http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: JIA LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/1962

BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1781            1963 SCR  (2) 864  CITATOR INFO :  D          1980 SC   1  (20)  RF         1980 SC1789  (36)

ACT: Criminal     Trial--Possession    of     unlicensed     arms Sanction--Provision  requiring sanction for  prosecution  in certain     areas    and    not    in     other     area--If discriminatory--Whether  offending portion of provision  can be  removed  and  remaining  portion  allowed  to  stand--If invalidity   of   provision   regarding   sanction   affects substantive  provisions also--Indian Arms Act, 1878  (XI  of 1878), ss. 19(1)(f), 29--Constitution of India, Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: Section  29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, provided that  for prosecution  for an offence under s. 19(f) of the  Act  com- mitted  in the territories north of the jumna and  Ganga  no sanction was required but sanction was required for the pro. section  if the offence was committed in other areas. j  was found  in possession of an unlicensed firearm in Delhi,  and though sanction under s. 29 was necessary, he was tried  and convicted  without obtaining such sanction.  B was found  in possession of an unlicensed firearm in Saharanpur and as  no sanction  under s. 29 was necessary for his  prosecution  he was tried and convicted without obtaining any sanction.  The respondents  contended  that s. 29 offended Art. 14  of  the Constitution and was unconstitutional. j contended that even if s. 29 was invalid in its operation as regards territories to the. ,North of the jurnna and Ganga it was not invalid in its 865 application  to the other territories as the parts of s.  29 were  separate  and  severable.  B  contended  that  if  the portion of s. 29 which offended Art. 14 was struck down  the remaining  portion  was  complete  in  itself  and  required sanction for prosecution in all cases, and that if s.29  was void  in toto s.19 could not stand and also become void  and unenforceable. Held,  that  s.  29  Arms  Act  offended  Art.  14  and  was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

unconstitutional  and as such no sanction was necessary  for the  prosecution  of  either j  or  B.  The  differentiation between the territories north of the jumna and Ganga and the other territories had no relevance now to the object of  the legislation.   The  differentiation had come into  being  an account  of  the  fact that the largest  opposition  to  the British  Government in 1857 had come from the people to  the north  of  the jumna and Ganga and they had  been  disarmed. But  now after more than a century conditions  have  changed and  the  distinction could not be sustained on  any  ground pertinent to the object ,of the law in question. Mehar Chand v. State, A.I.R. (1959) All. 660, approved. Held,  further,  that it was not permissible to  strike  out only the offending words from s. 29 and to read the  section as requiring sanction for prosecution for offences in  areas north  of  the jamna and Ganga.  The section could.  not  be construed as for bidding what it expressly authorised.   Nor could  the  section  insofar as  it  required  sanction  for prosecution  for offences committed in other territories  be severed  from  the  rest  and  held  valid  as  that   would necessarily  again result in discrimination.  The entire  s. 29 must be struck down. Bhai Singh v. State, A.I.R. (1960) All. 369. approved. Chamarbaugwalla  v.  Union  of  India,  (1957)  S.C.R.  930, referred to. Held,  further,  that s. 29 was severable  from  the  other, provisions of the Act and that its invalidity did not affect the  validity  of  s.  19.  Section  19  was  a  substantive provision  providing punishment for violation of ss. 14  and 15  and  s.  29 was merely procedural  and  in  general  the invalidity  of a procedural provision could not be  held  to affect  the validity of a substantive provision.  There  was nothing  in the Arm Act to take it out of the general  rule. Section  29  was  intended  for  giving  protection  to  the subjects  against frivolous and vexatious  prosecutions  but sanction was not one of the elements of the under offence s, 19(f).  It could not be said that the legislature                             866 would  not  have enacted the’ law  without  the;  protection afforded by s. 29. Davis  v.  Wallace, (1921)257 U.S. 477; 66 L.  Ed.  325  and Lemka  v.Parmers’ Grain Company, (1921) 258 U.S. 50;  66  L. Ed. 458, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 69  of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and order   dated December  23,  1960,  of- the Punjab  High  Court  (Circuit; Bench) at  Delhi in Criminal ’Appeal NO.: 10-D of 1960.                     WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 62 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 23,  1959, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1694 of 1958. Sarjoo Prasad and K. K. Sinha, or the appellant in     Cr. A. No. 69 of 1961. B.   K. Khanna and P. D. Menon., for the respondent in Cr. A. No. 69 of 1961. R.   K.  Garg,  D.  P. Singh and S.  C.  Agarwala,  for  the respondent in Cr.  A. No. 62 of 1960. G.   C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent in Cr.   A. No. 62 of 1960.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

1962.  May 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The appellant in Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961  Jia Lal Was searched by the Delhi Police on April  15, 1959,  and  was found to be in possession  of’  an’  English pistol for Which he held no licence.  He was then prosecuted for an offence under s. 20 of the Indian Arms Act of 1878 (XI of 1878), hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’ 867 before  the Additional Sessions Judge; Delhi  who  convicted him  under  s.  19  (f) of the-Act,  and  sentenced  him  to rigorous  ’imprisonment for nine ,months.  No  sanction  for the  prosecution had been obtained as required by s.  29  of the Act. the appellant then took the matter in appeal to the High  Court  of Punjab which confirmed  his  conviction  but reduced the sentence to 4-1/2 months rigorous  imprisonment. It  is  against this judgment that this  appeal  by  special leave is directed. Bhagwana was searched by the Saharanpur Police on August  6, 1956,  and was found to be in possession of  a  country-made pistol and four cartridges for which he held no licence.  He was prosecuted before the City Magistrate, Saharanpur  under a.  19(f) of the Act and was convicted and sentenced to  six months rigorous imprisonment.  No sanction was obtained  for his prosecution, obviously because under s. 29 of the Act it is  not required when the offence are committed  in  certain areas  and Saharanpur is within those areas.  The  appellant preferred  an appeal against his conviction and sentence  to the Sessions Judge, Saharanpur but the appeal was  dismissed and  the  conviction  and  sentence  were  confirmed.    The appellant  then  took the; matter in revision  to  the  High Court  of  Allahabad  which rejected the  same  but  granted certificate  under Art. 134(1) of the Constitution.   This-, is how this appeal comes before us.  Though the two  appeals arise  out of two different prosecutions un. connected  with each  other, they were heard together as the same  questions of law arise for determination in both. The  first question that arises for our decision is  whether a.  29  of  the  Act  is  unconstitutional    and  void   as contravening  Art.  14,  in that it  requires  sanction  for prosecution for offences under the Act, 868 when  they axe committed in some areas, but not  in  others. Section 29 of the Act is as follows:-               "Where an offence punishable under section 19,               clause  (f), has been committed  within  three               months  from the date on which this Act  comes               into force in any State, district or place  to               which section 32, clause 2 of Act XXXI of 1860               applies at such date, or where such an offence               has  been committed in. any part of India  not               being  such  a district, State  or  place,  no               proceedings  shall be instituted  against  any               person in respect of such offence without  the               previous  sanction  of the Magistrate  of  the               district  or  in  a presidency  town,  of  the               Commissioner of police." For  a  correct  understanding  of the  true  scope  of  the section,  it  is necessary to refer to the  history  of  the Legislation relating to it. The earliest enactment dealing with this subject is the Arms and Ammunition and Military Stores Act 18 of 1841 which came into  force  on  August 30, 1841, and  that  prohibited  the export  of  arms  and  ammunition  out  of  the  territories belonging  to  the East India Company  and  enacted  certain prohibitions as regards the storing of ammunition.  This Act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

was repealed by Act 13 of 1852.  After the uprising  against the  British rule in 1857, the Government felt that  a  more stringent law was required for preventing insurrections  and maintaining  order  and so a new Act was passed, Act  28  of 1857.   This  Act is a comprehensive one dealing  with  many matters not dealt with in previous legislation, and contains elaborate  provisions  as regards the  manufacture,  import, sale,  possession  and  use  of  arms  and  ammunition.   of particular relevance to the present discussion is P.   24 of this Act which empowered the Governor- 869 General  to order general search for arms and ammunition  in any  district.  In exercise of the power conferred  by  this section,  the  Governor-General  issued  a  notification  on December 21, 1858, ordering a general search and seizure  of arms in in the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga then known  as North Western Provinces.  The reason for this  was that  it  was this territory that was the main seat  of  the disturbances of 1857. Act 28 of 1857 was a temporary Act which was to be in  force for  a  period  of two years and after  some  extentions  it finaly  lapsed on October 1, 1 60. On that date a  new  Act, Arms  and Ammunition Act 31 of 1860 came into  force.   This statute  contains in addition to what was enacted in Act  28 of 1857, certain new provisions, of which a. 32 is  material for our discussion.  It is as follows:-               "’Clause  1.  It  shall  be  lawful  for   the               Governor-General  of India in Council  or  for               the Executive Government of any Presidency  or               for  any  Lieutenant  Governor,  or  with  the               sanction  of the Gevernor General  in  Council               for the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner  of               any  Province,  District or place  subject  to               their administration respectively, when.  ever               it  shall  appear  necessary  for  the  public               ,safety, to order that any Province, District,               or place shall be disarmed.               "Clause  2. In every such Province,  District,               or place as well as in any Province, District,               or  place  in  which an order  for  a  general               search  for arms has been issued and is  still               in  operation  under Act XXVIII  of  1857,  it               shall not be lawful for any person to have  in               his  possession  any arms of  the  description               mentioned  in  s.  6  of  this  Act,  or   any               percussion  caps, sulphur, gunpowder or  other               ammunition without a licence. 870 This  Act  ,,a,-in  was repealed, in  1878,and  the  present Indian Arms Act (XI of 1878) was enacted. Now  examining  s. 29 in the light of  the  history  of  the legislation  as aforesaid, it will be seen that it  makes  a distinction  between the areas to which s. 32 of Act  31  of 1860  applied  and  the other areas.   The  former  included territories  which  had been- disarmed under orders  of  the Governor-General  in accordance, with cl. (1) and  those  in which a general search-had been ordered under cl. (2)  which under  the  notification  of  December  1858  comprised  the territories  north  of  the Jumna and  Ganga.   Section  29, provides,.that for prosecution for offences committed within the  rem-to which s. 32 applied, no. sanction  was  required but  suoh sanction was required, for a prosecution  for  the same offence when committed in ’other areas.  The point  for decision  is  whether this, discrimination which is  hit  by Art., 14 of th Constitution.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

Now the principles governing the application of Art 14  are- ,Well,  settled  and  there  is no  need  to  restate  them. Article, 14 prohibits hostile legislation  directed  against individuals or groups of individuals, but it does not forbid reasonable   Classiit   scation.   And  in  order   that   a classifcation might be valid, it must rest on an intelligent ,differentia  which  distinguishes it from others  and  that further  that must’ have, a- reasonable relation to the  ob- ject  of  the  legislation.  There can be  a  valid  classi- fication based on a geographical differentia, but even then, that  differentia must be, ,pertinent to the object  of  the legislation.   The  short question before decision  the  are fore is whether the differentiation between the  territories north  of, the; Jumna and Ganga on theme band and the  other Territories on the other, has any relevance to the object of 871 the  legislation.   As already Pointed  out  this  differen- tiation  came  to  be  made as a  result  of  the  political situation  during 1857, and has reference to the fact’  that the largest opposition to the British Grovernment came  from the  Taluqdars  to the north of the Jumna  and  Ganga.   But more,  than a ventury has since elapsed and  the  conditions have  so  radically, changed that if is  impossible  now  to sustain  any distinction between the territories,  north  of the Jumna and Ganga and the other territories on any  ground pertinent  to the object of the law in question and  on  the well known principles differentiation   is    discrimination repugnant to Art..14. That    was the the view taken by, the Allhabad High Court in Mehar Chand v. State(1) and we are in agreement with it.  The correctness of this decision on this point has been assailed, before us. On this conclusion two questions arise,for decision: (i)  Is a. 29, omitting that part, of it which" contravenes Art. 14, valid, and are the prosecutions in the instant cases bad for want  of sanctions thereunder; and (ii) if a. 29 is void  in toto whether a. 19 also ’becomes void and unenforceable. On  the first question our attention has, been drawn to  two decisions  of the High Court of Allahabad where  this  Point has  been  considered.  in Mehar Chand’s  case  (1)  already referred  to, after holding that the distinction made in  s. 29 between offences committed in territories to the north of the  Jamuna  and  Ganga and those  committed  elsewhere  was repugned  to  Art,  14, the learned  Judges  stated  as  its consequence that sanction for prosecution under the Act  was necessary in all cases.  But this decision was overruled  by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bhai Singh v. The State(2) (1) A.I.R. (1959) All. 660.  (2) A.I.R. (1960) All 369. 872 where  it was held that the effect of the finding  that  the section  was in part unconstitutional was to render it  void in  its  entirety  and  that  accordingly  no  sanction  was necessary  for instituting prosecutions under the Act.   The respondent  relies on this decision, and contends  that  the present proceedings are not illegal for want of sanction. The  position  of  the  appellants in  the  two  appeals  in relation  to  this  question  is  somewhat  different.    In Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961 the appellant comes from an  area which  is not to the north of the Jumna and Ganga and  under s.29 sanction would be required for his prosecution but  the appellant  in Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960 comes from an  area north  of  the  Jumna and Ganga and  no  sanction  would  be required  under  that  section  for  his  prosecution.   The arguments  of  learned counsel on  this  question  therefore proceeded  on  somewhat different lines.  Mr.  Sarju  Prasad

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

appearing  on behalf of the appellant in Criminal Appeal  69 of 1961 contended that the decision in Bhai Singh’s case (1) was erroneous, that the fact that the section was invalid in its  operation  as regards territories to the north  of  the Jumna and Ganga did not render it invalid in its application to  the other territories, as the two parts of  the  section were  distinct  and  severable and that  on  the  principles enunciated  by this Court in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla  v.  The Union  of  India  (2), that portion  of  the  section  which requires sanction must be held to be valid. Mr.  Garg appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal  62 of  1960  also  contended that  sanction  was  required  for prosecution under the Act and his argument in support of the contention may thus be stated It "the portion of s. 29 873 which  offends  Art. 14 is , struck out, what  remains  will read as follows:-               "Where an offence under section 19 clause  (f)               has been committed in any part of India;               No  proceedings  shall be  instituted  against               any,  person  in respect of  such  of  offence               without  the previous sanction of  the  Magis-               trate of the District." The section as thus expurgated is complete in itself and  in harmony  with the rest of the Act.  The appropriate rule  of interpretation  applicable to this situation is thus  stated in Chamarbaugwalla’s Case               "On  the other hand, if they are  so  distinct               and  separate that after striking out what  is               invalid, what remains is in itself a  complete               code independent of the rest, then it will  be               upheld     notwithstanding  that the rest  has               become unenforceable.  " (p. 951). On this test,  the  part  of s. 29 which  requires  sanction must  be held to be severable from the portion, under  which no sanction is required, and therefore valid. This  contention  must fail for the simple reason,  that  if accepted  it must result in defeating the intention  clearly and unequivocally expressed in the section, that no sanction is required for prosecution for offences committed north  of the  Jumna and Ganga.  It will be opposed to all  recognised canons   of  interpretation,  to  construe  a   statute   as forbidding   what  it  expressly  authorises.    We   cannot therefore  so  read the section as to require  sanction  for prosecution for offences in the areas north of the Jumna and Ganga.  When once this conclusion is reached it is difficult to accept (1)  (1953) S.C.R. 930. 874 the contention, of Mr. Sarju Prasad that the section insofar as  it  requires  sanction  for  prosecution  for   offences committed  in territories other than those to the  north  of the  Jumna and Ganga is severable from the rest and that  to that  extent  the  law  is valid.   If  this  contention  is correct,  it  must  necessarily  result  in   discrimination between  persons who commit offences in the  territories  to the  north of the  Jumna and Ganga and those who commit  the same  offences elsewhere in that while the latter cannot  be prosecuted  without  sanctions the former can be.   It  will then  be open ’to the persons who are charged with  offences committed to the north of the Jumna and Ganga to assail  the law on the, ground that it discriminates against them.,  and there  can  be no answer,-to it as we have  held  that,  the classification  made by the section is not valid.  The  fact is  that it is inherent in the very vice  of  discrimination

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

that  it is incapable.of being broken up into what  is  good and  what is bad.  The gravemen of the charge that  Art.  14 has been contravened is that it makes an irrational distinc- tion among persons who are similarly circumstanced and where such  a  charge  is well founded the  section  must  in  its entirety be struck down.  We are accordingly of the  opinion that on our conclusion that the section is repugnant to Art. 14  in that it discriminates between the persons who  commit offence in areas north of the Jumna and Ganga and those  who commit  the same offences elsewhere, the whole of it  ought. to to be held to be bad. It is next contended that if s. 29 is void in its  entirety, s. 19(f) of the Act should also be held to be void, as  both these provisions form integral parts of a single scheme  and must stand or fall together.  ’it is, argued that the policy behind  s.  29  was  manifestly..,  to  give  protection  to innocent subjects, against, frivolous and, vexatious  prose- cution, and that sanction under that section must 875 therefore  be  regarded as one of  the  essential  elements, which  go to make the offence.  Support for this  contention was  also  sought in the statement of objects  and  reasons, made  when the measure ’was introduced in  the  Legislature, wherein it was said that ample safeguards were provided  "to prevent   this   prohibition   pressing   unfairly   against respectable persons".  It was strongly pressed on us that in view  of the above statement.. it ought to be inferred  that the  Legislature  would not have enacted s. 19,  if  it  had known  that s. 29 was void, and on that the conclusion  must follow that the two sections are inseverable.  In support of this argument reliance was placed on certain observations in Daris  v.  Wallace (1) and Lemke v. Farmers’  Grain  Company (2).   In  Davis  Wallace (1) the  point  for  decision  was whether  when  a  provision which is in  the  nature  of  an exception in held to be unconstitutional, the main provision which  it is intended to qualify can be enforced in its  own terms.  In answering it in the negative the Court observed : "Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted,  and  there can be no doubt  that  the  legislature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should  be taken as restricted accordingly.  Only with that  restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which  was essential  to  make  them part of the  statute  law  of  the State’;  and no other authority is competent to give them  a larger application." In  Lemke Farmers Grain Company (2), a law of  North  Dakota was  assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it  was one on interstate commerce which the State Legislature could not  enact.   One of the contentions raised was  that  there were certain provisions in the Act which could be  sustained as  within the competence of State Legislature In  rejecting this contention the Court (1)  (1921) 257 U.S. 477 ; 66 L. Ed. 325, 329. (2)  (1921) 258 V.S. 506 66 L. Ed. 468. 876 observed : ,It is insisted that the price-fixing feature  of the  statute  may  be  ignored,  and  its  other  regulatory features of inspection and grading sustained if not contrary to  valid Federal regulations of the same subject.. But  the features  of  this  act, clearly  regulatory  of  interstate commerce, are essential and vital parts of the general  plan of  the  statute to control the purchase of  grain  and  to, determine  the  profit  at  which it may  be  sold.   It  is apparent that, without these sections, the State legislature would  not have passed the act.  Without  their  enforcement

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

the  plan  and scope of the act fails of  accomplishing  its manifest  purpose.   We have no authority  to  eliminate  an essential  feature of the law for the purpose of saving  the constitutionality of parts of it." It is contended that on the rule of construction  laid  down above, a. 19 must be held to be inseverable from s. 29,  and must be struck down. We are unable to agree.  The contention that sanction  under s.  29 should be regarded as an essential ingredient of  the offence  under a. 19 proceeds on a misconception as  to  the true  scope of that section.  The scheme of the act is  that it imposes certain obligations and breaches thereof are made offences   for  which  penalties  are   prescribed.    These provisions  pertain to the domain of substantive law.   Thus with reference to the, matters involved in this appeal,  ss. 14  and  15, enact that no person shall have  possession  of arms, and ammunition, specified therein, without a  licence, and  under s. 19(f) a contravention of these sections is  an offence  punishable,  as provided therein.  The  offence  is complete,  when the conditions mentioned in sections 14  and 15  are  satisfied,  and sanction is thus  not  one  of  the elements  which enter into the constitution of the  offence. Then comes s. 29.  It is purely procedural.  It comes 877 into  operation  only  when  there  is  an  offence  already completed.  It cannot therefore be regarded as an ingredient of  the offence, which is" to be punished under a. 19 (f)  . This must be further clear from the fact that offences under the  Act are punishable under a. 19, without sanction  under a.   29, when they are committed in the territories to the north of the Jumna and Ganga.  It cannot be  contended  that the  contents  of  as. 14 and 15, for example  ,  which  are punishable under a. 19(f) differ according as they are to be applied to areas north of the Jumna and Ganga or elsewhere. We  agree with the appellants that the object a. 29  was  to give  protection  to  subjects  against  harassment.    That appears  clearly on the reading of the section.   There  was some  argument  before  us as to whether  the  statement  of objects  and  reasons  relied  on  for  the  appellants   is admissible in evidence.  It is well settled that proceedings ’of the Legislature cannot be called in aid for constructing a Section, vide Administrator General of Bengal, v.    Prem Lal Mullick     Krishna Ayyangar v.Nellapuru mal (2). "It is clear" observed Lord Wrightin   Assam  Railway &  Trading Co. Ltd. v.Inland  Revenue  Commissioner (3)  "that  the languageof  a  Minister  of  the  Crown  in  proposing  in Parliament a measure     which  eventually  becomes  law  is inadmissible." The question whether the statement of objects and reasons admissible in evidence for construing the statue arose  directly  for  decision  In  Aswini  Kumar  Ghosh  v. Arabinda Bose (4), and it was held that it was not. It  was  argued that the history of a legislation  Would  be admissible for ascertaining the legislative intent when  the question is one of severability.  That is so as held by this Court in B.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla’s case (5) at pages 951-952. (1) (1895) 221.A.107,118.  (2) (1919) L.R. 47 I.A. 33, 42. (3) (1935) A.C. 445, 458.  (4) (1953) S.C.R. I. 28. (5)  (1957) S.C.R. 930. 878 But  the statement of objects and reasons is not a  part  of the history of the legislation.  It is merely an  expression of what according to the mover of the Bill are the scope and purpose   of   the  legislation.   But   the   question   of severability  has  to  be judged on  the  intention  of  the legislature  as  expressed  in the Bill as  passed,  and  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

ascertain  if the statement of the mover of the Bill  is  no more  admissible  than  a speech made on the  floor  of  the House. It  may be mentioned that there are observations in some  of the,  judgments  of this Court judgments of  this  that  the statement  of  objects  and reasons but  for  Act  right  be admissible  not for construing the Act but for  ascertaining the  conditions  which prevailed when  the  legislation  was enacted.  Vide the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1),  M.  K.  Ranganathan v. Government of  Madras  (2),  A. Thangal  Kunju  Mudaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti  (3)  and Commissioner  of  Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh V.   Sm.  Sodra Devi It  is sufficient for the purpose of this case to  say  that the statement of objects and reasons is sought to be used by the  appellants  not for ascertaining the  conditions  which existed  at  the time When the statute was  passed  but  for showing that the legislature would not have enacted the  law without the protection afforded by s. 29.  In our opinion it is clearly not’ admissible for this purpose. But even apart from the statement of objects, it is clear on the  face  of the section that it has been enacted  with  a, view  to  giving protection to the subjects.   But  is  this sufficient  to support the conclusion that  the  legislature would not have enacted s. 19 if it had known that a. 29  was void ? It is this that the appellant has to establish before he (1)  (1954) S.C.R. 587, 628. (2)  (1955) 2 S.C.R. 374, 385. (3)  (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196, 1237. (4)  (1958) S.C.R. 1. 879 can succeed, and the policy behind a. 29 is only one element in  the decision of it.  Now it appears to us’ that what  is really  determinative  of  the question  is  what  has  been already  stated  that  s. 19  is  a  substantive  provision, whereas  s.  29 is an adjectival one, and  in  general,  the invalidity  of  a  procedural enactment cannot  be  held  to affect the validity of a substantive provision.  It might be possible  to conceive of oases in which the invalidity of  a procedural  section  or rule might so react  on  substantive provision, as to render it ineffective.  But such cases must be  exceptional.  And we see nothing in the present  statute to take it out of the general rule.  On the other hand,  the paramount  intention  behind the law was to  punish  certain offences.   No doubt s. 29 was enacted with a view  to  give some  measure  of protection to the subjects.   But  if  the legislature had been told that s. 29 would be bad, can there be any doubt as to whether it would have enacted the statute without   s.  29  ?  The  consequence  of  withdrawing   the protection  of  that section is only that the  accused  will have  to take up his trial in a court, but there  ultimately justice will be done.  Therefore if the choice was given  to the  legislature  between allowing an  offence  against  the State to go unpunished, and failing to give protection to  a subject  against frivolous prosecution, it is not  difficult to  see where it would have fallen.  We cannot, be  mistaken if we conclude that the intention of the legislature was  to enact the law, with s. 29 if that was possible, without  it, if  necessary.   And  that is also  the  inference  that  is suggested  by  the provision in s.  29,  exempting-  certain areas from its operation. The  American  authorities cited for the appellants  do  not require detailed consideration, as the principles laid  down therein have been approve by this Court in Chamarbaugwalla’s

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

case  (1)  at pages 950-951.  The question is  only  one  of application (1)  (1957) S.C.R, 930. 880 of  the  rules  of  interpretation  laid  down  therein   to particular  legislation.  It is however worthy of note  that in  Davis V. Wallace (1) as well as Lemke v.  Farmers  Grain Company the point for decision was to what the effect was of holding   that  a  substantive  provision  in  a   law   was unconstitutional,  on  another substantive law in  the  same statute. We  are  aware  that it has some times been  stated  that  a distinction  should be made in the matter ’ of  severability between  Criminal and Civil Laws, and that a  penal  statute must be construed strictly against the State.  But there are numerous  decisions in which the same rules of  construction have been applied in deciding a question of severability  of a  Criminal  statute as in the case of a Civil Law,  and  on principle  it  is difficult to see any good ground  for  the distinction.   "Perhaps  the moist that can be  said"’  says Sutherland,  for the distinction between criminal and  civil statutes is that the penal nature of a statute may be a make weight  on  the  side  of  inseparability"  Vide   Statutory Construction  Vol. 2 p. 197 para 2418.  In the present  case the  fact that a. 29 is a procedural and not  a  substantive enactment is sufficient to turn. the scale heavily in favour of the State. On  a  consideration  of  the scheme of  the  Act,  and  its provisions,  we are of opinion that s. 29 is severable  from the other portions of the Act, and that its invalidity  does not affect the validity of 19. In  Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961 a contention was also  raised that  the pistol of which the appellant was  ’in  possession was  not in a fit condition to be effectively used,  and  it bad  no  chamber, and it therefore did not fall  within  the definition  of  ’Arms’ in s. 4(1) of the Act.  There  is  no force in this (1)  (1921) 257 U.S. 47 7: 66 L. Ed. 325 329, (2)  (1921) 258 U.S, 50 ; 66 L Ed. 458. 881 contention  which  is  accordingly  rejected.   In  Criminal Appeal  62 of 1960 an argument was advanced that  the  State had  launched prosecutions under the De Act, some with,  and others without’ sanction, and that was discrimination bit by Art.  14.  There is no substance in this  contention,  which also is rejected. In the result both these appeals are dismissed. Appeal dismissed.     ---------