under Clause (c ) shall not
apply to the category of other backward classes of
citizens specified in Schedule II.
(2 )If, even in respect of any year of recruitment, any
vacancy reserved for any category of persons under Sub-
section (1) remains unfilled, special recruitment shall be
made for such number of times, not exceeding three, as
48
may be considered necessary to fill such vacancy from
amongst the persons belonging to that category.
(3) If, in the third such recruitment, referred to in Sub-
section (2), suitable candidates belonging to the
Scheduled Tribes are not available to fill the vacancy
reserved for them, such vacancy shall be filled by persons
belonging to the Scheduled Castes.
(4)Where, due to non-availability of suitable candidates
any of the vacancies reserved under Sub-section (1)
remains unfilled even after special recruitment referred to
in Sub-section (2), it may be carried over to the next year
commencing from first of July, in which recruitment is to
be made, subject to the condition that in that year total
reservation of vacancies for all categories of persons
mentioned in Sub-section (1) shall not exceed fifty one
per cent of the total vacancies.
(5)The State Government shall, for applying the
reservation under Sub-section (1), by a notified order,
issue a roster which shall be continuously applied till it
is exhausted.
49
(6)If a person belonging to any of the categories
mentioned in Sub-section (1) gets selected on the basis of
merit in an open competition with general candidates, he
shall not be adjusted against the vacancies reserved for
such category under Sub-section (1).
(7)If on the date of commencement of this Act, reservation
was in force under Government Orders for appointment
to posts to be filled by promotion, such Government
Orders shall continue to be applicable till they are
modified or revoked.”
Section 8 of the Act of 1994 reads as under:-
“8.Concession and relaxation- (1) The State Government
may, in favour of the categories of persons mentioned in
sub-section (1) of Section 3, by order, grant such
concessions in respect of fees for any competitive
examination or interview and relaxation in upper age
limit, as it may consider necessary.
(2)The Government orders in force on the date of
commencement of this Act, in respect of concessions and
relaxations, including concession in fees for any
50
competitive examination or interview and relaxation in
upper age limit and those relative to reservation in direct
recruitment and promotion, in favour of categories of
persons referred to in Sub-section (1), which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall
continue to be applicable till they are modified or
revoked, as the case may be.”
51. Schedule II gives a list of category of persons to whom
reservation under Section 3 (1) would not be available, as they fall
within the category of persons commonly known as “creamy layer”.
A perusal of Section 3 (1) would show that it provides for
reservation in favour of the categories mentioned therein at the
stage of direct recruitment. The controversy between the parties in
these appeals is limited to sub-section (6) of Section 3 and Section 8
of the 1994 Act. It was strenuously argued by Mr.Rao and Dr.
Rajeev Dhawan that Section 3 (6) of the Act of 1994 does not
permit the reserved category candidates to be adjusted against
general category vacancies who had applied as reserved category
candidate. In the alternative, learned counsel had submitted that at
least such reserved category candidate who had appeared availing
51
relaxation of age available to reserved category candidates cannot
be said to have competed at par in Open Competition with General
category candidates, and therefore, cannot be adjusted against the
vacancies meant for General Category Candidates. We are of the
considered opinion that the concessions falling within Section 8 of
the Act of 1994 cannot be said to be relaxations in the standard
prescribed for qualifying in the written examination. Section 8
clearly provides that the State Government may provide for
concessions in respect of fees in the competitive examination or
interview and relaxation in upper age limit. Soon after the
enforcement of the 1994 Act the Government issued instructions
dated 25.03.1994 on the subject of reservation for Scheduled Caste,
Scheduled Tribe and other backward groups in the Uttar Pradesh
Public Services. These instructions, inter alia, provide as under:-
“4. If any person belonging to reserved categories is selected on the basis of merits in open competition along with general candidates, then he will not be adjusted towards reserved category, that is, he shall be deemed to have been adjusted against the unreserved vacancies. It shall be immaterial that he has availed any facility or relaxation (like relaxation in age limit) available to reserved category.”
52
52. From the above it becomes quite apparent that the relaxation
in age limit is merely to enable the reserved category candidate to
compete with the general category candidate, all other things being
equal. The State has not treated the relaxation in age and fee as
relaxation in the standard for selection, based on the merit of the
candidate in the selection test i.e. Main Written Test followed by
Interview. Therefore, such relaxations cannot deprive a reserved
category candidate of the right to be considered as a general
category candidate on the basis of merit in the competitive
examination. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 further provides that
Government Orders in force on the commencement of the Act in
respect of the concessions and relaxations including relaxation in
upper age limit which are not inconsistent with the Act continue to
be applicable till they are modified or revoked. Learned counsel for
the appellants had submitted that in the present appeals, the issue
is only with regard to age relaxation and not to any other
concessions. The vires of Section 3 (6) or Section 8 have not been
challenged before us. It was only submitted by the learned Sr.
Counsel for the petitioners/appellants that age relaxation gives an
undue advantage to the candidate belonging to the reserved
53
category. They are more experienced and, therefore, steal a march
over General Category candidates whose ages range from 21 to 25
years. It is not disputed before us that relaxation in age is not only
given to members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
OBCs, but also the dependents of Freedom Fighters. Such age
relaxation is also given to Ex-servicemen to the extent of service
rendered in the Army, plus three years. In fact, the educational
qualifications in the case of Ex-servicemen is only intermediate or
equivalent whereas for the General category candidates it is
graduation. It is also accepted before us that Ex-servicemen
compete not only in their own category, but also with the General
category candidates. No grievance has been made by any of the
appellants/petitioners with regard to the age relaxation granted to
the Ex-servicemen. Similarly, the dependents of Freedom Fighters
are also free to compete in the General category if they secure more
marks than the last candidate in the General category. Therefore,
we do not find much substance in the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants that relaxation in age “queers the pitch”
in favour of the reserved category at the expense of the General
category. In our opinion, the relaxation in age does not in any
54
manner upset the “level playing field”. It is not possible to accept
the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that
relaxation in age or the concession in fee would in any manner be
infringement of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of India. These
concessions are provisions pertaining to the eligibility of a
candidate to appear in the competitive examination. At the time
when the concessions are availed, the open competition has not
commenced. It commences when all the candidates who fulfill the
eligibility conditions, namely, qualifications, age, preliminary
written test and physical test are permitted to sit in the main
written examination. With age relaxation and the fee concession,
the reserved candidates are merely brought within the zone of
consideration, so that they can participate in the open competition
on merit. Once the candidate participates in the written
examination, it is immaterial as to which category, the candidate
belongs. All the candidates to be declared eligible had
participated in the Preliminary Test as also in the Physical Test. It
is only thereafter that successful candidates have been permitted to
participate in the open competition.
55
53. Mr. Rao had suggested that Section 3 (6) ensures that there is
a level playing field in open competition. However, Section 8 lowers
the level playing field, by providing concessions in respect of fees for
any competitive examination or interview and relaxation in upper
age limit. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission. Section
3 (6) is clear and unambiguous. It clearly provides that a reserved
category candidate who gets selected on the basis of merit in open
competition with general category candidates shall not be adjusted
against the reserved vacancies. Section 3(1), 3(6) and Section 8 are
inter-connected. Expression “open competition” in Section 3 (6)
clearly provides that all eligible candidates have to be assessed on
the same criteria. We have already noticed earlier that all the
candidates irrespective of the category they belong to have been
subjected to the uniform selection criteria. All of them have
participated in the Preliminary Written Test and the Physical Test
followed by the Main Written Test and the Interview. Such being
the position, we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned
counsel for the petitioners/appellants that the reserved category
candidates having availed relaxation of age are disqualified to be
adjusted against the Open Category seats. It was perhaps to avoid
56
any further confusion that the State of UP issued directions on
25.3.1994 to ensure compliance of the various provisions of the Act.
Non-compliance by any Officer was in fact made punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to period of three months.
54. In view of the above, the appeals filed by the General Category
candidates are without any substance, and are, therefore,
dismissed.
Civil Appeal Nos………………………………………….…of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) NOS. 14078-80 of 2008 and 19100 of 2009)
Leave granted.
55. In the appeal filed by the State of UP it was submitted that
against the 67 posts of general category reserved for women only 15
qualified candidates were available. They were duly selected. 52
posts, which remained unfilled, were filled up from the male
candidates in accordance with GO dated 26.02.1999. Therefore,
there remained no unfilled vacancy in the general category.
Therefore, the Division Bench erred in coming to the conclusion
that 52 vacancies have been carried forward contrary to the
aforesaid GO. It was further submitted that the learned Single
57
Judge erred by directing the appellants to fill up the vacancy which
were excluded from 2% sports quota from the aforesaid selection.
According to the appellants, the advertisement clearly mentioned
that the vacancies under the sports quota shall be filled separately.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing for
filling up of these vacancies from this very selection. According to
Mr. Dwivedi, the entire factual position was placed before the
learned Single Judge in the counter affidavit which was duly
noticed by the learned Single Judge as follows:-
“In the counter affidavit the respondents have given details pertaining to the candidates belonging to different categories who were finally selected and the percentage of reservation fixed according to number of posts. According to the respondents total posts for Sub Inspector Civil Police were 1231 (male) + 148 female (ten per cent posts were referred to be reserved for women). According to the respondents the advertisement for 1634 posts was published containing 1231 male + 148 (female) Sub Inspector Civil Police and 255 Platoon Commander. It was stated that according to the police of the State 2% posts were reserved for sports men hence against 1478 posts of Sub Inspector 2% i.e. 29 posts of Sub Inspector were earmarked for sports men and five posts of Platoon Commander in sports quota. It was thus stated that 1350 posts were for Sub Inspector civil police and 250 posts were to be filled up by Platoon Commanders. The percentage of reservation against the aforesaid posts have been mentioned in
58
paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter-affidavit which is extracted below.
1-Posts 1350 for Sub Inspector, Civil Police
Sl.No
.
Caste/Class Percentage of reservation
Male Female 10%
Total
1 General Caste (Unreserved)
50% 608 67 675
2 8 Backward Class (reserved)
27% 328 37 365
3 8 Scheduled Caste (reserved)
21% 255 28 283
4 84 Scheduled Tribe
2% 24 03 027
1005 1215 135 1350 5 Dependent of
Freedom Fighters
2% 24 03 27
6. Ex-servicemen 1% 12 01 13
(2) 250 Posts for Platoon Commander, PAC
Sl.No
.
Caste/Class Percentage of reservation
Male
1 General Caste (Unreserved)
50% 125
2 Backward Class (reserved)
27% 67
3 8 Scheduled Caste
21% 53
59
4 84 Scheduled Tribe
2% 05
100% 250
It has been stated in the supplementary counter affidavit that 608 male belonging to general category were selected, against 67 posts of general category for women only 15 women were available who were selected rest of 52 posts were filled up on merit from male candidates in accordance with the Government order dated 26.02.1999. It was stated that the total 675 posts in general category were filled up and no post of general category is vacant. “
56. Mr. Dwivedi further submits that the learned Single Judge
took note of the averments made in paragraph 4 of the
supplementary counter affidavit, and yet issued a direction to
recalculate the number of posts of general category candidates by
applying 2% reservation for sportsmen horizontally and adding 2%
posts of sportsmen also while calculating the number of vacancy of
general category candidates. Mr. Dwivedi further submits that the
learned Single Judge erred in holding that the Government order
dated 26.02.1999 does not specifically provide that the post which
are not filled up by women candidates are to be filled up from the
male candidates. The Division Bench was, therefore, justified that
the aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge was apparently
erroneous and inconsistent to the specific provisions contained in
60
paragraph 4 of GO dated 26.02.1999. The Division Bench,
however, committed a factual error in recording the following
conclusion “we are constrained to hold that the authorities erred in
law by leaving the vacancies kept for reserved women candidates
unfilled instead of selecting and recommending suitable male
candidates of respective category of the same selection”.
57. Aggrieved against the aforesaid observations, the appellants
sought review of the aforesaid judgement which has been
erroneously dismissed by simply recording:-
“We have head Sri G.S. Upadhyay, learned Standing counsel appearing for the applicant. It is submitted that this Court’s observation at page 65 and 66 in respect of vacancies reserved for woman and sports quota which remain unfilled needs clarification.
We are of the view that our judgement is clear and it does not suffer from any ambiguity and thus does not require to be clarified or recalled.”
58. As noticed earlier, Mr. L.N. Rao and Dr.Dhawan had
submitted that the vacancies reserved for women and for the
outstanding sportsperson had to be filled by applying “horizontal
reservation”. No carrying forward of the vacancies was permissible.
61
59. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel. It is accepted by all the learned counsel for the parties
that these vacancies had to be filled by applying the principle of
horizontal reservation. This was also accepted by the learned
Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench. This in consonance
with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indra Sawhney
case (supra):-
“812. We are also of the opinion that this rule of 50% applies only to reservations in favour of backward classes made under Article 16(4). A little clarification is in order at this juncture; all reservations are not of the same nature. There are two types of reservations, which may, for the sake of convenience, be referred to as ‘vertical reservations’ and horizontal reservations’. The reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes [under Article 16(4)] may be called vertical reservations whereas reservations in favour of physically handicapped [under clause (1) of Article 16] can be referred to as horizontal reservations. Horizontal reservations cut across the vertical reservations – what is called interlocking reservations. To be more precise, suppose 3% of the vacancies are reserved in favour of physically handicapped persons; this would be a reservation relatable to clause (1) of Article 16. The persons selected against this quota will be placed in the appropriate category; if he belongs to SC category he will be placed in that quota by making necessary adjustments; similarly, if he belongs to open competition (OC) category, he will be placed in that category by making necessary adjustments. Even
62
after providing for these horizontal reservations, the percentage of reservations in favour of backward class of citizens remains – and should remain – the same. This is how these reservations are worked out in several States and there is no reason no to continue that procedure.”
60. The aforesaid principle of law has been incorporated in the
instructions dated 26.02.1999. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the aforesaid
instructions which are relevant are hereunder:-
“2. The reservation will be horizontal in nature i.e. to say that category for which a women has been selected under the aforesaid reservation policy for posts for women in Public Services and on the posts meant for direct recruitment under State Government, shall be adjusted in the same category only;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx
4. If a suitable women candidate is not available for the post reserved for women in Public Services and on the posts meant for direct recruitment under State Government, then such a post shall be filled up from amongst a suitable male candidate and such a post shall not be carried forward for future;”
61. The Learned Single Judge whilst interpreting the aforesaid,
has observed that it does not specifically provide for posts which are
not filled up by women candidates to be filled up from the male
candidates. This view is contrary to the specific provision contained
63
in Paragraph 4. The aforesaid provision leaves no matter of doubt
that any posts reserved for women which remain unfilled have to be
filled up from amongst suitable male candidates. There is a specific
prohibition that posts shall not be carried forward for future.
Therefore, the view expressed by the Learned Single Judge cannot
be sustained.
62. We may also notice here that in view of the aforesaid
provisions, the State has not carried forward any of the general
category posts reserved for women and outstanding sportspersons.
Furthermore, all the posts remaining unfilled, in the category
reserved for women have been filled up by suitable male candidates,
therefore, clearly no post has been carried forward. Therefore the
mandate in Indra Sawhney (supra) and the G.O. dated 26.2.1999,
have been fully coupled with. We are also of the opinion that the
conclusion recorded by the Division Bench is without any factual
basis. The factual position was brought to the notice of Division
Bench in the recall/modification application No.251407 of 2007.
However, the recall/modification application was rejected. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench erred in issuing
the directions to the appellants to fill in the unfilled vacancies
64
reserved for women candidates from suitable male candidates. This
exercise had already been completed by the appellant-State.
63. As noticed earlier, the learned Single Judge despite taking
note of the averments made in the supplementary counter affidavit
by the State, erroneously issued directions to recalculate the
vacancies reserved for outstanding sportspersons. It was
specifically pointed out that a separate advertisement had been
published for recruitment on the post reserved for outstanding
sportsperson. It was also pointed out that all the posts available in
the category of sportsmen were filled up in the subsequent
selection. No post remained unfilled. Therefore, the conclusion of
the learned Single Judge that the (29 SICP) + (5 PC) i.e. 34 posts
ought not to have been deducted from the available 1478 posts for
the purposes of calculating the number of vacancies available to the
general category, was factually erroneous. It is not disputed before
us that the principle of horizontal reservation would also apply for
filling up the post reserved for outstanding sportsperson. It is also
not disputed before us that there could have been no carry forward
of any of the post remaining unfilled in the category of outstanding
sportsperson. As a matter of fact, there was no carry forward of the
65
vacancies. They were filled in accordance with the various
instructions issued by the Government from time to time. In our
opinion the Division Bench erred in law in concluding that since the
advertisement did not mention that a separate selection will be
held, for the post reserved for sportsmen, the same would not be
permissible in law. The deduction of 34 posts for separate selection
would not in any manner affect the overall ratio of reservation as
provided by law. Furthermore, there is no carry forward of any
post. The separate selection is clearly part and parcel of the main
selection. In view of the factual situation, we are of the opinion,
that the conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench with regard to the 34 posts reserved for the
outstanding sportsmen category i.e. (29 SICP) + (5 PC) also cannot
be sustained.
64. Therefore, the aforesaid appeals filed by the State and the
Director General of Police are allowed. The direction issued by the
learned Single Judge in the final paragraph as well as the directions
issued by the Division Bench in modification of the order of learned
Single Judge are set aside.
66
..……….……………………….J (TARUN CHATTERJEE)
..…………………………………J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)
NEW DELHI, JANUARY 08, 2010.
67