REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1246 OF 2002

Jayabalan                    …. Appellant

Versus

U.T. of Pondicherry         …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In the  present  appeal,  the appellant  has challenged the legality  of  the  

judgment and order dated 04.09.2002 passed by the Madras High Court.  

The appellant is aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order as by the  

said judgment the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by  

the trial Court and convicted the present appellant under Section 302 of  

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the Indian Penal Code (in short “the IPC”) and sentenced him to undergo  

imprisonment for life.

3. The appellant - Jayabalan and the deceased - Vasanthi, got married on  

05.09.1988 and out of the aforesaid wedlock, two children were born.  

The  couple  was  living  just  opposite  to  the  house  of  the  deceased’s  

parents, the two houses i.e. of the appellant and that of the deceased’s  

parents being separated by a 20 feet wide road. The deceased, at the time  

of her death, was employed as a nurse in the T. B. Hospital, Pondicherry  

and the appellant was employed as a teacher in Alankuppam Government  

School,  Pondicherry.  The  relationship  between  the  appellant  and  the  

deceased  was  stated  to  be  strained.  The  appellant  used  to  collect  the  

salary of the deceased and also used to be very strict  in allowing the  

deceased to  spend her  money.  The appellant  was  also in the  habit  of  

suspecting the fidelity of the deceased whenever she would talk to a male  

person. On account of this, there used to be frequent quarrels between the  

couple. In July 1992, about two months prior to the date of the incident,  

the  deceased  is  said  to  have  complained  to  her  parents  that  she  

apprehended threat to her life from the appellant.  Just fifteen days prior  

to the date of the incident,  there was a quarrel  between the couple in  

connection with the ear piercing ceremony of their children.  It has been  

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alleged that while the appellant wanted to spend lavishly and celebrate  

the ear piercing ceremony along with the ear piercing ceremony of his  

brother’s children, the deceased did not agree to it, and on the contrary  

wanted the function to be as simple as possible without incurring much  

expenditure.  The ear piercing ceremony was fixed for 01.06.1992.  

4. On the fateful day of 29.05.1992, the deceased went to her parental house  

in  the  morning  with  her  children  and  took  her  breakfast  there  and  

thereafter she came back to her own house leaving behind her child in her  

parental house.  At about 9.10 a.m., when the baby started crying, the  

younger sister of the deceased, Chitra (PW-3) took the child and went to  

the house of the appellant and she left  the child there after informing  

about the same to the deceased.  At about 9.25 a.m., the brother of the  

deceased, Ravi Kumar (PW-1) and also the sisters (PW-3 and PW-4) of  

the deceased heard the screams of the deceased.  On hearing the said  

screams they immediately went to the house of the appellant and found  

the appellant jumping and coming out from the bathroom without any  

clothes on him. The appellant having suffered burn injuries on his body  

requested PW-1 to call for an auto rickshaw.  PW-1 took the baby and  

handed him over to PW-3 and requested their neighbor Narayanan (PW-

5) to fetch an auto rickshaw and when the auto rickshaw arrived,  the  

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appellant got into it along with one Illango (PW-6), who was asked to  

accompany the appellant to the hospital. The appellant along with PW-6  

then proceeded to the Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Medical Education  

and Research, Pondicherry where the appellant was attended to at 9.45  

a.m. for the burn injuries sustained by him.  

5. Immediately after  the appellant  and PW-6 left  for the hospital,  PW-1,  

PW-3, PW-4 as well as PW-5, came inside the house of the appellant and  

on  realising  the  screams  of  the  deceased  to  be  emanating  from  the  

bathroom, found the deceased to be burning inside the bathroom. As the  

bathroom door was bolted from inside and could not be opened,  they  

broke  open the  door  with  a  crow bar.  They immediately  covered  the  

deceased with gunny bags and put off the fire.  The deceased was stated  

to be conscious when she was lifted from the bathroom.  When PW-1  

asked the deceased as to what had happened, she told that the appellant  

had beaten her and had, after pouring kerosene oil set her on fire. They  

brought her to the hall and there she died. A fresh injury was also noticed  

on the forehead of the deceased just above her left eye on the face and  

her body was completely burnt.

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6. In the meanwhile, at about 9.30 a.m., one Premila, a neighbor is said to  

have informed the control room, Pondicherry about the occurrence. The  

said information was recorded by the Assistant Sub Inspector (PW-10)  

and was passed on by wireless to the Sub Inspector (PW-13) of the D.  

Nagar  Police  Station.  On  receiving  such  information,  PW-13  

immediately  proceeded  to  the  spot  of  occurrence  and  obtained  a  

complaint from PW-1.  Thereafter, he returned to the police station and  

registered an FIR under Section 302 IPC at 11.10 a.m.

7. After  completion  of  the  investigation,  the  police  filed  a  charge  sheet  

against the appellant. On the basis of the aforesaid charge sheet, the trial  

Court  framed  charge  under  Section  302  IPC  to  which  the  appellant  

pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

8. During the trial, a number of prosecution witnesses were examined.  The  

defence, however, did not produce any witnesses.  On conclusion of the  

trial, the trial Court by its judgment and order dated 07.10.1994 acquitted  

the appellant of the charge framed under Section 302 IPC against him.

9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal passed by the trial Court,  

the  State  preferred  an  appeal  to  the  High  Court.   The  High  Court  

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entertained  the  said  appeal  and  heard  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  

parties.   On  conclusion  of  the  arguments  the  High  Court  passed  a  

judgment and order by reversing and setting aside the order of acquittal  

passed in favour of the appellant and convicted him under Section 302  

IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.  The said order  

of conviction passed by the High Court is under challenge in this appeal.  

10. Mr.  U.U.  Lalit,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant, very painstakingly argued the appeal before us.  He highlighted  

various aspects which were relied upon by the trial Court for basing its  

order of acquittal and relying on the same, he submitted that the High  

Court was not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal, for what the  

High Court had found proved was only a plausible or possible view and  

version, which did not find favour with the trial Court.  He referred to a  

number of decisions in support of his contention that the High Court was  

not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal so lightly.  He also  

submitted that the High Court was not justified in relying upon the oral  

dying  declaration  made  by  the  deceased  as  the  same  appears  to  be  

doubtful.   In  support  of  the  aforesaid  contention,  he  relied  upon  the  

evidence of PW-5, who, according to the counsel, had failed to support  

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the case of the prosecution on the aspect of dying declaration.  He further  

submitted  that  the  High  Court  committed  an  error  in  convicting  the  

appellant solely on the basis of the dying declaration of the deceased and  

on the evidence of the interested witnesses. According to him, the first  

information report was a result of deliberations and consultations which  

is proved from the fact that considerable delay was made in recording the  

FIR  as  well  as  in  forwarding  the  same  to  the  Magistrate.  He  also  

submitted that the accused himself suffered burn injuries in the process of  

saving  his  wife,  and  therefore,  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  

upholding him guilty of committing murder of his wife.   

11. On the other hand, Mr. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel appearing  

on  behalf  of  the  State  submitted  that  the  allegation  of  murder  made  

against  the  appellant  is  proved and based on clinching  evidence.   He  

forcefully  denied  the  suggestion  of  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant that it was a case of self-immolation by the deceased.  In order  

to refute the said allegation, Mr. Kanagaraj relied upon the conduct of the  

deceased.  He  invited  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  on  the  day  of  the  

occurrence, the deceased requested her parents to come back from the  

Government hospital, where mother of the deceased was to go for some  

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medical treatment as the deceased had to go to the hospital for attending  

the second shift duty. He emphasized that such conduct on part of the  

deceased  clearly  indicated  that  she  had  no  intention  of  committing  

suicide  as  she  was  contemplating  going  to  work  on  that  day.  This,  

according to the counsel for the State, proves the fact that it was not a  

case of either suicide or self-immolation but a pure and simple case of  

murder.  He referred to and heavily relied on the conduct of the appellant  

at the time of incident and immediately after the incident in order to point  

out the guilt  of the appellant. Heavy reliance was placed on the dying  

declaration of the deceased.    

12. Before dwelling into the evidence on record and before addressing the  

rival contentions made by the parties, we would like to reiterate the well  

established legal position with regard to the scope of interference with an  

order of acquittal. It is open to the High Court on an appeal against an  

order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own  

conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the  

presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts  in the  

trial Court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate  

court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial Court which  

recorded the order of acquittal.

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13.   In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC  

793 this Court observed as follows in para 5:

“5. … An appellant aggrieved by the overturning of his  acquittal  deserves the final court’s  deeper concern on  fundamental  principles of criminal justice.  … But we  hasten  to  add  even  here  that,  although,  the  learned  Judges of the High Court have not expressly stated so,  they have been at  pains to dwell  at  length on all  the  points relied on by the trial court as favourable to the  prisoners for the good reasons that they wanted to be  satisfied in their conscience whether there was credible  testimony warranting, on a fair consideration, a reversal  of the acquittal  registered by the court  below. In law  there  are  no  fetters  on  the  plenary  power  of  the  appellate court to review the whole evidence on which  the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a  duty  to  scrutinise  the  probative  material  de  novo,  informed,  however,  by  the  weighty  thought  that  the  rebuttable  innocence attributed  to  the  accused having  been  converted  into  an  acquittal  the  homage  our  jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the  higher  court  not  to  upset  the  holding  without  very  convincing  reasons  and  comprehensive  consideration.  In  our  view the High Court’s  judgment  survives this  exacting standard.”

14. In Bishan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 288, this Court aptly  

summarized the legal position as follows in para 22:  

“22.  It  is  well  settled  that  the  High  Court  in  appeal  under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  has full power to review at large the evidence on which  the  order  of  acquittal  was  founded  and  to  reach  the  conclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal  should  be  reversed.  No  limitation  should  be  placed  upon that power unless it be found expressly stated in  the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the  Code and before reaching its conclusion upon fact the  High  Court  should  give  proper  weight  and  consideration to such matters as: (1) the views of the  trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the  presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a  presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he  has  been  acquitted  at  his  trial;  (3)  the  right  of  the  

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accused  to  the  benefit  of  any  doubt;  and  (4)  the  slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of  fact  arrived at  by a Judge who had the advantage of  seeing the witnesses.”

15.  In  Chandrappa v.  State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 this Court  

held as follows in para 42:

“42.  …  (1)  An  appellate  court  has  full  power  to  review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon  which the order of acquittal is founded. (2)  The  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973 puts  no  limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such  power and an appellate court on the evidence before it  may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of  fact and of law. (3)  Various  expressions,  such  as,  ‘substantial  and  compelling  reasons’,  ‘good  and  sufficient  grounds’,  ‘very  strong circumstances’,  ‘distorted  conclusions’,  ‘glaring  mistakes’,  etc.  are  not  intended  to  curtail  extensive powers of an appellate  court  in an appeal  against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the  nature  of  ‘flourishes  of  language’  to  emphasise  the  reluctance  of  an  appellate  court  to  interfere  with  acquittal  than  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  court  to  review  the  evidence  and  to  come  to  its  own  conclusion. (4) An appellate court,  however, must bear in mind  that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption  in favour of the accused.  Firstly, the presumption of  innocence is available to him under the fundamental  principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person  shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved  guilty  by  a  competent  court  of  law.  Secondly,  the  accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption  of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and  strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the  basis  of  the  evidence on record,  the  appellate  court  should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by  the trial court.”

16. Recently,  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Ghurey  Lal  v.  State  of  U.P.,  

(2008) 10 SCC 450, observed as follows in para 50:  

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“50.  A  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  M.G.  Agarwal v.  State of Maharashtra  observed as under:  (AIR pp. 205 & 208, paras 16 & 17) There is no doubt that the power conferred by clause  (a)  which  deals  with  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal is as wide as the power conferred by clause  (b)  which  deals  with  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High Court’s  powers in dealing with criminal appeals are equally  wide  whether  the  appeal  in  question  is  one  against  acquittal or against conviction. That is one aspect of  the question. The other aspect of the question centres  round the approach which the High Court adopts in  dealing  with  appeals  against  orders  of  acquittal.  In  dealing with such appeals,  the High Court naturally  bears in mind the presumption of innocence in favour  of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact  that the said presumption is strengthened by the order  of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court and  so, the fact that the accused person is entitled to the  benefit of a reasonable doubt will always be present in  the  mind of  the  High Court  when it  deals  with  the  merits  of  the  case.  As  an  appellate  court  the  High  Court  is  generally  slow in disturbing the finding of  fact recorded by the trial court, particularly when the  said  finding  is  based  on  an  appreciation  of  oral  evidence because the trial court has the advantage of  watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have  given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High  Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are  as  wide  as  those  which  it  has  in  dealing  with  an  appeal against conviction, in dealing with the former  class  of  appeals,  its  approach  is  governed  by  the  overriding  consideration  flowing  from  the  presumption of innocence. … The test suggested by the expression “substantial and  compelling  reasons”  should  not  be  construed  as  a  formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case,  and  so,  it  is  not  necessary  that  before  reversing  a  judgment  of  acquittal,  the  High  Court  must  necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein  as perverse. The  question  which  the  Supreme Court  has  to  ask  itself, in appeals against conviction by the High Court  in such a case, is whether on the material produced by  the  prosecution,  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the  prosecution  case  against  the  appellants  had  been  proved  beyond  a  reasonable doubt, and that the contrary view taken by  the  trial  court  was  erroneous.  In  answering  this  question,  the  Supreme  Court  would,  no  doubt,  consider the salient and broad features of the evidence  

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in  order  to  appreciate  the  grievance  made  by  the  appellants against the conclusions of the High Court.”                                                     (emphasis underlined)

17. One of us (Bhandari J.) summarized the legal position in  Ghurey Lal  

case (supra) as follows in paras 69 and 70:

 “69.  The following principles emerge from the cases  above: 1.  The  appellate  court  may  review  the  evidence  in  appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386  of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of  reviewing  evidence  is  wide  and  the  appellate  court  can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can  review the trial court’s conclusion with respect to both  facts and law. 2.  The  accused  is  presumed  innocent  until  proven  guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when  he was before the trial court. The trial court’s acquittal  bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3.  Due or  proper  weight  and consideration must  be  given to the trial court’s decision. This is especially  true when a witness’ credibility is at issue. It is not  enough for the High Court to take a different view of  the  evidence.  There  must  also  be  substantial  and  compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was  wrong.

70.  In light of the above, the High Court and other  appellate  courts  should  follow  the  well-settled  principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is  going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s  acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise  disturb  the  trial  court’s  acquittal  if  it  has  “very  substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number  of  instances  arise  in  which the  appellate  court  would  have  “very  substantial  and  compelling  reasons” to  discard the trial  court’s  decision.  “Very  substantial and compelling reasons” exist when: (i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts  is palpably wrong; (ii)  The  trial  court’s  decision  was  based  on  an  erroneous view of law; (iii)  The trial  court’s  judgment is  likely to result  in  “grave miscarriage of justice”; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing  with the evidence was patently illegal;

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(v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust  and unreasonable; (vi)  The  trial  court  has  ignored  the  evidence  or  misread the material evidence or has ignored material  documents  like  dying  declarations/report  of  the  ballistic expert, etc. (vii)  This  list  is  intended  to  be  illustrative,  not  exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight  and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached—one that  leads to acquittal,  the other to conviction—the High  Courts/appellate  courts  must  rule  in  favour  of  the  accused.”

18.Further, in the case of Raj Narain v. State of U.P. and Ors. [Criminal  

Appeal  Nos.  891-892  of  2002  decided  on  18.09.2009], this  Court  

reiterated  the  aforesaid  view  and  held  that  even  if  two  views  are  

reasonably possible,  one indicating conviction and other acquittal,  this  

Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal. However, this Court  

will not hesitate to interfere with such order if the acquittal is perverse in  

the sense that no reasonable person would have come to that conclusion,  

or  if  the  acquittal  is  manifestly  illegal  or  grossly  unjust  [See  also  

Chikkarangaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka Criminal Appeals No.  

634-635 of 2002 decided on 02.09.2009]

19.In light  of the aforesaid well  settled legal  position,  we have carefully  

scrutinized  the  evidence available  before us  in  detail.  Admittedly,  the  

marital life of the deceased with the appellant was not smooth and the  

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relationship between the couple was strained and not cordial.  The four  

prosecution witnesses, viz. PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 have clearly  

stated in their testimonies before the trial Court that the appellant did not  

allow the deceased to spend her money and used to suspect her fidelity.  

These witnesses have also stated that quarrels between the couple was a  

frequent phenomenon and that on one occasion about two months prior to  

the  occurrence,  the  deceased  had  come  back  to  her  maternal  house  

apprehending danger to her life from the appellant. It was only on the  

persuasion of her parents that the deceased returned to her matrimonial  

house. It was also brought to light by the aforesaid prosecution witnesses  

that even 15 days prior to the occurrence, there was a quarrel between the  

couple with reference to the ear piercing ceremony of their children. The  

appellant wanted to spend lavishly for that ceremony and wanted it to be  

conducted along with his brother’s children, which the deceased objected  

to as she wanted it to be a simple affair involving minimal expenditure.  

20.  With regard to the issue of dying declaration raised by the appellant, it is  

well established legal position that a dying declaration can be made the  

sole basis of conviction of an accused provided the dying declaration is  

found to be true and voluntary and is not a result of tutoring or prompting  

or a product of imagination. This Court in the case of Paniben v. State of  

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Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 has succinctly summarized the law on the  

point as follows in para 18:  

“18. Though  a  dying  declaration  is  entitled  to  great  weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no  power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for  eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This  is  the  reason  the  Court  also  insists  that  the  dying  declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full  confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has  to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a  result  of  either  tutoring,  prompting  or  a  product  of  imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the  deceased  was  in  a  fit  state  of  mind  after  a  clear  opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once  the Court  is  satisfied that  the declaration was true and  voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without  any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an  absolute  rule  of  law that  the  dying  declaration  cannot  form  the  sole  basis  of  conviction  unless  it  is  corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely  a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several  judgments  the  principles  governing  dying  declaration,  which could be summed up as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying  declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.  (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. ) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is  true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without  corroboration.  (State  of  U.P. v.  Ram  Sagar  Yadav 2;  Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar). (iii)  This  Court  has  to  scrutinise  the  dying declaration  carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the  result  of  tutoring,  prompting  or  imagination.  The  deceased  had  opportunity  to  observe  and  identify  the  assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.  (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor ).  (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not  be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed  Beg v. State of M.P.) (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never  make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it  is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P.)

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(vi)  A  dying  declaration  which  suffers  from  infirmity  cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v.  State of U.P.) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain  the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.  (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu ) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is  not be discarded.  On the contrary, the shortness of the  statement itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of   Bihar ) (ix)  Normally  the  court  in  order  to  satisfy  whether  deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying  declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the  eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and  conscious  state  to  make  this  dying  declaration,  the  medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v.  State  of M.P. ) (x)  Where  the  prosecution  version  differs  from  the  version  as  given  in  the  dying  declaration,  the  said  declaration  cannot  be  acted  upon.  (State  of  U.P. v.  Madan Mohan )”

21.  The same view has been consistently taken by this Court in numerous  

subsequent  decisions.  Reliance  may be placed  on the  decision  of  this  

Court in Jai Karan v. State of Delhi (1999) 8 SCC 161; Muthukutty v.  

State (2005)  9  SCC  113;  Sham  Shankar  Kankaria  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra (2006) 13 SCC 165; Mohanlal v State of Haryana (2007)  

9  SCC  143;  Vikas  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  (2008)  2  SCC  516.  

Reverting  back  to  the  factual  position  of  the  present  case,  it  is  the  

contention of the appellant that the High Court erred in relying upon the  

oral  dying  declaration  made  by the  deceased.  PW-1 has  categorically  

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stated in his deposition before the trial Court that when PW-1, with the  

help of PW-3 and PW-5 lifted the body of the deceased in order to bring  

her out from the bathroom where she was burning, PW1 had asked the  

deceased as to what had happened, upon which, the deceased told them  

that the appellant had beaten and burnt her after pouring kerosene oil on  

her.  On  the  other  hand,  PW-5,  in  his  deposition,  has  stated  that  the  

deceased was murmuring and, thus, he was not in a position to hear what  

the deceased had said. We are of the considered view that there exists no  

inconsistency  between  the  two  statements  given  by  PW-1 and  PW-5.  

From a careful perusal of the statement of PW-5, it cannot be inferred by  

any  stretch  of  imagination  that  the  deceased  had  not  made  such  a  

statement. In fact, the statement of PW-1 as to the cause of death due to  

burns caused by the appellant by pouring kerosene oil on her also finds  

corroboration  in the  statements  of  PW-3 and PW-4.  Accordingly,  this  

submission of the appellant being without any merit, fails.

22. It is the case of the appellant that the evidence of prosecution witnesses  

namely, PWs 1 to 4 is not reliable as all the aforesaid witnesses were  

very closely related to the deceased and were inimical to the appellant.  

We find no merit in this submission of the appellant. PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4  

being  the  brother,  the  father  and  the  two  sisters  respectively  of  the  

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deceased  are  closely  related  to  the  deceased  and  this  fact  is  not  and  

cannot be disputed. We are of the considered view that in cases where the  

Court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses,  

the  approach  of  the  Court,  while  appreciating  the  evidence  of  such  

witnesses  must  not  be  pedantic.  The  Court  must  be  cautious  in  

appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses  

but  the  Court  must  not  be  suspicious  of  such  evidence.  The  primary  

endeavour of the Court must be to look for consistency.  The evidence of  

a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from  

the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.  

23. From a perusal of the record, we find that the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 is  

clear and categorical  in reference to the frequent quarrels between the  

deceased and the appellant. They have clearly and consistently supported  

the prosecution version with regard to the beating and the ill-treatment  

meted out to the deceased by the appellant on several occasions which  

compelled the deceased to leave the appellant’s house and take shelter in  

her parental house with an intention to live there permanently. PWs 1 to 4  

have unequivocally stated that the deceased feared threat to her life from  

the  appellant.   The  aforesaid  version  narrated  by  the  prosecution  

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witnesses, viz. PWs 1 to 4 also finds corroboration from the facts stated  

in the complaint.

24. So far the contention of the appellant with regard to delay in registering  

the FIR and in sending the same to the Magistrate is concerned, we are  

not inclined to accept the same as it is without any substance. PW-13, in  

his deposition before the trial Court, clearly stated that immediately on  

receipt  of  information about  the  incident,  PW-13 intimated  his  senior  

officer PW-14 at the police station about the same. He further stated that  

after  registering  the  FIR  at  11.10  a.m.,  he  forwarded  the  FIR  to  the  

Magistrate forthwith. The crystal clear statements furnished by PW-13 do  

not  leave  any  doubt  in  our  minds  that  there  was  any  delay  either  in  

registering the FIR or in forwarding the same to the Magistrate.   

25.  It is the stand of the appellant that it was a case of suicide or accidental  

death,  and not  a  case  of  murder  as  alleged  by the  prosecution.  On a  

careful  perusal  of  the record before us,  we find the  contention of  the  

appellant to be devoid of merit.  From the evidence on record, we find  

that  even  though  the  appellant  had  stated  that  the  deceased  had  a  

tendency  to  commit  suicide  and  had  attempted  to  do  so  on  earlier  

occasions, it does not find support in the evidence on record before us. In  

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fact, the defence statement reveals that no such statement was made in  

the past prior to the happening of this incident. It is also pertinent to note  

here that none of the prosecution witnesses in their  testimonies stated  

about  the  possibility  of  the  deceased  committing  suicide.  It  is  also  

significant to refer to the opinion of Dr. R. Balaram, Junior Specialist of  

Forensic Medicines (PW-12), who in his deposition stated that if a person  

pours kerosene on himself or herself over his or her head, it would spread  

over the back also. The presence of kerosene on the body of the deceased  

is  established from the deposition of PW-12 who, in the post  mortem  

report of the deceased, recorded an observation that the scalp hair of the  

deceased smelt of kerosene. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that  

if it were a case of suicide by the deceased by pouring kerosene over her  

head, the kerosene oil would have certainly run down on the chest as well  

as on the back side of the body and the fire would have spread all over  

the body causing burn injuries both on the front as well as on the back  

side of the body. But that is not the case here. The post-mortem report  

revealed that there were no burn injuries on the back side of the chest,  

abdomen and right foot of the deceased. The body of the deceased was  

found to be in a lying position with a fresh injury mark on the left side of  

her  forehead. A  possible  inference  which  can  be  drawn  is  that  after  

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hitting the deceased on her forehead, the appellant made her lie down on  

the floor inside the bathroom and thereafter poured kerosene oil on the  

body of the deceased, which on account of  lying position of the body  

could be poured only on the front part of her body. As such, when the  

deceased was burnt, there were no burn injuries found on the back side of  

the body of the deceased.

26.  It is trite law that in a case where there is no direct eye-witness version  

available and the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the principle  

which  is  to  be  applied  by  the  Court  is  that  when  an  incriminating  

circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no  

explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the  

same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it  

complete. This Court has observed as follows in the case of  Trimukh  

Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra,(2006) 10 SCC 681, at page  

693:  

“21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where  no eyewitness  account  is  available,  there  is  another  principle  of  law which  must  be  kept  in  mind.  The  principle is that when an incriminating circumstance  is put to the accused and the said accused either offers  no  explanation  or  offers  an  explanation  which  is  found  to  be  untrue,  then  the  same  becomes  an  additional link in the chain of circumstances to make  it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of  decisions  of  this  Court.  [See  State  of  T.N. v.  Rajendran (SCC  para  6);  State  of  U.P. v.  Dr.  

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Ravindra  Prakash Mittal (SCC para  39 :  AIR para  40);  State of Maharashtra v.  Suresh (SCC para 27);  Ganesh Lal v.  State of Rajasthan (SCC para 15) and  Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (SCC para 4).]

22.   Where an accused is alleged to have committed    the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in  leading  evidence  to  show  that  shortly  before  the  commission of crime they were seen together or the  offence takes place in the dwelling house where the  husband  also  normally  resided,  it  has  been  consistently held that if the accused does not offer any  explanation how the wife received injuries or offers  an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong  circumstance  which  indicates  that  he  is  responsible  for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of   H.P. it  was  observed  that  the  fact  that  the  accused  alone was with his wife in the house when she was  murdered there with “khukhri” and the fact that the  relations of the accused with her were strained would,  in  the  absence  of  any  cogent  explanation  by  him,  point  to  his  guilt.  In  Ganeshlal v.  State  of   Maharashtra the  appellant  was  prosecuted  for  the  murder of his wife which took place inside his house.  It was observed that when the death had occurred in  his  custody,  the  appellant  is  under  an  obligation  to  give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death  in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. The mere  denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of  any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the  innocence  of  the  accused,  but  consistent  with  the  hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the  commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v.  Dr.  Ravindra  Prakash  Mittal the  medical  evidence  disclosed  that  the  wife  died  of  strangulation  during  late night hours or early morning and her body was set  on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the  husband was that the wife had committed suicide by  burning herself and that he was not at house at that  time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives  showed  that  the  husband  ill-treated  her  and  their  relations  were  strained  and  further  the  evidence  showed that  both of  them were in one room in the  night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was  complete and it was the husband who committed the  murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly  this  Court reversed the judgment of the High Court  acquitting  the  accused  and  convicted  him  under  Section 302 IPC.  In  State  of  T.N. v.  Rajendran the  wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire.  The evidence showed that the accused and his wife  were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and  

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the accused came out in the morning through the roof  when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that  it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the  death  of  his  wife  and  a  daughter.  The  medical  evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as  a result of strangulation and not on account of burn  injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the  accused  (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime.”                                                     (emphasis underlined)

27. The conduct of the appellant, in scaling up the bathroom wall, instead of  

opening the bolt and coming out, and leaving for the hospital for his own  

treatment without telling anyone as to what had actually happened, is an  

unnatural and unreasonable conduct. The stand of the appellant that he  

attempted to save the deceased from burning is untenable in view of the  

fact  that after  coming out  from the bathroom by scaling the wall,  the  

appellant immediately proceeded to the hospital without even making an  

endeavour to rescue the deceased or render help to the people who had  

gathered there at his house to facilitate her rescue. At the hospital, the  

appellant  informed  the  doctor  that  he  had  suffered  the  injuries  while  

lighting the stove, instead of telling that he had suffered those injuries  

while trying to save his wife from burning. If that were true, the appellant  

would  not  have  hesitated  in  informing  the  doctor  about  the  same.  

Hearing  the  screams  of  the  deceased,  PW  1  arrived  at  the  scene  of  

occurrence and at  that  time, he saw the appellant  scaling the wall  for  

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coming out from the bathroom.   The appellant knew that the deceased  

was burning inside the bathroom.  Instead of opening the door of the  

bathroom so as to bring the deceased out from there, the appellant chose  

to scale the bathroom wall despite having sustained burn injuries. The  

portion of the written statement furnished by the appellant wherein he  

categorically  states  that  he  was  in  an  unconscious  condition  after  

climbing over the bathroom wall and, therefore, he was unable to inform  

the witnesses who had gathered at his house about the incident stands in  

direct conflict with his statement under Section 313 CrPC as well as with  

the medico-legal examination report  of the appellant  (Ex P.14),  which  

speak to the effect that the appellant was conscious and oriented.  This  

position is fortified by the appellant who had himself admitted that he  

had jumped over the bathroom wall to come out.   If he was aware of that  

situation and when he could request PW1 for arranging an autorickshaw,  

it  is quite clear that he was totally conscious and oriented at the time  

when the appellant came out from the bathroom.  The presence of 18  

burnt  match  sticks  in  the  middle  of  the  bathroom and  failure  of  the  

appellant to afford a reasonable explanation in this regard only fortify our  

conviction that these matchsticks were used for the purpose of burning  

the  deceased.  After  considering  the  oral  and  material  evidence  

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cumulatively, including the written statement of the appellant,  we find  

that  the  suicide  theory  is  unsustainable.    In  the  same  manner,  the  

accident theory put forward by the appellant that she might have prepared  

hot water for her daughter after bolting the bathroom door from inside  

and might have fallen down also lacks merit.   

28. Thus, we are of the considered view that, in the absence of any proper  

explanation having been furnished by the appellant and from the facts  

and circumstances of the case, it is clear that it is the appellant who had  

hit the deceased, made her to lie down, poured kerosene on various parts  

of her body and lighted with 18 matchsticks, each part of the body and  

when  the  flames  started  coming,  he  was  also  caught  in  the  fire  and  

suffered the burn injuries.

29. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby dismissed. As the appellant is  

on  bail,  his  bail  bonds  stand  cancelled.  The  appellant  is  directed  to  

surrender himself before the jail authorities within 15 days from today  

failing which the concerned authority shall proceed against the appellant  

in accordance with law.

                                                                               ..............………………J.                                                                                             [Dalveer Bhandari]

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..........………………...J.                                                                                [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi November 6, 2009                                                                                                                

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