IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4558    OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.9658/2006)

     Jaswant Singh     ...Appellant

Versus

     Union of India & Ors....Respondents

O  R  D  E  R

Leave granted.

This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated

2.2.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh in  C.W.P.  No.  13790/2004 whereby and whereunder  the writ  petition

filed by the appellant  herein  challenging  the  validity of  an order  dated  10.5.2004

passed  by  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  Chandigarh  Bench   in

O.A.No.354/CH/2003 was dismissed.

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Appellant herein

was employed as a clerk in the services of the respondents. He was directed to join the

team who conducted survey of Sanjay Labour Colony,  Chandigarh. Inter-alia, on the

premise that  the appellant  had committed misconduct,  a  departmental  proceeding

was initiated wherein, following three charges were framed against him:

"  That  Shri  Jaswant  Singh  while  posted  and  functioning  as Clerk in the Labour Colony Branch of the Estate Office, UT,Chandigarh during the month  of  April,  1993  committed  acts  of  gross  misconduct  in  as  much  as,  he participated in the conduct of a survey of the Sanjay Labour Colony  Near  Sukhna  Chok  in  an  unauthorized  manner  without  any  orders  or authority concerned, made incorrect reports in 21 cases as falsely reporting them as residents of the said colony. He also issued the Provisional Identity Cards meant for the bonafide  residents of  the Sanjay Labour Colony by forging  signature of  Naib Tehsildar(Colonies) Shri K.S.Gill."

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Admittedly,  whereas  charge  No.  2  was  proved  in  the

departmental proceedings initiated against the appellant, he was exonerated of charge

Nos. 1 and 3.  

It is, furthermore, not in dispute that he was proceeded against

in a criminal case. By reason of a  judgment and order dated  11.10.2001, he was

acquitted of the said charges.  

The Criminal Court, in its judgment, opined as under:

"...As such, evidence of the prosecution is self contradictory and I have come to the conclusion that  the case of  the prosecution is  not  beyond any reasonable doubt and the evidence led by the prosecution is not sufficient to prove any charge against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt.

In view of my afore-mentioned discussion, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt and by giving the benefit  of doubt, the accused persons are acquitted of the charges leveled against them........" (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant  filed  an  Original  Application  before  the  Tribunal.

Relying on or on the basis of a decision of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs.

Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. And Anr.- JT 1999(2) SCC 456, a contention  was raised by

the appellant  before the Tribunal that he having been acquitted in the criminal case,

the order of punishment imposed upon him in the departmental proceedings cannot

be sustained.

The tribunal by its judgment opined that as a finding of fact has

been arrived at that the appellant  had furnished incorrect report in respect of  21

cases, in the disciplinary proceeding only because he was acquitted by the Criminal

Court giving him the benefit of doubt, Capt. M. Paul  

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(Supra), would not be applicable. It was, furthermore, held as under:

"  It  is  well  settled  principle  that  in  a  judicial  review,  the administrative  Tribunals  have  no  jurisdiction  to  go  into  the  truth  of allegations/charges, except in cases where they are based on no evidence or where they are perverse. We have the power only to examine the procedural correctness of

the  decision  making  process.  The  Tribunal  cannot  embark  upon  appreciation  of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact in place of these disciplinary/appellate authority. On this aspect of the matter, we are relying on a period of decisions in the case  of  B.C.Chaturvedi  Vs.  Union  of  India,  1995  (8)  JT  65,  State  of  Tamilnadu Vs.T.V. Venugopalan, 1994 (6) SCC 302, Union of India Vs. Upendra Singh 1994(3) SCC  357,Government  of  Tamilnadu  Vs.  A  Rajapanndian,  1995  (1)  SCC  216, Tamilnadu & Anr.Vs.S. Subhramaniam,AIR 1996 SC 1232,Director general of Police & Ors.  Vs.  Jani  Basha  1999 AIR SCW 4002 and Syed Rahimuddin  Vs.  Director General,CSIR & Ors. 2001 AIR SCW 2388. In the instant case, we also find that the procedure as laid down by law, has been followed by the respondents department, applicant  was  given  due  opportunity  to  defend  himself,  was  also  afforded  an opportunity of personal bearing etc. The punishment awarded to him is also not such, as  could  be terms as  disproportionate to  the charge proved against  him. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere in the matter. Since a penalty has been imposed on the applicant, his suspension period has also rightly been treated as non-duty."

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that

the Tribunal and consequently the High Court committed a serious error of law in

passing the impugned judgment as they failed to take into consideration  the fact that

the appellant having been exonerated in regard to charge Nos. 1 to 3, charge No. 2

being intrinsically connected therewith, could not stand alone and, thus, no finding of

misconduct was  possible  to  be arrived at in relation thereof.  It  was,  furthermore,

submitted that the criminal Court had considered the merit of the matter and keeping

in view the fact that all the documents as also the  

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oral  evidences which were produced by the respondents  both in the departmental

proceedings as also the criminal case were the same, the impugned judgment is not

sustainable. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a decision of

this Court in G.M.Tank Vs.State of Gujarat & Anr. - 2006(1) SCC 36.

Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondents,  on  the  other

hand, supported the impugned judgment.

We have noticed hereinbefore the charges levelled against the appellant.

The  first  charge  relates  to  his  participation  in  the  conduct  of  a  survey  in  an

unauthorized manner.  The  third  charge  was  in  respect  of  issuance  of  Provisional

Identity Cards meant for the bonafide  residents of  the  Sanjay Labour Colony by

forging signatures of Naib Tehsildar(Colonies) Shri K.S. Gill.

In the departmental proceedings, as indicated hereinebefore, the appellant

had been exonerated from the said charges which would mean that the conduct of

survey by the appellant was found to be authorised and it had not been found that he

had forged the signatures of Shri K.S.Gill.

Exoneration of  the appellant in  respect  of  the said  two charges,  in  our

opinion,  would not  lead to the  conclusion  that incorrect reports made by him in

relation to 21 cases reporting them as residents of the said Sanjay Labour Colony,

had any direct or indirect nexus with the charge Nos 1 and 3. Charge No.2, in our

opinion, is absolutely distinct and separate. On the basis of the said charge alone the

appellant could have been proceeded against in the departmental proceedings.

We,  therefore,  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  submissions  made  by  the

learned counsel in this behalf.

So far as the second contention of the appellant is concerned, there cannot

be any doubt, whatsoever, that in the  

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event  the  departmental  proceedings  and  the  criminal  case  are  based  on  identical

facts,the judgment of  acquittal  passed by the criminal  court  should  be taken into

consideration by the authority holding the departmental proceedings.  

In this case the appellant was given the benefit of doubt. He had not been

completely exonerated in the criminal case. Acquittal based on  benefit of doubt to an

accused, cannot be equated with an acquittal on merit of the matter. Furthermore, it

is trite that standard of burden of proof in a criminal case and in the departmental

proceedings  is  absolutely  different.  Whereas  in  the  former  proof,  beyond  all

reasonable  doubt  is  required  to  be  adopted;  in  the  latter   prepanderance   of

probability serves the purpose.

The  effect  of  a  false   report  by  a  government  servant  is  a  serious

misconduct.  The  same  may  not,  in  a  given  situation,   give  rise  to  a  criminal

misconduct.

It is well known that the Central Administrative Tribunal in a proceeding

questioning the validity and/or the legality of the departmental proceedings exercises

a  limited jurisdiction.  Its  jurisdiction to interfere  with  either  in  the departmental

proceedings or on the quantum of punishment imposed on the delinquent employee

being extremely limited, it cannot be said to have committed any illegality in passing

the impugned judgment. As noticed hereinbefore the principal contention raised by

the  appellant  was  based  on  a  decision  of  this   Court  in  Capt.  M.  Paul  Anthony

(Supra).

In  G.M.Tank(supra)  itself  this  Court  noticed  the  distinction  between  a

departmental proceedings and a criminal case inter alia in view of the standard of

proof.  However, having regard to the fact situation prevailing therein, namely, the

case related to a charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, both  departmental

proceedings and the criminal case,were held to be based on absolutely identical facts.

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We may notice that this Court in several decisions had laid emphasis on

the aforementioned distinction, namely, standard of proof.  

In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh - (2006) 4 SCC

265 this Court held as under:

"13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed."         

For  the  reasons  aforementioned,  we  do  not  find  any   infirmity  in  the

impugned judgment.  

The appeal is dismissed. There shall,however, be no order as to costs.

......................J.       [S.B. SINHA]

......................J.       [CYRIAC JOSEPH]

New Delhi, July 16, 2008.