REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8590 OF 2003

Jaipur Development Authority                                 …….  Appellant

Versus

Mahesh Sharma & Anr.         ......Respondents     

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9158 OF 2003

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9161 OF 2003

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9162 OF 2003

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8590 OF 2003

1. We propose to dispose of these appeals together since the  

issues in these matters are interconnected.

2. A narration of the facts leading to the filing of the present  

appeal would indicate as to how money and land of the  

Government  has been squandered away by some of  the  

Government officials of Jaipur by joining hand with certain  

private parties.  The facts of the present case would also  

reflect  how  unscrupulous  and  adventurous  people  in  

connivance with bureaucrats and persons in power have  

not  only  sought  to  give  undue  advantage  of  giving  

compensation for  land but also sought to grab valuable  

lands  causing  willful  loss  to  the  Government  exchequer  

and  gain  unto  themselves.   Facts  of  the  present  case  

appropriately reflects the earlier observations of this court  

in  Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal  

Jain, reported at (1997) 1 SCC 35  wherein it was stated  

that  public  policy  cannot  be  a  camouflage  for  abuse  of  

power  and  trust  entrusted  with  a  public  authority  or  

public servant for the performance of public duty and an  

illegal  allotment  of  land  founded  upon  ultra  vires and  

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illegal  policy  of  allotment  made  to  some  other  persons  

wrongly would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the  

respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal  order  

nor would it be legalized.

3. These points find close imitation in the facts of this case,  

which we may briefly narrate here. This appeal arises out  

of  an  order  passed  by  the  Rajasthan  High  Court  in  a  

contempt  petition  filed  against  the  appellant,  Jaipur  

Development Authority, for failure to comply with an order  

of the High Court of Rajasthan passed in 1984 to award  

the  respondent  not  only  compensation  for  the  land  

acquired  but  also  directing  for  allotment  of  a  plot  of  

developed  land  admeasuring  2500  sq.  yards.    On  

18.02.1952, the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption  

of  Jagir  Act (hereinafter  “Jagir  Act”  for short)  came into  

force whereby all Jagir lands from the commencement of  

the Act was made liable to payment of land revenue to the  

Government.  With the coming into force of the aforesaid  

Act, land measuring 29 Bighas and 17 Biswas under the  

occupation of Idol of which Mahant Ram Narain was the  

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Manager, being the sole priest of the temple, also vested  

with the Government.  The said land measuring 29 Bighas  

and 17 Biswas was resumed by the Government effective  

from  01.08.1960.   A  Notification,  however,  was  issued  

under Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act  

(hereinafter “the Act” for short),  which was published in  

the  Rajasthan  Gazatte  on  09.06.1960,  to  acquire  552  

Bighas and 8 Biswas of land in village Bhojpura and Chak  

Sudershanpura Tehsil Jaipur.  The land which was sought  

to be acquired under  this  Notification also included the  

aforesaid  29  Bighas  and  17  Biswas  of  land,  which  is  

included in Khasra Nos. 257, 258, and 259, which was  

popularly known as Lal Kothi scheme, which is adjacent to  

Jaipur  city  for  a  planned  development  of  the  city.   On  

03.05.1961,  a  Notification  under  Section  6  of  the  

Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act came to be published in  

the Rajasthan Gazette for the same area of land.  The sole  

priest of the temple submitted a statement of his claim on  

16.09.1965 for payment of compensation by treating his  

Maufi  rental  income  of  Rs.  1,000/-  before  the  Jagir  

Commissioner.   An order was passed on 17.10.1968 by  

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the Jagir Commissioner sanctioning the payment of a sum  

of Rs. 2250/- as interim compensation and rehabilitation  

grant payable to the Jagirdar Mahant Ram Narain under  

Section  36  of  the  Rajasthan  Land  Reforms  and  

Resumption  of  Jagirs  Act,  1952.   The  aforesaid  

compensation  was  received  by  Jagirdar  Mahant  Ram  

Narain on 29.10.1968 as interim compensation under the  

Jagir Act.   

4. Despite  the  aforesaid  fact  of  vesting  of  the  land on the  

State Government by virtue of the provisions of Jagir Act  

and despite the payment of interim compensation under  

Jagir Act, an Award was passed by the Land Acquisition  

Officer  on  29.04.1971,  determining  a  sum  of  Rs.  

2,62,680/- as compensation in lieu of the acquisition of  

the  land.   Surprisingly  and  rather  peculiarly,  the  Land  

Acquisition  Officer  apart  from  determining  the  

compensation for the land, also recommended allotment of  

developed  plot  of  land  measuring  2,500  sq.  yds.  to  be  

given to the respondent.   The Government of  Rajasthan  

taking  the  stand  that  the  aforesaid  issuance  of  

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notifications under  Sections 4 and 6 of  the  Act  as also  

passing of the Award on 29.04.1971 was a nullity, issued  

an  order  dated  26.09.1973  deacquiring  the  land  under  

Section 48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act stating  

therein that the possession of the land in question stood  

resumed on the day under the Jagir Act.  On 27.11.1973,  

the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  moved  an  application  for  

withdrawal  of  reference  on  the  ground  that  the  land  

already  stood  deacquired,  consequent  upon  which  the  

learned Civil Judge, Jaipur City, dismissed the reference  

on 14.05.1974 as withdrawn.  The respondent seems to  

have  been  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  order  and  

accordingly preferred an application on 06.09.1974 before  

the Land Acquisition Officer for payment of compensation  

amount,  which  was  rejected  by  the  Land  Acquisition  

Officer holding inter alia that since the land stood resumed  

under  the  Jagir  Act  there  is  no question of  payment  of  

compensation.  

5. The Government officials adopted the stand that the land  

was  Government  land  after  its  vesting  with  the  

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Government  under  the  provisions  of  the  Jagir  Act.  The  

said position was also fortified by entry made in the Memo  

of Entries (Jamabandi) of village Bhojpura Tehsil, Jaipur  

District,  Jaipur,  wherein  the  entire  land  measuring  29  

Bighas and 17 Biswas was shown with Khasra numbers  

as  government  land  and  the  said  land  stood  as  

Government land for the period between Samvat 2015 to  

2034  which  is  years  1958  to  1977.   The  aforesaid  

jamabandi entries, therefore, clearly indicate the land in  

the  revenue  record  was  recorded  as  Government  land  

during the period from 1958 to 1977.  But despite the said  

fact,  a  Notification  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  was  

issued  for  acquiring  the  land  by  the  State  Government  

followed  by  a  Notification  under  Section  6  of  the  Act.  

Further,  not  only  did  an  award  come  to  be  passed  on  

29.04.1971 by the Land Acquisition Officer determining a  

sum  of  Rs.  2,62,680/-  as  compensation  in  lieu  of  the  

acquired  land,  but  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  also  

recommended the allotment of additional land measuring  

2500  sq.  yds.  of  developed  land  to  be  given  to  the  

respondent.

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6. The  respondent  being  aggrieved  by  the  issuance  of  the  

aforesaid Notification by the Government under Section 48  

of  the  Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition  Act  preferred  a  writ  

petition before the Rajasthan High Court praying for the  

quashing  and  setting  aside  of  the  Notification  dated  

26.09.1973 with a further prayer to direct the appellant  

herein to make immediate payment of an amount of Rs.  

2,62,680/-  awarded  under  the  award  dated  29.04.1971  

and  also  to  allot  the  land  measuring  2500  sq.  yds  in  

compliance of the award.  The said writ petition was heard  

by the learned single Judge of the High Court, who allowed  

the writ petition filed by Mahant Ram Narain and pursued  

by his son, the present respondent No. 1 as Ram Narain  

himself expired before the judgment was pronounced.  The  

High Court  while  allowing the writ  petition quashed the  

Notification issued by the State Government under Section  

48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act with a further  

direction  to  the  State  Government  to  deposit  the  

compensation  amount  in  the  court  of  the  Civil  Judge,  

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Jaipur within three months and also to allot a plot of land  

of 2500 sq. yds.   

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment and Order passed by  

the learned Single Judge, the appellant herein preferred a  

DB Civil Special Appeal before the Division Bench of the  

High  Court  of  Rajasthan  contending  inter  alia that  the  

land acquisition proceedings were void ab initio as the land  

had already vested in the State and therefore, no benefit  

could be granted to the respondent under illegal and void  

proceedings, particularly when the entire land acquisition  

proceedings was a nullity.  It was also contended before  

the Division Bench of the High Court that the predecessor-

in-interest  of  the  respondent  had  accepted  the  interim  

compensation under the Jagir Act, which indicates that he  

explicitly admitted resumption of the land, and therefore,  

there was no occasion to take possession under the Land  

Acquisition Act.   The  Division Bench of  the  High Court  

admitted  the  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  herein  but  

ultimately dismissed the said appeal on 06.02.1996 on the  

ground that the State had failed to take necessary steps.  

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On  17.04.2002,  an  application  for  recalling  the  order  

dated 06.02.1996 was filed and the High Court dismissed  

the  matter  holding  inter  alia that  the  application  was  

pending for last six years.  As against the aforesaid order a  

special  leave  to  appeal  petition  was  filed  in  this  Court,  

which was also dismissed on 11.10.2002.   

8. It  appears  thereafter  the  respondent  preferred  a  fresh  

petition  before  the  High Court  under  Article  226 of  the  

Constitution on 22.07.2002 for contempt of court in view  

of the alleged non-compliance of the order passed by the  

High Court.   On 27.11.2002,  the  Division Bench of  the  

High Court took up the aforesaid writ petition and rejected  

the same.   

9. The contention of the appellant before the High Court was  

that the order dated 27.11.2002 was non est and a nullity.  

Before the High Court it was also stated by the appellant  

that  not  only  was  the  initiation  of  the  acquisition  

proceedings  by  issuance  of  notifications  under  Sections  

4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act a nullity, but even  

10

the passing of the award was also a nullity.  In support of  

the contentions, reliance was placed on the decisions of  

this Court in  Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey  

Shyam,  reported at  (1994)  4 SCC 370 and  Secretary,  

Jaipur  Development  Authority  v.  Daulat  Mal  Jain,  

reported at  (1997) 1 SCC 35, as also the case of  Narpat  

Singh & others  vs.  Jaipur  Development  Authority  &  

Another reported at (2002) 4 SCC 666.   

10.The  Division  Bench,  however,  by  the  impugned  order  

dated  27.11.2002,  held  that  the  Division  Bench  cannot  

enter  into  a  controversy  so  as  to  find  out  whether  the  

order dated 17.05.1984 is a nullity once the order dated  

17.05.1984  has  attained  its  finality  upto  the  Supreme  

Court,  and  therefore,  a  direction  was  issued  to  the  

appellant herein to carry out the order.  Being aggrieved by  

the  aforesaid  order  dated  27.11.2002  passed  by  the  

Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant preferred  

the  present  Special  Leave  Petition  in  which  initially  a  

notice was issued and an interim order was passed staying  

the operation of the impugned order.  However, an order  

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came to be passed on 03.11.2003 by this Court granting  

leave  and  also  making  interim  order  absolute  till  the  

disposal of the appeal.  It was, however, ordered by this  

Court  in  the  same  order  dated  03.11.2003  that  the  

amount awarded would be deposited before the Registrar  

of the High Court within a period of four weeks and that  

the  same  would  be  permitted  to  be  withdrawn  by  the  

respondents on furnishing security to the satisfaction of  

the  Registrar  of  the  High court.   Now the  appeal  being  

ready in all respects was listed for hearing and in the light  

of  the  aforesaid background facts  we heard  the  learned  

counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  in  this  appeal  but  

none appeared for the respondent despite the matter being  

heard on several dates.

11.Mr.  S.K.  Bhattacharya,  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant submitted before us that the land measuring 29  

Bighas  and  17  Biswas  having  been  vested  with  the  

Government, and with the legislation and enforcement of  

the  Jagir  Act  the  said  land  having  been  resumed,  and  

there being a case of resumption of the entire land by the  

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Government  effective  from  01.08.1960,  there  could  not  

have been any notification under Section 4(1) and 6 of the  

Land Acquisition Act seeking to acquire land belong to the  

Government  itself,  and therefore,  entire  initiation  of  the  

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and passing of  

the award under the Land Acquisition Act was a nullity.  It  

was  also  submitted  by  him  that  the  land  in  question  

belonged to the Idol and not to Ram Narain, who was only  

a Mahant being the sole priest of the temple and therefore  

passing of the Award of compensation in favour of Ram  

Narain, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent was  

not only illegal, but also a nullity, and therefore, even on  

that ground the award is  non est  in the eyes of law.  His  

further submission was that in any case the order passed  

by the Land Acquisition Officer directing allotment of land  

measuring 2500 sq. yds. in favour of Ram Narain was void  

ab  initio and  that  the aforesaid  directions  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Officer were contrary to and unknown to the  

law  of  the  land.   He  also  drew  our  attention  to  an  

agreement dated 21.04.2001, copy of which is placed on  

record, whereby the respondent no. 1 herein had entered  

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into an agreement for the development of land measuring  

3 Bighas and 15 Biswas covered by Khasra No. 130 with  

Messrs  Ganpati  Royal  Estate,  who  is  described  as  

partner/purchaser.  In the said agreement, it was stated  

by  the  respondent  no.  1  that  the  aforesaid  property  is  

entered in the revenue record and papers in the name of  

father  of  first  party  Shri  Ram  Narayan  Sharma  and  

consequent  upon his  death,  the  owner  of  the  aforesaid  

land,  proprietor  is  first  party  and  land  owner.   It  was  

further  stated  in  the  said  agreement  that  the  aforesaid  

land  is  under  acquisition  proceeding  initiated  by  the  

Government of Rajasthan but no award or compensation  

has  yet  been  paid  to  the  land  owner  –  respondent  for  

which litigation is pending, and therefore, the agreement is  

being  executed  for  development  of  the  aforesaid  land  

under the said agreement.  

12.Our  attention  was  also  drawn  by  the  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellant  to  a  Circular  dated  

13.12.1991,  which was issued by the Deputy Secretary,  

Admn.,  Government  of  Rajasthan,  Jaipur to  the Deputy  

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Director, Bikaner, Settlement Commissioner, Jaipur.  The  

subject  of  the  said  Circular  described  the  Entry  of  the  

name of Pujari along with Mandir Dev Statue for khatedari  

of  land.   In  the  said  Circular,  it  was  stated  that  the  

question has been raised time and again that when such  

Mandirs  which  have  their  personal  lands,  whether  the  

name  of  the  Pujari  should  be  entered  in  the  revenue  

records (Jamabandi) along with the Idol (Dev Statue).  In  

paragraph 3 of the said Circular, it was also clarified that  

the  right  position  is  that  the  name  of  the  Pujari  or  

Shiwayat should not be mentioned in the Jamabandi.   

13.In view of the aforesaid position and for the protection of  

the  Dev  statue  and in  order  to  check  the  unwarranted  

litigation  relating  to  the  land  of  the  Dev  statue,  it  was  

decided  that  in  the  Jamabandi  to  be  prepared  by  the  

Revenue Department or by the Settlement Department in  

future,  the  name of  Pujari  will  not  be  mentioned along  

with the name of the Dev statue. Another direction which  

was  issued  was  that  in  Jamabandis  which  have  been  

prepared  and  presently  in  force,  the  name  of  Pujari  

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wherever it occurs alongwith name of Dev statue be struck  

off and be mentioned in the aforesaid register.  It was also  

informed under the aforesaid Circular that the aforesaid  

directions shall come into force with immediate effect.   

14.During the course of his arguments, the learned counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellant  relied  upon  the  copy  of  

Jamabandi for the period between 1958 to 1977, wherein  

the entire 29 Bighas and 17 Biswas of land was shown to  

have  been  registered  as  Government  land  in  the  

Jamabandi.

15.The facts of the present case, which we have delineated at  

length, clearly disclose that the entire land of 29 Bighas  

and 17 Biswas stood in the name of the Government and  

has been shown as Government land in the Jamabandi for  

the period between 1958 to 1977. That entry came to be  

entered into in view of the promulgation of the Jagir Act  

w.e.f. 18.02.1952 and was fortified by the resumption of  

the entire land effective from 01.08.1960.  The order of the  

Jagir  Commissioner  dated 17.10.1968 is  also placed on  

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record.   A  bare  perusal  of  the  said  order  proves  and  

establishes that a sum of Rs. 2250/- was sanctioned as  

interim compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to  

the  Jagirdar  Ram  Narain  under  Section  36  of  the  

Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of  Jagirs  Act,  

1952.  There could have been a mistake in describing Ram  

Narain as Jagirdar as the land belonged to the Idol/Dev  

statue  and Ram Narain  being  only  a  priest  of  the  said  

temple. Such description of Ram Narain as Jagirdar was  

also not in tune with the circular dated 13.12.1991. This  

fact gets established even by the application filed before  

the  Jagir  Commissioner  by showing Ram Narain as  the  

Pujari and Manager and showing the Idol as the Jagirdar.  

In  paragraph  1  of  the  said  application  filed  by  the  

predecessor-in-interest of respondent no. 1 herein, it was  

clearly stated that there is a temple with an Idol of Lord  

Hanuman Ji in which Ram Narain is the only Pujari and  

Manager.  He had stated in the said application that with  

the vesting and resumption of the land, he is entitled to  

get compensation under Section 22 of the Land Reforms  

and Resumption of Jagir Act, which should be paid to him.  

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Pursuant to the same, order for interim compensation was  

made  by  the  Jagir  Commissioner,  Rajasthan.  The  

predecessor-in-interest  of  respondent  no.  1  received the  

interim compensation thereunder without any protest and  

demur.   Consequently,  he  was,  at  the  most,  entitled  to  

receive balance compensation under the Jagir Act.

16.Despite  vesting of  the land with the Government under  

the provisions of the Jagir Act and also resumption of the  

said  land  measuring  29  Bighas  and  17  Biswas  by  the  

Government,  a  notification  proposing  acquisition  of  the  

said land was issued by the  Government under  Section  

4(1) of the Act followed by the notification under Section 6  

of the Act.   The Land Acquisition Officer even proceeded  

to pass an award in respect of  the  land,  which already  

belonged  to  the  Government,  by  determining  

compensation,  and  proceeded  further  in  directing  

retention  of  interim compensation  paid  under  Jagir  Act  

and also by directing the allotment of a plot of developed  

land measuring 2500 sq. yds.  Although there was no law  

supporting such action, the said action on the part of the  

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Land  Acquisition  Officer  directing  the  payment  of  

compensation and also allotting a plot of land in favour of  

the respondent indicates as to how Government officials,  

who  are  protectors  of  the  Government  property,  abuse  

their  power  and  trust  under  the  camouflage  of  

performance  of  their  public  duty.  The respondent  no.  1  

entering into a private agreement describing himself as the  

owner  of  the  land  is  in  itself  a  disclosure  as  to  how  

property belonging to an Idol is being frittered away by a  

trustee who is a Manager for promoting his self  interest  

and self gain.  If on the one hand, a Government officer of  

the status of  Land Acquisition Officer,  who is  entrusted  

with a public authority while performing a public duty has  

sought  to  make  an  illegal  acquisition  of  land  and  also  

making illegal allotment of land, on the other hand it is a  

trustee and the Manager who has abused his position and  

has, following the trust reposed on him, sought to fritter  

away a property belonging to the Idol.

17.Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge while hearing the  

first writ petition completely ignored the aforesaid position  

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and instead issued a direction for not only for retaining  

payment of the interim compensation under the Jagir Act  

but also ordered for payment of compensation under the  

Land Acquisition Act along with interest, but also upheld  

the  order  of  allotment  of  additional  land.   The  Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  

therefrom on the ground that the appellant has failed to  

take appropriate steps.  The special leave petition by this  

Court was dismissed for non-prosecution as the appellant  

failed to take steps in the appeal.  In the subsequent writ  

petition,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  by  the  

impugned  order  directed  for  payment  of  compensation,  

totally ignoring the contention of the appellant that such  

an order is a nullity in the eyes of law which submission  

was enforced by at least three decisions of this Court.   

18.In Jaipur  Development  Authority  v.  Radhey  Shyam,  

reported at (1994) 4 SCC 370, at page 372, it was held by  

this  Court  that  the  power  expressly  given  to  the  Land  

Acquisition Officer is only in respect of enquiry into the  

true area of the land acquired and determination of the  

20

compensation which in his opinion should be allowed to  

the acquired land and apportionment of the compensation  

among the claimants who appeared before him or persons  

known or  believed to  be interested in  the  land whether  

appeared or not and that it excludes by implication any  

other  power  other  than  that  given  to  the  Collector  by  

Section 11. It was also held in the said decision that the  

award  is  only  an  offer  made  after  consideration  of  the  

above matters and is only made subsequent to reference  

and determination made under sub-section (1) of Section  

23  of  the  amounts  awardable  thereunder  or  any  other  

amount  awarded  under  any  or  all  other  clauses  

thereunder  including  sub-section  (2).  Subsequently,  an  

award  shall  be  made  by  court  and  such  award  by  

operation of sub-section (2) of Section 26 would be deemed  

to be a decree.   In Para 7, this Court laid down that a  

reading of sub-section (4) of Section 31 indicates that the  

Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to  

give any land under acquisition or any other land in lieu of  

compensation. The contention of the learned counsel for  

the claimants was that while awarding compensation, the  

21

Collector  (Land  Acquisition  Officer)  has  a  higher  power  

than  the  limited  power  given  under  sub-section  (3)  of  

Section 31.  It was held that such a position is not tenable,  

and would run counter to the scheme envisaged in the Act  

and  such  interpretation,  if  accepted  would  result  in  

defeating the public purpose.  This Court clearly held in  

the said decision that what is executable is only an award  

under Section 26(2), namely, the amount awarded or the  

claims  of  the  interests  determined  of  the  respective  

persons in the acquired lands and that the decree cannot  

incorporate any matter other than the matters determined  

under  Section  11  or  those  referred  to  and  determined  

under Section 18 and no other.  

19. The subsequent decision of this Court in  Secy., Jaipur  

Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, reported at  

(1997) 1 SCC 35 is almost to the same effect.  In the said  

decision,  this  Court  has  laid  down almost  to  the  same  

extent  while  interpreted the  provisions of  the  Rajasthan  

Land  Acquisition  Act,  1953.   This  Court  held  in  

paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 as under:  

22

“11. ……… In  a democratic  society  governed by  rule of law, power is conferred on the holder of the  public  office  or  the  authority  concerned  by  the  Constitution by virtue of appointment. The holder  of the office, therefore, gets opportunity to abuse  or  misuse  the  office.  The  politician  who  holds  public office must perform public duties with  the   sense of purpose, and a sense of direction, under   rules or sense of priorities. The purpose must be  genuine in a free democratic society governed by  the  rule  of  law  to  further  socio-economic  democracy.  The  Executive  Government  should  frame  its  policies  to  maintain  the  social  order,   stability, progress and morality. All actions of the   Government are performed through/by individual   persons in collective or joint or individual capacity.   Therefore, they should morally be responsible for  their actions.

12.  ……..The  Government  acts  through  its   bureaucrats,  who shape its social,  economic and  administrative  policies  to  further  the  social   stability  and progress socially, economically and  politically.  Actions of the Government,  should be  accounted  for  social  morality.  Therefore,  the   actions  of  the  individuals  would  reflect  on  the   actions  of  the  Government.  The  actions  are  intended  to  further  the  goals  set  down  in  the  Constitution,  the  laws  or  administrative  policy.   The  action  would,  therefore,  bear  necessary  integral connection between the ‘purpose’ and the   end  object  of  public  welfare  and  not  personal  gain.  The action cannot be divorced from that of   the individual actor. The end is something aimed  at and only individuals can have and shape the  aims to further the social,  economic and political   goals. The ministerial responsibility thereat comes  into consideration………  

13.  All  purposes  or  actions  for  which  moral   responsibility  can  be  attached  are  actions  performed  by  individual  persons  composing  the  department.  All  government  actions,  therefore,  means actions performed by individual persons to   further the objectives set down in the Constitution,   the  laws  and  the  administrative  policies  to   develop  democratic  traditions,  social  and  economic  democracy  set  down  in  the  Preamble,   Part  III  and  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution.  The  intention  behind  the  government  actions  and  

23

purposes is to further the public welfare and the   national interest. Public good is synonymous with   protection  of  the  interests  of  the  citizens  as  a  territorial unit or nation as a whole. It also aims to  further the  public  policies.  The limitations  of  the   policies are kept along with the public interest to   prevent the exploitation or misuse or abuse of the   office or the executive actions for personal gain or  for illegal gratification.”

What the Court has said in paragraphs 14 and 15, have  

been extracted right at the beginning of this Judgment.   

20. In  State  of  Orissa  v.  Brundaban  Sharma,  reported  at  

1995 Supp (3)  SCC 249,  this  Court  has held  that  the  

Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate or provide for  

the  acquisition  of  any  interest  belonging  to  the  

Government in the land on acquisition.  It  reiterated the  

settled  position  of  law  that  the  Government  being  the  

owner of the land need not acquire its own land  merely  

because person mistakenly  resorted  to  acquire  the  land  

and  later  on  mistakenly  published  notifications  under  

Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.

21. The  aforesaid  position  was  reiterated  in  a  subsequent  

decision of this Court in  Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of  

India, reported at  (2004) 7 SCC 362.  In paragraphs 15  

24

and 16 of the said judgment, this Court has held that the  

High Court has clearly erred in setting aside the order of  

the Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference  

since it is settled law that in land acquisition proceedings  

the  Government  cannot  and  does  not  acquire  its  own  

interest. While laying down the aforesaid law, this Court  

has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Collector  

of  Bombay  v.  Nusserwanji  Rattanji  Mistri  &  Ors.  

reported at (1955) 1 SCR 1311.   

22. We may at this stage appropriately refer to the decision of  

this Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman  

Paswan & Ors. reported in (1955) 1 SCR 117. In the said  

case this Court has held that judgment passed by a Court  

without jurisdiction is a nullity and such a judgment could  

be challenged even in execution or collateral proceedings.  

Court on page 121 at para 6 held thus:  

“………………………  It  is a fundamental  principle   well-established that a decree passed by a Court  without  jurisdiction  is  a  nullity,  and  that  its   invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever   it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at   the  stage  of  execution  and  even  in  collateral   proceedings. ………………”

25

23. In the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sanahullah  

Mir reported in (1980) 3 SCR 281 this court dealing with  

a case regarding resumption of land on pages 286-287 at  

para 9 held thus: -

“…………………  On  going  through  these  documents  it  appears  to  us  that  under  the   influence of some high-ups a case was made out   for payment of compensation to the respondent in  respect  of  the  land  acquired  60  years  ago  by  acquiring  it  again  which  naturally  led  to  the  determination of the market value of the land in or  about the year 1955. The State Exchequer cannot  be  made  to  suffer  for  such  wanton  and  illegal   actions of its officers. The land had been resumed  long  ago.  It  belonged  to  the  State.  The  whole   proceeding of land acquisition was a nullity. The  Award  resulting  therefrom  was  also-ultra  vires  and  a  nullity.  It  mattered  little  whether  the   proceeding was taken as a result of the fraud or   mistake  or  otherwise.  We  are  accepting  the   findings of the courts below that  the respondent  had not  practised  and  fraud nor  was  the  land  acquisition proceeding started as a result of any  mistake of fact. It was either as a result of gross  negligence or a deliberate  act on the part of  the   officials at the instance of some high-ups to help  the respondent. It  is well-settled that there is no  question of any acquisition of the State's own land  as was purported to be done in this case.”

24. In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is crystal  

clear that the issuance of notifications under Sections 4  

and 6 of the Act as also the Award passed for acquisition  

of the land was a nullity and the subsequent action of the  

Government  de-requisitioning  land  by  issuance  of  

notification under Section 48 was just and proper as that  

26

was  an  action  for  rectification  of  the  mistake.   The  

subsequent  land  acquisition  officer  was  justified  in  

refusing to refer to the Reference Court in view of the fact  

that the land was already a Government land and was so  

described  in  the  revenue  record  itself.   The  Land  

Acquisition Officer, who passed the award, committed an  

illegality by not only determining the compensation under  

the Land Acquisition Act but also directing for retention of  

the interim compensation paid under Jagir Act and also in  

directing  for  allotment  of  a  developed  plot  of  land  

admeasuring 2500 sq.  yds.   Initiation of the acquisition  

proceedings  as  also  award  passed  by  the  said  Land  

Acquisition Officer is nullity in the eyes of law and void ab  

initio and therefore could be held so and set  aside in a  

proceeding of  this  nature.   We,  therefore,  hold that  the  

directions  for  payment  of  compensation  under  the  

Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition  Act  to  the  predecessor-in-

interest  of  the  respondent  no.  1  and  subsequently  to  

respondent no. 1 are illegal and without jurisdiction as the  

award passed by the land acquisition officer was only an  

offer  which  itself  was  a  nullity.   Payment  made  to  the  

27

predecessor-in-interest of the respondent no. 1 and also to  

the  respondent  no.  1  as  its  successor  is  also  held  

unwarranted as the said orders were passed considering  

them as the owners of the land and not as a trustee or  

manager.  Therefore, the said orders directing for payment  

of compensation and withdrawal of the compensation by  

respondent  no.  1  is  held  to  be  illegal  and  without  

jurisdiction.  We set aside the said orders by allowing the  

appeal  filed  by  the  appellant.   The  amount  deposited  

pursuant  to  the  orders  of  this  Court,  if,  has  been  

withdrawn by respondent no. 1 shall be realized from him  

through  the  process  of  the  High  Court.   The  Registrar  

General of the High Court would take necessary steps to  

realise the amount paid to the respondent by invoking the  

security furnished and if necessary by resorting to remedy  

in accordance with law. In terms of the aforesaid order the  

appeal  is  allowed but we leave the parties to bear their  

own costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9158 OF 2003

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9161 OF 2003

28

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9162 OF 2003

25. The remaining appeals may be disposed together since the  

facts and circumstances in these cases are similar.

26. In  all these  appeals,  the  respondents  are  sub-awardees  

who  have  come  to  the  fore  after  a  Notification  under  

Section  4  of  the  Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition  Act  was  

published in the State Gazette for acquisition of land in  

village Bhojpura and Chak Sudershanpura Tehsil Jaipur.,  

for  the  purpose  of  construction  of  a  scheme  popularly  

known as Lal Kothi scheme, which is adjacent to Jaipur  

City for a planned development of the city.   

27.These appeals  merit  the same observations as we have  

made in Civil Appeal No. 8590 of 2003, wherein the Land  

Acquisition Officer proceeded to pass an award in respect  

of the land acquired, which was already vested with the  

Government after the coming into force of the Rajasthan  

Land Reforms and Resumption  of  Jagir  Act  (hereinafter  

“Jagir  Act”  for  short)  on  18.02.1952,  by  determining  

29

compensation, and went further by directing for allotment  

of a plot of developed land measuring 2500 sq. yds.  We  

have made it clear in the aforesaid appeal that the Land  

Acquisition Officer, through such an action, was not only  

acting beyond his mandate and jurisdiction, but was also  

betraying  the  public  trust  reposed  on  him  by  virtue  of  

being a public servant.

28. Pursuant to such an illegal award that we have held in the  

aforesaid appeal to be non est and void ab initio, the sub-

awardees who are also Respondents in the present appeals  

made  representations  to  the  Urban  Improvement  Trust,  

Jaipur for allotment of land. Unfortunately, the Trust not  

only complied with these representations but also drew up  

allotment plans, asking the Respondents to deposit money  

in lieu of the same.

29. Kamla Mehta, who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No.  

9162, claims to have paid the full price for this reallotted  

plot  on  17.12.1970.  Dr.  S.K.  Sharma,  who  is  the  

respondent in Civil Appeal No. 9161, was initially allotted  

a  plot  no.  32  in  the  Lal  Kothi  Scheme  by  the  Urban  

Improvement Trust and he had deposited the full amount  

30

of the plot on 31.3.1970. In the case of Pushpa Saxena,  

the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9158, she had purchased  

land measuring 400 sq. yards from one Usha Kumari vide  

an agreement to sell dated 7.7.72.  The said Usha Kumari  

who had purchased the plot from the original Khatedar,  

one Narpat Singh, was allotted a plot no H-256 in the Lal  

Kothi Scheme vide allotment letter dated 13.9.1970.

30. The Respondents, in their Writ Petitions submitted before  

the High Court of Rajasthan had complained that the said  

allotments were not being made expeditiously.  The High  

Court allowed the Writ Petitions holding inter alia that the  

actions of the appellants herein cannot be sustained and  

that  once  an  allotment  has  been  made  by  the  Urban  

Improvement Trust, the same cannot remain unfulfilled.

31.We  heard  the  counsel  for  parties  at  length.  Mr.  S.K.  

Bhattacharya,  Advocate  appearing  for  the  appellant  

submitted  before  us  that  the  entire  initiation  of  

proceedings  and  passing  of  the  award  under  the  Land  

Acquisition Act was a nullity.  The learned counsel for the  

appellant based his argument on the contention that the  

Land Acquisition Officer had no authority or right to allot  

31

plots in addition to monetary compensation.  It was also  

the submission of the appellant that the allotment of the  

plots  in  respect  of  the  Respondents  was  cancelled  and  

possession  was  taken  back.  Therefore,  according  to  the  

appellant, the High Court’s decision to allow the claims of  

the Respondents on the basis of policy was erroneous as  

the High Court failed to appreciate that the policy of the  

State  Government  is  inapplicable  to  the  facts  of  these  

cases  and  that  such  action  allowing  sub-awardees,  

nominees,  dealers  and  even  encroachers  to  obtain  

developed land at nominal rates, as opposed to the high  

market prices. On this count, the appellant also submitted  

that  recognizing  the  claim  of  the  Respondents  would  

tantamount  to  recognizing  the  right  of  dealers  in  land,  

since  nearly  all  the  original  Khatedars  have  sold  their  

anticipated allotment in favour of unscrupulous dealers.

32. The  learned  counsel  for  the  Respondents,  on  the  other  

hand, submitted before us that the principles of natural  

justice were not followed in the proceedings that led to the  

cancellation of allotment in that the Respondents were not  

provided an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, it was the  

32

submission  of  the  Respondent  that  the  appellant  was  

delivering possession to a number of other allottees who  

were similarly situated.

33.It  is  amply  clear  from our decision in  Civil  Appeal  No.  

8590  of  2003  that  the  issuance  of  notifications  under  

Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as also the  

Award passed for acquisition of the land was a nullity and  

the subsequent action of the Government de-requisitioning  

land by issuance of Notification under Section 48 was just  

and proper as that was merely by way of rectification of  

the  mistake  committed  therein.  In  the  light  of  this  

decision,  we  find  that  the  Respondents  herein  have  no  

claim or right to a fresh allotment of land, as directed by  

the  Land  Acquisition  Officer.  That  other  allottees  have  

been wrongly delivered possession by the appellant does  

not, in any way, entitle the Respondents to claim the same  

benefit  for  a  wrong  action  cannot  be  allowed  to  be  

perpetuated on the ground of discrimination, which is not  

at all applicable. Furthermore, it is important to note that  

none of the Respondents herein has been in possession of  

the said land allotted to them.   

33

34. Moreover, this Court in  Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of  

Rajasthan,  reported  at  (1996)  1  SCC  334,  on  a  case  

dealing with the lapse on the part of the Land Acquisition  

Officer in wrongly granting a benefit to one party, has held  

that the benefit thus wrongly granted cannot entitle others  

to  get  the  same  or  to  press  claims  of  invidious  

discrimination.

35. In Jaipur  Development  Authority  v.  Radhey  Shyam,  

reported at (1994) 4 SCC 370, at page 372, it was held by  

this  Court  that  the  power  expressly  given  to  the  Land  

Acquisition Officer is only in respect of enquiry into the  

true area of the land acquired and determination of the  

compensation which in his opinion should be allowed to  

the acquired land and apportionment of the compensation  

among the claimants who appeared before him or persons  

known or  believed to  be interested in  the  land whether  

appeared or not and that it excludes by implication any  

other  power  other  than  that  given  to  the  Collector  by  

Section  11.  Seen  in  the  light  of  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  the  present  appeals,  and  from  our  

decision  in  Civil  Appeal  No.  8590  of  2003,  there  is  no  

34

doubt  that  the  award  passed  by  the  Land  Acquisition  

Officer determining compensation and allotting fresh plots  

of land to the Respondents is illegal and void ab initio.  

36. Furthermore,  it  is  settled  law  that  sub-awardees  and  

subsequent purchasers possess right vis-à-vis the original  

vendor only and not against the State Government as the  

purchases were subsequent to passing of the award. When  

the  acquisition  proceedings  are  itself  a  nullity,  there  

clearly cannot be a valid claim to allotment as has been  

contended  by  the  Respondents  in  this  case.  In Secy.,  

Jaipur  Development  Authority  v.  Daulat  Mal  Jain,  

reported at (1997) 1 SCC 35, this Court has held at page  

43  :  

“The diverse contentions give rise to the first   question:  whether  the  respondents  have  a  right  to  allotment  of  the  lands?  It  is  an  admitted  position  that  they  purchased  the   lands from Chhote  Lal,  the  erstwhile  owner,   pursuant to the sale deeds executed by him in  1970 or an agreement of sale etc. Their source  of title, therefore, is Chhote Lal, the erstwhile   owner.  The  sales  obviously  are  void  since  Chhote Lal had no right,  title  and interest in  the  land  acquired  pursuant  to  notification  under  Section  4(1)  issued on 29-6-1960 and  possession  taken  under  Section  16  of  the   Central Act and equivalent to Section 16 of the   State  Act.  The  pre-existing  right,  title  and  interest had by Chhote Lal stood ceased and  

35

the  same  were  vested  in  the  appellant  free  from all  encumbrances.  The nomenclature  of   sub-awardees  or  nominees  does  not  get   elevated  above  the  source  and  they  had  no  right, title or interest under void sale except, if   at  all,  only  to  claim  compensation  under  Section  23(1)  of  the  Act.  In  Gian  Chand  v.   Gopala  this  Court  had  held  that  after  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  is  published,  any  encumbrances  created  by  the  owner  of  the land does not bind the Government. The  agreement of sale,  if  any, was frustrated by  the  publication  of  the  notification  under  Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section   6. In Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan   and a catena of other decisions, this Court has  held that the purchase after notification under  Section 4(1) published in the Gazette was not  lawful which did not clothe the sale with any   colour  of  title  as  against  the  State.  All   encumbrances  stand  extinguished  by  operation of Section 16 of the Act. Therefore,  the  purchaser  gets  no  title  to  the  acquired  land.  The  sale  (being  opposed  to  the  public  policy)  was  void  under  Section  23  of  the   Contract  Act,  1872.  Consequentially,  the  respondents acquired no right, title or interest   either  under  the  sale  deeds  or  agreement  entered  into  by  them  with  Chhote  Lal,  the  erstwhile owner.”

37.So  far  as  the  respondents-claimants,  namely,  Pushpa  

Saxena, Kamla Mehta and Dr. S.K. Sharma are concerned,  

there is no dispute to the fact that they purchased a part  

of the acquired land after the same was vested with the  

State  Government  under  the  Jagir  Act  and  after  the  

36

Government had resumed possession of the said land. All  

the aforesaid purchases were in any case subsequent to  

the  notification  issued  by  the  State  Government  under  

Section  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  even  after  

passing of the award, so as to take advantage of the undue  

and invalid direction for  allotment  of  additional  land by  

the Land Acquisition Officer.

38. Pushpa  Saxena  purchased  her  land  from  Usha  Kumari  

vide sale  deed  dated  07.07.1972  and  the  area  of  land  

which was purchased by her was only 400 sq. yards. Usha  

Kumari  had  earlier  purchased  the  land  from Khatedar,  

Narpat Singh. The total area of land of Raja Narpat Singh  

that was acquired was  872.22 sq. yards whereas he was  

given an area of plot of 1,000 sq. yards  as an alternative  

plot,  which  itself  proves  and  establishes  how  some  

government officers got together to give undue benefit to  

unscrupulous  person  and  were  thereby  trying  to  cause  

wrongful loss to the government of their assets.

39.There were many such awardees who were being given  

more land as an alternative to the area of the land which  

was  sought  to  be  acquired  by  issuing  the  notification  

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under Section 4. There were 12 awardees who also entered  

into compromise and they were awarded plots of land in  

additional to mandatory compensation as under:

S.No .

Name  of  the  Awardee

Sl.  No.  of  the Land

Area  of  Land  (in  sq.yards)

The  area  of  plot  to  be  given  in  addition  to  cash  compensati on  as  per  the award

1. Sh.  Radhuveer  Singh

50 1361 1500

2. Sh.  Ram  Lal/Pokhermal

27 2108 2000

3. Sh.  Raja  Narpat Singh

36 872.22 1000

4. Smt.  Sharda  Dhapar

54 1097 1000

5. Smt.  Jyotsna  Kumari

28 2089 2000

6. Sr.  Tulsi  Vishnoi

48 2166 2000

7. Sr.  Rameshwari  Sethi

33 2658 2000

8. Amrit  Chain  Kumari

29 2089 2000

9. Madhu  and  Vibhu Kashyap

60 2166 2000

10. Alok  Prasad  Mathur

52 298 500

11. B.P. Bhatnagar 500

40. Incidentally,  Raja  Narpat  Singh  who  was  the  original  

Khatedar and from whom Usha Kumari purchased land of  

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which  Pushpa  Saxena  purchased  about  400  sq.  yards,  

approached the  Supreme Court  but  he  himself  was not  

allotted  any  plot  of  land  whereas  Pushpa  Saxena,  who  

purchased the land from Usha Kumari, is now seeking for  

allotment of alternative land at least to the extent of 250  

sq. yards.  

41. In so far as the claim of Dr. S.K. Sharma is concerned, his  

case  is  similar  to  that  of  Kamla  Mehta  whose  case  is  

disposed by the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan  

dated 2nd June, 2000. Dr. S.K. Sharma purchased the land  

from Rajendra Singh whose area of land that was acquired  

was 3508 sq. yards as against which there was an order  

for  allotment  of  alternative  land of  an area of  2000 sq.  

yards.  Kamla Mehta,  out of  the anticipated allotment of  

land  measuring  1500  sq.  yards  in  favour  of  Raghubir  

Singh,  entered  into  an  agreement  for  allotment  of  land  

measuring 375 sq. yards. She has lodged her claim on the  

basis of documents like receipt and the alleged agreement  

to sale and she put forth her request for allotment of land  

in her favour on the basis of such anticipated allotment.

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42.The decision to allot alternative plot of land was given by  

the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  in  the  absence  of  any  

supporting law to support  such claim on the ground of  

alleged rehabilitation of the person whose land is sought to  

be acquired by the Government.  

43.Necessarily,  none  of  the  aforesaid  awardees,  namely,  

Pushpa Saxena, Kamla Mehta and Dr. S.K. Sharma falls  

into  the  aforesaid category.  When they  entered into  the  

agreements  to  sale  there  was  no  allotment  of  land  in  

favour of the vendors and there was just an anticipated  

and possible action of allotment of some alternative land  

either  to  the  vendors  or  the  Khatedars  from whom the  

vendors  purchased  through  agreement  to  sell.  While  

ordering for allotment of land in favour of such persons  

the concerned officers misused their position and the trust  

reposed on them. In any case, as of now, there is neither  

vacant land available in the Lal Kothi area nor are any of  

the  aforesaid  respondents-claimants  is  entitled  to  

allotment of any alternative land.  

44. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, and  

our discussion in Civil Appeal 8590 of 2003, we find that  

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the cases of the Respondents are devoid of any merit. We,  

therefore,  hold  that  the  directions  for  payment  of  

compensation and allotment of land under the Rajasthan  

Land Acquisition Act to the Respondents are illegal  and  

without  jurisdiction  as  the  award  passed  by  the  land  

acquisition  officer  was  only  an  offer  which  itself  was  a  

nullity.  They are not entitled to an allotment of 250 sq.  

yards of plot, for any direction to allot such plot of land  

could amount to unjust enrichment of a person who had  

sought to bind the Government, although, in law no such  

binding  effect  came  into  existence  as  the  land  already  

vested in the Government. If any one of them has paid the  

charges for allotment of alternative land they can only get  

back  the  same  from the  competent  authority,  in  which  

case, they shall be paid interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a  

from the date of the deposit of the amount till the date of  

the payment.  

...............………………………J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

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..…...............………………..J.   [Anil R. Dave ]

New Delhi, September 21, 2010.

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