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PETITIONER: JASWANT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/10/1957

BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  124            1958 SCR  762

ACT:        Criminal trial-Sanction in respect of one offence-Trial  for        two  offences  requiring  sanction-If  trial  wholly   void-        Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1947  (II  of  1947),  ss.        5(1)(a), 5(1)(d) and 6.

HEADNOTE:        Sanction  was  given  under  s.  6  of  the  Prevention   of        Corruption  Act, 1947, for the prosecution of the  appellant        for  having  received  illegal gratification  from  one  Pal        Singh.  He was charged with and tried for two offences under        s. 5(1)(a) of the Act for habitually accepting or  obtaining        illegal  gratification  and under S. 5(1)(d)  for  receiving        illegal  gratification  from Pal Singh.  The  Special  judge        found  both charges proved and convicted the appellant.   On        appeal, the High Court held that the appellant could neither        be tried nor convicted of the offence under S. 5(1)(a) as no        sanction  had  been given in respect of it  but  upheld  the        conviction  for  the  offence under  S.  5(1)(d)  for  which        sanction had been given.  It was argued that the  conviction        even  for  the offence under S. 5(1)(d) was illegal  as  the        trial was wholly void and without jurisdiction :        Held,  that the contention that the trial for  two  offences        requiring  sanction  is wholly void, where the  sanction  is        granted  for  only  one offence and not for  the  other,  is        unsustainable.   The  want of sanction for  the  offence  of        habitually  accepting  bribes does not make  the  taking  of        cognizance  of the offence of taking a bribe from Pal  Singh        void nor the trial for that offence illegal and the Court  a        Court without jurisdiction.        Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown, (1939) F.C.R. 159 and  Basirul-        Huq v. The State of West Bengal, (1953) S.C.R. 836, referred        to.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 66  of        1954.        Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 31st  December,        1953 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 540  of        1953,  arising out of the judgment and order dated the  14th

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      September, 1953, of the Court of Special Judge, Amritsar, in        Corruption Case No. 13/1-10/3 of 1953.        Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant.        Gopal Singh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.        1957.  October 25.  The following judgment of the Court  was        delivered by        763        KAPUR J.-The sole point in this appeal against the  judgment        and  order of the Punjab High Court pronounced  on  December        31,  1953, is the validity and effect of the sanction  given        under s. 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 2  of        1947), hereinafter termed the Act.        The   appellant   was  prosecuted  for   receiving   illegal        gratification  and  the  charge  against  him  was  in   the        following terms:        "That,  you,  Jaswant Singh, while employed  as  a  Patwari,        Fatehpur  Rajputan  habitually  accepted  or  obtained   for        yourself illegal gratification and that you received in  the        sum of Rs. 50 on 19-3-1953 at Subzi Mandi Amritsar from  Pal        Singh  P. W. as a reward for forwarding the application  Es.        P.  A.  with  your recommendation for  helping  Santa  Singh        father of Pal Singh in the allotment of Ahata No. 10 situate        at  village  Fatehpur  Rajputan  and  thereby  committed  an        offence of Criminal misconduct in the discharge of your duty        mentioned in section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption        Act,  1947, punishable under sub-section 2 of section  5  of        the aforesaid Act and within my cognizance.  "        The  Special  Judge found that the  appellant  had  accepted        illegal  gratification from Pal Singh, Hazara Singh,  Harnam        Singh,  Joginder  Singh, Atma Singh, Hari  Singh  and  Ganda        Singh  and  that he had received Rs. 50 from  Pal  Singh  on        March 19, 1953, at Subzi Mandi, Amritsar.  He then held:        "The  charge  under section 5 (1)(a) of  the  Prevention  of        Corruption  Act,  1947,  has been  established  against  him        beyond  reasonable  doubt.   He  is  guilty  of  an  offence        punishable  under sub-section (2) of section 5 of  the  said        Act.  "        The appellant took an appeal to the High Court of the Punjab        and  Dulat  J.  held  that  taking  into  consideration  the        sanction which will be quoted hereinafter:        "  The  appellant  could  neither  have  been  charged   nor        convicted  of  what  is probably a much  graver  offence  of        habitually accepting bribes."        97        764        But  he  held  that sanction was valid  qua  the  charge  of        accepting  illegal gratification of Rs. 50 from  Pal  Singh.        The  conviction  was therefore upheld but the  sentence  was        reduced to the period already undergone and the sentence  of        fine maintained.        The  argument raised by the appellant in this court is  that        as the sanction was confined to illegal gratification of Rs.        50  paid  by  Pal Singh and the charge  was  for  habitually        accepting  illegal  gratification  the  trial  was   without        jurisdiction  and the appellant could not be convicted  even        for  the offence which was mentioned in the  sanction.   The        sanction was in the following terms:        "  Whereas I am satisfied that Jaswant Singh Patwari son  of        Gurdial  Singh Kamboh of village Ajaibwali had  accepted  an        illegal  gratification of Rs. 50 in 5 currency notes of  Rs.        10  denomination  each from one Pal Singh son  of  S.  Santa        Singh  of  village Fatehpur Rajputan,  Tehsil  Amritsar  for        making a favorable report on an application for allotment of        an ahata to S. Santa Singh father of the said S. Pal Singh.        And  whereas  the evidence available in  this  case  clearly

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      discloses  that  the  said  S.  Jaswant  Singh  Patwari  had        committed  an offence under Section 5 of the  Prevention  of        Corruption Act.        Now  therefore,  1,  N. N. Kashyap,  Esquire  I.C.S.  Deputy        Commissioner,   Asr,  as  required  by  Section  6  of   the        Prevention  of Corruption Act of 1947, hereby  sanction  the        prosecution  of  the  said S. Jaswant  Singh  Patwari  under        section 5 of the said Act."        Section 6(1) of the Act provides for sanction as follows:        "  No Court shall take cognizance of an  offence  punishable        under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or        under  sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged  to        have  been  committed by a public servant, except  with  the        previous sanction.  " Section 5 (1)(a) relates to a case  of        a   public   servant  if  he  habitually   accepts   illegal        gratification and s. 5(1)(d)        765        if  he obtains for himself any valuable thing  or  pecuniary        advantage.   The  contention  comes  to  this  that  as  the        sanction   was  only  for  receiving  Rs.  50   as   illegal        gratification from Pal Singh and therefore an offence’ under        s.  5  (1)(d)  the prosecution, the  charge  and  conviction        should  have been under that provision and had that been  so        there  would have been no defect in the jurisdiction of  the        court  trying the case nor any defect in the conviction  but        as  the  appellant  was tried under the charge  of  being  a        habitual  receiver of bribes and the sanction was  only  for        one single act of receiving illegal gratification the  trial        was  wholly  void  as  it was a trial  by  a  court  without        jurisdiction.        The  sanction under the Act is not intended to be nor is  an        automatic formality and it is essential that the  provisions        in  regard  to  sanction should be  observed  with  complete        strictness; Basque Agarwala v. King Emperor (1).  The object        of the provision for sanctions is that the authority  giving        the  sanction  should be able to consider  for  itself  tile        evidence   before  it  comes  to  a  conclusion   that   the        prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden.        In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King (2) the Judicial        Committee of the Privy Council also took a similar view when        it observed:        " In their Lordships’ view, to comply with the provisions of        cl.  23  it must be proved that the sanction  was  given  in        respect  of the facts constituting the offence charged.   It        is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on        the  face of the Sanction, but this is not essential,  since        cl. 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular        form,  nor  even  to  be  in  writing.   But  if  the  facts        constituting  the offence charged are not shown on the  face        of  the sanction’ the prosecution must prove  by  extraneous        evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning        authority.   The  sanction  to  prosecute  is  an  important        matter;   it  constitutes  a  condition  precedent  to   the        institution  of the prosecution and the Government  have  an        absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction.        (1)[1945] F.C.R. 93,98   (2) [1948] L.R. 75 I.A.30, 37        766        It  should be clear from the form of the sanction  that  the        sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it  and        after  a consideration of all the circumstances of the  case        sanctioned the prosecution, and therefore unless the  matter        can be proved by other evidence, in the sanction itself  the        facts  should be referred to indicate that  the  sanctioning        authority   had   applied  its  mind  to   the   facts   and        circumstances  of the case.  In Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy  v.

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      The  King (1) it was held that a valid sanction on  separate        charges  of hoarding and profiteering was essential to  give        the  court  jurisdiction to try the  charge.   Without  such        sanction  the prosecution would be a nullity and  the  trial        without jurisdiction.        In   the  present  case  the  sanction  strictly   construed        indicates the consideration by the sanctioning authority  of        the   facts  relating  to  the  receiving  of  the   illegal        gratification  from  Pal Singh and therefore  the  appellant        could   only  be  validly  tried  for  that  offence.    The        contention that a trial for two offences requiring  sanction        is  wholly  void,  where the sanction  is  granted  for  one        offence   and  not  for  the  other,  is  in   our   opinion        unsustainable.    Section   6(1)  of  the   Act   bars   the        jurisdiction  of the court to take cognizance of an  offence        for  which  previous sanction is required and has  not  been        given.   The  prosecution  for  offence  under  s.   5(1)(d)        therefore  is  not barred because the  proceedings  are  not        without  previous sanction which was validly given  for  the        offence of receiving a bribe from Pal Singh, but the offence        of  habitually receiving illegal gratification could not  be        taken  cognizance of and the prosecution and trial for  that        offence  was void for want of sanction which is a  condition        precedent  for the courts taking cognizance of  the  offence        alleged  to  be committed and therefore the High  Court  has        rightly set aside the conviction for that offence.  In  Hori        Ram  Singh  v.  The Crown(1) the charges  against  a  public        servant were under ss. 409 and 477A, Indian Penal Code,  one        for  dishonestly  converting  and  misappropriating  certain        medicines entrusted to the public servant and the other  for        wilful  omission  with intent to defraud to  record  certain        entries in the        (1)(1949) L.R. 76 I.A.158        (2)[1939] F.C.R.159.        767        account  books of the hospital where he was employed.   Thus        two  distinct offences were committed in the course  of  the        same transaction in which the one, under s.  477A,    Indian        Penal Code, required sanction under,s.  270(1)    of     the        Government  of India Act and the other under s. 409,  Indian        Penal  Code, did not.  But the bar to taking  cognizance  of        the former offence was not considered a bar to the trial for        an offence, for which no sanction was required and therefore        the proceedings under s. 477A were quashed as being  without        jurisdiction  but the proceedings under s. 409 Indian  Penal        Code  were allowed to proceed.  Similarly the Supreme  Court        in Basir-ul-Huq v. The State Of West Bengal (1) held s. 195,        Criminal  Procedure  Code to be no bar to the  trial  for  a        distinct  offence not requiring sanction although  disclosed        by  the  same facts if the offence is not  included  in  the        ambit  of an offence requiring such sanction.  The  want  of        sanction  for  the offence of  habitually  accepting  bribes        therefore  does  not make the taking of  cognizance  of  the        offence of taking a bribe of Rs. 50 from Pal Singh void  nor        the  trial  for that offence illegal and the court  a  court        without jurisdiction.        The  submission next raised is that the evidence in  support        of being habitually a receiver of bribes has caused  serious        prejudice  to  the  defence of the  appellant  but  no  such        prejudice  has been shown nor does the judgment of the  High        Court which has proceeded on the evidence in support of  the        charge of Pal Singh’s transaction, indicate the existence of        any  prejudice  and there was nothing  indicated  before  us        leading,  to  the conclusion of prejudice or  to  consequent        failure of justice.

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      The High Court came to the conclusion that the trial for the        offence of habitually accepting illegal gratification  could        not  be validly tried and evidence led on that charge  could        not be considered but the conviction of receiving a bribe of        Rs.  50  from Pal Singh is well founded and  also  that  the        appellant  has  not been prejudiced in the  conduct  of  his        defence.        (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 836.        768        No arguments were addressed to this court on the correctness        of the finding of the High Court in regard to the conviction        for  receiving  illegal gratification from  Pal  Singh.   We        agree  with the opinion of the High Court that  the  offence        under  S. 5(1) (d) of receiving illegal bribe of Rs. 50  has        been made out and would therefore dismiss this appeal.        Appeal dismissed.