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PETITIONER: JAI PRAKASH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/02/1991

BENCH: REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) BENCH: REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) FATHIMA BEEVI, M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 SCR  (1) 202        1991 SCC  (2)  32  JT 1991 (1)   288        1991 SCALE  (1)114

ACT:      Indian Penal Code-Section 300 Clause Thirdly,  302-Held ‘intention’ if established as ingredient-Offence  would   be murder-‘intention’     ‘motive’,      ‘knowledge’-Difference explained-Words ‘intention’-‘Knowledge’ in Section  300-True meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant, had illicit connection with  Agya  Devi (P.W.  3),  wife of the deceased and in that  connection  he used  to  visit  her  house quit  frequently  to  which  the deceased and his two brothers & mother living separately  in the  adjacent house used to object.  It may be pointed  that the  Agya  Devi  was related to the  appellant’s  wife.   On August 18, 1973, at about 11 p.m. when the deceased was  not in  house,  the  appellant  came  to  visit  Agya  Devi.   A shortwhile  later,  the  deceased  also  came  home  and  he objected  to  the  presence of the  appellant  whereupon  an altercation  and  exchange of hot words ensued  between  the appellant and the deceased.  The appellant took out a kirpan (chhurra)  from  his waist and stabbed the deceased  in  the chest.   The deceased fell down  crying that  the  appellant has killed him and the appellant fled away with the  weapon. the incident was witnessed by Agya Devi (P.W. 3) and P.W. 2, deceased’s  brother  from  the  roof  of  the  house.    The deceased  died as a result of the injury.   The  prosecution was  thereupon  launched  against  the  appellant  and   the prosecution  examined and amongst others P.W. 2 and P.W.  3. P.W.  3 turned hostile, with the result the prosecution  was left  with  only  P.W. 2 (brother of the  deceased)  as  eye witness.   The trial court relied on the evidence of P.W.  2 and  also  held that his evidence was  corroborated  by  the P.Ws. 1 and 5 and recorded the conviction under section 302, I.P.C.  and  sentenced  him to  imprisonment  for  life  for causing the death of Champat Rai, the deceased, which  order was  later affirmed  by the Delhi High Court.   Hence   this appeal by the appellant, after obtaining special leave.  The main  contention  of  the  appellant is  that  even  if  the prosecution case is to be accepted, an offence of murder  is not  made  out as the accused was entitled to the  right  of private defence; even otherwise the accused having inflicted

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only one injury which proved fatal, the offence would be one amounting to culpable homicide.                                                        203 Dismissing the appeal, this Court,      HELD:  ‘Intention’  is  different  from  ‘‘motive’   or ignorance  or  ‘‘negligence’.   It  is  the  ‘knowledge’  or ‘intention’  with  which  that  act  is  done   that   makes difference,  in arrival at a conclusion whether the  offence is  culpable homicide or murder. [208-E]      The language of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 speaks of intention  at two places and in each the sequence is  to  be established  by the prosecution before the can can  fall  in that Clause.  The ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ of the accused are  subjective  and  invisible states  of  mind  and  their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the  weapon used, the ferocity  of attack,  multiplicity  of injuries  and  all  other  surrounding  circumstances.   The framers  of the Code designedly used the  words  ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences  which  may result in doing an act is  not  the same  thing as the intention that such  consequences  should ensue.   Firstly,  when an act is done by a  person,  it  is presumed  that  he  ,  must have  been  aware  that  certain specified  harmful consequences would or could follow.   But the  knowledge is bare awareness and not the same  thing  as ‘intention’   that  such  consequences  should  ensue.    As compared to ‘knowledge’, ‘intention’ requires something more than  the  mere foresight of the  consequences,  namely  the purposely   doing  of  a  thing  to  achieve  a   particular end.[211H-212C]      ‘Knowledge’  as contrasted with ‘intention’  signify  a state of mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness   of  certain facts in which  human  mind  remains supine  or  inactive.  On the other hand, ‘intention’  is  a conscious  state in which mental faculties are aroused  into actively  and  summoned  into action  for  the  purpose   of achieving a conceived end. [213B-C]      The   circumstances   would  show  that   the   accused intentionally  inflicted  that injury though it may  not  be pre-mediated  one.   All the circumstances  would  certainly indicate   such  a state of mind namely that  he  aimed  and inflicted that injury with a deadly weapon.  In the  absence of  evidence  or reasonable  explanation to  show  that  the appellant  did not intend to stab in the  chest with  kirpan with that degree of force sufficient to penetrate the heart, it  would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend  to inflict   that   injury  that  he  did.    When   once   the ingredient ‘intention’ is established then the offence would be  murder as the intended injury is found to be  sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.   Therefore an offence of murder  is made out. [218D-E]                                                        204      Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1984] 2 SCC 133; Jagrup Singh  v. State of Haryana, [1981] 3 SCC 616; Randhir  Singh v. State of Punjab [1981] 4 SCC 484; Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab,  [1981]  4 SCC 245; Hari Ram v.  State  of  Haryana, [1983] 1 SCC 193; Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983]  2 SCC 342; Ram Sunder v. State of U.P., Crl. Appeal No. 555/83 decided  on  24.10.1983;  Chahat Khan v.  State  of  Haryana [1972] 3 SCC 408; Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya  Pradesh, AIR 1954  SC 652; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 2 SCR 1140;  Harjinder Singh alias Jinda  v. Delhi admn.,  [1968] 2 SCR 246; Laxman Kalu Nikalji v. State of Maharashtra, [1968] 3 SCR 685; Gurmail Singh and Ors.  v. State of Punjab, [1982] 2 SCC 185, referred to.

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    Virsa  Singh  v.  State of  Punjab,  [1958]  SCR  1495, followed.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal  No. 50 of 1979.      From   the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.1977  of  the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1975.      R.K.  Garg, R.K. Jain,  Ranjan Mahapatra and P.K.  Jain for the Appellant.      V.C.  Mahajan,  Ashok Bhan (NP) and Ms.  A.  Subhashini (NP) for the Respondent.      The Judgment of  the Court  was delivered by      K.  JAYACHANDRA  REDDY,  J.  The  appellant,  the  sole accused in this case, has been convicted  under Section  302 I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment  for life  by the  High Court  of Delhi for causing the murder of one  Champat  Rai, the deceased in the case.      The  prosecution case mainly rests on the  evidence  of P.W.  2,  the  sole eye-witness.  Learned  counsel  for  the appellant  contended  that the uncorroborated  testimony  of P.W.  2 is not wholly reliable and therefore the  conviction cannot  be sustained.  However, we may at this  stage  point out  that  the  main submission has been that  even  if  the prosecution case is to be accepted, an offence of murder  is not  made  out as the accused was entitled to the  right  of private  defence.  Even otherwise, according to the  learned counsel, having regard to the fact that as the appellant  is alleged to have inflicted only a single injury which  proved fatal,  the  offence  committed would be  one  amounting  to culpable   homicide.  To appreciate these submissions  in  a proper perspective, we                                                        205 think it necessary to state the facts of the case.      The deceased was married to Agya Devi examined as  P.W. 3.  He lived with his wife in a house in East   Azad  Nagar, Shahdra,  Delhi.   In the adjoining  house were  living  his mother,  P.W.  1  and his two brothers P.Ws 2  and  5.   The appellant  was married to a cousin of Agya Devi, P.W. 3  and he used  to visit the house of the deceased ostensibly as  a relative.   The  deceased, P.Ws 1,2 and 5  objected  to  the appellant’s  visit  as  they  suspected   illicit   relation between  the  appellant and Agya Devi P.W. 3,  wife  of  the deceased.   On  August 18, 1973 at about 11  P.M.  when  the deceased was not in the house , the appellant  came to visit Agya Devi.  A few minutes later the deceased also came  home and  he objected to the presence of the appellant.  On  this there  was an altercation and exchange of hot  words.   Then the appellant  took out a kirpan (churra) from his waist and stabbed  the deceased in the chest.  The deceased fell  down crying  that  the appellant has killed him.   The  appellant with  the  weapon ran out of the house.   The  incident  was witnessed  by P.W. 2 from the roof where he had retired  for sleeping  during the night.  P.W. 2 and his another  brother P.W.  5  chased the appellant but as the appellant  who  was armed   with a lethal weapon threatened them and  made  good his escape.  On return they found the deceased dead.  P.W. 3 was  sitting   next  to  the  body  and  was  crying.    The information  was  sent to the police and P.W. 18,  the  Sub- Inspector,  Kotwali  Police Station  came to the  scene   of occurrence and recorded the statement of P.W. 2 on the basis of  which   the case was registered against  the  appellant. He  seized certain incriminating articles, held the  inquest

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and  sent the dead body for post-mortem.  He  also  recorded the   statement  of  the  material  witness.   One  of   the recoveries made by him consisted of a sheath of the  kirpan. The  Doctor, P.W. 17, examined the dead body  and  conducted the  post-mortem.   He found one incised stab wound  on  the left  chest  which  proved fatal.  The  particulars  of  the injury are:-             (1) One incised stab wound, horizontally placed          on the (L) side of the chest 1" lateral to the left            side and 2" below and medial to the (L_) Nipple          size 1" x 1/2" x with spindle shaped appearance          and with either margins pointed.  The margins   of          the wound were smooth and the collection of blood          in the soft tissues.             (2)  One  incised  wound   over  right  little          finger  at the base of second   phalynx  on  dorcal          surface size 3/4" x  4/10" x  bone  deep.  There is          collection  of blood in the soft tissues and  there          was cut                                                        206          mark  on  the base of second phalnyx  right  little          finger.   The  wound was bandaged with a  piece  of          bandage  and cotton soiled in blood.  The wound  is          not spindle shaped in appearance.  The margins were          smooth.   This injury was a simple one and not  due          to a separate blow.      The  Doctor opined the injury  NO.1 was sufficient   to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.  The cause  of death  was  haomorrhage  and shock  due  to  injuries.   The accused  was  arrested on 28.8.73 and at  his  instance  the kirpan    was   recovered.    After   completion   of    the investigation,  the  charge-sheet  was  laid.   The  accused pleaded not guilty and denied the recoveries.      The  prosecution  examined P.W. 2, the brother  of  the deceased  and P.W. 3 Agya Devi, wife of the  deceased.   But P.W.  3  turned hostile.  Consequently the  prosecution  was left  with  the  testimony of P.W.  2,  the  remaining  eye- witness.   Both the courts below relied on the  evidence  of P.W. 2 and they also held that his evidence was corroborated by that of P.Ws 1 and 5.      As hereinbefore mentioned, the learned counsel for  the appellant submitted that the evidence of P.W. 2 on which the case  entirely  rests,  cannot be accepted.   We  have  gone through  his evidence carefully as well as that of  P.Ws.  1 and  5.   The evidence of P.W. w does not  suffer  from  any serious   infirmity.    At   any   rate   there   is   other corroborative evidence also.  We see absolutely no reason to disagree  with  the findings of the courts  below  regarding their evidence.      The  learned  counsel,  however,  submitted  that   the accused must have acted in right of self-defence.  According to  the  learned counsel, P.W. 2 himself  has  deposed  that there  was exchange of hot words between the  appellant  and the  deceased which would have resulted in a fight  and  the appellant having reasonably apprehended danger to his  life, inflicted  the injury on the deceased in  self-defence.   We see  no  basis  for this submission.  P.W. 2  has  no  doubt stated  that  there was exchange of hot  words  between  the appellant  and the deceased but he did not speak  about  any fight between the two.  On the other hand his evidence shows that when the deceased came and questioned the accused  then there  was exchange of hot words.  The  accused  immediately took  out a kirpan (churra) from his waist and  stabbed  the deceased.  Both the courts below also have  rightly rejected this  plea.  Therefore we see absolutely no grounds to  come

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to a different conclusion.                                                        207      The  next  and rather the main submission is  that  the offence  committed  by the appellant would  only  amount  to culpable   homicide  inasmuch as he has inflicted  only  one injury.  In support of his submission, he relied on some  of the  decisions of this Court.  In Tholan v. State  of  Tamil Nadu, [1984] 2 SCC 133 the accused who dealt a single  knife below  on the chest found to be sufficient to  cause  death, was convicted  under Section 304 Part II I.P.C., disagreeing with the  contention on behalf of the State that Clause  III of Section 300 I.P.C. would be attracted in such a case.  In arriving  at  such  a  conclusion,  this  Court  took   into consideration various surrounding circumstances namely  that the  presence of the deceased at the scene of occurence  was wholly accidental and that the accused dealt only one  blow. It  must  also be mentioned that the deceased,  who   was  a stranger  in that case, came out of his house and  cautioned the  accused  not to indulge in abusive language  as  ladies were present in that area.  The accused thereupon questioned him  and when both were remonstrating, he took out  a  knife from his waist and stabbed the deceased on the right side of the chest.  On these facts, this Court held:          "We  are satisfied that even if Exception I is  not          attracted,   the  requisite  intention  cannot   be          attributed   to   the  appellant.    But   in   the          circumstances herein  discussed he wielded a weapon          like  a  knife and therefore he can  be  attributed          with  the knowledge that he was likely to cause  an          injury which was likely to cause death.  In such  a          situation,  he  would  be guilty of  committing  an          offence  under  Section 304 Part II of  the  Indian          Penal Code."      In  support  of this view, reliance is placed  on  some earlier  decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh v. State  of Haryana, [1981] 3 SCC 616; Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, [1981]  4 SCC 484; Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, [1981]  4 SCC  245;  Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, [1983] 1  SCC  193; Jagtar  Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 SCC 342  and  Ram Sunder  v.  State  of  U.P.,  Criminal  Appeal  No.   555/83 decided  on 24.10.1983.  The learned counsel submitted  that the  observations made in these cases apply on all fours  to the  facts  of this case.  According to him,  there  was  an altercation  and  during  the same  the  appellant  suddenly whipped out a kirpan and inflicted only one injury and it is therefore  reasonable  to  infer  that  he  would  not  have intended  to cause that particular injury  and  consequently Clause  Thirdly  of  Section  300  is  not  attracted.   The submission  though put forward in a simple way leads  to  an important  legal  quandary regarding the  interpretation  of Clause  Thirdly  Section  300  I.P.C.  which  is  considered be a                                                        208 difficult and interact issue by the courts.  However,  Virsa Singh  v. State of Punjab, [1958] SCR 1495 is considered  to be  an  authoritative  pronouncement in  this  regard.   But perhaps   inspired  by  some  of  the   decisions   rendered thereafter  both  by the High Courts and the  Supreme  Court there  is  a marked change in the trend of  the  contentions regarding the scope of Clause Thirdly Section 300 I.P.C.  It has  reached  a  stage over simplification and  it  is  very often argued that whenever death is due to a single blow the offence  would  be  a  culpable  homicide  and  not  murder. Somewhat to the same effect is the contention in the instant case.

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    In our view it is fallacious to contend that when death is  caused by a single blow Clause Thirdly is not  attracted and therefore it would not amount to murder.  The ingredient ‘Intention’ in that Clauses is very important and that gives the clue in a given case whether offence involved is  murder or not.  For the purpose of considering the scope of  Clause 3 it is not necessary  for us to embark  upon an examination of  the  entire scope of Section  299 and 300 I.P.C.  It  is enough if we start with Virsa Singh’s case.  Clause  Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C. reads thus:           "3rdly-If it is done with the intention of causing          bodily  injury to any person and the bodily  injury          intended  to  be  inflicted is  sufficient  in  the          ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-" We  may  note at this stage that ‘intention’   is  different from  ‘motive’  or ‘ignorance’ or ‘negligence’.  It  is  the ‘knowledge’  or ‘intention’ with which the act is done  that makes  difference, in arriving at a conclusion  whether  the offence  is culpable homicide or murder.  Therefore,  it  is necessary  to know the meaning of these expressions as  used in  these provisions.  Before doing so we shall first  refer to the  to the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh’s case and the meaning given to the expression ‘intention’.      The appellant Virsa Singh was sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C.  There was only one injury on  the  deceased and that was attributed to  him.   It  was caused as a result of the spear thrust and the Doctor opined that  the injury was  sufficient in the ordinary  course  of nature  to  cause death.  The Courts also   found  that  the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a chance of meeting. Peritonit is also supervened which hastened the death of the deceased.   It  was contended that the prosecution  has  not proved  that  there  was an intention to  inflict  a  bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in                                                        209 the ordinary course of nature and therefore the offence  was not  one  of murder.  This contention was  rejected.   After analysing  the Clause Thirdly it is held the Court that  the prosecution must prove:          "First, it must establish, quite  objectively,  that          a bodily injury is present;               Secondly,  the  nature of the injury  must  be          proved; there are purely objective investigations.               Thirdly,  it must be proved that there was  an          intention to inflict that particular bodily injury,          that  is  to  say, that it was  not  accidental  or          unintentional,  or that some other kind  of  injury          was intended.               Once  these  three elements are proved  to  be          present, the enquiry proceeds further and,               Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of          the  type  just  described made  up  of  the  three          elements set out above is sufficient to cause death          in the ordinary course of nature.  This part of the          enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has          nothing to do with the intention of the offender." The Court Further added thus:          "One  of these four elements is established by  the          prosecution  (and, of course, the burden is on  the          prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under          Sec. 300, 3rdly.  It does not matter that there was          no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that          is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course          of nature (not that there is  any real  distinction          between  the  two).  It does not even  matter  that

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        there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will          be  likely to cause death.  Once the  intention  to          cause  the  bodily  injury  actually  found  to  be          present  is  proved,  the rest of  the  enquiry  is          purely  objective and the only question is whether,          as  a  matter of  purely objective  inference,  the          injury  is  sufficient in the  ordinary  course  of          of nature to cause death.  No one has a licence  to          run around inflicting injuries that are  sufficient          to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and          claim that they are not guilty of murder.  If  they          inflict  injuries of that kind, they must face  the          consequences; and they can                                                        210          only  escape  if  it can be  shown,  or  reasonably          deduced   that  the   injury  was   accidental   or          otherwise  unintentional."                                         (emphasis supplied) The learned Judge also observe thus:          "In   the  absence  of  evidence,   or   reasonable          explanation,  that the prisoner did not  intend  to          stab   in  the  stomach  with  a  degree  of  force          sufficient to penetrate that far into the body,  or          to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident          and  that  he  intended  otherwise,  it  would   be          perverse  to  conclude that he did  not  intend  to          inflict  the injury that he did.  Once that  intent          is   established   (and  no  other  conclusion   is          reasonable possible in this case and in any case it          is  a question of fact), the rest is a  matter  for          objective determination from the medical and  other          evidence  about the nature and seriousness  of  the          injury." Adverting  to  the contention that there is  only  a  single blow, it is further held:          "The question is not whether the prisoner  intended          to  inflict a serious injury or a trivial  one  but          whether  he intended to inflict the injury that  is          proved to be present.  If  he can show that he  did          not,  or  if  the  totality  of  the  circumstances          justify  such  an inference, then, of  course,  the          intend  that  the section requires is  not  proved.          But  if there is nothing beyond the injury and  the          fact  that  the appellant inflicted  it,  the  only          possible  inference is that he intended to  inflict          it.   Whether  he  knew  of  its  seriousness,   or          intended serious consequences, it neither here  nor          there.   The question, so far as the  intention  is          concerned,  is not whether he intended to kill,  or          to  inflicit  an injury of a particular  degree  of          seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the          injury  in question; and once the existence of  the          injury is proved the intention to cause it will  be          presumed  unless the evidence or the  circumstances          warrant  an opposite conclusion.  But  whether  the          intention  is there or not is one of fact  and  not          one  of  law.   Whether the  wound  is  serious  or          otherwise,  and  if  serious,  how  serious,  is  a          totally  separate  and distinct  question  and  has          nothing  to  do  with  the  question  whether   the          prisoner   intended  to  inflict  the   injury   in          question."                                                        211 At  another  passage which has to be noted in  this  context reads thus:

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        "It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be          linked up with the seriousness of the injury.   For          example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of          the  circumstances justify an inference,  that  the          prisoner  only intended a superficial  scratch  and          that  by accident his victim stumbled and  fell  on          the  sword or spear that was used, then  of  course          the offence is not murder.  But that is not because          the  prisoner did not intended the injury that   he          intended  to inflict to be a serious as  it  turned          out to be but because he did not intend  to inflict          the  injury  in question at all. His  intention  in          such a case would be to inflict a totally different          injury.   The difference is not one of law but  one          of  fact; and whether the conclusion should be  one          way  or  the  other is a  matter  of  proof,  where          necessary,   by  calling  in  aid  all   reasonable          inferences  of  fact  in  the  absence  of   direct          testimony.   It  is  not  one  for  guesswork   and          fanciful conjecture.      Referring  to these observations, Divisional  Bench  of this Court in Jagrup Singh’s case observed thus:          "These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have  become          locus  classicus.   The  test laid  down  in  Virsa          Singh’s  case  for  the  applicability  of   clause          Thirdly  is now ingrained in our legal  system  and          has become part of the rule of law." The  Division Bench also further held that the  decision  in Virsa  singh’s case has throughout been followed  as  laying down  the  guiding principles.  In both these  cases  it  is clearly  laid down that the prosecution must prove (1)  that the  body  injury  is  present,  (2)  that  the  injury   is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause  death, (3)  that  the accused intended to inflict  that  particular injury that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or  that some other kind of injury was intended.   In  other words the 3rd Clause consists of two parts.  The first  part is that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said injury is  sufficient  to  cause death in the  ordinary  course  of nature.   Under the first part the prosecution has to  prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the  accused was to cause that particular  injury.   whereas the second part whether it was sufficient to cause the death is  an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference  or deduction from the particulars of the injury.  The  language of Clause Thirdly of Section 300                                                        212 speaks  of intention at two places and in each the  sequence is to be established by the prosecution before the case  can fall in that Clause.  The ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ of the accused are subjective and invisible state of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances, such as the, weapon used, the ferocity of attack,   multiplicity  of injuries  and  all  other  surrounding  circumstances.   The framers  of the code designedly used the  words  ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences  which  may result in doing an act is  not  the samething  as  the intention that such  consequences  should ensue.   Firstly,  when an act is done by a  person,  it  is presumed  that  he,  must  have  been  aware  that   certain specified  harmful consequences would or could follow.   But that  knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing  as intention that such consequences should ensue.  As  compared to ‘knowledge’, ‘intention’ requires something more than the

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mere  foresight of the consequences, namely  the  purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end.      Kenny  in  "Outline of Criminal Law" (17th  Edition  at page 31) has observed:          "Intention:  To intend is to have in mind  a  fixed          purpose  to  reach  a desire  objective;  the  noun          ‘intention’  in the present connexion  is  used  to          denote  the  state of mind of a man  who  not  only          forsees but also desires the possible  consequences          of  his  conduct.  Thus if one man  throws  another          from  a  high tower or cuts off his head  it  would          seem  plain  that the both  foresees  the  victim’s          death  and  also  desires it: the  desire  and  the          foresight  will  also  be  the  same  if  a  person          knowingly  leaves  a  helpless  invalid  or  infant          without  nourishment  or  other  necessary  support          until death supervenes. It will be noted that there          cannot be intention unless there is also foresight,          since  a man must decide to his  own  satisfaction,          and  accordingly  must foresee, that to  which  his          express purpose is directed.              Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless          he  desires to do it.  It may well be a thing  that          he  dislikes doing, but he dislikes still more  the          consequences  of his not doing it.  That is to  say          he desires the lesser of two evils, and  therefore,          has made up his mind to bring about that one." Russel on Crime (12th Edition at Page 41) has observed:                                                        213          "In  the present analysis of the mental element  in          crime  the word ‘intention’ is used to  denote  the          mental attitude of a man who has resolved to  bring          about  a certain result if he can possibly  do  so.          He  shapes his line of conduct so as to  achieve  a          particular end at which he aims." it can thus  be seen that the ‘knowledge’ as contrasted with ‘intention’  signify a state of mental realisation with  the bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in  which human  mind remains  supine or inactive.  On the  otherhand, ‘intention’  is a conscious state in which mental  faculties are  aroused into activity and summoned into action for  the purpose  of achieving a conceived end.  it means shaping  of one’s  conduct  so  as  to  bring  about  a  certain  event. Therefore  in the case of ‘intention’ mental  faculties  are projected   in   a  set  direction.   Intention   need   not necessarily involve premediation.  Whether there is such  an intention  or not is a question of fact.  In Clause  Thirdly the  words  "intended to be inflicted"  are  singnificant.l; As  noted  already,  when a person commits  an  act,  he  is presumed to expect the natural consequences.   But from  the mere  fact  that  the injury caused  is  sufficient  in  the ordinary  course  of  nature  to cause  death  it  does  not necessarily  follow that the offender intended to cause  the injury of that nature.  However, the presumption arises that he  intended  cause  that  particular  injury.   In  such  a situation the  Court has to ascertain whether the facts  and circumstances  in  the  case  are  such  as  to  rebut   the presumption and such facts and circumstances cannot be  laid down  in  an abstract rule and they will vary from  case  to case.   However,  as pointed out in Virsa Singh’s  case  the weapon  used, the degree of force released in  wielding  it, the antecedent relation of the parties, the manner in  which the  attack was made that is to say sudden or  premeditated, whether  the  injury  was inflicted  during  a  struggle  or grappling, the number of injuries inflicted and their nature

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and the part of the body where the injury was inflicted  are some of the relevant factors.  These and other factors which may  arise  in  a case have to be considered  and  if  on  a totality  of  these circumstances a doubt arises as  to  the nature of the offence, the benefit has to go to the accused. In  some cases, an explanation may be there by  the  accused like    exercise  of  right  of  private  defence   or   the circumstances  also may indicate the same.   Likewise  there may  be circumstances in some cases which attract the  first exception.  In such cases different considerations arise and the  Court has to decide whether the accused is entitled  to the  benefit  of  the  exception,  though   the  prosecution established  that  one or the other clauses of  Section  300 I.P.C.  is attracted.  In the present enquiry  we  need  not advert to that aspect since we are concerned only with scope of clause  Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C.                                                        214      The decision in Virsa Singh’s case has throughout  been followed in a number of cases by the High Courts as well  as by the Supreme Court.  Such decisions are too numerous   and it may not be necessary  for us to refer to all those cases. However,  it  would be useful to refer to  a  few  decisions which have a bearing to the point in issue.  In Chahat  Khan v.  State  of  Haryana, [1972] 3 SCC 408  the  deceased  was waylaid  by  the accused who were armed  with  lathis.   The accused had both gun and a lathi but he used only the  lathi and struck a blow on the head with sufficient force and  the solitary below with the lathi was found to be sufficient  in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was held that the case fell within clause Thirdly as there was  clear intention to cause such bodily injury which in the  ordinary course  of nature was sufficient to cause death.  In  Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 652 there was exchange  of  abuses  between the two  parties  armed   with lathis  and in the course of the fight, the  accused  struck one  lathi blow on the head of the deceased which  causes  a fracture  of the skull resulting in death, and it  was  held that  he had given the blow  with the knowledge that it  was likely to cause death.  In Willie (Williams) Slaney v. State of  Madhya  Pradesh, [1952] 2 SCR 1140 there  was  a  sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and in the heat  of the  moment  a solitary blow with a hockey  stick  had  been given on the head.  It was held that the offence amounted to culpable  homicide  punishable  under Section  304  Part  II I.P.C.    In Harjinder Singh (alias Jinda) v.  Delhi  Admn., [1968]  2  SCR  246 the facts are that there  was  a  sudden commotion and when the deceased intervened in the fight, the accused  took out a knife and stabbed the deceased  and  the deceased  was in crouching position presumably to  intervene when  he  received the blow.  Though the  injury  was  found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death., he was convicted for the offence of culpable homicide.   The intention  to cause that particular injury was not  present. To the same effect is the decision in Laxman Kalu Nikalji v. State  of  Maharashtra, [1968] 3 SCR 685 where  the  accused lost  his  temper  and took out a knife and  gave  one  blow during a sudden quarrel.      In  all these cases the approach has been to  find  out whether  the  ingredient namely the intention to  cause  the particular  injury  was present or not and it is  held  that circumstances  like a sudden quarrel in a fight or when  the deceased  intervenes in such a fight, would create  a  doubt about the ingredient of intention as it cannot definitely be said  in such circumstances that the accused aimed the  blow at a particular part of the body.  When an accused  inflicts

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a  blow  with  a deadly weapon the presumption  is  that  he intended to inflict that injury but                                                        215 there  may be circumstances like those, as mentioned  above, which  rebut  such presumption and throw a doubt  about  the application  of clause Thirdly.  Of course much  depends  on the  facts  and  circumstances of each  case.   Now  let  us examine  some of the cases relied upon the  learned  counsel for the appellant.      In Kulwant Rai’s case a Bench consisting of D.A.  Desai and R.B. Misra, JJ. held in a hit and run case that where it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict the very fatal  injury, clause Thirdly is not attracted.  That was  a case  were  only one blow was given with the dagger  in  the epigastrium area and the facts would  go to show that  there was no pre-meditation, no prior enmity and  a short  quarrel preceded   the  assault.   However,  we  do  not  find   any discussion  about  the  scope of  clause  Thirdly.   Randhir Singh’s case was decided by a Bench consisting of D.A. Desai and Baharul Islam,  JJ.  In that case, a single head  injury was  inflicted by a college student on the deceased  with  a weapon  supplied by his father and the deceased  died  after six days and there also an assault was preceded by a quarrel between  the  father of the accused and the  deceased.   The Bench observed that:          "Merely  because  the blow landed on  a  particular          spot on the body divorced from the circumstances in          which the  blow was given it would be hazardous  to          say  that  the  accused  intended  to  cause   that          particular injury.   The weapon was not handy.   He          did  not  possess  one.   Altercation  took   place          between  his  father and the deceased and  he  gave          blow  with  -  kassi.   In  our  opinion  in  these          circumstances it would be difficult to say that the          accused intended to cause that particular injury." Before the same Bench, in Gurmail Singh and others v.  State of Punjab, [1982] 3  SCC 185 this question again came up for consideration.   In that case, an indecent joke cut  by  the accused  with  the wife of a P.W. led to a quarrel  and  the deceased who was nowhere in the picture tried to  intervene, two  of  the accused gave some blow on  him.   Then  Gurmail Singh, the appellant therein, gave a single blow with  spear on  the chest which proved fatal.  It was contended  by  the State that clause Thirdly of Section 300 I.P.C was attracted. it is observed that:          "But it was said that the case would be covered  by          Para  3  of  Section  300  in  that  Gurmail  Singh          intended to cause an injury and the injury intended          to be inflicted was proved to                                                        216          be  sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to          cause  death.   This argument is often  raised  for          consideration by this Court and more often reliance          is placed on Virsa Singh v. State of  Punjab,[1958]          SCR 1495.  We would have  gone into the question in          detail  but  in Jagrup Singh v.  State  of  Haryana          [1981]  3 SCC 616, Sen. J. after examining all  the          previous decisions on the subject, observed that in          order  to bring the case within Para 3  of  Section          300,  I.P.C., it must be proved that there  was  an          intention to inflict that particular bodily  injury          which   in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature   was          sufficient  to cause death.  This view was  further          affirmed in a decision rendered in Randhir Singh v.          State  of Punjab, [1981 4 SCC 484.  We are  of  the

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        opinion  that in the facts found by the High  Court          it  could not be said that accused 1 Gurmail  singh          intended  to  cause that particular  bodily  injury          which in fact was found to have been caused.          May be, the injury inflicted may have been found to          be a sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to          cause  death.  What ought to be found is  that  the          injury found to be  present was the injury that was           intended to be inflicted.  It is difficult to  say          that with confidence in the present case keeping in          view the facts found by the High Court that accused          1  Gurmail Singh intended to cause the very  injury          which was found to be fatal." Therefore this decision also affirms the view taken in Virsa Singh’s case.  Then came the decision in Jagtar Singh’s case rendered  by a Bench consisting of D.A.Desai  and  Amarendra Nath  Sen,  JJ.   In  that case  a  single  knife  blow  was inflicted in the chest and it was found to be sufficient  in the  ordinary  course of nature to cause death.   The  Bench held  that  clause  Thirdly was not  attracted  in  view  of circumstances  i.e. there the accused was a  young  man  and inflicted  the  injury on the spur of the  moment  and  some extent on deceased’s provocation in a sudden chance  quarrel and  on a trivial issue.  The Bench observed that:          "The  cause  of  quarrel though  trivial  was  just          sudden and in this background the appellant, a very          young  man gave one blow.  He could not be  imputed          with the intention to cause death or the  intention          to  cause  that  particular  injury  which   proved          fatal." In  this case, there is no reference to Virsa  Singh’s  case but there is a                                                        217 references  to Jagrup Singh’s case which decision, as  noted already, has followed the ratio in Virsa singh’s case.      Then  came the decision in Tholan’s case on  which  the counsel  has  heavily relied upon.  In that  case  also  the appellant inflicted only a single knife blow on the chest of the  deceased  sufficient to cause death but it was  on  the spur of the moment.  The Division Bench, consisting of  D.A. Desai  and R.B.Misra, JJ. took into the  consideration  that the  deceased had nothing to do with the chit organised   by one   K.G.  Rajan in respect of which there  was  a  quarrel between  the  appellant and the organisers of the  chit  and when  the accused was abusing the organisers,  the  deceased seemed  to  have told the accused not to  misbehave  in  the presence  of  the ladies and not to use  vulgar  and  filthy language.    The  presence  of  the  deceased   was   wholly accidental  and  the  appellant on the spur  of  the  moment inflicted the fatal injury on the chest.  The Division Bench relying on the earlier decision under similar  circumstances convicted  the  accused  under  Section  304  Part  II.    A reference  is  also made to the decision in  Jagrup  Singh’s case.   Therefore in this case also, the ratio laid down  in Virsa Singh’s case is presumably followed.      In  all these cases, injury by a single blow was  found to  be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death.   The  supreme  Court  took  into  consideration  the circumstances  such  as sudden quarrel,  grappling  etc.  as mentioned  above  only to assess the state  of  mind  namely whether  the accused had the necessary intention   to  cause that particular injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that  such injury only should be the result.  It is held  in all  these cases there was no such intention to  cause  that particular  injury  as in those circumstances,  the  accused

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could  have been barely aware i.e only had knowledge of  the consequences.    These   circumstances   under   which   the appellant  happened  to  inflict the injury it  is  felt  or atleast  a doubt arose that all his mental  faculties  could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve  the particular  result.   We  may  point out  that  we  are  not concerned  with  the intention to cause death in which  case it  will  be  a  murder  simpliciter  unless  exception   is attracted.   We are concerned under clause Thirdly with  the intention   be  cause  that  particular  injury   which   is subjective inquiry and when and when once such intention  is established and if the intended injury is found  objectively to  be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death,  clause Tirdly is attracted and it would  be  murder, unless  one of the exceptions to Section 300  is  attracted. If  on the otherhand this ingredient of ‘intention’  is  not established  or if a reasonable doubt arises in this  regard then  only  it  would be reasonable  to  infer  that  Clause Thirdly is not                                                        218 attracted and that the accused must be attributed  knowledge that  in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause  death in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable  under Section 304 Part II I.P.C.      Bearing  these  principles in mind, if we  examine  the facts  in the  present case, clause Thirdly of  Section  300 I.P.C. is fully attracted.  The appellant was having illicit relation with Agya Devi, wife of the deceased and his visits to  her  house were resented and objected.  On  the  day  of occurence,  the accused visited the house when the  deceased was  not there and he went there armed with a kirpan.   When the  deceased  came and objected to his presence  there  was only  an  altercation and exchange of hot words, and  not  a fight.   Thereupon  he took out a knife and stabbed  on  the chest  of  the deceased resulting instantaneous death of the deceased.   The  above  circumstances would  show  that  the accused  intentionally inflicted that injury though  it  may not be pre-mediated one.  All the above circumstances  would certainly indicate such a state of mind  namely he aimed and inflicted that  injury with a deadly weapon.  As observed in Virsa Singh’s case in the absence of evidence or  reasonable explanation  show that the appellant did not intend to  stab in  the  chest  with  a kirpan with  that  degree  of  force sufficient  to penetrate the heart, it would be perverse  to conclude that he did not intend to inflict that injury  that he did.  When once the ingredient ‘intention’ is established then  the offence would be murder as the intended injury  is found  to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to cause  death.  Therefore an offence of murder is  made  out. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. Y.Lal                                      Appeal dismissed.                                                        219