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PETITIONER: JANGBIR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHAVIR PRASAD GUPTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR   27            1977 SCR  (1) 670  1976 SCC  (4) 682

ACT:             Second  Appeal--Disturbance of a concurrent  finding  of         fact without considering the objects of the notifications or         discussing any principle of construction of documents  which         could  indicate that a point of law had really arisen for  a         decision is patently exceeding the jurisdiction of the  High         Court--Civil Procedure Code (Act V) 1908. S. 100.             Interpretation  of documents--Principles  applicable  to         interpretation  of documents--Notifications Nos. F.  9/5/59-         R&S published in gazette dated  17-1-60 u/s 507 of the Delhi         Municipal  Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957) and  Notifica-         tion--GSR  486 u/s 1(2) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  (59         of  1958) gazetted or, 21-4-62--Whether the whole  of  Mauza         Chowkri  Mubarakabad and whole of Onkar Nagar and  Lekhupura         were meant to be notified.

HEADNOTE:             Mauza  Chowkri  Mubarakabad  was  included  within   the         limits   of   Delhi  Municipal Corporation Act,  1957  by  a         notification  dated  7th January, 1960.  By  a  notification         dated  12th  April 1962, the provisions of  the  Delhi  Rent         Control  Act, 1958 was extended to the localities  mentioned         in the schedule to the, notification dated 7th January 1960.         The  respondent landlord who purchased a house  situated  in         Khasra  No.  203, Khewat No. 1 situated at  village  Chowkri         Mubarakabad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar  Nagar         II, filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant tenant of  a         room in the said house and for recovery of rent.  The  trial         court and the first appellate court  held that  the   juris-         diction  of  the civil court was barred by  the  Delhi  Rent         Control Act, 1958.  However on second appeal, a single judge         of  the  High Court disturbed the findings of fact  and  re-         versed  the judgments of the courts below.   Dismissing  the         appeal by special leave the Court,             HELD:  (i) There cannot be any doubt, that, in  the  in-         stant case, by deciding to set aside the concurrent findings         of  fact,  ignoring the law laid down by  this  Court,  and,         before that by the judicial committee of the Privy  Council,         the High Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under  s.         100   .C.P.C.  without  considering  the  objects   of   the         notifications or discussing any principle of construction of         documents  which  could  indicate that a point  of  law  had

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       really arisen for decision. [673 D--F]             Deity  Pattabhiramaswamy  v.S. Hanyamayya  &  Ors.,  AIR         1959   SC  57; Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors. v. Shri  Ranga         Ramanuja Jeer & Anr. 1962(2) SCR 509; Nedunuri  Kameswaramma         v.  Sampati  Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR  208;  Bhusawal  Borough         Municipality  v. Amalgamated Electricity Co.  Ltd.  &   Am’.         1964(5) SCR 905; Secy. of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam  &         Ors., AIR 1934 PC 112; Anup Mahto v. Mita Dusadh & Ors.  AIR         1934  PC  5 and Narayanrao Deshmukh v.  Jaiwantrao  Yadaorao         Deshmnkh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171; applied             (ii)  The  well known principles  of  interpretation  of         documents are: (a) firstly, a document must be construed  as         a  whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so construed as not  to         reduce  what was meant or being done by it to a  patent  ab-         surdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column.  appears         to  have  been carelessly made, so as not to give a  correct         indication  Of what was otherwise clearly capable  of  being         inferred from the objects and. rest of the contents of  such         a notification, the slight error., due obviously to inadver-         tance, would not matter on an application of the  principle:         Falsa Demonstrated non nocet."         [675 B-C]         671             (iii)  Unless interpretation of a document involves  the         question  of application of a principle of law, mere  infer-         ences from or the evidentiary value of a document  generally         raises only a question of fact. [674 C]             Nedanuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, 1963 (2) SCR         208;  explained.         Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income  Tax,         Madras, 1956 SCR 691; referred to         (iv)  In  the instant case, it is evident that  the  proviso         does not require the mention of anything more than the urban         areas which is to be included or excluded from the limits of         the  Municipal  Corporation.   That  area  was  sufficiently         clearly  indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant,  for         the  Revenue Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the  vil-         lage.   The  whole of   Mauza Chowkri  Mubarakabad  and  the         whole  of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to  be  noti-         fied.  The mere fact that the last column was not filled  up         in  such  a manner as to show precisely  where  each  Khasra         number  lay did not affect the question whether the area  to         be included was sufficiently indicated  or not.  The  provi-         sions  of  Section  1(2) of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act  as         wellas  of  Section 507(a) and (b) of  the  Delhi  Municipal         Corporation Act refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra         nos.  which  are  convenient divisions for  the  purpose  of         indicating what lay within each area. [674 H, 675 A--B, GH]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 768 of 1972.             Appeal  by Special Leave from the  Judgment  and   Order         dated 24-8-71 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 137/67.         G.N. Dikshit and R.N. Dikshit, for the Appellant.             O.P.  Malhotra,  S.N. Mehta, Uma Datta, Sat Pal  and  M.         Iyengar, for the Respondent.         The Judgment of the Court .was delivered by             BEG, J.--Jangbir, appellant, is a tenant of a room in  a         house  which was purchased by the respondent Mahavir  Prasad         Gupta  on 15th May, 1956, for Rs. 1930/- shown in  his  sale         deed as situated in "Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1,  situated         at  Village Chowkri  Mubarkabad, Delhi Province, within  the         abadi  of Onkar Nagar-II".  The landlord owner had  filed  a

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       suit for the ejectment of the appellant and for recovery  9f         rent which was dismissed by a Subordinate Judge of Delhi  on         26th  May, 1966 on the ground that the jurisdiction  of  the         Civil Court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958,         (hereinafter  referred to as ’the Act’) which  provided  the         only  modes of relief for aggrieved landlords by  proceeding         under the Act.             The respondent landlord had alleged that the suit lay in         the  ordinary  Civil Court and that it was governed  by  the         provisions  of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as  the         house, in which the appellant was the tenant of a room, fell         outside the area to which the Act was applicable. The  short         question on which the case was decided was whether the house         of  the respondent was situated in an area to which the  Act         had been applied by a notification under  Section 507(a)  of         the  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation Act,   1957,   dated  7th         January,  1960.   published  in the Delhi  Gazette  on  17th         January,  1960 read with the notification dated 12th  April,         1962  under Section 1, sub. s. (2) of the Act. published  in         the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962.         672             The  operative  part of the notification  of  the  Delhi         Administration reads as follows:                        "No. F. 9/5/59-R&S--In exercise of the powers                  conferred by clause (a) of Section 507 of the Delhi                  Municipal  Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957),  the                  Corporation  with  the previous  ’approval  of  the                  Central  Government  hereby declares that the  fol-                  lowing  localities mentioned in the Schedule  given                  below,  hitherto forming part of the  rural  areas,                  shall cease to be rural area".                  Thereafter,  was  given a  schedule and  then  came                  the  heading: "Shahdara Zone".  The schedule has  5                  columns.   The first is for the "Serial  No."   The                  second  is  for the name of the  "Revenue  estate",                  which  is translation of Mauza, said to be an  area                  composed of several villages.  The third column  is                  for the name of the actual village or colony of the                  Mauza.   It is headed "Name of Colony Village  pro-                  posed  to  be  included in the  urban  area".   The                  fourth  column  is for what is called  the  "square                  number".  The last and the fifth column was headed:                  "Khasra/Killa   Nos.    covered   by   the    Colo-                  ny/Villages".   We are. concerned here with  serial                  No.  7 which has the entries indicated  below  made                  under the appropriate number of each column:                  "1. No. 7.                  2. Chowkri Mubarakabad.                     3. Onkar Nagar. Lekhu Pura.                  4. Square No. Not given.                     5.  Across "Onkar Nagar" are shown:  "238,  242,                  240,  234, 235, 236, 234, 231, 230 and  271";  and,                  across  "Lekhu  Pura"  are  shown:  "215  to   217,                  211,212, 199 to 203".                      The  notification published in the  Gazette  of                  India  on  21st April, 1962, may be  reproduced  in                  toto. It reads:                  "New Delhi, the 12th’ April, 1962.                        G.S.R.  No. 486--In exercise of  powers  con-                  ferred by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section                  1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958),                  the  Central  Government  hereby  extends  all  the                  provisions of the said Act :--                     (a)  to the areas which immediately  before  the                  7th April, 1958, were included in the Notified Area

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                Committee, Najafgarh and the Notified Area  Commit-                  tee, Narela; and                     (b)  to the localties mentioned in the  schedule                  to the notification of the Municipal Corporation of                  Delhi No. F-9/5/59-R&S, dated the  28th   December,                  1959, published in the Delhi Gazette Part IV, dated                  the 7th                  673                  January, 1960, and which by virtue of that  notifi-                  cation  have formed part of the urban areas  within                  the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.                  (No. 35/8/61-Delhi-I)                  A.V. Venkatasubban, Deputy Secretary".             The Subordinate Judge, very rightly observed that  there         was no dispute between the parties that Mauza Chowkri  Muba-         rakabad was  included. within the limits of Delhi  Municipal         Corporation by the notification dated 7th January, 1960.  He         pointed  out that there was no indication of a  sub-diviSion         of Khasra No. 203 showing that any part of it was divided or         separately numbered.             The  disappointed plaintiff landlord was,  however,  not         content with so obviously correct a finding.  He appealed to         the District Judge who agreed entirely with the Trial  Court         and  also  recorded a finding of fact that Khasra  No.  203,         situated in the Mauza or Revenue Estate  of Chowkri  Mubara-         kabad,  was  covered by the notifications.  It seems  to  us         that no other inference was reasonably possible.             The plaintiff respondent seems, in a gambling spirit, to         have decided to try his luck by a second appeal to the  High         Court.   What surprises . us is that a learned Judge of  the         Delhi  High  Court, without considering the objects  of  the         notifications or discussing any principle of construction of         documents  which  could  indicate that a point  of  law  had         really arisen for decision before him, decided to set  aside         the  concurrent  findings of fact,  and,  thereby,  patently         exceeded  the jurisdiction of the High Court  under  Section         100  Civil  Procedure Code.  We need hardly say  that  there         cannot  be any doubt that he did so.  We are surprised  that         the  law laid down by this Court, and, before that,  by  the         Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should have been  so         completely  ignored. By way of example we  may refer to  the         following cases:  Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v.S. Hanyamayya  &         Ors.  (1);  Sri  Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors.  v.  Shri  Ranga         Ramanuja  Jeer & Anr.(2); Nedunuri Kameswaramma  v.  Sampati         Subba  Rao(3); Bhusawal Borough Municipality v.  Amalgamated         Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr.(4);  Secy. of State v. Rameshwa-         ram  Devasthanam  &  Ors.(5);Anup Mahto  v.  Mira  Dusadh  &         Ors.,(6) Sahebrao Narayanrao Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao         Deshmukh & Ant.(7)             It  is urged on behalf of the appellants that  the  con-         struction of a document is always a question of law.   Reli-         ance   was  placed  upon Meenakshi Mills,   Madurai  v.  The         Commissioner of  income-tax, Madras,(8) and Nedunuri  Kames-         waramma v. Sampati  Subba Rao (Supra).  This Court has never         laid  down  that  inferences from contents  of  a  documents         always raise  questions of law.   Indeed, in           (1)   A.I.R.  1959  S.C.  57.                 (2)   [19621         (2)S.C.R. 509.           (3)  [1963]  (2) S.C.R. 208.              (4)  [1964]  (5)         S.C.R. 905.          (5) A.I.R. 1934 PC. 112.               (6) A.I.R. 1934 P.C.         5.           (7)  A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 171.              (8) [1956]  S.C.R.         691.         674

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       Nedunuri  Kameshwaramma’s case (supra), this Court  observed         (atp. 215-216):                         "A  construction of documents  (unless  they                  are documents of rifle) produced by the parties  to                  prove a question of fact does not involve an  issue                  of  law, unless it can be shown that  the  material                  evidence contained in them was misunderstood by the                  Court  of fact.  The documents in this case,  which                  have been the subject of three separate  considera-                  tions,  were the  Land Registers the  Amarkam,  and                  Bhooband  Accounts and the Adangal  Registers,  to-                  gether  with  certain documents  derived  from  the                  Zamindari records.  None of these documents can  be                  correctly described as a document of title, whatev-                  er its evidentiary value otherwise".                      We  think  that,  unless  interpretation  of  a                  document involves the question of application of  a                  principle  of law mere inferences from or the  evi-                  dentiary value of a document generally raises  only                  a question of fact.                      We think that, if the learned Judge of the High                  Court  had cared to consider the provisions of  law                  relating  to  the  extension of the  Act  to  urban                  areas. or to bear in mind the correct principles of                  construction. of documents, or, tried to appreciate                  the  true nature of the case before him,  he  could                  not  have possibly interfered with  the  concurrent                  findings of the two Courts below simply because the                  number of the Khasra in which the house of respond-                  ent lay was not mentioned against both the portions                  of  Chowki  Mubarakabad but  wholly  against  Lekhu                  Pura.   In so far as the assumption, from  the  en-                  tries  in column 5 of’ the notification,  could  be                  that the whole of No. 203 fell in Lekhupura, it was                  an  obviously  erroneous  assumption.   A  clerical                  error  was the most that was indicated by  such  an                  entry.   But,  even so, it left no doubt  that  the                  whole Khasra No. 203 was duly notified.                         "1.  (1)  This Act may be called  the  Delhi                  Rent Control Act, 1958.                        (2)  It extends to the area  included  within                  the  limits of the  New Delhi  Municipal  Committee                  and  the Delhi Cantonment Board and’ to such  urban                  areas  within the limits of the Municipal  Corpora-                  tion  of   Delhi as  are  specified in  the   first                  ScheduIe;                        Provided that the Central Government may,  by                  notification  in the Official Gazette, extend  this                  Act  or any provision thereof, to any  other  urban                  area  included within the limits of  the  Municipal                  Corporation  of Delhi or exclude any area from  the                  operation of this Act or any provision thereof".                      It is evident that the proviso does not require                  the  mention of anything more than the  urban  area                  which is to be included or excluded from the limits                  of the Municipal Corporation,  That area was suffi-                  ciently  clearly indicated by entries in columns  2                  and 3 meant for’ the Revenue                  675                  Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the  village.                  It  is  clear from these that the  whole  of  Mauza                  Chowkri  Mubarakabad and the whole of  Onkar  Nagar                  and Lekhupura were meant to be notified.  The  mere                  fact  that  the last column was not  filled  up  by                  whoever  drew up the notification in such a  manner

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                as  to show precisely where each Khasra number  lay                  did not affect the question whether the area to  be                  included  was sufficiently indicated or  not.   The                  well-known principles of interpretation  applicable                  to such cases are:  (a) Firstly, a document must be                  construed  as a whole.  (b) Secondly, it has to  be                  so  construed  as not to reduce what was  meant  or                  being done by it to a patent absurdity. (c)  Third-                  ly,  if any entry of a column appears to have  been                  carelessly made, so as not to give a correct  indi-                  cation  of  what was otherwise clearly  capable  of                  being  inferred  from the objects and rest  of  the                  contents of such a notification, the slight  error,                  due obviously to inadvertence, would not matter  on                  an application of the principle:  Falsa  Demonstra-                  tio  non nocet.  A deliberate intention to  omit  a                  part of a Khasra number the whole of which is given                  in the notification of 7th January, 1960, could not                  possibly be inferred.                      When we look at Section 507 of the Delhi Munic-                  ipal  Corporation Act, 1957, we find  the  relevant                  part runs as follows:                         "507. Notwithstanding anything contained  in                  the    foregoing provisions of this Act,--                        (a) the Corporation with the previous approv-                  al of the Central Government  may, by  notification                  in the  Official Gazette, declare that any  portion                  of  the  rural  areas shall cease  to  be  included                  therein  and  upon the issue of  such  notification                  that portion shall be included in and form part  of                  the urban areas;                        (b)  the Corporation with the  previous   ap-                  proval of the Central Government may,  by notifica-                  tion in the  Official Gazette,--                      (i)  exempt  the  rural areas  or  any  portion                  thereof from such of the provisions of this Act  as                  it deems fit.                      (ii) Levy taxes, rates, fees and other  charges                  in the rural areas or any portion thereof at  rates                  lower  than those at which such taxes, rates,  fees                  and other charges are levied in the urban areas  or                  exempt  such  areas or portion from any  such  tax,                  rate, fee or other charge;"                      Thus,  we find the provisions of Section 1  (2)                  of the Act as well as of Section 507(a) and (b)  of                  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation Act refer only  to                  "areas"  and  not  to mere Khasra  Nos.  which  are                  convenient divisions for the purposes of indicating                  what  lay  within each area.  The Khasra  is  often                  spoken of as the "village map".  Khasra for "abadi"                  areas even indicate. the type of construction which                  may  lie within a particular number or the  use  to                  which  a  piece of land was being  put.   The  term                  "urban  area"  or  "rural area" is  used  for  much                  larger units than Khasra Nos.  It would, obviously,                  be  quite  impossible to think  of  one  particular                  number, within an "abadi" area, left out or         676         dropped deliberately, without any rhyme or reason, from  the         notifications  mentioned above.  No conceivable  reason  has         been  suggested for such an omission.  Indeed, there is  not         even  an omission the effect of which may have been  helpful         to the appellant.  It was only a case where the whole number         is  shown  against one village only instead of  being  shown         against two.

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           The learned High Court Judge, by basing his whole  judg-         ment  on a farfetched conjecture from supposed  omission  of         No.  203  in column 5, against Onkar Nagar, adopted  a  con-         struction  of the Notification, if that is what the  learned         Judge was doing, which was quite unintelligible with  refer-         ence to the facts of the case or purposes of such  notifica-         tions.   The learned Judge would have been well  advised  to         rest  content with the obviously correct position that  what         the two Courts below had done was to arrive at a pure  find-         ing  of fact as to whether a particular Khasra  number  con-         taining the house in question was included within a Mauza to         the whole of which the provisions of the Act had been plain-         ly extended.  In view of all the facts of the case, no other         conclusion was reasonably possible.             Consequently,  we allow this appeal, by  special  leave,         with  costs throughout, set aside the judgment of  the  High         Court  and  dismiss  the plaintiff’s suit.   As  no  counsel         appeared  to hear the Judgment today’s costs are  disallowed         to both the parties.         S.R.                                                  Appeal         allowed.         677