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PETITIONER: JETHA BAI & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUNDERDAS RATHENAI, ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1988

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR  812            1988 SCR  (2) 871  1988 SCC  (1) 722        JT 1988 (1)   329  1988 SCALE  (1)243  CITATOR INFO :  R          1989 SC 922  (10)

ACT:      Whether  against  an  order  of  a  District  Court  in Revision under  section 20  of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control  Act 2 of 1965, a further Revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure- Determination of-Landlord-Tenant dispute-In the matter of.

HEADNOTE: %      These appeals  together with  a  petition  for  special leave raised  a common  question of  law-whether against  an order of  a District  Court in  revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a further revision  would lie  to the High Court under section 115 of  the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question was not res  integra in  view of  the decision  of this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133-A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 203, the matters were listed for consideration, by a Bench  of three Judges, of the very same question in order to see  whether there  was any  conflict between  the  views taken in Aundal Ammal’s case above-said and a later decision of this  Court in  Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt & Ors., [1987]  3 J.T.  663, and whether the view taken in the earlier case  required reconsideration.  Aundal Ammal’s case arose  under   the  Kerala   Act  afore-mentioned,  and  the Shyamaraju Hegde’s case was under the karnataka Rent Control Act, and  there were  essential differences  between the two Acts.      The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section 18(5) of  the Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of the  Kerala High  Court in  Vareed v.  Mary, A.I.R.  1969 Kerala 103,  which held  that a decision of a District Court under section  20 of the Kerala Act was undoubtedly amenable to the  revisional jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under section 115  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure.  The question decided by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above- mentioned, came  to be  considered by this Court (a Bench of two Hon.  Judges) in  Aundal Ammal’s  case (supra),  and the

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Court held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed’s  case (supra)  could not be approved because the High Court had not properly construed the sections 18(5) 872 and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error.      So far  as the  Karnataka Act was concerned, this Court held in  Shyamaraju Hegde’s  case (supra) that an order of a District Judge  under section  50(2),  though  it  conferred finality under  the Act,  was nevertheless open to challenge before the  High Court  by revision under section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.      What fell  for consideration  in the  present cases was whether there  was any  conflict between  the  decisions  in Aundal Ammal’s  case (supra)  and  Shyamaraju  Hegde’s  case (supra) and  whether the  ratio in  the former case required reconsideration.      Disposing of  the Appeals  and the Petition for Special Leave, the Court, ^      HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji & S. Natarajan, JJ.      After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail,  the  Court  concluded  that  there  was  really  no conflict between  the two  decisions of this Court in Aundal Ammal’s case  (supra) and  Shyamaraju Hegde’s  case (supra), because the  provisions in  the  two  Acts  were  materially different. As  to the  question whether a fresh thinking was called for  on the  scope of  section 20  read with  section 18(5) of  the Kerala Act, the Court did not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in the Aundal Ammal’s case; on the  contrary, the renewed discussion by the Court of the matter called  for a  reiteration of  the view  expressed in Aundal Ammal’s case. [889C-D]      The  Court   was   unable   to   conntenance   in   the circumstances of  the case, the argument advanced that since the decision  of the  Kerala High  Court in  Vareed v.  Mary aforementioned had  been a good law for a number of years in the  Kerala   State  and  since  the  High  Court  had  been entertaining revision  petitions under  section  115  C.P.C. against the  revisional orders  of the District Courts under sections 20(1)  of the  Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed  to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court, and the reason therefore, the Court observed, could be set out by referring to certain  English  decisions  and  the  reasoning  adopted therein, in  West Ham  Union v. Edmonten Union, 13 1908 AC 1 at 4; Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. v. Hongton V. Chester i.e. Street  Assessment Committee,  12 1937  2 All  ER  298, affirmed in  1938 (2)  All E.R. 79. These decisions had been followed in Brownsee Haven Proper 873 ties Ltd.  v. Poole  Corporation, [1958]  1 All  ER, 205. On similar lines,  this Court  deemed it  necessary to overrule the ratio  in  Vareed  v.  Mary  (supra),  as  the  decision suffered from miscontruction of the relevant sections in the Act, and  the weakness  in the  reasoning became manifest in the light  of the  subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh  Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32 = 1980 2 SCC 378 = AIR 1980 SC 892.[889E-F; 890A-C]      In the  light of  the conclusion  of the Court, all the appeals succeeded in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under section 115, C.P.C.,  was concerned.  In Civil  Appeals Nos.  626 of 1981 and  624 of  1985, the  High Court allowed the revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C., and ordered the eviction of the  tenants. In  Civil Appeal  No.  2079  of  1981,  the

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District Judge  set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored  the order  of eviction.  In the Civil Appeal No. 1619  of 1986,  the District  Judge allowed the Revision and restored  the order  of  eviction  passed  by  the  Rent Controller and  the High  Court confirmed  the said order in revisions. In  the  Civil  Appeal  No.  7505  of  1983,  the District Judge reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the  Appellant Authority  and ordered  eviction and  the High Court confirmed the order of the District Judge. In the petition for  special leave  listed with  the  appeals,  the Appellate Authority  sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under  section 11(3)  of the  Act but  remanded the case to  the  Rent  Controller  for  deciding  the  question whether the  tenant was  entitled to  resist the  claim  for eviction. The  District Court  and the  High Court confirmed the order of remand.[890D-G]      In accordance  with the pronouncement of the Court, the order of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., in each of the appeals above-mentioned was set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case, restored to become operative. The appeals were directed only against the orders of the High Court passed in revision, and they were disposed of with  the pronouncement  of the Court on the above lines. [890G-H; 891A]      In the  petition for  special leave  also, the order of the  High   Court  under   section  115   C.P.C.,  was   not sustainable, but  even so,  the Court did not find any merit in the  petition,  because  the  finding  of  the  Appellate Authority and  the order  of remand  passed by  it had  been confirmed by  the District Court ’and as such, there were no merits in the petition. [891B] 874 Per S. Ranganathan, J. (dissenting)      While a  number of enactments of various States on rent control confer  specific  jurisdiction  on  the  State  High Courts, some  others are  broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala  and  Karnataka  enactments.  Though  the  Court  was concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these matters, a  similar question  might  well  arise  under  the corresponding enactments of some other States as well.[891C- D]      The Kerala  and Karnataka  Rent Control Acts vest power of revision  in the  District Judge  against certain orders. The question  in these  matters was whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., could be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District  Judge.  This  question  was  answered  in  the negative in  Aundal Ammal  v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 SCC 133 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987] 3 J.T. 663 (a decision under  the Karnataka Act), and hence this reference to a larger Bench.[891E-F]      Normally, a  revision lies  to  the  High  Court  under section 115  of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court. The  fact that the order might have been passed under a  special  statute  or  that  the  statute  contained expressions purporting  to confer  finality on  the order of the District  Judge/Court  or  a  subordinate  authority  or Court,  had   been  held  insufficient  to  take  away  this jurisdiction. This  was  the  effect  of  the  decisions  in Chhagan Lal  v. The  Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 871  and Krishandas  Bhatija v.  Venkatachala Shetty, S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju’s case  (supra),   which  were   direct  decisions  under  the Karnataka Act.  In the opinion of his Lordship, there was no

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vital or  material difference  between the two enactments in this respect  and that  the same  result should follow under the Kerala Act also. [891G-H; 892A-B]      Under the  Karnataka Act, after its amendments in 1975, the rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the  District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller. There is  no provision  for an  appeal from  this order  but there  is   one  for  revision.  This  revisional  power  is bifurcated under  section 50  between the High Court and the District Court.  The High  Court is  empowered to revise the order of  the Civil  Judge/Rent Controller  and the District Judge  that   of  the   District  Munsiff.   Section   50(2) specifically declares  that the  order of the District Judge under this  provision is  final. The  Kerala pattern  is the same except  that section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller 875 to an  officer or  an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or  of  a  superior  rank.  Section  20  provides  for revision. The  revisional power  is to  be exercised  by the District  Court   where  the   appellate  authority  is  the subordinate Judge,  and the  High  Court,  in  other  cases. Section 20  does not  provide, as  does section  50  of  the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge would be final.  The much  wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act  does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under  s. 115  of the  C.P.C., as had been held in the two cases referred to above, and it was difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. [892C-H]      This led  to the  question of  a choice between the two views of  this Court-one  in Shyamaraju  and the  other,  in Aundal Ammal.  Shyamaraju followed  the earlier decisions of this Court  in Chhagan  Lal v.  The  Municipal  Corporation, Indore, AIR  1977 SC  1955 and  Krishnadas Bhatija  v.  A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13,  1978. The  only other  decision of this Court, having relevance  in the  present context, was Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti  Prasad, [1980]  3 SCR  32, relied  upon in Aundal Ammal. His  Lordship was  in  agreement  with  the  view  in Shyamaraju that  Vishesh Kumar  was rendered  in  a  totally statutory  context.   That  decision   turned   largely   on legislative history of s. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small  Causes Courts Act, in their application to the State  of Uttar  Pradesh. His  Lordship was,  therefore, inclined to  lean in  favour of  the view that had commended itself to  this  Court  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the Karnataka Act,  and to  hold that the High Court had a power of revision  over the  order of the District Judge under the Kerala Act  as well.  The result  of applying  Aundal  Ammal would be  to completely  exclude the  High Court in the Rent Control matters,  and, this,  as the  two Acts  were in pari materia according  to his  Lordship’s view,  would leave the litigant in  Karnataka only  a  right  of  revision  to  the District Court.  It was  doubtful whether, in the absence of clear language,  the  Legislature  could  be  held  to  have intended to  completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important Branch of law. The provisions did not and  could not,  in his  Lordship’s view,  preclude  the applicability of  s. 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District  Court, not  as a  persona designata,  but as a civil court  of the land. Section 18 and 20 had a vital role to pay  but their effect was not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of  the High  Court under section 115. [893A-F; 894B-C]

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    As a result of the various decisions of the Courts, the position had  been  that  right  through  in  the  State  of Karnataka and for at least a 876 period of  20 years  in the  State of  Kerala, the prevalent view had  been in  favour of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court. In a matter of procedure, such a long standing  practice should  not be  disturbed unless the statutory indication was quite clear to the contrary. [894F]      The revision  petitions  before  the  High  Court  were maintainable.[894G]      Aundal Ammal  v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133; Shyamaraju Hegde  v. G.  Venkatesha Bhatt  & Ors.,  [1987] 3 J.T. 663;  Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984] K.L.T. 845; Vareed  v. Mary,  AIR 1969 103; Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980]  2 SCR  32; Krishnaji  Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram  Kavalekar &  Ors., ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585; Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555; Krishnadas  Bhatija v.  A.S. Venkatachala  Shetty, SLP (Civil) No.  913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978; M.M. Yaragatti v.  Vasant &  Ors., AIR  1987 Karnataka  186; S.S. Khanna v.  F.J. Dillon, AIR 1954 S.C. 497; West Ham Union v. Domonton Union,  13 1908  A.C. 1  at  4;  Robinson  Brothers (Brewers) Ltd.  v. Honghton  & Chester_ie_Street  Assessment Committee, 12 1937 2 All E.R. 298 and 1938 2 All E.R. 79 and Brownsee Haven  Properties Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, [1958] 1 All ER, 205 referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 626 of 1981 Etc.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  12.12.1980 of  the Kerala High  Court in  Civil Revision  Petition No.  2939 of 1978.      P.S. Poti,  G.  Viswanatha  Iyer,  A.K.  Ganguli,  T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, E.M.S. Anam. R. Sathish, M.A. Firoz, N. Sudhakar, Miss  Nalini Poduval  and S.  Balakrishnan for the appearing parties.      The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:      NATARAJAN, J.  These appeals  by special  leave and the special leave petition have been clubbed together and listed for consideration  of a  common question  of law involved in them, viz.  whether against  an order of a District Court in revision under  Section 20  of the  Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control  Act 2  of 1965  (for short the Kerala Act), a further revision  would lie  to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 877      Though the  question is  not res integra in view of the decision of  this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1  SCC 133:  AIR 1987  SC 203,  the appeals have been listed for  consideration by  a Bench of three Judges of the very same  question in  order to  see whether  there is  any conflict between  the views  taken in  Aundal  Ammal’s  case (supra) and  a later  decision of  this Court  in Shyamaraju Hedge v.  G. Venkatesha  Bhat &  Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663 and whether  the   view  taken  in  the  earlier  case  requires reconsideration.      Even at  the threshold  of the  judgment it  has to  be mentioned that  Aundal Ammal’s  case arose  under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge’s case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka  Rent  Control  Act.  Since  there  are  essential differences between the two Acts, it is necessary to set out

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the  relevant   provisions  of   the  two   Acts   and   the circumstances in  which the  decision pertaining to each Act came to be rendered by this Court.      As per  section 20(5) of the Kerala Act "a Rent Control Court" means  a Court  constituted under  Section  3.  Under Section 3(1)  "the Government  may, by  Notification in  the Gazette appoint  a person  who is  or  is  qualified  to  be appointed, a  Munsif to  be the  Rent Control Court for such local areas  as may be specified therein." Section 11 of the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant only by  making an application to the Rent Control Court and it also  sets out  the grounds  on which a landlord can seek eviction of  his tenant.  Section 18 of the Act provides for an Appeal  being preferred  by an  aggrieved person  to  the Appellate Authority. The relevant portions of Section 18 are as under:           "18. Appeal:(1)(a)  The Government may, by general           or special  order notified  in the Gazette, confer           on such  officers and  authorities not  below  the           rank  of   a  Subordinate   Judge  the  powers  of           appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act           in such  areas or  in such classes of cases as may           be specified in the order.                (b) ........                (2) ........                (3) ........                Explanation ..... 878                (4) The  appellate authority  shall have  all           the powers of the Rent Control Court including the           fixing of arrears or rent.                (5) The  decision of the appellate authority,           and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent           Control Court  shall be  final and  shall  not  be           liable to  be called  in question  in any Court of           law, except  as provided in section 20." (Emphasis           supplied). Then comes  Section 20  which provides  for Revisions and it reads as follows:           "20. Revision:(1)  In cases  where  the  appellate           authority  empowered   under  section   18  is   a           subordinate Judge,  the  District  Court,  and  in           other cases  the High  Court may,  at any time, on           the application  of any  aggrieved party, call for           and examine  the records  relating  to  any  order           passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such           authority for  the purpose of satisfying itself as           to the  legality, regularity  or propriety of such           order or  proceedings and  may pass  such order in           reference thereto as it thinks fit.                (2)  The   costs  of   and  incident  to  all           proceedings before  the  High  Court  or  District           Court  under   sub-section  (1)  shall  be  in  it           discretion.                20A. Power  to remand:  In  disposing  of  an           appeal or application for revision under this Act,           the   appellate   authority,   or   the   revising           authority, as the case may be, may remand the case           for fresh disposal according to such directions as           it may give."      The scope and effect of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5) of  the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench of the  Kerala High Court in Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 Kerala 103. The  Full Bench  held that  since  the  District  Court exercising revisional  powers under  Section  20(1)  of  the

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Kerala Act  functions as  a  Court  and  not  as  a  persona designata, the  ordinary incidence  of the procedure of that Court including  any right  of appeal  or revision  will  be inhered to  the decision  rendered by the District Court. In that view  of the matter the Full Bench held that a decision of a  District Court  under Section  20 of the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction 879 of the  High Court  especially when there is no provision in the Act  providing for  an appeal  against an  order of  the District Court  under Section  20 or  in the alternative any express provision  declaring the finality of the said order. The decision  of the  Full Bench held the field for a number of years  in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases where the  competence of  the  High  Court  to  entertain  a revision under  Section 115  C.P.C. against  an order  of  a District Court  passed under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act was challenged  the contention  was repelled by reference to the judgment  of the  Full Bench.  One such case in point is Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984]KLT 845.      The question  decided by  the Full Bench, however, came to be  raised before  this Court,  in  Aundal  Ammal’s  case (supra). A  Bench consisting  of E.S.  Venkataramiah, J. and one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) held that the ratio laid down by  the Kerala  High Court  in  Vareed’s  case  (supra) cannot be  approved because  the High Court had not properly construed Sections  18(5) and  20 of  the  Kerala  Act.  The relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms:           "In our  opinion, the  Full Bench misconstrued the           provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the           Act. Sub-section  (5) of Section 18 clearly states           that such  decision of  the appellate authority as           mentioned in  Section 18  of the  Act shall not be           liable to be questioned except in the manner under           Section 20  of  the  Act.  There  was  thereby  an           implied  prohibition  or  exclusion  of  a  second           revision under  Section 115  of the  Code of Civil           Procedure to  the High  Court when  a revision has           been provided  under Section  20  of  the  Act  in           question.  When   Section   18(5)   of   the   Act           specifically states  that "shall  not be liable to           be called  in question in any court of law" except           in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot           be said  that the  High Court  which is a court of           law and  which is  a civil court under the Code of           Civil Procedure  under Section  115 of the Code of           Civil Produce  could revise  an order  once  again           after revision  under Section  20 of the Act. That           would mean  there would be a trial by four courts,           that would  be repugnant to the scheme manifest in           the different  sections of  the Act  in  question.           Public   policy   or   public   interest   demands           curtailment of  law’s delay  and  justice  demands           finality with quick disposal of case. The language           of the  provisions  of  Section  18(5)  read  with           Section 20  inhibits further  revision. The courts           must so construe." 880      The Bench  drew support  for  its  conclusion  from  an earlier decision  of this  Court in  Veshesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980]  3 SCR  32: 1980(2) SCC 378: AIR 1980 SC 892. In that  case the  two questions that case the two questions that fell for consideration were:           "(1) Whether  the High  Court possesses revisional           jurisdiction under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure

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         in respect of an order of the District Court under           s. 115 disposing of a revision petition?           (2) Whether  the High  Court possesses  revisional           jurisdiction under  s. 115 against an order of the           District Court  under  s.  25,  Provisional  Small           Cause  Courts   Act  disposing   of   a   revision           petition?" Answering both the questions in the negative, it was held in so far as question no. 1 is concerned, as follows:           "........ In  determining whether  the Legislature           intended a  further revision  petition to the High           Court, regard  must be  had to  the principle that           the construction given to a statute should be such           as would advance the object of the legislation and           suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It           seems to  us that  to recognise a revisional power           in the  High Court  over a revisional order passed           by the  District Judge  would plainly  defeat  the           object  of  the  legislative  scheme.  The  intent           behind the  bifurcation of jurisdiction- to reduce           the number of revision petitions filed in the High           Court-would be  frustrated. The  scheme would,  in           large measure,  lose its  meaning. If  a  revision           petition is  permitted to  the High  Court against           the revisional order of the District Court arising           out of  a suit  of a  value less than Rs.20,000, a           fundamental  contradiction  would  be  allowed  to           invade and  destroy  the  division  of  revisional           power between  the High  Court  and  the  District           Court,  for   the  High  Court  would  then  enjoy           jurisdictional  power   in  respect  of  an  order           arising  out  of  a  suit  of  a  valuation  below           Rs.20,000. That was never intended at all." The second question was answered as under:           "The question before us arises in those cases only           where the  District Judge has exercised revisional           power under s. 881           25. Is  an order  so made  open to revision by the           High Court  under s. 115. Code of Civil Procedure?           An examination  of the  several provisions  of the           Provincial Small  Cause Courts  Act indicates that           it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present           enquiry  is   concerned.  For   the   purpose   of           correcting decrees  or orders  made by  a Court of           Small Causes  the Act provides for an appeal and a           revision in  cases falling  under s.  24 and s. 25           respectively. Cases  in which  the District  Judge           and High  Court respectively  exercise  revisional           power,   revisional    powers   are   specifically           mentioned. A complete set of superior remedies has           been incorporated  in the  Act. Moreover, s. 27 of           the Act provides:                "27. Finality  of decrees and orders. Save as           provided by this Act, a decree or order made under           the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of           Small Causes shall be final."           The Legislature  clearly intended that a decree or           order made  by a  Court of  Small Causes should be           final subject  only to  correction by the remedies           provided under  the Provincial  Small Cause Courts           Act. It  is a  point for consideration that had s.           25, in  its application  to  the  State  of  Uttar           Pradesh continued  in its  original form  the High           Court would  have exercised  the revisional  power

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         under s.  25, and no question could have arisen of           invoking the  revisional power  of the  High Court           under s.  115 of  the Code.  All  the  indications           point to the conclusion that a case falling within           the Provincial  Small Cause  Courts Act  was never           intended to be subject to the remedies provided by           the Code  of Civil  Procedure. By  way of abundant           caution s.  7 of  the Code  made express provision           barring the  application of  ss. 96 to 112 and 115           of  the  Code  to  courts  constituted  under  the           Provincial Small  Cause Courts  Act. Section  7 of           the Code  merely embodies  the  general  principle           against resort  to remedies outside the Provincial           Small Cause  Courts Act. Although the court of the           District Judge  is not  a court  constituted under           the Act  the general  principle continues  to take           effect. No  change in  the principle  was  brought           about merely because revisional power under s. 25,           before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to           the District Judge. It must be remembered that the           legislative intention  behind the amendment was to           relieve the High Court of the 882           burden of  exercising revisional  jurisdiction  in           respect of  cases  decided  under  the  Provincial           Small Cause  Courts Act.  We are  of firm  opinion           that the  central  principle  continues  to  hold,           notwithstanding the  amendment effected  in s. 25,           that the  hierarchy of  remedies  enacted  in  the           Provincial Small  Cause  Court  Act  represents  a           complete and  final order  of remedies,  and it is           not possible  to proceed  outside the Act to avail           of a superior remedy provided by another statute."      Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra) that "the  Full Bench  of the Kerala High Court was in error and the  High Court  in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC."      Coming now  to the  Karnataka Act  and the decisions of the High  Court and  of this  Court pertaining to Section 50 read with  Section 48(6)  of  the  said  Act,  it  is  first necessary to  refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood  before and  after the amendments effected by the Amendment Act  31 of  1975. The relevant portions of Section 48 and  50, as they stood before the amendment and after the amendment are as under: Before the Amendment          After the Amendment 48.                           48. Appeals:-(1)Notwithstanding   Appeals:-(1) omitted. anything contained in any law for the time being in force, every person aggrieved by an order under section 14, Section 16, Section 17 or section 21, passed by the Controller or the Court may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer  an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisd- iction over the area in which the premises are situate. 2............                 2.............. 3............                 3.............. 4............                 4..............

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5. The appellate authority    5. The appllate authority         shall send for the records       shall send for the records of 883 of the case from the Courtthe case from the Controller and or the Controller, as the caseafter giving the parties an oppor- may be, and after giving thetunity of being heard and if parties an opportunity of beingnecessary after making such further heard and if necessary afterenquiry as it thinks fit either itself making such further enquiry asor through the Controller shall it thinks fit, either itself ordecide the appeal. through the Court or the Contro- ller, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal. Explanation ............. 6. Subject to any decision of the6. An order of the court or the High Court under section 50 theController shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge shalldecision of the District Judge or th e be final, and an order of the CourtHigh Court under section 50 or of or the Controller shall, subject tothe relevant appellate authority the decision of the relevant appel-under this Act be final and shall late authority under this Act or ofnot be liable to be called in questio n the High Court under section 50,in any court of law whether in a be final and shall not be liable tosuit or other proceeding or by way be called in question in any courtof appeal or revision. of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision. 50. Revision by the High Court50. Revision. 1. The High Court may, at any(1).The High Court may,at any time, call for and examine-time,call for examine any order                               passed or proceeding taken by the (i) the records relating to anycourt of Civil Judge under this Act decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con- taken by the District Judge.troller under sections 14,15 16,or                               17 for the purpose of satisfying itself (ii) any order passed or proceed-as to the legality or correctness of ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference Controller under section 14,thereto as it thinks fit. section 15 or section 16. for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision, order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit; 2. The costs of, and incidental2. The District Judge may, at any all proceedings before the Hightime, call for and examine any order Court shall be in its distretion.passed or proceeding taken by the 884 Court of Munsiff referred to in sub-clause(iii)of clause (d) of section(3)for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. the order of the District Judge shall be final. 3. The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be." On a  reading of  the provisions  it may  be seen that under

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Section 48 as it stood prior to the amendment, an appeal lay to the District Judge against an order passed under Sections 14, 16,  17 or  21 by  the Rent  Controller or the Court and thereafter a revision lay to the High Court under Section 50 of the  Act. Sub-section  (6) of Section 48 further provided that the  decision of  the District  Judge shall, subject to the decision  of the  High Court  under Section 50, be final and the  order of  the Court or the Controller shall subject to the  decision of  the relevant  Appellate Authoirty under the Act  or of  the High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether  in a  suit or  other proceedings  or by way of appeal or  revision. One  of the  changes  effected  by  the Amending Act  was to  confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in the place  of District  Munsifs in  respect  of  house  rent control cases  arising in  the city  of  Mangalore.  Another change effected  was to take away the right of appeal to the District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control Court by deleting sub-section  (1) of  Section 48.  The third  change effected is  of a  two-fold nature. The first is to restrict the High Court’s powers of revision under Section 50 to only those cases  decided by the city Civil Judges and the second is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect of cases  decided by  the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in areas  outside   the  city   of  Bangalore.  Thus  what  the legislature had  done was  to do  away with the remedy of an appeal so  as to save the litigants from "a large segment of time and  much expenses".  The resultant position is that as against the  orders  of  District  Munsifs  acting  as  Rent Controllers a  right of  appeal to  the District Judge and a further revision  to the  High Court has been taken away and instead only  a right  of revision  to the District Court is provided. In  so far  as the  cases disposed of by the Civil Judges in  the city  of Bangalore  are concerned, a right of revision is  provided to the High Court. Notwithstanding the changes effected, 885 Section 48(6) inter alia provided that an order of the Court or the  Controller shall,  subject to  the decision  of  the District Judge  or the  High Court under Section 50 be final and shall  not be  liable to  be called  in question  in any court of  law, whether  in a  suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision.      In  the   background  of   the  changes   made  by  the legislature, a  Full Bench  of the Karnataka High Court went into  the  question  in  Krishnaji  Venkatesh  Shirodkar  v. Gurupad Shivram  Kavalekar & Others, ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 whether by  reason  of  Section  48(6)  a  further  revision against a  revisional order  passed by  the  District  Judge under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to the High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. Venkataramiah, J. (as he  then was), who spoke for the Full Bench held that in the  light   of  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555 and  Krishnadass Bhatija  v. A.S.  Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil)  No. 913  of 1978  decided on 13th February 1978 the jurisdiction  of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. to revise  an order  of  the  District  Judge  passed  under Section 50(2) will stand unaffected.      The correctness  of this  view  was  questioned  before another Full  Bench of  the Karnataka  High  Court  in  M.M. Yaragatti v.  Vasant &  Others, AIR  1987 Karnataka 186. The Full Bench  took the view that in the light of the decisions of the  Supreme Court  in two  subsequent cases, viz. Aundal Ammal’s case  (supra) and  Vishesh Kumar’s case (supra), the

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law  laid   down  in  Krishnaji’s  case  (supra)  cannot  be considered good  law  any  longer  and  as  such  a  further revision to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. will not lie against  an order passed by a District Judge in exercise of  his   revisional  powers  under  Section  50(2)  of  the Karnataka Act.      The correctness  of the view taken by the Full Bench in Yaragatti’s case  (supra) fell  for  consideration  by  this Court in  Shyamaraju’s case  (supra). A  Bench of this Court held that  in so  far as the Karnataka Act is concerned, the relevant  provisions   warranted  invoking   the  ratio   in Chhaganlal’s case  (supra) and  Krishna Das  Bahtija (supra) and therefore  the view  taken by  the earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji’s case (supra) is the correct one and not the view taken in  Yaragatti’s case (supra). The position, therefore, is that so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned an order of a District  Judge  under  Section  50(2),  though  conferred finality under  the Act  is nevertheless  open to  challenge before the  High Court  by means of a further revision under Section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party. 886      What now  falls for  consideration is  whether there is any conflict  between the  decision in  Aundal Ammal’s  case (supra) and  Shyamaraju Hegde’s case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case requires reconsideration.      Even without  any discussion  it may  be seen  from the narrative given  above that  there  is  really  no  conflict between the  two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are  materially different.  However, to clarify matters further we  may point  out the  differences between  the two Acts in  greater detail  and clarity.  Under the Kerala Act, against an  order passed  by a  Rent Control  Court presided over by  a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right  of appeal under Section 18. The Appellate Authority has to  be a  judicial officer  not  below  the  rank  of  a Subordinate  Judge.   The  Appellate   Authority  has   been conferred powers co-extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having over-riding effect. Having these factors in mind, the  Legislature has  declared that  in so  far as  an order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority; and  in so  far  as  an  Appellate  Authority  is concerned, its  decision shall  be final  and shall  not  be liable to  be called  in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20. As regards Section 20, a division of the  powers of  revision exercisable  thereunder has been made between  the High  Court and the District Court. In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section  18, the  District Judge  has been constituted the revisional  authority. It  is only  in other  cases i.e. where the  decision sought  to  be  revised  is  that  of  a judicial officer  of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, the  High   Court  has   been  constituted   the  Revisional authority. The revisional powers conferred under Section 20, whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may  be are  of greater  amplitude than  the powers  of revision exercisable  by a  High  Court  under  Section  115 C.P.C. Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to  satisfy   itself  about   the  legality,  regularity  or propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that, the Appellate  Authority and  the Revisional  Authority have been expressly  conferred powers of remand under Section 20A of the Act. Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth  his case  before the  Rent Control Court and then

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before the  Appellate Authority  and thereafter  if need  be before the  Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the Appellate Authority  is of  the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before 887 three courts,  viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the  Revisional  Court,  there  was  no  need  to  make  the revisional order  of the  District Court  subject to further scrutiny by  the High  Court by  means of  a second revision either under  the Act  or under the Civil Procedure Code. It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra) that the Full Bench  of the  Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms  of Section  20 read  with Section  18(5) in their proper  perspective   and  this  failing  had  affected  its conclusion. According  to the Full Bench, a revisional order of a  District Court  under Section  20 laid itself open for further challenge to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. because of  two factors viz. (1) there was no mention in the Act that  the order  would be  final and  (2) there  was  no provision in  the Act  for an  appeal being  filed against a revisional order  under Section 20. The Full Bench failed to notice certain  crucial factors. In the first place, Section 20 is  a composite  section and  refers  to  the  powers  of revision exercisable  under that Section by a District Judge as well  as by  the High Court. Such being the case if it is to be  taken that  an order passed by a District Court under Section 20  will not  have finality because the Section does not  specifically  say  so,  then  it  will  follow  that  a revisional order  passed by  the High  Court  under  Section 20(1) also  will not  have finality.  Surely  it  cannot  be contended by  anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of  its powers  of revision under Section 20(1) can be subjected  to further  revision because Section 20(1) has not expressly  conferred finality  to an  order passed under that Section.  Secondly, the  terms of Section 20(1) have to be read in conjunction with Section 18(5). Section 18(5), as already seen, declares that an order of a Rent Control Court shall be  final subject  to the  decision of  the  Appellate Authority and  an order  of an  Appellate Authority shall be final and  shall not  be liable  to be called in question in any court  of law except as provided for in Section 20. When the Legislature  has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court  and the  decision of  the Appellate Authority shall be  final at  their respective states unless the order is modified  by the  Appellate Authority  or the  Revisional Authority as  the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to  declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court  as the  case may  be will  also have the seal of finality. The  third aspect  is that the Legislature has not merely conferred  finality to  the decision  of an Appellate Authority but  has further laid down that the decision shall not be  liable to  be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20. These additional words clearly spell  out the  prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under  Section 115 C.P.C. to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court 888 under  Section  20  of  the  Act.  This  position  has  been succinctly set  out in  para 20  of the  judgment in  Aundal Ammal’s case  (supra). As  was noticed  in  Vishesh  Kumar’s case, the  intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to  reduce the  number of revision petitions filed in the

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High Court  and for  determining the legislative intent, the Court must  as far  as possible construe a statute in such a manner as  would advance  the object  of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.      A  thought  may  occur  to  some  whether  by  a  rigid construction of  Section 20(1)  read with Section 18(5), the High Court’s  power of  superintendence  over  the  District Court, even  when it  functions as  a revisional court under Section 20(1)  of the  Kerala Act, will not stand forfeited. We may  only state  that legislative  history would indicate that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by a High  Court under  Section 115  C.P.C. appear to have been conferred and  vested "because  the supervisory jurisdiction to  issue   writs  of   certiorari  and   prohibition   over Subordinate Courts  in the  mofussil could not be exercised, (and hence)  it would  be reasonable  to hold  that  it  was intended .........  to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue  the   high  prerogative   writs  and   the  power  of supervision  under   the  Charter   Act  and  its  successor provisions in  the Constitution  Acts." vide  para  10  S.S. Khanna v. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497.      Incidentally,  we   may  also   point  out   that   the Legislature has  not taken  away and  indeed it  cannot take away the  power of  superintendence of  the High Court under Article  227   of  the  Constitution  over  all  courts  and tribunals which  are within  the territories  in relation to which the High Court exercise its jurisdiction.      Having said  so much  it is really not necessary for us to dwell  at length  about the decision in Shyamaraju’s case restoring the ratio in Krishnaji’s case and disapproving the decision in Yaragatti’s case. Even so we cannot but refer to the fact  that in  the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely  taken away  and the  entire proceedings are sought to  be limited  to a  two tier  system viz.  the Rent Control Court  and the  Revisional Court,  whereas under the Kerala Act  there is  a three  tier  system  viz.  the  Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court. Though Section  48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also speaks of  the finality  of the  order of  the Rent  Control Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under Section 50  in more  or less  the same  terms as  in Section 18(5) of  the Kerala  Act, the  force underlying  the  words "shall be final 889 and shall  not be  liable to be called in question" etc. has to be  reckoned at  a lesser  degree than  the terms  in the Kerala Act  because the  words of  finality in  the two Acts under the  relevant provisions  present distinctly different perspections. It  is in  that  situation  it  was  found  in Shyamaraju’s  case  that  the  relevant  provisions  of  the Karnataka Act  warranted the  application of  the  ratio  in Chhaganlal’s case  and Krishnadas Bhatija’s case rather than the ratio  in Vishesh  Kumar’s case and Aundal Ammal’s case. In fact,  it is  worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who spoke for  the Full Bench in Krishnaji’s case was a party to the judgment  in Aundal  Ammal’s case and the learned judge, while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji’s case.      There is,  therefore, no  conflict between the decision rendered in  Aundal Ammal’s  case (supra)  and  Shyamaraju’s case (supra). As to the question whether a fresh thinking is called for  on the  scope of  Section 20  read with  Section 18(5) of  the Kerala  Act, we  do not  find any  grounds for reconsidering the  view taken  in Aundal Ammal’s case and on

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the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a  reiteration of  the view  expressed in Aundal Ammal’s case.      An argument  was advanced  that since  the decision  in Vareed v.  Mary had  been good  law for a number of years in Kerala State  and since the High Court had been entertaining revision petitions  under Section  115  C.P.C.  against  the revisional orders  of District Courts under Section 20(1) of the Kerala  Act, the  decision should  have been  allowed to stand even  though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance  by this  Court. We are unable to countenance this argument  in the  circumstances of  the  case  and  the reason therefore  can be  set out  by  refering  to  certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein. In West Ham Union  v. Edmonton  Union, 13 1908 A.C. 1 at page 4 Lord Loreburn, L.C. spoke as under:           "Great  importance   is  to  be  attached  to  old           authorities,  on   the  strength   of  which  many           transactions may  have been  adjusted  and  rights           determined. But  where they are plainly wrong, and           especially where the subsequent course of judicial           decisions has  disclosed weakness in the reasoning           on which  they were based, and practical injustice           in the  consequences that  must flow  from them, I           consider it  is the duty of this House to overrule           them, if  it has  not lost  the right  to do so by           itself expressly affirming them." 890      In Robinson  Brothers  (Brewers)  Ltd.  v.  Houghton  & Chesteric Street  Assessment Committee,  12 1937  2 All E.R. 298, affirmed  in 1938  2 All  E.R. 79,  the members  of the Court, having  concluded that  a decision  on a  question of rating  pronounced   some  forty   years  previously   by  a Divisional   Court   was   plainly   wrong,   overruled   it accordingly, although  the  earlier  decision  had,  without doubt, been  frequently acted  on in  rating matters  in the meantime, and although no judicial doubt had previously been cast on  its correctness. These decisions have been referred to and  followed in  Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, All E.R. 1958 1205. On similar lines this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed v. Mary, (supra) as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the relevant Sections  in  the  Act  and  the  weakness  in  the reasoning became  manifest in  the light  of the  subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar (supra).      In the  light of  our conclusion  all the  appeals must succeed in  so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to  entertain revision  petitions  under  Section  115 C.P.C. is  concerned. In  Civil Appeal  Nos. 626 of 1981 and 624 of  1985, the  High Court  allowed the revision petition under Section  115 C.P.C.  and ordered  the eviction  of the tenant. In  Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside  the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order  of eviction. In Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986 the District Court  allowed the  Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court has confirmed  the said  order in  the revision preferred to it. In  Civil Appeal  No. 7505  of 1983  the District  Court reversed the  decisions  of  the  Rent  Controller  and  the Appellate Authority  and ordered  eviction and  order of the District Court  has been  confirmed by  the High  Court.  In Special Leave  Petition  No.  4311  of  1985  the  Appellate Authority sustained  the claim  of the landlord for eviction under Section  11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Control  Court for  deciding the  question whether  the

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tenant is  entitled to  resist the claim for eviction on the basis of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The order of  remand was confirmed by the District Court and the High Court.      In accordance  with our  pronouncement it  follows that the order of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. in each of the  appeals concerned,  viz., Civil  Appeal Nos.  626 of 1981, 624  of 1985,  2079 of  1981, 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of 1983 will  stand set  aside and  the revisional order of the District Judge  in each  case will stand restored and become operative. As  the appeals  are directed  only  against  the order 891 of the  High Court passed in revision the appeals will stand disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines.      In Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4311 of 1985 also the order  of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. is not sustainable but  even so  we do  not find  any merit  in the petition because  the finding of the Appellate Authority and the order  of remand passed by it have been confirmed by the District Court  and as  such, there  are no  merits  in  the petition, accordingly  it is  dismissed. Interim  orders, if any, passed  in the  appeals and  the special leave petition will stand  vacated.  The  parties  in  all  the  cases  are directed to bear their respective costs.      S. RANGANATHAN,  J. 1.  I find  on a cursory perusal of various State  enactments on  rent  control  that,  while  a number of them do confer s . cific jurisdiction on the State High Court,  some others  are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala  and Karnataka  enactments. Thus,  though we  are concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these cases,  a  similar  question  might  well  arise  under  the corresponding enactments of some other States as well. It is in view  of this  importance of  the question  raised that I have considered it necessary to state my views in a separate order.      2. The  Kerala and  Karnataka Rent  Control Acts vest a power of  revision in  the District  Judge  against  certain orders.  The  question  in  these  matters  is  whether  the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) can be invoked to seek a further revision of  the revisional  order passed  by  the  District Judge. This  question has  been answered  in the negative in Aundal Ammal  v.  Sadasivan  Pillai,  [1987]  3  SCC  83  (a decision under  the Kerala  Act) but  in the  affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde  v. Venkatesha  Bhat, [1987]  3 J.T. 663 (a decision under  the Karnataka  Act) and hence this reference to a  larger Bench. My learned brothers are of the view that there is  no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments  are not  in pari materia and that, so far as the  Kerala   Act  is  concerned,  Aundal  Ammal  should  be followed. With respect, I am unable to agree.      3. Normally,  a revision  lies to  the High Court under section 115  of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court. The  fact that  the order  may have been passed under  a  special  statute  or  that  the  statute  contains expressions purporting  to confer  finality on  the order of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court have been  held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This is the effect 892 of the decisions in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977]  2 SCR  871, a  case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation  Act  and  in  Krishandas  Bhatija  v. Venkatachala  Shetty,   SLP  No.  913  of  1978  decided  on

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13.2.1978 and  Shyamaraju’s case  (supra), which  are direct decisions under  the Karnataka  Act. In my opinion, there is no vital  or material  difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also.      4. The  relevant provisions  of the two enactments have been extracted  in the order of Natarajan J. and need not be set out  again, Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendment in 1975,  rent control  matters are  decided, in  the  first instance, by  the District  Munsiff or  the Civil Judge/Rent Controller, according  as the  case arises outside or inside the city  of Bangalore.  There is no provision for an appeal from  this  order  but  there  is  one  for  revision.  This revisional power  is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court  and  the  District  Judge.  The  High  Court  is empowered to  revise  the  order  of  the  Civil  Judge/Rent Controller and  the District  Judge  that  of  the  District Munsiff. Section  50(2) specifically declares that the order of the  District Judge  under this  provision is  final. The Kerala pattern  is the same except that an appeal intervenes before the  revision. Section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent  Controller to  an officer  or an  authority of the rank of  a Subordinate  Judge or of a superior rank. Section 20 provides  for revision.  The revisional  power is  to  be exercised  by   the  District   Court  where  the  appellate authority is  the Subordinate  Judge and  the High  Court in other cases. Section 20 does not provide, as does Section 50 of the  Karnataka Act,  that the  decision of  the  District Judge shall  be final.  It is true that section 18(5) of the Kerala Act  lays down  that the  order of  the Rent  Control court or,  where there  is an  appeal, the  decision of  the appellate authority  shall be  final and shall not be called into question  in any  court of  law except  as provided  in section  20  but  the  language  of  section  48(5)  of  the Karnataka Act  is even  stronger. It provides that the order of the  Court or  the Rent  Controller shall (subject to the decision in  appeal or  of the  District Judge  or the  High Court in  revision under section 50) be final and "shall not be liable  to be  called into  question in  any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision." If  the much  wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka  Act does  not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court  under S.  115, as has been held in the two cases referred to  above, it is difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. 893      5. This poses then the question of a choice between the two views  of this  court: the one in Shyamaraju and the one in Aundal Ammal. As has already been pointed out, Shyamaraju follows the  earlier decisions  of this Court in Chhagan Lal and Krishnadas  Bhatija. The  only other  decision  of  this Court, which has relevance in the present context, is Vihesh Kumar v.  Shanti Prasad,  [1980] 3  SCR 32  which  has  been relied upon in Aundal Ammal. I am in agreement with the view expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally different  statutory context.  That decision  turned largely on  the legislative  history of S. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to  the State  of Uttar  Pradesh. I am therefore inclined to  lean in  favour of  the view that has commended itself to  this  Court  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of revision over  the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well.      6.  Aundal   Ammal  has   pointed  out   that  such  an

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interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four courts under  the Kerala  Rent Control Act viz: the court of the first  instance, the appellate court, the district court and then  the High  Court whereas  under the  Karnataka  Act there are  only three  courts, viz:  the court  of the first instance, the district court by way of revision and the High Court by  way of further revision. This is no doubt true but can this  alone be a reason why identical statutory language should be  given  different  interpretation  under  the  two enactments? I  think not. That apart, the result of applying Aundal Ammal  would be  to completely exclude the High Court in rent  control matters and this, if I am right in thinking that the  two Acts are pari materia, will leave the litigant in Karnataka  with only  a right of revision to the District Court. I  venture to  doubt whether  in the absence of clear language the  Legislature can  be held  to have  intended to completely exclude  the jurisdiction  of the  High Court  in such an important branch of the law. Moreover to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 would only  encourage  the  recourse,  by  aggrieved  parties,  to articles 136,  226 and  227  of  the  Constitution  and  the conclusion may  not even  result in  reducing the  spate  of litigation under  the Rent  Control Acts  in the High Courts and Supreme  Court. I  am, therefore, not inclined to attach muct importance  to this  circumstance as  a  guide  to  the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute.      7.  The   above  interpretation  will  not  render  the language and  scheme of  section 18(5)  read with section 20 totally redundant  as was  suggested in arguments before us. Section 20 is necessary because 894 though, at present, Subordinate Judges have been constituted as the  appellate authorities  under the  Act, the appellate authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and, but for  such a specific statutory provision, there would be no remedy  to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority. Section  18(5) is a provision of a general nature intended to  prevent the  orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged  in the  courts. These  provisions,  in  my opinion, do  not and cannot preclude the applicability of s. 115 of  the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District Court, not as  a persona  designata, but  as a  civil court  of the land. In  this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a vital part  to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115.      8. One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation  to be  placed on this procedural problem is this.  In the  State of  Kerala, as early as in Vareed v. Mary, AIR  1969 Ker.  101, a  view was  taken that  the High Court can entertain a second revision and, though Shri Potti suggested that  this view  has been  often  challenged,  the above Full  Bench decision  hold the field till Aundal Ammal was decided.  In Karnataka,  the maintainability of a second revision appears  to have  been taken  for granted  untill a doubt was  raised in  view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act. This doubt was dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji’s case (ILR 1978 Kar. 1585) that  the High Court could maintain a second revision. This view  was sought  to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in  Yaragatti’s case,  in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju’s case. In  the result,  the position  has  been  that,  right through in  the State  of Karnataka  and for  atleast for  a period of  almost twenty  years in  the State of Kerala, the prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of

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a second  revision by  the High  Court. I  think that  in  a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed  unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary.      9. I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable and that the matters before us  should be  disposed of  accordingly. However, the petitions and  appeals will  stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers. S.L.                      Appeals and petitions disposed of. 895