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PETITIONER: JAMILABAI ABDUL KADAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHANKERLAL GULABCHAND & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/04/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2202            1975 SCR  336  1975 SCC  (2) 609  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC2234  (27)

ACT: Advocates  Act, 1961--Scope of authority of an  advocate  to enter into  compromise on behalf of his client.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  engaged  a pleader to fight her  case  in  a Court.   The  case was adjourned from time to time  for  the parties to compose their differences.  Eventually, the Court recorded  a  compromise,  signed  by  the  pleader  of   the appellant.   At the time of signing the  compromise,  though the appellant was not present in Court, her litigation agent was present and was consulted when the order was made.   The appellant  later  filed a suit-for a  declaration  that  the decree based on a compromise entered into by her pleader was without authority and was not binding on her.  The suit  was dismissed.   The appeal was dismissed in limine by the  High Court. On  appeal  to  this  Court,  it  was  contended  that   the respondent, being a mere pleader, had no power to compromise a suit unless expressly authorised by the party. Dismissing the appeal- ‘ HELD  :  (a)  Lawyers,      be  they  advocates,  vakils  or pleaders, stand on the same footing in regard to their power to  act on behalf of their clients.  By the  Advocates  Act, 1961,   the  Indian  Bar  came  into  existence   permitting enrollment of various categories of legal practitioners like vakils  and pleaders.  Section 55 of the Act  provides  that every  pleader,  who  did not elect to be  enrolled  as  ’an advocate  tinder that Act, shall continue to enjoy the  same ,is rights  respects practice in any Court as be had  before that Act came into force. [340 H, 341-A] In the instant case, though the respondent. bad not enrolled himself  as an advocate, his. rights respects  practice,  in any Court are what he had enjoyed under the Bombay  Pleaders Act,  1920  notwithstanding its repeal P. by  the  Advocates Act. [341-B]. (b)  Every legal practitioner is an officer of the Court and aids  in  the cause of justice.  The responsibility  of  the

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advocates  to their clients and to the Court has to  be  the same even though some of them may be entitled to appear only in District Courts while others in High Courts.  The quality of power cannot stand differentiation. [341-GH] (2)  If  a  suitor countermands his pleader’s  authority  to enter into a compromise or withholds, by express recital  in the  vakalat, the power to compromise the legal  proceeding, the  pleader or the advocate cannot go against  such  advice and  bind the principal, his client.  This is as illegal  as it is unprofessional. [342-FG] Jiwibai v. Ramjuvar, AIR 1947 N4g. 17, approved. (3)  To act for the suitor involves myriad intricate actions often so legal that the client may not even understand’  the implication.   Representation in Court may be  so  demanding and so transforms forensic obligation that a lawyer may have ethical   difficulties  in  mechanically  obeying  all   the directions of his principal.  The legal skill that is  hired by the client may, for its very effective exercise, ’need in area of autonomy and quickness of decision that to  restrict the  agency  to  express  authorisation is  to  ask  for  an unpredictable   and  endless  enumeration  of  powers.    To circumscribe  the power to act is to defeat the  purpose  of the engagement.  It is perfectly open to a party, like any 337 other principal, to mark out in the vakalat or by particular instructions forbidden areas or expressly withhold the right to  act in sensitive matters, the choice being his,  as  the master.   The legal profession is a para-public  institution which  deserves the special confidence of and  owes  greater responsibility .to the community at large than the  ordinary run of agency. [346-D-G, H] Sourindra v. Heranba, AIR 1923 PC 98, followed. Laxmidas Ranchhodrlas v. Savitabai, [1955] 57 BLR 988, S. S. Waiker v. L. S. waiker, AIR 1960 Bom. 20 and C. S. Nayak- v. A. N. Menon AIR 1963 Ker. 213 approved. Rondel v. Morsley [1969] 1 A. C. 191 referred. to. (4)  The Advocate or pleader has authority to act by way  of compromising at case     in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client subject     to  two   over- riding  considerations : (i) He must act in good  faith  and for  the benefit of his client; otherwise the  power  fails. (ii) It is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent if there is time and opportunity.  In any  case, if  there is any instruction to the contrary or  withdrawal’ of  authority,  the  implicit power  to  compromise  in  the pleader will fall to the ground.[352-B] In  the present case, the ’pleader had  acted  substantially with  the  knowledge of and encouraged by his  client.   The several adjournment taken by the appellant specifically  for settling  the suit speak for themselves.  There is no  doubt that  the broad sanction for. the compromise came  from  the appellant,  that  no shady action was in  imputable  to  the respondent  and that his conduct had been motivated  by  the good of his client. [352-H] [Counsel should not rush in with a compromise where due care will  make them fear to tread, that a junior  should  rarely consent on his own when there is a senior in the brief, that a  party  may validity impunge an act of compromise  by  his pleader  if  he  is available for consultation  but  is  by- passed.  The lawyer must be above board, especially if he is to agree to an adverse verdict.] [353-C-D]

JUDGMENT:

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 43 of 1968 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated the, 11th December, 1967 of the Bombay High Court at  Bombay ill Second Appeal No. 1428 of 1967. V.   M. Limiyae, V. N. Ganpule,R.  N. Nath and Urmila  Sirur for the   appellant. Y.   S. Chitale and A. G. Rainaparkhi, for respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER,  J. There is more than meets the eye  in  the seemingly simple legal issue raised in this ejectment  suit, if we probe the deeper public and professional  implications of  the  limitations on a pleader’s implied power  to  enter into  a  compromise of a case bona fide can  behalf  of  his client, bat in his interest, although without his consent. The  facts  to use trite phraseology, fall within  a  narrow compass.   The  landlords., Respondents 1 to 3,  brought  an action  for eviction of the tenant-appellant  (Regular  Suit 141   of  1964)  under  the  rent  control  law  extant   in Maharashtra.   Litigation is often so harassingly long  that even ",here recovery of possession is sought for immediate 338 bona fide need of the owner, the judicial process takes  its slow  motion  course that settlement of the dispute  is  not infrequently   preferred   by  both  sides   to   protracted adjudicatory justice.  In the present case, although parties had  engaged  lawyers and gone to trial, they  took  several adjournments  from court to compose their  differences,  The last such was granted in these terms :               "19-4-65 Parties as before present               "Application  by  defendant  for   adjournment               granted.  Suit  is adjourned  for  hearing  to               21-4-65.                       Sd/- R. H. Maslekar,                       Joint Civil Judge                       Junior Division." Eventually,   on  April  21,  1965  the  court  recorded   a compromise,  signed by the pleader of the tenant, giving  18 months  time to give vacant possession and decreed the  suit on the agreed terms.  But at heart the tenant harboured  the intent to resist eviction; the impropriety of breaching  she compromise  was  overpowered  by the tempting  plea  of  the illegality  of the decree on consent.  So she, started  some miscellaneous proceedings which were carried right upto this Court  although  dismissed in every  court  as  incompetent. Then she inaugurated this, the third chapter of  litigation, Regular  Civil Suit No. 422 of 1966 for a  declaration  that the decree based on a compromise entered into by her pleader without  authority was not binding on her  and  consequently she  was not liable to be dispossessed.  This last spell  of litigation,  after the first compromise in Court, has  taken long  ten years.  Socio-legal research may well  prove  that legal  justice  may  soon  reach a point  of  no  return  if fundamental structural reform of the whole forensic  process were not launched upon and frivolous litigation screened  so as not to discredit faith in court justice.  Anyway, in  the present  case, the hierarchy of courts has held against  the appellant  and she has come up, by special leave,  conscious of adverse findings of fact by courts below, to this  Court. The  only  point urged by Shri Limaye for the  appellant  is that  Respondent 4 the pleader, Shri Palshikar,  who  signed the razi, bad no authority to do so, especially because  the client’s  consent  so  to do had not  been  secured  and  an advocate-respondent  5 before us-had also been  retained  in the case who had neither signed the document not represented to  the Court about the settlement.  It is common case  that

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the tenant was absent in court although her litigation agent was present (and consented) when the order was made. Shri Limaye has raised the principal plea that Respondent  4 being  a mere pleader, had no power to compromise  the  suit unless expressly authorised by the party and here admittedly no such express authorisation existed.  He seemed to make  a distinction  between advocate and pleader although  at  some stages  he read this limitation as applicable  to  advocates too.  A second point faintly raised was prudently  abandoned for the reason that it had not been set up in the  pleadings or  urged at earlier stages.  Last minute ingenuity  is  not fairplay in court and 339 we cannot and did not permit him to argue that the court had no  material in the recitals of the compromise to  make  out the  mandatory  grounds required under  the  relevant  ’rent control’ law for a court to direct dispossession of a tenant of  a  building.   We do not examine the  materials  of  the contention of all. Now  to the only contention canvassed before  us.   Although vintage  rulings  and  relevant books have  been  cited  and voyages  to  Anglo-American legal systems made, we  have  to decide  the  issue in the light of  Indian  statute-law  and decisions   against  the  backdrop  of  Indian   conditions. Foreign aid is helpful but in law, as in life, Indian genius must speak.  In this perspective, first we have to look  tit the  pertinent provisions of the Civil Procedure  Code,  the Advocates Act and the Bombay Pleaders Act. Even  before  that  we  may  reproduce  the  terms  of   the compromise which resulted in the decree for eviction in  the prior suit-(Regular Civil Suit No. 141 of 1964) : "IN  THE  COURT  OF THE CIVIL JUDGE  ,  JUNIOR  DIVISION  AT JALGAON                   Regular Suit No. 141/64               SHANKARLAL GULABCHAND-Plaintiff                              V.               ABDUL KADAR H. WELDER-Defendant A  compromise  has  been arrived  at  mutually  between  the plaintiff and the defendant and it is agreed as under  :-The defendant  is to give to the plaintiff actual possession  of the suit properties on or before the date the 30-10-66.   In case the defendant fails to deliver actual possession of the said  suit  properties according the plaintiff  is  to  take actual  possession  of  the  said  properties  by  filing  a Darkhast.  The defendant is liable to pay at the rate of Rs. 55.90  the  amount  of the loss sustained  in  the  form  of arrears of rent inclusive of the municipal tax and education cess  subsequent  to the filing of the suit, from  the  date 1-4-64 until delivery of actual possession of the plaintiff, and  accordingly, the defendant is to pay at the  said  rate the  damages  for  the  intervening  period.   In  case  the defendant  fails  to  pay (the same), the  plaintiff  is  to recover  the amount by filing a Darkhast.  The defendant  is to  bear  his  own costs and to pay  to  the  plaintiff  the latter’s  costs of this suit.  The plaintiff is to take  the amount of refund in respect of the Court fee stamp that  may be paid.  It is agreed as above.  A decree may therefore  be passed in terms thereof.                      Sd/- Shankarlal Gulabchand.                         Sd/- R. C. Agarwal.                         Reagular Suit No. 422/66                         Produced on behalf of the plaintiff                         on the date 30-1-67                        (Signature-illegible)                         Advocate for the plaintiff

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340 (In English) Sd/- D. B. Choudhari. Advocate for Plaintiff. with authority to Compromise. Sd/- B. H. Falashikar Plaintiff with authority to Comp. No. 1 and 2 and plaintiff Shankarlal Gulabchand with pleader and  defendant Abdul kadar with pleader admitted  before  me the compromise.  It is verified and admitted.                              Sd/- R. H. Maslekar.                              C.    J. 24-4-65" Although  the  Civil  Judge  mentions  in  the  order   that ’defendant Abdul Kadar’ with pleader admitted before him the compromise,  it was not the defendant but his agent who  was actually present.  That this is an error is conceded by  Sri Chitale appearing for respondents 1 to 3. The trial court as well  as the District Court went into the  question  whether the plaintiff-appellant had made out that express directions were given to the pleader Shri Falshikar (respondent No.  4) not  to compromise the suit and have come to the  conclusion that  no such positive instruction ’not to  compromise’  was given  by the party.  This being the concurrent  finding  of fact  and the High Court having dismissed the Second  Appeal in limine we may proceed on the footing that Sri  Palshikar, the  pleader,  had not been affirmatively  informed  not  to enter into a compromise.  The second question on which  also both  the  Courts  of fact  have  negatived  the  plaintiff- appellant’s  version  is that the compromise was an  act  of sharp practice, a fraud played by the pleader on his  client and  on the court.  We therefore exclude the possibility  of dubiety  and assume bona fides on the part of  the  pleader. We mention this to narrow the scope of the controversy which really  turns on the existence or otherwise of  the  implied authority of a pleader to compromise a suit in the interests and  on  behalf  of  his  client  although  without   actual reference  to him where his vakalat is silent on the  point. There  is no statutory provision decisive of this issue  and we  have to garner the principles from various factors  like the  status  and  significance of the  legal  profession  in society,   the   wider  powers  conferred  on   lawyers   as distinguished from ordinary agents on account of the  triuna facets of the role of an advocate vis a vis the client,  the court  and  the  public and its  traditions  and  canons  of professional ethics and etiquette.  Above all, the paramount consideration  that the Bench and the Bar form a  noble  and dynamic  partnership  geared  to the great  social  goal  of administration  of justice puts the lawyer appearing in  the court  in  a  class by himself and to compare  him  with  an ordinary  agent  may  be  to lose sight  of  the  lawyer  as engineer of the rule of law in society. National  integration at the lawyer’s level was  statutorily achieved by the Advocates Act, 1961 whereby the Indian  Bar, with a classless orientation, came into existence permitting enrollment  of various categories of legal practioners  like vakils and pleaders (see s. 29).  It 341 must  be  noted, however, that Shri Palshikar has  not  been enrolled  as  an Advocate.  On the contrary, the  party  had briefed,  apart from Shri Palshikar (just a pleader  with  a sanad  under  the Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920-for  short,  the Bombay  Act),  an  Advocate  Shri  Khatib,  6th  respondent. Section 55 of the Advocates Act provides that every  pleader who does not elect to be enrolled as an Advocate under  that Act  shall  continue to enjoy the same  rights  as  respects

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practice  in any court as he had before that Act came,  into force.   Thus his rights as respects practice in  any  court are   what   he   had  enjoyed   under   the   Bombay   Act, notwithstanding  its  repeal  by  the  Advocates  Act.   Our attention  was drawn to ss. 9 and 16 of the Bombay  Act  but neither  section helps us much in regard to the  controversy bearing  on  the competence of a pleader, to  enter  into  a compromise  without  the consent of  the,  concerned  party. Even  so,  s. 9 illumines the area to some  extent  and  the relevant portion may be extracted               "9.  No person shall appear, plead or act  for               any party in any civil proceeding in any court               unless he is a pleader as defined in this  Act               and is entitled and duly empowered to  appear,               plead   and  act  for  such  party   in   such               proceeding;" Shri  Chitale  contends-and this argument has  found  favour with  the courts below-that a pleader has power to  act  for any  party  and to settle a dispute involved in  a  suit  is ancillary  to  or  implied in this power to  act.   When  he settles his client’s suit he acts for him as much as he does so  when he gives up a point as meritless.  We will  examine this matter more in depth a little later. There is force in the suggestion that even though a  pleader or’ vakil might not have chosen to get himself enrolled , in their very eligibility to be enrolled as advocates, there is implicit statutory acceptance of the position that all these categories of legal practioners have substantially the  same powers  vis-a-vis client and court.  The  egalitarian  ethos injected  by  the Advocates Act makes for parity  of  powers between  pleaders  and advocates to act on behalf  of  their client.   We  think  if right to read into  the  complex  of provisions  bearing  on legal  practitioners  this  activist identity   of  power  to  act.   After  all,   every   legal practitioner  labels apart, is an officer of the  court  and aids in the cause of justice.  Logically and  sociologically and, indeed, legally, their responsibility to their  clients and  to  the Court have to be the same even though  some  of them may be entitled to appear only in District Courts while others in the High Courts, and Advocates in any Court in the whole  of the country.  The quality of the  power-limitaions on  the  courts  in which appearance  is  permissible  being ignored  for  the time being cannot  stand  differentiation. This  stand  is  reinforced  by a  reference  to  the  Civil Procedure  Code which regulates the legal process in  Indian courts.  Order III, r. 1, reads :               " 1. Any appearance, application or act in  or               to any Court, required or authorised by law to               be made or done by a party in such Court, may,               except where otherwise               442               expressly  provided  by any law for  the  time               being in force, be made or done by a PartY  in               person,  or  by his recognised agent or  by  a               pleader  appearing, applying or acting on  the               case may be,.on his behalf               We may also read r. 4(1) of the same order               "(1)  No pleader shall act for any  person  in               any  Court, unless he has been  appointed  for               the  purpose by such person by a  document  in                             writing signed by such person Both  these provisions clothe the pleader with the power  to act  in  any  court  provided he has  been  empowered  by  a vakalatnama in this behalf.  The Code has defined  ’pleader’ in these general terms :

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             "Sec.   2(15)  ’Pleader’  means  any   ’person               entitled  to appear and plead for  another  in               Court,  and includes an advocate, a vakil  and               attorney of a High Court." It-is  obvious that this definition obliterates any  status- wise  distinction  between an advocate and any  other  legal practitioner like a vakill or pleader entitled to appear  in court on behalf of his client.  A profession whose founding, fighting  faith  is  equal justice under the  law  does  not practice  inequality within its fold deaf to the mood  music of non-discrimination. The  broad conclusion, having due regard to the  perspective ’we have set out right at the beginning, is that lawyers, be they  Advocates,  vakils  or pleaders,  stand  on  the  same footing  in regard to their power to act on behalf of  their clients. The cases cited before us, discerningly understood,  confirm the  soundness  of  this  equating  principle.   As  earlier clarified,  the sole issue is the delineation of  the  scope and  ambit  of ’action.  Does the power to ’act’  cover  the right  to  settle  the suit  without  getting  the  client’s consent,  or  is  it implied in the engagement  ?  To  clear possible confusion we may straightaway state that both sides agree-and  that  is  the  undoubted  law-that  if  a  suitor countermands  his  pleader’s  authority  to  enter  into   a compromise or withholds, by express recital in the  vakalat, the  power to compromise the legal proceeding,  the  pleader (or,  for that matter, the Advocate, cannot go against  such advice  and  hind  the principal, his client.   This  is  as illegal as it is unprofessional. Shri Limaye has relied on a few decisions-both of the  Privy Council  and of the Indian High Courts, in his  endeavor  to make  out  that  pleaders  cannot  compromise  suits  unless expressly  authorised ’by the vakalatnama.  To  substantiate the contrary position, Shri Chitale has drawn our  attention to  other rulings.  These citations may he briefly  surveyed and  they are : Sourindra v. Heramba(1) ; Sourendra Nath  v. Tarubala Dasi(2); Jiwibai v. Ramiuwar (FB) (3); Supaji v. (1) A.I.R. 1923 PC 98.         (2) A.I.R. 1930 PC 158. (3)  A.I.R. 1947 Nag. 17. 343 Nagorao(1); Ramaswami v. Jai Hind Talkies(2); Govindammal v. Marhmuthu Maistry (3); Laxmidas Ranchhoddas v. Savitabai(4); S. S. walker v. L. S. Walker(5); and C. S. Nayakam v. A. N. Menon(6) . Although, on an analysis of these decisions, some discordant notes may be heard, there is substantial harmony of judicial opinion  on  the proposition that the different  classes  of legal practitioners have the same rights in relation to  the case in which they have been engaged.  Indeed, even if there be any marginal doubt, we have to interpret the law in  such manner  as to promote the integration of the Indian  Bar  in tune  with  the spirit of s. 29 of the Advocates  Act  which categorically states that subject to the provisions of  that Act and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as from  the appointed  day,  be only one class of  persons  entitled  to practice the profession of law, namely, advocates. Shri   Limaye   placed  great  reliance  on   the   Judicial Committee’s  statement in Sourindra (supra) where  Sir  John Edge observed;               "A  pleader,  who does not hold  and  has  not               filed  in  the  suit  before  the  Court   his               client’s general power of attorney authorising               him generally to compromise suits on behalf of               his  clients, cannot be recognised by a  Court

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             as having any authority to compromise the suit               unless  he has filed in the suit his  client’s               vakalatnama giving him authority to compromise               the suit before the Court." Superficially  understood,  this supports the  appellant  in wriggling  out of the compromise, because the  pleader  Shri Phalsikar had not been given any authority to compromise the suit, in the vakalatnama, but we do not think that this is a disability specially attaching to a pleader as distinguished from  an  Advocate.  We go further and consider  that  these observations have to be construed in the context of the fact that  in the facts of that case some of the  defendants  had not  filed  vakalatnamas at all and  that,  ultimately,  the Judicial  Committee had upheld the compromise after  special valalatnamas were filed for the unrepresented parties.   The question  of the powers of a pleader, as distinguished  from the  larger  powers  of  an Advocate did  not  come  up  for consideration in that appeal and we cannot treat the  ruling as authority for the position taken up by the appellant. Lord Atkin, speaking for the Judicial Committee in Sourendra Nath (supra) also had to deal with agreement to compromise a suit and the implied power of an advocate to settle the suit on behalf of his (1)  A.I.R, 1954 Nag. 250. (2) A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 586. (3) A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 7. (4) [1955] 57 B.L.R. 988. (5) A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 20. (6) A.I.R. 1968 Ker. 213. 10 SC 75-23 444 client.   ’.he statement of the law is instructive  and  may well extracted:               "They  are of opinion that Mr. Sircar,  as  an               advocate of the High Court, had, when  briefed                             on behalf of the defendant, in the Cou rt of the               Subordinate  Judge  of  Hoogly,  the   implied               authority  of his client to settle  the  suit.               Their Lordships have already said that he must               be  treated as though briefed on the trial  of               the suit.  Their Lordships regard the power to               compromise a suit as inherent in the position.               of  an advocate in India.  The  considerations               which  have  led to this implied  power  being               established  in  the  advocates  of   England,               Scotland and Ireland apply in equal measure to               India.  It is a power deemed to exist  because               its  existence is necessary to effectuate  the               relations between advocate and client, to make               possible the duties imposed upon the  advocate               by his acceptance of the cause of his client.               The  advocate is to conduct the cause  of  his               client   to  the  utmost  of  his  skill   and               understanding.   He must in the  interests  of               his  client be in the position, hour by  hour,               almost  minute  by  minute,  to  advance  this               argument,  to withdraw that; he must make  the               final decision whether evidence is to be given               or  not  on any question of fact  ;  skill  in               advocacy    is   largely   the    result    of               discrimination.   These powers  in  themselves               almost  amount to powers of compromise  ;  one               point  is given up that another  may  prevail.               But in addition to these duties, there is from               time  to  time thrown upon the,  advocate  the               responsible  task of deciding whether  in  the               course of a case he shall accept an offer made

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             to him, or on his part shall make an offer  on               his   client’s  behalf  to  receive   or   pay               something less than the full claim or the full               possible  liability.  Often the decision  must               be  made  at  once.  If  further  evidence  is               called  or  the advocate has  to  address  the               Court the occasion for settlement will vanish.               In such circumstances, it the advocate has  no               authority  unless  he  consults  his   client,               valuable   opportunities  are  lost   to   the               client." (emphasis, ours) Their  Lordships  referred to the  apparent  authority  that counsel  has  in  England  to  compromise  in  all   matters connected  with the action.  The jurisprudential basis as  a branch of the Law of Agency has been thus expressed by  Lord Atkin :               "Two  observations may be added.   First,  the               implied   authority  of  counsel  is  not   an               appendage  of office, a dignity added  by  the               Courts to the status of barrister or  advocate               at law.  It is implied in the interests of the               client, to give the fullest beneficial  effect               to his employment of the advocate.   Secondly,               the   implied   authority   can   always    be               countermanded by the express directions of the               client.   No advocate has actual authority  to               settle a case against the express instructions               of  his client.  If he considers such  express               instructions                345               contrary  to the interests of his client,  his               remedy is to return his brief." The  Judicial Committee equated the Indian Advocate and  his duties  to  his client in the conduct of the suit as  in  no wise different from those of his counter-parts in the United Kingdom :               "There  are no local conditions which make  it               less desirable for the client to have the full               benefit   of  an  advocate’s  experience   and               judgment." There is an obscure passage in the judgment which, according to Shri Limaye supports him : True, the Board has observed :               "Where the legal representative in Court of  a               client  derives his authority from an  express               written  authority,  such  as  a  vakalatnama,               different  considerations may well arise,  and               in  such  cases  their  Lordships  express  no               opinion  as  to the existence of  any  implied               authority of the kind under discussion." We are unable to see anything here to contradict the general power, actual though implied, of counsel (be he advocate  or pleader)  to  settle the suit of his client as part  of  his duty to protect the interests of his client. We  may now move on to the Indian decisions, none  of  which specifically  uphold the absence of implied authority  of  a pleader  qua pleadegr to enter into a compromise binding  on his client. Perhaps  the  clearest pronouncement against  the  degrading differentiation  of pleaders is that by a Full Bench of  the Nagpur  High Court in Jiwibai (supra).  After an  exhaustive discussion, which we need not repeat, the Court concluded at p. 26 :               "Our  answer  to the second question  is  that               counsel   in   India,   whether    Barristers,               Advocates, or pleaders, have inherent  powers,

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             both  to compromise claims, and also to  refer               disputes in Court to arbitration, without  the               authority  or  consent of the  client,  unless               their   powers  in  this  behalf   have   been               expressly countermanded, and this, whether the               law  requires a written authority to ’act’  or               ’plead’ or not."                     (emphasis, ours)               The  legal  deduction is  contained  in  these               emphatic words :               "Brush  unrealities aside and what do  we  get               but  a  contract ? How much more is  that  the               case   in  those  parts  of  India  where   no               solicitor  intervenes and counsel  and  client               meet  face to face ? How much more when  there               is  an  actual instrument of  engagement  or  a               power of attorney ? How much more when the law               requires writing ?" (p. 24)                                    346               "The  Privy  Council tells us  that  there  is               inherent   in  the  position  of  counsel   an               implicit  authority  to  do all  that  is  ex-               pedient, proper and necessary for the  conduct               of   the  suit  and  the  settlement  of   the               dispute." (p. 25)               "Turning next to 0.3, R. 4, consider again the               case in which a pleader is appointed simply to               ’act’  without  any attempt to set  forth  the               scope of his acting. (That incidentally is  in               substance  the power given to the  plaintiff’s               counsel  in the case).  Is compromise  not  an               acting ?" (p. 25) Our attention has been drawn to Supaji (supra) which,  while affirming  implicit  authority of an  Advocate,  doubts  the application   of   the  same  principle  to   pleader.    We unhesitatingly prefer the Full Bench view (supra). A little reflection will unfold the compelling necessity  of giving  a comprehensive meaning to the expression ’act’  and for  the inclusion of all categories of legal  practitioners as  repositories of this. ample agency, bound yet  broadened by  obligatory traditions, professional control  and  public confidence in the Bar as a massive social instrumentality of democracy.  To act for the suitor involves myriad  intricate actions  often  so  legal  that  the  client  may  not  even understand  the implication, sometimes so sudden  that  time for taking instructions is absent.  Representation in  court may  be so demanding and so transforms  forensic  obligation that a lawyer may have ethical difficulties in  mechanically obeying  all  the directions of his  principal.   The  legal skill  that  is  hired  by the  client  may,  for  its  very effective  exercise, need an area of autonomy and  quickness of   decision  that  to  restrict  the  agency  to   express authorisation  is  to ask for an unpredictable  and  endless enumeration of powers such as what to ask a witness and what not to, what submissions to make and what points to give  up and  so on.  To circumstances the power to act is to  defeat the  purpose of the engagement.  Those who know  how  courts and   counsel  function  will  need  no  education  on   the jurisprudence  of lawyer’s position and powers.  Of  course, we  hasten  to enter a caveat.  It is perfectly  open  to  a party, like any other principal, to mark out in the  vakalat or  by particular instructions forbidden areas or  expressly withhold  the right to act in sensitive matters, the  choice being  his,  as  the master.  If the  lawyer  regards  these fetters as inconsistent with his position, he may refuse  or

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return  the brief.  But absent speaking instructions to  the contrary, the power to act takes in its wings the right  and duty to save a client by settling the suit if and only if be does so bona fide in the interests and for the advantage  of his client.  This amplitude of the power to act springs from the  builtin  dynamism,  challenge  and  flux  of  the  very operation of legal representation as felicitously expressed, if  we may say so with great respect, in the noble words  of Lord Atkin (Sourendra Nath’s Case (supra). We may supplement the  grounds for giving this wider construction by the  fact that the legal profession is a para-public institution which deserves   the  special  confidence  of  and  owes   greater responsibility  to the community at large than the  ordinary run of agency. 347 This  reasoning  has been high lighted by  the  Kerala  High Court  in  its  Full Bench  decision  in  Nayakaim  (supra). Mathew  J., examined the English authorities and applied  it to Indian conditions.  The learned Judge observed               "The construction of a document appointing  an               agent is different from the construction of  a               vakalat appointing counsel.  In the case of an               agent the document would be construed strictly               and  the agent would have only such powers  as               are   conferred  expressly  or  by   necessary               implication.  In the case of counsel the  rule               is otherwise because there we are dealing with               a profession where well-known rules have crys-               tallised through usage.  It is on a par with a               trade  where the usage, becomes an  additional               term  of the contract, if not contrary to  the               general law or excluded by express agreement."               (p. 215) More  importantly, Mathew, J. placed accent on  the  special position of the Bar               "That  counsel  is  not a mere  agent  of  the               client  would be made clear if we look at  the               nature of his duties and relationship with the               public   and   the  court.   Counsel   has   a               tripartite relationship : one with the public,               another with the court, and the third with his               client.   That  is a  unique  feature.   Other               professions or callings may include one or two               of  these relationships but no other  has  the               triple duty.  Counsel’s duty to the public  is               unique in that he has to accept all work  from               all  clients  in  courts  in  which  he  holds               himself    out    as    practicing,    however               unattractive the case or the client." (p. 216) The  passages  quoted from Lord Dearing M. R.  in  Ronadel’s Case (1967 1 Q.B. 443) bear repetition when considering  the public justice role of the Bar :               "A   barrister  cannot  pick  or  choose   his               clients.   He is bound to accept a  brief  for               any  man  who  comes before  the  courts.   No               matter how great a rascal the man may be.   No               matter  how given to complaining.   No  matter               how  undeserving or unpopular his cause.   The               barrister   must  defend  him  to   the   end.               Provided only that he is paid a proper fee, or               in  the case of a dock brief, a  nominal  fee.               He  must  accept  the brief,  and  do  all  he               honorably can on behalf of his client.  I say I               all he honorably can’ because his duty is  not               only to his client.  All those who practice at

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             the Bar have from time to time been confronted               with cases civil and criminal which they would               have  liked to refuse, but have accepted  them               as burdensome duty.  This is the service  they               do  to the public.  Counsel has the  duty  and               right   to  speak  freely  and   independently               without fear of authority, without fear of the               judges and also without fear of a stab in  the               back from his own client.  To some extent,  he               is a minister of justice."                348               "It  is  a mistake to suppose that he  is  the               mouth-piece of his client to say what he wants               :  or his tool to do what he directs.  lie  is               none of these things.  He owes allegiance to a               higher  cause.  It is the cause of  truth  and               justice.  He must not consciously misstate the               facts.   He  must not  knowingly  conceal  the               truth.  He must not unjustly make a: charge of               fraud,  that is, without evidence  to  support               it.    He  must  produce  all   the   relevant               authorities, even those that are against  him.               He  must  see that his  client  discloses,  if               ordered,  the relevant documents,  even  those               that are fatal to his case.  He must disregard               the most specific instructions of his  client,               if  they conflict with his duty to the  court.               The code which requires a barrister to do  all               this  is not a code of law.  It is a  code  of               honour.   If  he breaks it,  he  is  offending               against  the  rules of the profession  and  is               subject to its discipline."                  (p. 216) A  Division  Bench of the Bombay High  Court  (where  Chagla C.J.,  spoke  for  the Court) takes a pragmatic  view  of  a lawyer’s powers to settle as is reflected from the head-note which  is  sufficient  for our  purpose  (see  head-note  in Ranchhoddas (supra);               "It  is impossible for a member of the Bar  to               do  justice to his client and to carry on  his               profession according Lo the highest  standards               unless  he  has the implied  authority  to  do               everything  in  the interests of  his  client.               This  authority not only consists  in  putting               forward  such arguments as be  thinks  proper,               but also to settle the client’s litigation  if               he  feels  that a settlement would be  in  the               interests  of  his  client  and  it  would  be               foolish  to  let the litigation proceed  to  a               judgment, This implied authority has also been               described as an actual authority of counsel or               an advocate.  This authority may be limited or                             restricted or even taken away.  If a l imitation               is  put upon counsel’s authority, his  implied               or   actual   authority   disappears   or   is               destroyed.   In  such a case he  has  only  an               ostensible authority as far as the other  side               is  concerned.  When the actual  authority  is               destroyed and merely the ostensible  authority               remains, then although the other side did  not               know of the limitation put upon the  authority               of an advocate, the Court will not enforce the               settlement   when  in  fact  the  client   had               withdrawn  or  limited the  authority  of  his

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             advocate." The   Madras  decisions  have  not  been   consistent.    In Ramaswami’s Case (supra) it was observed               "It has been laid down in Jagpati Mudaliar  v.               Ekabara  Mudaliar 21 Mad. 274 that it  is  not               competent  to  a  pleader  to  enter  into   a               compromise on behalf of his client without his               express authority to do so.  See also  Thermal               Ammal v.  Sokkammal 1918.  Mad. 656 and Sarath               Kumari Dasi v. Amulyadhan 1923 PC 13.                                    349               As the vakalat did not give counsel  authority               to  compromise, Kesrvaraman Chettiar  and  the               two  other directors who sail with  him  would               not be bound by the compromise."                               (p. 589) The   reference   to  ’pleader’  here  is  not   really   in contradistinction   to  ’advocates’.   But  in   Govindammal (supra) Ramaswami, J., after an elaborate examination of the Indian and Anglo-American cases and books sums up thus :               "An  examination  of  these  authorities   and               extracts   from   standard   publications   on               professional   conduct,   leads  us   to   the               following deductions : The decisions appear to               be fairly clear that even in cases where there               is  no express authorisation to enter  into  a               compromise,   under  the  inherent   authority               impliedly given to the Vakil, he has power  to               enter  into  the compromise on behalf  of  his               client.   But  in  the present  state  of  the               clientele world and the position in which  the               Bar  now  finds  itself and  in  the  face  of               divided  judicial  authority  and  absence  of               statutory  backing,  prudence  dictates   that               unless  express power is given in the  vakalat               itself to enter into compromise, in accordance               with the general practice obtaining, a special               vakalat  should  be  filed  or  the   specific               consent  of  the  party  to  enter  into   the                             compromise   should   be   obtained.   If   an               endorsement  is  made on the plaint  etc.,  it               would  be better to get the signature  or  the               thumb impression of the party affixed thereto,               making  it evident that the party is aware  of               what is being done by the vakil on his or  her               behalf." (p. 1 2) In  the  American  system there is only a  single  class  of attorney  unlike in Great Britain, but the implied power  to compromise has, not been upheld.  American Jurisprudence  S. 98 (pp. 318-320) has the following to say :               "The rule is almost universal that an attorney               who  is clothed with no other  authority  than               that  arising  from  his  employment  in  that               capacity has no implied power by virtue of his               general retainer to compromise and settle  his               client’s  claim  or cause  of  action,  United               States v. Beebe (1901) 180 US 343(ZI6), Holkar               v.  Parker (1813) 3 Law Ed. 396 (ZI7),  Golder               v.  Bradley  (C.C.A. 4th)  233  F.  721.(ZI6),               Anucas,  1917  A  921 (ZI9) :  In  re  Sonyder               (1907) 190 N.Y. 66 (Z20), Ward v. Orsini  1926               243 N.Y. 123 (Z21), except in situations where               he is confronted with an emergency and  prompt               action  is necessary to protect the  interests

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             of the client and there is no opportunity  for               consultation with him.  Generally, unless such               an emergency exists, either precedent  special               authority from the client or subsequent rati-               350               fication  by him is essential in order that  a               compromise or settlement by an attorney  shall               be binding on his client."                                  (p. 12) We  are impressed by the eloquent and luminous  observations of  Lord  Reid, if we may say so with  great  deference,  in Rondel v. Worsley (1) :               "Every  counsel  has  a  duty  to  his  client               fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every               argument,  and  ask  every  question,  however               distasteful,  which  he thinks will  help  his               client’s  case.   But, as an  officer  of  the               court,  concerned  in  the  administration  of               justice,  he  has an overriding  duty  to  the               court, to the standards of his profession, and               to  the public, which may and often does  lead               to  a  conflict, with his client’s  wishes  or               with  what his client thinks are his  personal               interests.   Counsel  must  not  mislead   the               court,  be  must not lend himself  to  casting               aspersions on the other party or witnesses for               which  there  is no sufficient  basis  in  the               information  in  his possession, he  must  not               withhold  authorities or documents  which  may               tell against his clients but which the law  or               the standards of his profession require him to               produce.   And by so acting he may well  incur                             the displeasure or worse of his client  so  that               if the case is lost, his client would or might               seek legal redress if that were open to him."               (Cases and Materials on The English Legal               System-by  Geoffrey  Wilson-Sweet  &  Maxwell-               1973,p. 124) We may now deal with the properties whichmay bear  upon thebona  fides   of the lawyer’s conduct if he  settles  a suit,  without  client’s  consent,  Powers  are  one  thing, prudence  is another and indeed the latter  sometimes  bears upon  the former.  Mathew J set the record straight,  if  we may say with respect, in Nayakam (supra) :               "Although  we  see  no  reason  to  limit   or               restrict  the implied authority of counsel  to               compromise  an  action  or  confess   judgment               unless  expressly  done so by his  client,  we               think that both in the interest of the  client               and  the  good reputation of  counsel,  it  is               always  advisable that he should get  specific               instructions  before  taking  such  a  radical               step."                                          (p. 216) Another facet of the limit on lawyer’s powers is articulated in  the  Bombay  view, if we may  use  that  expression  for convenience,  the  ruling-viz., Waikar  (supra  )-being  one relating  to  the  implied of  an  advocate  to  compromise. Certainly, as pointed out there, the power cannot extend  to matters extraneous to the action.  Mudholkar J.   has uttered a caution that, as far as possible, irrespective  of the (1) [1969] 1 A.C. 191. 351

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scope  of  the  power  the lawyer must  prefer  to  get  his client’s  concurrence  to the settlement.  The  reasons  are obvious.  If the compromise is not bona fide in the client’s interests,  the power is exceeded and it is rash to  bind  a party  to razi without his knowledge when there is  time  to consult  and  the  terms affect him  adversely.   The  Privy Council’s  observation in Sheonandan Prasad Singh  v.  Abdul Fateh Mohammed Reza (11) serve as reminder :               "But whatever may be the authority of counsel,               whether  actual or ostensible,  if  frequently               happens  that actions are compromised  without               reference to the implied authority of  counsel               at  all.   In these  days  communication  with               actual  principals is much easier and  quicker               than in the days when the authority of counsel               was  first established.  In  their  Lordship’s               experience  both in this country and in  India               it constantly happens that counsel do not take               upon  themselves to compromise a case  without               receiving express authority from their clients               for  the  particular  terms :  and  that  this               position  in each particular case is  mutually                             known between the parties." (p. 22) (s upra) Ramaswami  J., also in Govindammal (supra) in the  paragraph already extracted, has referred to a disturbing aspect which must  alert  the public and the profession  to  the  lurking dangers  of a carte blanche to counsel to compromise a  case without  client’s precedent permission.  The  learned  Judge quotes,  what may be a cautionary signal. from Thenal  Ammal v. Sokkummal (ILR 41 Mad. 233, 235AIR 1918 Mad. 656)               "It is not the ordinary duty of an Advocate to               negotiate  terms,  without  reference  to  his               client,  with  the opposite  party.   Such  an               action is calculated to place the practitioner               in  a false position.  We do not think  it  is               desirable that such a power should vest in him               in  the interest of the profession.  From  the               point of view of the client, we think that  it               is  not  safe that he should  be  regarded  by               engaging  a vakil to have given him  authority               to dispose of his right in any way he chooses.               Therefore  we  think that  the  general  power               claimed is not in consonance with the  highest               ideals  of the profession or of justice.   For               these  reasons  we think that  a  very  strict               interpretation  should be placed upon  vakalat               containing powers of this kind." Ramaswami,  J.  has  adverted to the  wiser  alternative  of counsel  seeking  client’s consent before  compromising  the litigation, having regard to the ’position in which the  Bar finds itself’ these days. (1)  AIR 1935 P.C. 119. 352 While  we are not prepared to consider in this case  whether an Advocate or pleader is liable to legal action in case  of deviance  or negligence, we must uphold the  actual,  though implied,  authority  of  a  pleader  (which  is  a   generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in s.  2(15), C.P.C.) to act by way of compromising a  case  in which  he is engaged even without specific consent from  his client,    subject    undoubtedly   to    two    over-riding considerations  : (i) He must act in good faith and for  the benefit of his client ; otherwise the power fails (2) it  is prudent  and  proper  to consult his  client  and  take  his

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consent  if there is time and opportunity.  In any case,  if there  is any instruction to the contrary or  withdrawal  of authority,  the implicit power to compromise in the  pleader will fall to the ground.  We need hardly emphasise that  the bar  must sternly screen to extirpate the black-sheep  among them,  for  Caesar’s wife must be above  suspicion,  if  the profession is to command the confidence of the community and the court. On  the facts of the present case we have little doubt  that the  pleader has acted substantially with the  knowledge  of and  encouraged  by his client.   The  several  adjournments taken  by the appellant specifically for settling  the  suit speak  better when we read the penultimate  application  for postponement on this score.  Exhibit 21, d/17-2-65 runs:               "In the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, J.  D.               at Jalgaon Reg.  Suit No. 141/64               Shankarlal       Gulabchand       More       &               Ors...........................               Plaintiffs                                   Versus               A.Kadarr H. Welder................. Defendant               The  respectful application on behalf  of  the               Plaintiffs            and    the Defendant  is               as follows :-               In the said matter, talks regarding compromise               are  going on mutually between the  plaintiffs               and  the  defendants.   The  talks  have   not               concluded as yet.  Hence be pleased to adjourn               the  hearing fixed for today and give  another               date for hearing.  This is the application. Date : 17-2-1965         Sd/- D. H. Chaudhri                           Advocate for plaintiff Sd/- B. H.  Palshikar Advocate for defendant.                           Allowed                     Sd/- R. H. Maslekar                         17-2-65." We feel no doubt that the broad sanction for the  compromise came  from the tenant, that no shady action is imputable  to respondent 4 and that his conduct has been motivated by  the good of his client. 353 The last posting was for reporting the compromise.  But,  on that  date, the Court declined further adjournment  and  the party  being absent and away, the pleader for the  appellant had  no  alternative  but to suffer an  eviction  decree  or settle it to the maximum advantage of his Ordinarily when  a junior  and  senior  appear  in the case,  it  would  be  an adventurist  act exposing himself to great risk on the  part of the junior to report a compromise without consulting  his senior,  even  assuming that the party  was  not  available. Nevertheless,  we have had an over-all view of the facts  of the  present case and do not feel inclined to the view  that the  implied authority of the pleader has been abused.   The courts  below were right in fastening the settlement of  the suit upon the appellant. Nevertheless, it is right to stress that counsel should  not rush  in with a razi where due care will make them  fear  to tread,  that a junior should rarely consent on his own  when there  is  a senior in the brief, that a party  may  validly impugn  an  act  of  compromise by  his  pleader  if  he  is available  for  consultation but is by-passed.   The  lawyer must  be  above board, especially if he is to  agree  to  an adverse verdict.  As for classes of legal practitioners,  we are  equally clear that the tidal swell of  unification  and

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equalisation  has  swept away all  professional  sub-castes. Anyway,  that is the law.  Such artificial  segregations  as persist  are mere proof of partial survival after death  and will wither away in good time.  Anyway, that is our hope. We  dismiss  the  appeal, but in view  of  divided  judicial opinion in the High Courts and the Constitutional obligation of  this Court under Art. 141 to resolve and settle the  law we direct the parties will bear their costs in this Court.                               Appeal dimissed P. B. R. 354