Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7207  OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.352 of 2008]

James Joseph … Appellant

Vs.

State of Kerala … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.  

Leave granted.  

2. This appeal relates to the scope of an appeal against an appellate order  

under section 12A of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 (‘Act’ for short). The State  

Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Travancore Forest  

Regulation II of 1068 ME proposing to declare certain lands including the  

disputed lands as revenue forest. The appellant’s predecessor in title filed a  

written statement before the Forest Settlement Officer under section 6 of the  

Act in (claim case No.2/1955) claiming title to the disputed lands, which  

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formed part of the proposed reserve forest. The Forest Settlement Officer by  

common order dated 14.11.1969 rejected his claim inter alia holding that the  

notified  areas  were  lands  at  the  disposal  of  the  government  and  the  

government was entitled to constitute the same as a reserve forest. Feeling  

aggrieved the appellant’s predecessor filed an appeal against the order of the  

Forest  Settlement  Officer  under  section  11  of  the  Act.  The  appeal  was  

allowed  by  the  first  Additional  District  Judge,  Ernakulam  by  common  

judgment dated 23.6.1980 holding that the Royal Neet of 1928 ME to which  

the  appellant  traced  back  his  title  was  a  genuine  document  and  the  

notification issued by the Government in respect  of the proposed reserve  

forest was without jurisdiction.  

3. The  State  Government  filed  an  appeal  against  the  said  appellate  

judgment  before  the  High  Court  under  section  12A  of  the  Act.  (MSA  

No.1/1981).  The High Court  allowed the second appeal  and reversed the  

judgment of the District Judge. The order of the High Court was challenged  

by the appellant.  This Court  by order dated 25.11.2003 allowed the civil  

appeal filed by the appellant and remanded the matter to the High Court for  

fresh consideration, with the following observation :

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“…  some decisions have also been referred, to that the jurisdiction under  Section 12A of the Act is akin to Section 100 C.P.C. We feel that since the  matter is fit to be remanded for fresh decision this question as raised may  also be better canvassed before the High Court for its consideration.”

4. When the matter was pending before the High Court on remand, the  

appellant (who is the 33rd respondent in the said appeal) filed an application  

(IA No.955/2005) praying that the High Court be pleased to formulate the  

substantial questions of law before proceeding with the hearing of appeal.  

He contended that the appeal under section 12A was a second appeal; that a  

second  appeal  was  available  only  if  the  case  involved  any  substantial  

question of law and was governed by the provisions of section 100 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure (‘Code’ for short);  and that the High Court should  

therefore, before hearing the second appeal, formulate the questions of law  

involved  in  the  appeal.  The  High  Court  by  the  impugned  order  dated  

23.3.2007 dismissed the said application. The High court held that section  

12A of the Act did not provide for a “second appeal”, but only provides for  

an appeal against an appellate order and therefore the question of importing  

the requirements  of section 100 of the Code into such an appeal  did not  

arise; that the intention of the legislature in enacting section 12A of the Act,  

granting a right of appeal against an order passed by the District Court under  

section 11 of the Act, was not limited to substantial questions of law; and  

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therefore the question of formulating any substantial questions of law before  

hearing the appeal did not arise.  

5. The  said  order  of  the  High  Court  is  challenged  in  this  appeal  by  

special leave. The appellant contends that an appeal under section 12A of the  

Act is a ‘second appeal’; that a second appeal is available only in regard to  

questions of law and not in regard to any question of fact; that whenever  

there is a second appeal from a District Court/Civil Court to the High Court,  

such second appeal will be governed by section 100 of the Code and it will  

be maintainable only if it involves a substantial question of law; and that  

where  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  second  appeal  involves  any  

substantial questions of law, it should formulate the said questions of law.  

Questions for considerations  

6. On the contentions raised, the questions that therefore arise for our  

consideration in this appeal are :  

(i) Whether an appeal under section 12A of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961  

against an appellate order under section 11 of the said Act, would lie only if  

it involves a substantial question of law?

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(ii) If  so,  whether  the  Memorandum  of  appeal  shall  have  to  state  the  

substantial  question of  law involved in the  appeal  and whether  the  High  

Court  is  bound  to  formulate  the  substantial  question/s  of  law,  while  

admitting the appeal or before posting the appeal for hearing.  

The relevant legal provisions  

7. The  answers  to  the  questions  raised  depend  upon  the  scheme  of  

chapter II of the Act relating to Reserved forests. The relevant portions of  

Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12A and 83 of the Act are extracted below :  

“4. Notification by Government.- Whenever it is proposed to constitute  any land a Reserved Forest, the Government shall publish a notification in  the Gazette- x x x  

[c] appointing an officer (hereinafter called the Forest Settlement Officer)  to  inquire  into  and determined  the  existence,  nature  and extent  of  any  rights claimed, by or alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over any  land comprised within such limits, or to any forest produce of such land  and to deal with the same as provided in this Act.”

“5. Suits  barred.- Except as  hereinafter  provided,  no Civil  court  shall  between the dates of publication of the notification under section 4, and of  the notification to be issued under section 19, entertain any suit against the  Government to establish any right in or over any land, or to the forest  produce  of  any  land,  included  in  the  notification  published  under  section 4.”

“6. Proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer.-

(1)   When  a  notification  has  been  issued  under  section  4,  the  Forest  Settlement Officer shall publish in the Gazette and at the headquarters of  each Taluk in which any portion of the land included in such notification  is situate, and in every town, village and headquarters of Panchayats in the  neighbourhood of such land a proclamation.

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(a) specifying, as nearly as possible, the  situation and limits of the land proposed to be included within the  Reserved Forest.

(b) setting  forth  the  substance  of  the  provisions of section 7,

(c) explaining  the  consequences  which  as hereinafter provided will ensure on the reservation of such forest,  and  

(d) fixing a period of not less than three  and  not  exceeding  six  months  from  the  date  of  publishing  such  proclamation in the gazette, and requiring every person claiming and  right referred to in section 4 either to present to such Officer, within  such period, a written statement specifying or to appear before him  within such period and state, the nature of such right and in either  case,  to  produce,  all  documents  and  other  evidence  in  support  thereof.

(2) The Forest Settlement Officer shall also serve a notice to the same  effect on every known or reputed owner or occupier of any land included  in or adjoining the land proposed to be constituted a Reserved Forest or on  his recognized agent or manager. Such notice may be sent by registered  post.”      

“8. Inquiry by Forest Settlement Officer.-

(1) The Forest Settlement Officer shall  inquire into all  claims made  under section 6 recording all statements and the evidence in the manner  prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for appealable cases.

(2) He  shall,  at  the  same  time,  consider  and  record  any  objection  which the Forest Officer, if any, appointed under section 4 to attend at the  inquiry on behalf of the Government, may make to any such claim.

(3) He may also inquire into and record the existence of any rights  referred to in section 4 and not claimed in answer to the notice issued  under section 6, so far as they are ascertainable from the records of the  Government and the evidence of any person likely to be acquainted with  the same.

9. Powers of Forest Settlement Officer.- For the purpose of such  inquiry, the Forest Settlement Officer may exercise the following powers,  namely:-

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(a) the power to enter by himself or to authorize any officer to enter  upon and land, and to survey, demarcate and make a map of the same; and  

(b) the powers of a Civil Court in the trial of suits.”

   “11. Appeals from the Orders of Settlement Officer.-

(1) Where a claim is rejected wholly or in part, the claimant may, within  ninety days  from the date of the order prefer an appeal  to the District  Court  in  respect  of  such  rejection  only.  The  time  taken  for  obtaining  copies of the order appealed against shall be excluded in computing the  period of ninety days.

(2) Whenever a claim is admitted in the first instance wholly or in part, a  like  appeal  may  be  preferred  on  behalf  of  Government  by  the  Forest  Officer appointed under section 4, or other person generally or specially  empowered by the Government in this behalf.”

“12A. Appeal to the High Court.-

(1) The  Government  or  any  person  objecting  to  any  order  of  the  District Court in an appeal under section 11 may, within a period of ninety  days from the date of that order, appeal against such order to the High  Court:                 xxxxx

83. Decision  or  order  of  Forest  Settlement  Officer  to  have  the  effect  of  District  Court  decrees.- Any decision  or  order  passed  by a  Forest settlement Officer under this Act and any order passed in appeal  there  from  shall  be  enforceable  by  the  District  Court  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  land  is  situated  as  if  it  were  a  decree  passed  by  such  District Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  

8. The  following  hierarchical  structure  in  regard  to  appeals  emerges  

from the provisions of the Act :  

(a) The claims to any land proposed to be included in the reserved forest  under the Act,  are inquired into and determined by the Forest Settlement  Officer;  

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(b) If  the  claims  are  rejected  an  appeal  lies  to  District  Court  at  the  instance of the claimant and if the claim is admitted, an appeal lies to the  District Court at the instance of the State Government.  

(c) Either the State Government or any person objecting to any order of  the District Court in an appeal under section 11 of the Act can file an appeal  against the appellant order, to the High Court.  

9. Section 12A does not use the words “second appeal”. It provides that  

an appeal would lie against an appellate order under section 11 to the High  

Court. The word ‘appeal’ is not defined either under the Act or under the  

Code. Black’s Law dictionary, (7th edn.) defines an appeal as “a proceeding  

undertaken  to  have  a  decision  reconsidered  by  bringing  it  to  a  higher  

authority.”  

10. The classic definition of an appeal in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti  [ ILR  

(1899) 22 Madras 68], by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, adopted  

by this Court, in Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [2004  

(5) SCC 1], is as follows :

“Appeal  implies in its  natural  and ordinary meaning the removal  of  a  cause from any inferior court or tribunal to a superior one for the purpose  of testing the soundness of decision and proceedings of the inferior court  or tribunal. The superior forum shall have jurisdiction to reverse, confirm,  annul or modify the decree or order of the forum appealed against and in  the event of a remand the lower forum shall have to rehear the matter and  

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comply with such directions as may accompany the order of remand. The  appellate jurisdiction inherently carries with it a power to issue corrective  directions binding on the forum below. … An appeal is a process of civil  law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the facts as well as the   law, to a review and a retrial.”

  (emphasis supplied)

11. In  Hari  Shankar  v.  Rao Girdhari  Lal  Chowdhury [1962 Supp.  (1)  

SCR 933], this court held :

“A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as  fact,  unless  the  statute  conferring  the  right  of  appeal  limits  the  rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done in second appeals  arising under the Code of Civil Procedure.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. In  Shankar  Ramchandra  Abhyankar  v.  Krishnaji  Dattatreya  Bapat  

[1969  (2)  SCC  74],  this  court  referred  to  the  statement  in  Story  on  

Constitution  (of  United  States),  Vol.  2,  Article  1761  that  the  essential  

criterion  of  appellate  jurisdiction  is  that  it  revises  and  corrects  the  

proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The  

appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in   

any form in which the Legislature may choose to prescribe. An appeal is a   

process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact   

as well as the law to a review and a retrial.  

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13. In  Sri  Raja  Lakshmi  Dyeing  Works  v.  Rangaswamy Chettiar [AIR  

1980 SC 1253], this court held :

“Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law  as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction  may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in  the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under  some Rent Acts in some States.”

This  Court  thereafter  proceeded  to  explain  the  scope  of  revisional  

jurisdictional and then concluded that  the question of the extent of appellate  

or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to  

the language employed by the statute.”          

14. Section  100  of  the  Code  is  a  classic  example  of  limiting  the  

jurisdiction in an appeal. It specifically provides that the second appeal will  

be  available  only  where  there  exists  substantial  question  of  law.  Some  

enactments  do  not  specify  that  the  second  appeal  will  be  restricted  to  

substantial  questions of  law,  but  incorporate  section  100 of  the  Code by  

reference, in regard to appeals from appellate orders. Section 18(1) of the  

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 is an example :  

“18. Appeal  to  Supreme  Court  –  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in any other  law, an appeal shall lie against any order, not being an interlocutory order,  

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of the Appellate Tribunal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the  grounds specified in section 100 of that Code.”

Some other  statutes  have  provisions  in  regard  to  appeals  from appellate  

orders placing specific limitations on the extent and scope of the appellate  

jurisdiction by providing that  a second appeal will  lie only if  it  involves  

substantial questions of law or questions of law, without reference to section  

100 of the Code. We may by way of illustration, refer to the following :

Section 260A of Income Tax Act, 1961.

“Appeal to High Court.  260A. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed  in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the  case involves a substantial question of law.

(2)  The  Chief  Commissioner  or  the  Commissioner  or  an  assessee  aggrieved  by  any order  passed  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal  may  file  an  appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall be -

(a)  filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on  which the order appealed against is received by the assessee or the  Chief Commissioner or Commissioner;

(b)  [omitted]

(c)  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum  of  appeal  precisely  stating  therein the substantial question of law involved.

(3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law  is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated, and  the respondents shall at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that  the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or  abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the  

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appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is  satisfied that the case involves such question.

(5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated and  deliver  such  judgement  thereon  containing  the  grounds  on  which  such  decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit.

(6) The High Court may determine any issue which -

(a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or

(b)  has  been wrongly determined by the  Appellate  Tribunal,  by  reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in  sub-section (1).

(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) relating to appeals to the High Court  shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section.

Section 15Z of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992

15Z. Appeal  to  Supreme  Court.- Any  person  aggrieved  by  any  decision or order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to  the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of communication of  the decision or order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal to him on any  question of law arising out of such order  ……….”  

15. Some enactments impliedly incorporate the provisions of section 100  

of the Code. In  Chunilal Vithal Das vs.  Mohanlal Motilal Patel – (1966)  

Supp SCR 180, this court dealt with such a provision contained in section  

28(1) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, 1951, extracted below :

“Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any  law,  but  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Provincial  Small  Cause  Court  Act,  as  adapted  and  applied to the State of Saurashtra, an appeal shall  lie from a decree or  order made by a Civil Judge or a Munsiff exercising jurisdiction under  section 27 to the District Court and a second appeal to the High Court.”

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It was contended by the appellant-tenant therein that an appellate court is  

competent to examine the correctness of the decision appealed from on the  

ground that  the decision is  erroneous in point  of law  or fact,  and in the  

absence of any express provision to the contrary, restrictions imposed on the  

power  of  the  High  Court  under  one  statute  cannot  be  imported  merely  

because of similarity of nomenclature, when exercising jurisdiction under  

another statute unless those restrictions are imposed by express enactment or  

necessary intendment.  It  was further contended that as no restriction was  

imposed upon the power of second appeal under section 28 of the Rent Act,  

the High Court was competent and indeed bound to entertain all objections  

to the correctness of the judgment including those relating to questions of  

fact. This court negatived the said contention. This court held that a second  

appeal under section 28 of the Saurashtra Act can be entertained by a High  

Court  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  section  100  of  the  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure and it  is  not open to the parties  to demand re-appraisal  of the  

evidence by the High Court. This Court held that the scheme of Saurashtra  

Act did not confer any special jurisdiction upon the courts described therein,  

but it only intended to provide for a second appeal in terms of section 100 of  

the Code. This Court held that the Saurashtra Act merely declared that a  

second appeal will lie to the High Court against decrees or orders passed by  

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the courts exercising jurisdiction under section 27, but thereby the essential  

character  of  a  second  appeal  under  the  Code  was  not  altered  and  the  

procedure in the trial of suit, applications and proceedings under the Act,  

was the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore it  

had to be held that the legislature intended to confer a right of second appeal  

subject to the restrictions imposed by section 100 of the Code.  

16. We may therefore formulate the following principles with reference to  

appeals :  

(i) An  appeal  is  a  proceeding  where  an  higher  forum reconsiders  the  

decision of a lower forum, on questions of fact and questions of law, with  

jurisdiction to confirm, reverse, modify the decision or remand the matter to  

the lower forum for fresh decision in terms of its directions.  

(ii) The  appellate  jurisdiction  can  be  limited  or  regulated  by  the  

legislature and its extent has to be decided with reference to the language  

employed by the statute conferring the appellate jurisdiction.  

(iii) The  width  of  jurisdiction  or  the  limitations  on  jurisdiction  with  

reference to an appeal,  does  not  depend on whether  the  appeal  is  a  first  

appeal or a second appeal, but depends upon the limitations, if any, placed  

by the statute conferring the right of appeal.

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(iv) If the Legislature’s intention is to limit the jurisdiction in an appeal, it  

may indicate such limits in the provision providing for appeal. Alternatively,  

it may expressly or impliedly incorporate the provisions of section 100 of  

the Code, into the provision for appeals.

(v) Generally statutory provisions for appeals against original orders or  

decrees (that  is,  first  appeals) will  not have any limitations and therefore  

rehearing on both law and fact is contemplated; and statutory provisions for  

appeals against appellate orders (that is, second appeals) will be restricted to  

questions of law. But such restriction is not on account of any legal principle  

that all second appeals should always be with reference to questions of law,  

but would depend upon the wording of the statute placing the restrictions  

upon the scope of second appeal.  

(vi) Where  the  statute  does  not  place  any  limitations  or  restrictions  in  

regard to the scope and width of the appeal, it shall be construed that the  

appeal provides a right of rehearing on law as well as facts. If the Legislature  

enacts a self contained provision for second appeals, without any limitation  

upon the scope of the second appeal and excludes the possibility of reading  

the provision of section 100 of the Code, into such provision, then, it will  

not be permissible to read the limitations of section 100 of the Code into the  

special provision.  

17. We  may  now examine  the  scope  of  section  12A of  the  Act  with  

reference to the above principles. For convenience we have juxtapositioned  

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section 100 of the Code with section 12A of the Act, to ascertain the scope  

of section 12A of the Act.  

Section 12A of the Act. “Appeal to the High  Court”.-

Section 100 of the Code – “Second appeal”. —

(1) The Government or any person objecting to   any order  of  the  District  Court  in an appeal  under section 11 may, within a period of ninety  days from the date of that order, appeal against  such order to the High Court: Provided that High Court may admit an appeal  preferred after  the expiration of the period of  ninety days aforesaid if it  is satisfied that the  appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring  the appeal within the said period.

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the  body of this Code or by any other law for the  time being in force, an appeal shall  lie to the  High Court from every decree passed in appeal  by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  case   involves a substantial question of law.

------ (2) An appeal may lie under this section from  an appellate decree passed ex parte.  

(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be in  the prescribed form and shall be verified in the  prescribed  manner  and  shall  be  accompanied  by a fee of one hundred rupees.

(3)  In  an  appeal  under  this  section,  the  memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the  substantial  question  of  law  involved  in  the  appeal.

(3) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section  (1),  the  High  Court  may,  after  giving  the  parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard,  either in person or by a representative:-

(a) confirm or cancel the order of the District  Court appealed against; or

(b) set aside such order and remand  the case to  the District Court for decision after such further  enquiry as may be directed; or

(c) pass such other orders as it may think fit.

(4)  Where  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  a  substantial question of law is involved in any  case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so  formulated  and  the  respondent  shall,  at  the  hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that  the case does not involve such question:        Provided that  nothing in this  sub-section  shall  be  deemed to  take  away or  abridge  the  power of the Court to hear,  for  reasons to be  recorded,  the  appeal  on  any  other  substantial  question  of  law,  not  formulated  by it,  if  it  is  satisfied that the case involves such question.

(4)  Every  order  passed  in  appeal  under  this  section shall be final. -----

(5) Any order passed by the High Court under  this section shall be enforceable by the District  Court  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  land  is  situated, as if it were a decree passed by such  District  Court  under  the  Code  of  Civil  

-----

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Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908.)  

The form of memorandum of Appeal referred to in section 12A(2) of the Act  

is prescribed by the Kerala Forest (Appeal to the High Court) Rules 1981.  

The said form is extracted below :  

“Form Of Appeal [See Rule 2]

(1) Name or names (with full address/addresses  of the appellant/appellants.

(2) Name or names (with full address/addresses) of the person/persons who shall be impleaded or brought  on record as respondent/respondents.  

(3) Statement of facts.

(4) Grounds of Appeal.

(5) Prayer.

Signature Appellant(s)/Counsel for Appellant

The facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signature Appellant(s)/Counsel for Appellant

18. The  following  differences  in  the  two  provisions  demonstrate  that  

section 12A of the Act is intended to be self contained in so far as appeals  

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under the Act to the High Court, deliberately deviating from the provisions  

of section 100 of the Code :

(i) Sub-sections  (1),  (3)  and  (4)  of  section  100  of  the  Code  provide  

specifically  that  the  second  appeal  would  lie  only  where  substantial  

questions of law are involved. On the other hand, sub-section (1) of section  

12A provides for an appeal against the order of the appellate authority under  

section  11  of  the  Act  would  lie,  without  specifying  any  limitation  or  

restriction.  

(ii) Section 100 of the Code begins with the words “Save as otherwise  

expressly provided … by any other law”. This means that a second appeal  

can  be to  a  court  or  Tribunal  other  than the  High Court,  or  that  second  

appeal need not be restricted to substantial questions of law, if so provided  

by other law. Section 12A of the Act is one such provision of other law,  

expressly providing otherwise.  

(iii) Where the Act wants to adopt the provisions of the Code, it expressly  

provided so.  For example,  sub-section (5) of section 12A and section 83  

expressly refer to and make applicable the provisions of the Code in other  

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contexts. But when it comes appeals to High Court, section 12A of the Act  

deliberately chalks a different path from section 100 of the Code.  

(iv) While  sub-section  (3)  of  section  100  of  the  Code  requires  the  

appellant  to  precisely  state  the  substantial  question  of  law  in  the  

memorandum of appeal, sub-section (2) of section 12A of the Act read with  

Rule 2(1) and the form of appeal under the Kerala Forest (Appeal to the  

High Court) Rules 1981, does not require the appeal memorandum to state  

any questions of law, substantial or otherwise. The provisions of sub-section  

(3) of section 12A also clearly reiterates by implication that the jurisdiction  

of the High Court under section 12A is not subject to any limitations.  

19. In view of the above, the High Court was right in holding that the  

appeal under section 12A of the Act is available both in respect of questions  

of fact and questions of law. Therefore there is no need for the High Court to  

frame any substantial question of law. The appeal is dismissed as having no  

merit.                

……………………………J. (R V Raveendran)

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New Delhi; ……………………………J. August 31, 2010. (H L Gokhale)                    

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