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PETITIONER: JANG BAHADUR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BAIJ NATH TIWARI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/04/1968

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1969 AIR   30            1969 SCR  (1) 134  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1974 SC 642  (6)  R          1988 SC2118  (5)

ACT: Contempt of Court-Writ Petition pending to quash suspension order-Stay  vacated--Service of charge-sheet in  respect  of disciplinary proceedings-If amounts to contempt.

HEADNOTE: Pending  an  inquiry  into the conduct  of  the  respondent- Principal  of a college in respect of  certain  allegations, the  respondent was suspended.  The respondent filed a  writ petition in the High Court to quash the order of  suspension and also obtained ex-parte stay against the continuation  of the inquiry.  The ex-parte stay was vacated.  Thereafter the appellant-manager  of the college, served a charge-sheet  on the   respondent  and  called  upon  him  to   explain   the allegations.   The  respondent  moved  the  High  Court  for holding  the  appellant guilty of- contempt of  Court.   The High  Court held the appellant guilty of contempt of  Court. In appeal, this Court. HELD:The appeal must be allowed. An authority holding an inquiry in good faith in exercise of the  powers  vested in it by statutory  eegulations  is  not guilty  of  contempt  of Court, merely  because  a  parallel inquiry is imminent or pending before a Court.  The issue in the  disciplinary  proceedings is whether  the  employee  is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to take action against  him.   The same issue may arise for decision  in  a civil  or criminal proceeding pending in a Court.   But  the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the taking  of disciplinary  action.  The power of taking such-  action  is vested in the disciplinary authority.  The civil or criminal court has no such power.  The initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated  to obstruct  or  interfere with the course of  justice  in  the pending court proceeding.  The employee is free to move  the court  for  an  order restraining  the  continuance  of  the disciplinary  proceedings.   If he obtains a stay  order,  a wilful  violation  of the order would of  course  amount  to contempt  of  court.  In the absence of a  stay  order  the- dirciplinary  authority  is  free  to  exercise  its  lawful

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powers. [137D--G] In  this case, after the stay order was vacated by the  High Court,   the   appellant  bona  fide   believed   that   the disciplinary proceedings could be continued, and the charge- sheet  was  served  in good faith and was  not  intended  or calculated to, interfere with the court proceedings.  Rather the  respondent  instituted the  contempt  proceedings  with ulterior  motives to indefinitely hold up the inquiry  after having failed to obtain the stay order. [139 E-F] Tukaram Gaokar v. S. N. Shukla, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 422, Reg, v. Gray,  [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, Arthur Reginald Perors v. The  King [1951]  A.C. 482, 488, Re : Shri Mehra A.I.R. 1962 M.P.  72; Saibal  Kumar Gupta v. B. K. Sen [1961] 3 S.C.R. 460;  Delhi Cloth  and  General Mills Ltd., v. Kaushal  Bhan,  [1960]  3 S.C.R. 227; Tata Oil Mills Co., Ltd.. v. The Workmen, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 155; The King v. Parmanand, A.I.R. 1949 Pat.  282; D.  J.  Shield v. Ramesam, A.T.R. 1955 Andhra  Pradesh,  156 referred to. 135

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 187  of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated August 3, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc. Contempt Case No. 7 of 1965. U. P. Singh and D. N. Mishra, for the appellant. Sobhagmal  Jain,  S.  P. Singh and J.  P.   Goyal,  for  the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J.-The appellant is the manager of Hiralal  Memo- rial  Intermediate  College, Bhaurauli, in the  District  of Azamgarh.  The respondent was the principal of the  College. On December 14, 1963 the respondent drew from the Boys’ Fund of  the  college  two  sums  of  Rs.  189  for  payment   of scholarship to the two Harijan students for, the period from May  to November 1963.  On withdrawal of the monies he  sent to  the Harijan.  Tatha Samaj Kalyan Adhikari a form  called Form  No.  14 to the Adhikari containing a  receipt  of  the scholarship signed by the two students and counter-signed by himself.  The Adhikari wrote to the appellant informing  him of the complaint. made by the students that in spite of  the submission  of  Form  No.  14  they  had  not  received  the scholarship.   On March 24, 1964 the District  Inspector  of Schools  visited  the  College  and  on  finding  that   the scholarships had not been paid called for an explanation for nonpayment.   On April 10, 1964 the appellant forwarded  the Inspector’s  letter of March 24 to the respondent and  asked him  to give an, explanation.  The respondent sent  a  reply stating that payments were made to the students on March 31, 1964 and that the delay in payment was due to the absence of the students from the College and the fact that the register on which receipts had to be obtained were with the Inspector from December. 8, 1963 to March 10, 1964.  A meeting of  the managing committee was called on April 14, 1964 to  consider the  Inspector’s  letter and the  respondent’s  explanation. According  to the appellant, on April 19, 1964 the  managing committee  met  and  resolved to  take  disciplinary  action against  the  respondent.  On April 21, 1964  the  appellant passed  an  order  suspending  the  respondent  pending  the inquiry.  The order stated that it was passed in exercise of the  power  vested  in the appellant by the  rules  and  the resolution  of the managing committee dated April 19,  1964.

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A  copy of the resolution was attached.  On April  24,  1964 the  respondent filed a writ petition in the High  Court  of Allahabad  praying for appropriate writs quashing the  order of  suspension.  He  alleged  that  the  appellant  had   no authority  to pass the order and that the order was made  in bad  faith.  On the same date the respondent obtained an  ex parte order from the High Court 136 staying the, operation of the suspension order.  On July 22, 1964  after hearing both the parties the High Court  vacated the stay order.  On December 25, 1964 the appellant served a charge,sheet  on  the respondent.  Charge No.  (IV)  was  as follows               "The  scholars hip amounts of Rs.  216/25  and               Rs.  216/25 of Sri Karam Deo Ram and  Sri  Jai               Raj  Ram students of Class XII for the  months               of May 1963 to November 1963 were withdrawn by               you  on 14-12-1963 but the same  have  neither               been  disbursed to the students concerned  nor               refunded  to  the,  Treasury.   Thus  you  are               guilty  for misappropriation of the  aforesaid               amount.               Evidence which is proposed to be considered in               support of the charge :               1.    Letter of D.J.O., dated 24-3-1964.               2.    Letter of H.W.O., dated 31-3-1964.               3.    Statement of students.               Thus  it  is evidently clear  that  you  being               entrusted  -with  the  aforesaid  money   have               dishonestly  misappropriated  the  amount  for               your  own use and the poor students have  been               put  to loss by your misconduct.  As such  you               have  committed criminal breach of trust  dis-               honestly punishable under sec. 406 I.P.C." The  respondent  was required to submit his  explanation  by January 24, 1965.  Instead of submitting his explanation the respondent  filed  a petition in the High Court  asking  for committal  of  the  appellant for contempt  of  court.   His contention  was  that the aforesaid charge was  the  subject matter of inquiry in the pending writ petition, and that  as the respondent had launched a parallel inquiry in the matter he  had  committed  contempt  of  court.   The  ’High  Court accepted  the contention and held that the  respondent  ’was guilty  of  contempt  of court and directed  him  to  pay  a fine .,of Rs. 500 and costs.  The respondent has filed  this appeal after ,-obtaining special leave from this Court. The conditions of service of the teachers in the College are governed  by  sec. 16 G of the Intermediate  Education  Act, 1921.  (U.P.  Act  11 of 1921) and  the  Regulations  framed thereunder.   ’Regulations 31 to 45 provide for  punishment, inquiry and suspension.  The Committee of Management is the, punishing   ,authority.   The  punishments   of   dismissal, removal,  discharge and reduction in rank and dimunition  in emoluments  require prior approval of the Inspector.  If  it is decided to take disciplinary action against an  employee, the  inquiry  is  made by an  authority  :appointed  by  the committee.  The ground on which it is proposed 137 to  take action is reduced in the form of definite  charges. The  charges  are  communicated  to  the  employee,  who  is required  to submit a written statement of his  defence.  If the employee or the inquiring authority so desires, an  oral inquiry takes place. The inquiring  authority then  makes  a report.  On  receipt of the report the  punishing  authority takes  its decision on the case. On receipt of the  decision

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of  the  committee  the Inspector gives  his  decision.  The Committee then implements the decision of the  Inspector.The Regulations indicate definite time limits for the communica- tion  of the charge, submission of the written statement  of defence,completion of the inquiry, the making of the  report by  the inquiring authority, the taking of decisions by  the punishing authority and the Inspector and the implementation of  the decision.Pending the inquiry and final  orders,  the employee  may  be suspended by the committee. The  power  of suspension  may  be  exercised  by  the  manager  if  it  is delegated  to  him under the rules of the  institution.  The employee under suspension is paid a subsistence allowance of an amount equal to half his pay. The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the em- ployee  is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed  to take  action  against  him. The same  issue  may  arise  for decision  in  a civil or criminal proceeding  pending  in  a court. But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking  such action is vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or criminal  court  has  no  such  power.  The  initiation  and continuation  of disciplinary proceedings in good  faith  is not  calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course  of justice  in  the pending court proceeding. The  employee  is free  to  move  the  court  for  an  order  restraining  the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a wilful violation of the order would of  course amount to contempt of court. In the absence  of a stay order the  disciplinary authority is free to exercise its   lawful powers. An authority holding an inquiry in good faith in exercise of the  powers  vested in it by statutory  regulations  is  not guilty  of  contempt  of court, merely  because  a  parallel inquiry  is imminent or pending before a court.  In  Tukaram Gaokar   v.  S.  AT.Shukla(1)  this  Court  held  that   the initiation and continuance of proceedings for imposition  of penalty  on the appellant for his alleged complicity in  the smuggling of gold under sec. 112(b) of the Sea Customs  Act, 1962 did not amount to a contempt of court though his  trial in  a criminal court for offences under sec. 135(b) of  that Act  and other similar offences was imminent  and  identical issues  would  arise in the proceedings before  the  customs authorities and in the trial before the criminal court. This Court observed (1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 422. 138               "To  constitute contempt of court, there  must               be   involved  some  ’act  done   or   writing               published  calculated  to bring a court  or  a               judge  of the court into contempt or to  lower               his  authority’  or ’something  calculated  to               obstruct  or interfere with the due course  of               justice  or the lawful process of the  court.’               Reg. v. Gray(1) Arthur Reginald Perors v.  The               King(2).  The customs officers did nothing  of               this   kind.   They  are  acting   bona   fide               discharging  their statutory duties under  ss.               111  and  112.   The  power  of   adjudicating               penalty and confiscation under those  sections               is  vested in them alone.  The criminal  court               cannot  make this adjudication.  The issue  of               the  show cause notice and proceedings  there-               under  are authorised by the Act and  are  not               calculated  to obstruct the course of  justice               in  any  Court.  We see no  justification  for

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             holding   that  the  proceedings   amount   to               contempt of court." In  Re: Shr Mehra(3) the High Court of Madhya  Pradesh  held that  the bona fide holding of a departmental inquiry  on  a charge of misappropriation against a government servant  did not  amount to contempt of court merely because  a  criminal prosecution  on the same charge was pending against him.   A fortiori  the inquiry cannot amount to contempt court if  it is not a parallel investigation on a matter pending before a court, see Saibal Kumar Gupta V. B. K. Sen(4). In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kaushal Bhan(5) and Tata  Oil Mills Co., Ltd., v. The Workmen(6) the Court  held that  a  domestic inquiry by the employer into  the  charges against  a  workman  was not vitiated because  it  was  held during  the  pendency of a criminal trial into the  same  or similar  charges.  It may be desirable to stay the  domestic inquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case  but the  inquiry could not be characterised as mala fide  merely because  it  was held during the pendencY  of  the  criminal proceedings. In  The King v. Parmanand(7) a Full Bench of the Patna  High Court held that the giving or withholding of consent to  the withdrawal of the prosecution under sec. 494 of the Code  of Criminal  Procedure was a judicial act and it  was  improper for  the  court to permit withdrawal of the  prosecution  on orders  of  the  Government without making  any  attempt  to exercise   its   discretion,  that  the   power   to   grant adjournments of pending proceedings under s. 344 of the Code and the power to call for records in A pending or  completed case under secs. 423, 435 of the (1) [1900] 2Q.B.36.      (2) (1951] A.C.482.488. (3) A.I.R, 1962 M.P.72.  (4) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 460. (5) [1960] 3S.C.R.227.   (6) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 155. (7)  A.I.R. 1949 Pat 282. 139 Code  and the general rules and circular orders were  vested in the court and not in executive officers.  Those questions do  not arise for decision in this case.  Narayan, J.  in  a separate judgment observed that in an inquiry with regard to a matter which is sub judice was bound to interfere with the even  and ordinary course of justice and a parallel  inquiry of this kind would amount to opening the door for  contempt. In  that case the executive officers were issuing orders  to the criminal court calling for its records and asking it  to adjourn the proceedings and to consent to the withdrawal  of the  prosecution and on those facts it might be possible  to hold  that  the officers were guilty of  contempt.   But  we cannot  agree  with the broad observation  that  a  parallel inquiry  on  a  matter pending before  a  court  necessarily amounts to a contempt of court.  We think that an inquiry by a  domestic tribunal in good faith into the charges  against an  employee  does not amount to contempt  of  court  merely because an inquiry into the same charges is pending before a civil or criminal court.  In D. J. Shield v.Ramesam (1)  the Andhra  Pradesh High Court agreed with the  observations  of Narayan, J. but the decision is distinguishable because  the court  found  that  the inquiry by the  Collector  into  the charges against a sub-magistrate was not a parallel  inquiry and did not amount to contempt of court. After  the High Court vacated the stay order  the  appellant bona fide believed that the disciplinary  proceedings  could be  -continued.   The  service of the  charge-sheet  on  the respondent  was made in good faith and was not  intended  or calculated to interfere with the court proceedings.  We  are inclined  to  think  that  the  respondent  instituted   the

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contempt  proceeding  with ulterior motives.  He  was  under suspension and was drawing half pay for doing nothing.   His intention was to delay the inquiry into the charges  against him.  Having failed to obtain the stay order he launched the contempt   proceeding   so  that  the   inquiry   might   be indefinitely held up.  In view of the order under appeal  he has successfully delayed the inquiry so far. In  the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the  judgment and order of the High Court dated August 3, 1965 and dismiss the petition filed under the Contempt of Courts Act. Y.P.               Appeal allowed- (1) A. 1. R. 1955 A. P. 156. 140