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PETITIONER: JEEWAN NATH WAHAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHEIKH MAHFOOZ JAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/09/1969

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1704            1970 SCR  (2) 243  1970 SCC  (2) 833

ACT: Motor  Vehicles  Act 4 of 1939, ss. 47 (3), 48,  57  and  64 (a)Application for permit for a new route--RTA deciding that new  route  not  necessary--Whether  order  appealable    to Appellate   Tribunal   under s. 64 (a)--Order  is  under  s. 47(3) and not under section 48 and therefore not appealable.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellants,  among others applied  to  the  Regional Transport  Authority  for permits to operate  a  direct  bus service  on. a route in Meerut District, U.P., which had  no direct passenger bus service.  After hearing the  appellants and those who opposed them, the Regional Transport Authority was satisfied that there was no sufficient demand for such a direct  service, and therefore, there was  no  justification for  opening the proposed new route.  The.  applications  of "the    appellants  and  other  applicants  were   therefore rejected.  The Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of  the Regional  Transport  Authority and granted  permits  to  the three  appellants.   The respondents  therefore  filed  writ petitions  in the High Court for quashing the order  of  the Tribunal contending that no appeal against the order of  the Regional Transport Authority lay under s. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act  1939 and that  consequently,  the Tribunal had no.  jurisdiction  to  entertain  such  appeals,  and  grant permits to the  appellants.  A Single  Bench  dismissed  the petitions   but   the  Division Bench held  that  no  appeal against  the order of the  Regional transport Authority  lay under  s. 64(a) and accordingly, allowed the writ  petitions and quashed the Tribunal’s order.  On appeal to this Court, HELD: The appeal must be dismissed.     The  decisions of this Court clearly lay down  that  the R.T.A.  has  first to make "a general order"  as  stated  in Abdul  Mateen’s  case under s. 47 (3) as to  the  number  of permits necessary for a new route and he cannot exceed  that limit while he is at the next stage when he considers  under s.  48 read with, s. 56(7) as to. who among  the  applicants should  be granted the permit or permits.  Such  a  ’general order’  limiting the number of permits presupposes  that  he has come to a decision that the new route either proposed by

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him  or  by an applicant or applicants is necessary  in  the public interest.  If the order ’as to the number of  permits is  a ’general order’ passed under s. 47(3) with  which  the individual  applications are not concerned and  is  anterior to the stage under s. 48 when applications of the individual operators  are taken into, consideration, and  therefore  is not  appealable  under s. 64 (a) it must follow  a  fortiori that  the decision as to whether the new route is  necessary or  not  is  equally ’a general  order’  arrived  at  either earlier  or  contemporaneously with the decision as  to  the number  of permits.  If the latter order is not  appealable, it  cannot be that the former i.e. the decision whether  the new  route is necessary or not, is not an  equally  ’general order’ with which individual applications are not  concerned and can appeal against it under s. 64 (a).     However, the powers of the R.T.A. in connection with the decision as to whether a proposed route should be opened  or not are not un- 244 limited  and  unbridled.   The  power  is  subject  to   the revisional power of the State Government under s. 64-A. [250 E--251 C]     Abdul Mateen v.R.K. Pandev [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523; M/s Java Ram Motor Service v.S. Rajarathinam C.A. 95 of  1965,   dec. on  October 27, 1967; R. Obliswami Naidu v. The Addl.  State Transort  Appellate Tribunal Madras C.A. 1426 of 19’68, dec. on Feb. 17, 1969, applied.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1278 of 1969.     Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 13,  1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal  No.  1060  of 1967.     C.K.  Daphtary,,  Yogeshwar Prasad, S.K.  Davon  and  S. Bagga, for the appellants.     H.R.  Gokhale,  J.P.  Goyal,  Ilyas  Hussain  and   V.C. Prashar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Shelat,  J.   The question arising in  this  appeal,  by certificate, may be stated thus:                   When an applicant applies for a permit  to               run a passenger bus service on the ground that               the route for which he applies, though one not               yet  opened, is necessary in public  interest,               but  the  Regional  Transport Authority  comes               to.  the  conclusion  that it  does  not,  and               thereupon rejects his application, whether his               order is one under s. 48 of the Motor Vehicles               Act,  4 of 1939 and is, therefore,  appealable               under s. 64(a)  of  that Act ?     The  route  involved in this case was  the  one  between Meerut  and  Dankaur  which had  no  direct  passenger  bus: service.   There were, however, two routes which were  being operated,  namely, one from Meerut to Bulandsharhar and  the other from Siana to Dankaur, one crossing the other, so that if  one  wanted to go from Meerut to Dankaur  there  was  no direct service, and therefore, he would have first to travel in the bus running from Meerut to Bulandshahar, get down  at a  place near Gulsothi and catch the bus running from  Siana to  Dankaur.   This was the position  when  the  appellants, amongst   others,  applied  to   the    Regional   Transport Authority  for  permits to operate. a  direct  service  from Meerut  to Dankaur.  This was, therefore, not a  case  where

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the  R.T.A. had already decided upon opening the new  route, fixed  the number of permits necessary for such a route  and then invited applications from operators.  Nevertheless, the R.T.A., follow- 245 ing  the procedure laid down in s. 57 of the Act,  published these applications, to which objections. were raised amongst others  by those who were operating on the  routes.  earlier referred to.     These  applications  came up for  consideration  in  the meeting held before the R.T.A. on July 28, 1965 when Item  3 of the Agenda for that meeting was:                   "To    pronounce    decision     regarding                             recognition  and  classification of  M eerut  to               Dankaur via Hapur Gulsothi Sikandarabad route.               and grant of permits thereon." It  is  apparent  that Item 3  involved  two  questions  for determination   of  the  R.T.A.;  (a)  whether  the    route proposed   by  the appellants and others should  be  opened, and  (b)  if  so, to whom, amongst  the  applicants,  should permit or permits, depending upon the number of permits  he. should  decide  upon, should be granted. After  hearing  the applicants  and  those  who opposed  them,  the  R.T.A.  was satisfied  that  there was no sufficient demand for  such  a direct  service, and therefore, there was no   justification for opening the proposed new route.  Having arrived at that’ conclusion  the  question  of  granting  or   not   granting permits   to  individual  applicants did not  arise  and  he rejected  the  applications  of the’  appellants  and  other applicants.  Appeals having  been filed before the Appellate Tribunal,  the Tribunal  reversed  the order of  the  R.T.A. and granted permits to the three appellants. The respondents thereupon  filed  writ  petitions  in  the  High  Court  for quashing the order of the Tribunal contending that no appeal against  the  order of the. R.T.A. lay under s.  64(a),  and that  con  sequently, the Tribunal had no   jurisdiction  to entertain  such appeals and grant permits to the appellants. The  learned Single Judge of the High Court, who. heard  the writ petitions in the first instance, dismissed them, but on appeal   against  his order  the Division Bench of the  High Court came to the conclusion that no appeal against the said order  of  the R.T.A. lay under s. 64(a),  and  accordingly, allowed  the  writ  petitions and  quashed  the  Tribunal’s. order.  This appeal is directed against this order. Counsel  for  the  appellants  urged  that  there  was.   no provision in the Act separately providing for the R.T.A.  to decide first as   to whether particular route proposed by an applicant  should be opened or not.  It was argued that  the provisions of Ch., IV, and in particular ss. 47 and 57, show that  once  an  application  for a permit  is  made  and  is published and objections thereto are invited and the  R.T.A. applies  his mind to it and rejects it, no matter  what  his reasons  for  such rejection are, his order  amounts  to.  a refusal  under s. 48 and is appealable under s. 64(a).   The rival  contention,  on the other hand, was  that  s.  47(3), which . Sup. C1/70---4 246 contains  the  power of the R.T.A. to  first  determine  the number     of  permits  necessary for  a  particular  route, [which  decision, as held by this Court, is  not  appealable under s. 64(a)], contains also the power to decide whether a proposed  route   should  be opened or not, and that  it  is only  after  these two points are first ,decided,  that  the

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question,  who  amongst  the applicants  should  be  granted permits,  arises.   It  is at this  latter  stage  that  the question  of granting or refusing to grant a  permit  arises under  s. 48, and it is against an order under that  section that  an  appeal  under    64(a) is provided.  The. argument was  based  on the principle that a right of appeal  is  not something  which is inherent, but is  that  which   and   to the  extent  it is provided for by the statute.     The  provisions  of the Act relevant  to  the  questions raised  in this appeal as also their scheme have  been  more than  once examined by this Court.  There is  therefore,  no necessity to  analyse them once more.  In Abdul Mateen  v.R. K.   Pandey(1)   the  ,question  was  whether   the    Bihar Government   acting  under s. 64-A, as amended by the  Bihar Amendment Act, 1950, had the power to increase the number of permits  for  which  applications had been  invited  by  the R.T.A.   In negativing the claim that the  State  Government had  such power, this Court inter alia held that s.  47  (3) was  concerned  with  a  "general  order"  limiting   .stage carriages on a consideration of matters specified in s.  47, and  that such an order can be modified by the R.T.A. if  it so decides one way or the other.  But such a modification is not    a matter of consideration when it is dealing with the actual grant of permit under s. 48 read with s. 57, for,  at that  stage what  the R.T.A. has to do is to choose  between various  applicants who may have applied under s.  46.   The Court  held that  that  is not the stage when  the  "general order"  passed under s. 47(3) can be reconsidered, for,  the order   under  s. 48 is    subject  to s. 47  including  the provisions  of   s. 47 ( 3 )  under  which     the  "general order"  limiting the number of permits is       passed.   At page  531  of the Report, the Court further  held  that  the appeal  contemplated  under  s. 64 is by  a  person  who  is aggrieved  by  the   order specified therein  and  does  not contemplate  any  appeal against "the general order"  passed under s. 47 (3 ).  On this view of s. 47, it was lastly held that when an appeal is taken from an order under s. 48 and a revision  is’  applied  for  under s.  64-A   of  the  Bihar Amendment Act, the power of the Appellate Authority, as also of  the State Government as the revisional authority, is  as much subject to s. 47(3) as the power of the R.T.A. under s. 48,  i.e.,  it  cannot  grant a  permit  beyond  the  limit. already  .decided  upon under s. 47(3).  In  M/s.  Java  Ram Motar Service (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523. 247 v.S.  Rajarathinam,.(1)  the R.T.A. had  already  introduced the  new  bus route and then had invited  applications   for permits.  34  applicants applied for  permits.   The  R.T.A, however,  rejected  them all on the ground  that  there  was after  all  no need for the new route.  On these  facts  the question  was,  whether  a  person,  whose  application   is rejected by the R.T.A. on the ground that there was no  need for a new route, in spite of his decision previously arrived at  that such a route was necessary, could appeal  under  s. 64(a)  against  such rejection.  Following the  decision  in Abdul Mateen’s case(2) we held that:                   "the  Authority  had already  resolved  to               introduce   a  new  bus  route   and   invited               applications  for a permit under  sec.  57(2).               It could no doubt have acted under sec. 47 ( 3               ) and modified its earlier decision.  instead,               what  it  did was that while  considering  the               question  as to who amongst the 34  applicants               should  be granted that permit, i.e.,  at  the

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             stage  not under section 47(3) but under  sec.               48  (  1  ),  it   decided   to   refuse   all               applications  on the ground that there was  no               longer any need for any such permit.  In other               words,  though  the earlier  order  was  still               intact,    the    authority    rejected    the               applications  on the ground that there was  no               need  for  any fresh permit.   The  order  was               clearly contrary to the  previous order passed               under sec. 47(3) and therefore cannot be  said               to  be in consonance with sec. 47 as  required               by  sec. 48 ( 1 ).  The  order  was  not   one               under sec. 47(3) but under sec. 48(1) refusing               thereby  the applications including  those  of               the  appellant  and  the respondents  and  was               therefore  subject to  an  appeal  under  sec.               64(a)."     Does it make any difference to. the principle laid  down in these decisions whether the R.T.A. invites   applications having  previously  decided  to introduce a  new  route   or whether  an applicant proposes such a new route and  applies for  a permit. Abdul Mateen’s case(2) and the case  of  Java Ram  Motor   Service(1) were cases where  the   R.T.A.   had first   decided   to  introduce A new  route  and  had  then invited  application.   On the other hand, in  R.  Obliswami Naidu  v.  The  Addl.  State Transport  Appellate  Tribunal, Madras(3) no such decision had been previously taken by  the R.T.A.  and the appellant had applied for a permit on a  new route.   The   question  canvassed  there  was  whether  the R.T.A.  had  first  to decide the necessity of  such  a  new route, and then having come to such a decision proceed (1) CA 95 of l965 decd.  on October 27, 1967. (2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523. (3) C.A. 1426 of 1968, dec. on Feb. 17, 1969. 248 to  examine  the  question whether an  applicaNT  should  or should  not be’ granted the permit.  The Appellate  Tribunal had held that the: procedure followed by the R.T.A. was  not in  accordance  with law as it had failed to  determine  the question  of  the  need for a service  for  the   new  route applied   for   by   the   appellant  before  deciding   his application  for permit, and had contravened the  provisions of  s. 47(3).  The appellant challenged the order by a  writ petition  in  the High Court which was  dismissed.   In  the appeal in this Court against that order, Hegde, J., speaking for  the Court, upheld the view of the  Appellate   Tribunal and  held that though s. 47 (3), if read by itself, did  not throw  light  on the question, secs. 47 and  57,  when  read together, made it clear that the R.T.A. had first to  arrive at   a  decision  whether there was the necessity  for.  the new route, and then decide under s. 48 whether the appellant should  be  granted a permit or not  This  decision  clearly shows  that  it  makes no  difference  between  cases  where applications are invited by the R.T.A. after  having come to the conclusion as to the necessity for a new route, or where an applicant himself proposes a new route and applies for  a permit.  In both the cases, the R.T.A. has to decide, before reaching  the  stage of s. 48 when he  considers  individual applications for deciding as to whom amongst the  applicants the  permit  should  be granted, whether the  new  route  is necessary in the interest of the public.     The decisions referred to above, in our opinion, clearly lay down that the R.T.A. has first to make "a general order" as stated in Abdul Mateen’s case(1) under s. 47(3) as to the number  of permits necessary for a new route and  he  cannot

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exceed  that  limit while he is at the next  stage  when  he considers.rs  under s. 48 read with s. 57 as to who  amongst the  applicants  shouId be granted the  permit  or  permits. Such  a  "general  order" limiting  the  number  of  permits presupposes  that  he has come to a decision  that  the  new route  either  proposed  by  him  or  by  an  applicant   or applicants  is necessary in public interest.  Obviously,  he does not have to decide the number of permits necessary  for such a new route unless he first decides that the new  route should be opened.  If the order as to the number of  permits is  a "general order" passed under s. 47 (3), in respect  of which  the individual applicants are not concerned with  and is  anterior to the stage under s. 48 when  applications  of the  individual operators  are taken into  consideration,and therefore,  not  appealable  under s. 64(a), it must  follow a fortiori that the decision as to whether the new route  is necessary.  or not is equally a "general order"  arrived  at either earlier or contemporaneously with the decision as  10 the  number  of  permits.   If  the  latter  order  is   not appealable, (1) [1963] S.C.R. 523. 249 it cannot be that the former, i.e., the decision whether the new  route is necessary or not, is not an  equally  "general order"  with which individual applicants are not  concerned, and can appeal against it under s. 64(a).     On  this view, it would at first sight appear as if  the R.T.A.  has  an unlimited or unbridled power  in  connection with  the decision as to whether a proposed route should  be opened  or  not.  That it is not so is clear  from  s.  64-A introduced  in  the  Act by Act 100 of  1955  which  confers revisional power on the State Transport Authority, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, to call  for the  record of any case in which an order has been  made  by the:  R.T.A. and in which no appeal lies, and if it  appears to  the  State  Transport Authority that such  an  order  is improper or illegal, to pass such order as it deems fit.     In  our  view  the  Division Bench  of  the  High  Court correctly  interpreted  ss.  47,  48, 57  and  64,  and  the decisions  of this Court in Abdul Mateen’s case(1)  and  the case   of   Jaya   Ram   Motor  Service(2).    The   appeal, consequently,  must  fail  and has  to  be  dismissed.   The Appellants  will pay to the  respondents the  costs of  this appeal. R.K.P.S.                          Appeal dismissed. (1) (1963) 3 S.C.R. 523. (2) C.A. No. 95 of 1965 decd. on Oct. 27, 1967. 250