http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: JASPAL SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, BULANDSHAHR AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/09/1984

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1880            1985 SCR  (1) 889  1984 SCC  (4) 434        1984 SCALE  (2)538  CITATOR INFO :  R          1986 SC 600  (9)

ACT:      U.P. Urban  Buildings (Regulation  of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,  1972, ss.  3(a), 3(g),  11, 13,  14 and  15- Whether tenancy rights can be devised by a "Will"      Words and Phrases-"heir"-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      Section 14  of the  U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent  and Eviction)  Act (For  short, the Act) as it stood prior  to its  amendment in  1976 and  also after  its amendment by  the  U.P.  Act  No.  28  of  1976  deals  with regularisation  of   occupation  of  existing  tenants.  The unamended section  14 of the Act provided that a person must satisfy two  conditions in  order to get the benefit of this section, namely, (i) that he was a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement  of this  Act and  (ii) that  he was  not a person against  whom proceedings under section 7A of the old Act are  pending immediately  before such  commencement. The amended section  14 of the Act lays down that a person shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of building if (i) any licensee or tenant is in occupation of a building with the  consent of  the landlord  immediately  before  the commencement of the Act as amended by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 and (ii) that he was not a person against whom any suit or proceeding  for eviction  is pending  before any court or authority on  the date of such commencement. Section 3(a) of the Act  provides that  a tenant  in relation  to a building means a  person by  whom its  rent is  payable, and  on  the tenant’s death,  in the  case of a non-residential building, his heirs.      On the  death  of  Naubat  Singh-a  tenant  in  a  shop situated  in  Bulandshahr,  the  landlord  started  eviction proceedings u/s.  12 read  with s.  16 of  the Act  for  the release of  his shop. The appellant a nephew of the deceased tenant, resisted  the eviction  application on  the grounds: (i) that  he was  entitled to get the benefit of the amended and/or unamended  section 14  of the  Act since  he had been helping the  deceased tenant  in his  business for  the last several years  and remained  in continuous possession of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

disputed shop  after his  death; and (2) that he was an heir of the  deceased tenant  on the  basis of a will executed by the deceased  tenant in  his favour  and therefore  be was a tenant within the meaning of section 3(a) of the Act. 890      The Rent  Control and  Eviction  officer  rejected  the application holding  that the  appellant was entitled to get the tenancy  rights under the unamended s. 14 of the Act. In revision the Additional District Judge held that, since even after the  death of  Naubat Singh  on 31st  August 1974, the appellants been,  permitted to continue in possession of the premises, he  got the  benefit of  amend ed s. 14 of the Act and therefore dismissed the revision petition. Thereupon the landlord filed a writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court against  the orders  of the two authorities below. The High Court  negatived all the contentions of the appellants, allowed the  writ petition  and quashed  the orders  of  the authorities below and directed the Rent Control and Eviction officer  to   decide  the   release  application  afresh  in accordance with the law. Hence this appeal by special leave.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: (1) Admittedly Naubat Singh was the tenant of the shop on  the date  immediately preceding the commencement of the Act,  that is,  15th July  1972 and  he  was  alive  and therefore no  question of the appellant being regularised as a tenant  arises. The  appellant  also  could  not  get  the benefit of  amended sec.  14, since at the relevant time the application for  release filed  by the  landlord against the appellant was  pending in  the court  of Additional District Judge by  way of  revision petition wherein the landlord had contested the claim of tenancy by appellant. [893 H; 894, B- C]      (2) The  word ’heir’ has been construed both in a wider as well  as  in  a  narrower  sense.  Which  sense  will  be applicable to  the facts  of a  particular case  will depend upon the intention and scheme of a particular legislation in which the question occurs. [895 G]      Smt. Rukmani  v. III  Addl. District  Judge, Kanpur (1) 1977 ARC  72 and Munni Lal v. Smt. Shiva Devi 1981 ARC (S.N. 13); referred to      Gulzara Singh  v. Smt.  Tej Kaur,  AIR 1961 Punjab 288, approved.      (3) It is clear from a survey of ss 3(g), 11, 12,13 and 15 of  the Act that there are restrictions placed by the Act on the right of the tenant to transfer or sublet the tenancy rights and  he  can  keep  possession  of  the  building  or premises for  himself and for the purpose of his family, for his business  and for the business of his family members. He obviously cannot  be allowed  to transfer a tenancy right. A fortiori, the  scheme  of  the  Act  does  not  warrant  the transfer of  the tenancy  right to  be effective  after  his lifetime. [897 G-H]      (4) In  the instant  case, the  appellant was neither a tenant of  the disputed  shop nor  he was  an  heir  of  the deceased tenant  since he  is not  a member of the family of the deceased  tenant  as  defined  u/s.  3(g)  of  the  Act. Besides, on  a plain  reading of the will it is evident that the will  has been  executed in  respect of other properties including his  business but  not in  respect of  the tenancy right. There  fore, this Court sees no reason to differ from the finding of the High Court. [898 A-B]

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1275 of 1979      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 891 the 27th  March, 1979  of the  Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1416 of 1977.      Mr. E.C. Agarwala, Advocate for the Appellant.      Mr. J. P. Goyal, Mr. S. R. Jain and Mr. Rajesh, for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA, J.  The present  appeal by special leave against the judgment  of the  Allahabad High  Court  dated  27th  of March,  1979  centers  round  a  shop  No.  270  situate  in Grouceganj, Bulandshahr.  This shop  was owned  by Ratan Lal and Naubat Singh was a tenant of the shop. Nabuat Singh died on 31st  of August,  1974. He had no male issue but had four daughters, all  of whom  were married and were residing with their husbands  outside Bulandshahr. He also left behind his widow  who   was  residing   in  village   Rampur,  district Bulandshahr.  He  was  carrying  on  some  business  in  the disputed shop  during his  lifetime. On his death Ratan Lal, the landlord,  filed an application under s. 12 read with s. 16 of  the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)  Act 1972  (for short, referred to hereinafter as ’the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972’) for a declaration that the shop was  vacant and  he required  the same for his personal need.      The application  was  resisted  by  Jaspal  Singh,  the present appellant,  on the  ground that  he was  the heir of Naubat Singh  deceased and was in occupation of the disputed shop; that on 4th of July 1973 Naubat Singh before his death executed a  will conveying  all his  rights  and  properties including the  tenancy rights  in the  disputed shop to him; that he  had been helping Naubat Singh in his business s for the last several years and remained in continuous possession of the  disputed shop after the death of Naubat Singh and so he was  entitled to  get the benefit of s.14 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.      The Rent  Control and  Eviction  officer  rejected  the application holding  that Jaspal  Singh the,  appellant, had been living  with the  deceased Naubat  Singh and  was  also assisting him in doing the business in the disputed premises to the  full knowledge  of  the  landlord,  and  so  he  was entitled to  get the  tenancy rights under s. 14 of the U.P. Act No.  13 of 1972, as it stood prior to its amendment made by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. 892      Feeling aggrieved  the landlord  preferred  a  revision before  the   District  Judge,   Bulandshahr,,   which   was transferred to  the Additional District Judge, who dismissed the same  on 8th  of July,  1976. He, however, did not agree with the  finding of  the Rent  Control and Eviction officer that Jaspal Singh was entitled to the benefit of original s. 14 of  the U.P.  Act No. 13 of 1972 but since even after the death of  Naubat Singh,  on 31st of August 1974 Jaspal Singh had been permitted to continue in possession of the premises he got  the benefit of amended s. 14, as amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976.      Undaunted  by   his  failures,  the  landlord  filed  a petition under  Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the orders of the two authorities below. The High Court endorsed the finding  of the  Additional District  Judge that  Jaspal Singh could  not get  the benefit  of the unamended s. 14 of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

the U.P.  Act No.  13  of  1972  inasmuch  as  on  the  date immediately preceding  the commencement of the Act, i.e., on 14th July,  1972  Naubat  Singh  was  very  much  alive  and admittedly he was the tenant of the premises in question and as such  no question  of regularisation  of Jaspal  Singh as tenant could  arise. The  High Court  also held  that Jaspal Singh was  not even  entitled to  get  the  benefit  of  the amended s.  14 as  it stood amended by the U.P. Act No.28 of 1976, which  came into force on 5th of July, 1976. According to the  High Court  the benefit  of amended  s. 14  would be available to  Jaspal Singh,  the appellant, only when he was living in  the premises  with the  consent of  the  landlord provided that  no proceedings for his eviction were pending. The landlord, however, in the instant case immediately after the death  of Naubat  Singh started  the proceedings for the release of  the  premises  in  1974.  The  High  Court  took exception  to  the  assumption  of  the  learned  Additional District  Judge  regarding  the  consent  of  the  landlord. According to  the High  Court consent of the landlord cannot be assumed  or presumed,  it must  be proved  as a  fact but there was  no proof of the consent of the landlord. The High Court alter construing the scheme and the various provisions of the Act also held that the appellant could not be an heir on the  basis of the will executed by Naubat Singh nor could Naubat Singh  execute any  will in  respect of  the  tenancy rights. On these findings the High Court held the possession of Jaspal  Singh to  be unauthorised. Consequently, the High Court allowed  the writ  petition and  quashed the orders of the authorities  below and  directed the  Rent  Control  and Eviction officer to decide the release application afresh in accordance with  the law.  Jaspal Singh  has not  approached this Court  by  special  leave,  and  the  counsel  for  the appellant has reiterated the same points before us. 893      The first  question which  calls for  consideration  is whether Jaspal  Singh, the  appellant  is  entitled  to  the benefit of  the unamended and amended s. 14 of the rent Act. It would  be appropriate  at this  stage  to  read  the  old unamended and  amended s.  14 of  the Act.  Section 14 as it stood originally in the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 read:           "14.  Regularisation  of  occupation  of  existing      tenants.- Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  and      general order  made under  sub-section (2) of section 7      of the  old Act, any tenant in occupation of a building      with the consent of the landlord immediately before the      commencement of  this Act,  not being  a person against      whom proceedings  under section  7-A of the old Act are      pending immediately  before such commencement, shall be      deemed to be in authorised occupation of such building.      Section 14 of the Act as amended by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 reads:           "14.  Regularisation  of  occupation  of  existing      tenants.- Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  this      Act or  any other  law for the time being in force, any      licensee (within  the meaning  of  Section  2-A)  or  a      tenant in  occupation of a building with the consent of      the landlord immediately before the commencement of the      Uttar Pradesh  Urban Buildings  (Regulation of Letting,      Rent. and  Eviction Amendment)  Act, 1976  not being  a      person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction      is pending before any court or authority on the date of      such commencement  shall be  deemed to be an authorised      licensee or tenant of such building."      A bare  perusal of  s. 14  as it  stood  prior  to  its amendment in  1976 would  indicate that  in order to get the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

benefit of  this section  a person  must satisfy that (1) he was a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of this Act and that  he was not a person against whom proceedings under s. 7A  of the  old Act  are pending  immediately before such commencement, i.e., on 14th July, 1972 (date of commencement of the Act being 15 July, 1972). Admittedly Naubat Singh was the tenant of the shop on the date immediately preceding the commencement of  the Act  (i.e., 15th July, 1972) and he was alive 894 and therefore  no question of Jaspal Singh being regularised as a tenant arises.      In order  to attract  s.  14  as  it  stood  after  the amendment in  1979, Jaspal  Singh had to prove that he was a licensee or  a tenant  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord immediately before  the commencement  of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976  which came  into force  on 5th  July, 1976.  At the relevant time, however, the application for release filed by the landlord  against Jaspal  Singh was  pending in court of Additional  District  Judge  by  way  of  revision  petition wherein the  landlord Ratan  Lal had  contested the claim of tenancy by Jaspal Singh. The appellant, therefore, could not get the  benefit of amended 5. 14 as well and the High Court was right in so holding.      This leads us to the next contention that the appellant is a  tenant within  the meaning of s. 3(a) of Act No. 13 of 1972:      "3.  In this Act, unless the context otherwise require-      (a)  "tenant" in relation to a building, means a person           by whom  its rent  is payable, and on the tenant’s           death-           (1)   in the  case of a residential building, such                only of  his heirs  as normally  resided with                him in the building at the time of his death;           (2)   in the  case of  a non-residential building,                his heirs:"      The appellant  would be  a tenant within the meaning of s. 3 (a) only when he is an heir. The appellant is not a son but only a nephew of Naubat Singh. He, however, claims to be an heir  on the  basis of  a will  executed by  Naubat Singh conveying  all  his  rights  and  properties  including  the tenancy rights in respect of the disputed shop in his favour and that  he had  been helping  Naubat Singh in his business for the  last several  years  and  continued  to  remain  in possession of the shop even after the death of Naubat Singh. Accordingly he was entitled to the benefit of s. 14. We have already dealt  with the  question whether  the appellant was entitled to  the benefit  of s.  14 as it stood prior to its amendment in  1976 and  also of the amended provisions of s. 14 and  we have  negatived the  contention of the appellant. Therefore, the  precise question  for consideration would be whether the  appellant is  an heir  within the meaning of s. 3(a) on  the basis  of the  will executed  in his  favour by Naubat Singh.  There seems  to be  a cleavage  of opinion on this point in various High 895 Courts. The Allahabad High Court in Smt. Rukmani Devi v. III Addl. District  Judge, Kanpur  and Munni  Lal v.  Smt. Shiva Devi held  that the  question as  to who  are heirs  of  the deceased tenant,  will be  decided in  accordance  with  the personal law  of the  tenant, as  this Act does not lay down the list  of heirs  on whom  the tenancy  should devolve. Tn some of  the Rent  Control Acts  list of  the heirs has been specified for  the purpose  of devolution  of tenancy on the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

death of  the tenant.  A Division  Bench of  the Punjab  and Haryana High  Court in Gulzara Singh v. Smt. Tej Kaur on the other hand held:           "Generally speaking ’heirs’ are those persons whom      the law  declares to  be entitled  to the  estate of  a      deceased person,  and in common legal parlance the word      ’heir’ like  the expression  ’heir at  law’ undoubtedly      connotes and  is suggestive of a person who succeeds to      the estate  in case  of intestacy under the statutes of      succession. But  in common speech this word is also not      infrequently used  to indicate  those who  come in  any      manner to  the ownership  of any  property by reason of      the death  of  the  owner  or  persons  upon  whom  the      property devolves on the death of another either by law      or by will."           In  other  words,  it  is  indicative  of  persons      entitled by  will or  otherwise to  share the estate of      the deceased. It is thus true that technically the word      ’heir’ may  be distinguish able from the word ’legatee’      but it  is also  at times  used in its more general and      comprehensive sense  as indicating the person upon whom      the property devolves on the death of another and hence      when the  intent is  clear the  word ’heir’ may well be      treated as  equivalent to  ’Legatee’ or  devised’.  The      true scope,  effect and  significance of  this word is,      there fore,  in all cases a question of intention which      has to  be determined principally on a consideration of      the objection and purpose of the statute in which it is      used."      Thus, the word ’heir has been construed both in a wider as well  as  in  a  narrower  sense.  Which  sense  will  be applicable to  the facts  of a  particular case  will depend upon the intention and scheme of a particular legislation in which the question occurs. This will also 896 raise an allied question whether the tenancy rights could be devised by  a will.  It will  be relevant  at this  stage to refer to material provisions of the Act.      The word  ’family’ has  been defined  in s. 3(g) of the Act:      (g)  "family" in  relation to a landlord or tenant of a           building, means, his or her-           (i) spouse,           (ii) male lineal descendants,           (iii)such parents, grand parents and any unmarried                or  widowed   or   divorced   or   judicially                separated daughter  or  daughter  of  a  male                lineal descendant,  as may have been normally                residing with him or her,           and includes,  in  relation  to  a  landlord,  any           female, having  a legal right of residence in that           building;"      Section  11  deals  with  the  prohibition  of  letting without allotment order. It reads:           "Save as hereinafter provided, no person shall let      any building  except in pursuance of an allotment order      issued under Section 16."      Section 12  deals with  a deemed vacancy of building in certain cases and reads:      "(1) A landlord  or a  tenant of  a building  shall  be           deemed to  have ceased to occupy the building or a           part thereof           (a)  he  has  substantially  removed  his  effects                therefrom, or           (b)   he has  allowed it  to be  occupied  by  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

              person who is not a member of his family, or           (c)   in the case of a residential building, he as                well as  members of  his family have taken up                residence,  not  being  temporary  residence,                elsewhere. 897      (2)  In the  case of  non-residential building, where a           tenant carrying on business in the building admits           a person  who is  not a  member of his family as a           partner or  a new partner, as the case may be, the           tenant shall  be deemed  to have  ceased to occupy           the building."      Section 13  provides for  restrictions on occupation of building without allotment or release, and reads:           "Where a  landlord or  tenant ceases  to occupy  a      building or  part thereof, no person shall occupy it in      any capacity  on his behalf, or otherwise then under an      order of  allotment or release under Section 16, and if      a person  so purports  to occupy  it, he shall, without      prejudice to the provisions of Section 31, be deemed to      be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part."      Section 15  casts an  obligation on the landlord or the tenant to  intimate  vacancy  to  the  District  Magistrate. Section 16  deals with  allotment and  release of  a  vacant building. Section  20 puts  a bar  of suit for eviction of a tenant except on specified grounds enumerated therein.      From a survey of these provisions it will be clear that if a  tenant parts  with possession  of the  premises in his possession, the  same would  be treated as vacant. There are restrictions in  the case of a residential building that the tenant will  live only  with the  members of  his family and after he  has allowed  the same to be occupied by any person who is  not a  member of  his family,  the tenant  shall  be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In the case of a non-residential  building, when  a tenant  is carrying  on business in  the building,  admits a  person who  is  not  a member of  his family  as a partner or a new partner, as the case may  be, the  tenant shall  be deemed to have ceased to occupy the  building. If  a tenant subjects the premises, he is  able  to  ejectment.  Obviously,  therefore,  there  are restrictions placed by the Act on the right of the tenant to transfer or  sublet the  tenancy  rights  and  he  can  keep possession of  the building  or premises for himself and for the purpose  of his  family, for  his business  and for  the business of  his family  members. He  obviously,  cannot  be allowed to  transfer a tenancy right. A fortiori, the scheme of the  Act does  not warrant  the transfer  of the  tenancy right  to   be  effective  after  his  lifetime.  Thus,  the appellant was  neither a  tenant of the disputed shop nor he was an heir of Naubat Singh, the 898 original tenant.  Besides, on a plain reading of the will it is evident  that the  will has  been executed  in respect of other properties  including his  business but not in respect of the  tenancy rights.  The  High  Court  also  recorded  a finding to  the effect  that there was no will in respect of the tenancy rights of the disputed shop.      Having given our anxious consideration to the questions involved in  the case  we see  no reason  to differ from the finding  of  the  High  Court.  The  appeal  is  accordingly dismissed but  in the  circumstances of the case the parties are allowed to bear their own costs. M.L.A.    Appeal dismissed. 899

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8