REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

     CIVIL APPEAL NO……………..OF 2009      ( Arising out of SLP© NO.5627 of 2008)  

Jai Prakash Gupta (D) thr. Lrs.     ...Appellants

Versus

Riyaz Ahamad & Anr.       ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

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1. In spite of repeated opportunities having been granted to  

the respondents to contest this appeal, the respondents had  

failed to appear at the time of hearing.   

2. Leave granted.

3. This  appeal  by  way  of  Special  Leave  arises  from  the  

Judgment and final order of the High Court of Judicature at  

Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.1112 of 2001 dated  

11th of December, 2007, whereby the High Court had set aside  

the  Judgment  and  order  of  the  Additional  District  Judge,  

Meerut and remanded the same to it to consider the effect of  

subsequent  developments  which  had  occurred,  on  the  

question of bonafide requirement of the landlord and also on  

the comparative hardship of the parties.   

4. The brief facts, which are necessary for decision of this  

appeal are as follows :-  

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On 17th of  December,  1992,  the  father  of  the  present  

landlord,  viz.  Late  Sri  Jai  Prakash  Gupta  had  filed  an  

application under Section 21(1)(a)  of  the U.P.  Act No.  13 of  

1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) before the Prescribed  

Authority  at  Meerut  for  the  release  of  the  Shop  No.  51,  

situated at the Ground Floor in House No. 64, Banshipura,  

Suraj Kund Road, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as “the shop  

in dispute”).  It was pleaded in the application for release that  

the landlord required the shop in dispute for his bonafide need  

to use the same as an office space to establish his son in the  

profession of Chartered Accountancy.  It was alleged that the  

tenant was running a big business of ‘Verk’ job in Khairnagar  

in Meerut City and that he would suffer no hardship since he  

had  kept  the  shop  in  dispute  unutilized.   The  tenant  not  

having vacated the shop in dispute which would be required  

for the bonafide requirement of the landlord, the landlord was  

constrained to file the application for release.     

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5. The  tenant  entered  appearance  and  contested  the  

application for release by filing a written objection denying the  

material allegations made in the application for release.  It was  

specifically  denied  that  the  landlord  required  the  shop  in  

dispute for the above mentioned purpose and, therefore, the  

tenant sought for dismissal of the application for release filed  

by the landlord.     

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6. Parties adduced evidence and issues were framed by the  

Prescribed Authority in which one of the issues was whether  

the  landlord  required  the  shop  in  dispute  for  his  bonafide  

requirement for starting an office for his Chartered Accountant  

son.   After  framing  issues  and  after  the  parties  had  led  

evidence in support of their respective claims, the Prescribed  

Authority  rejected  the  application  for  release,  inter  alia,  

holding that since the landlord was in occupation of a space  

available in the first floor, where he along with family members  

are residing, he could very well use the same as the office of  

his Chartered Accountant son and such space, being available  

to the landlord, shall  be sufficient for their requirement.  It  

was further held by the Prescribed Authority that there was no  

need  to  consider  the  case  of  comparative  hardship  of  the  

parties  when bonafide  requirement  of  the  landlord  was  not  

proved.       

7. Aggrieved  by  the  said  decision  of  the  Prescribed  

Authority, the landlord filed an appeal under Section 22 of the  

Act  and on 14th of  December,  2000,  the  Additional  District  

Judge, 11th Court at Meerut, allowed the appeal filed by the  

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landlord and set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority  

inter  alia holding  that  the  landlord  required  the  shop  in  

dispute for the use as mentioned above, as he was of the view  

that it was an appropriate place for the son to start his office  

as  a  Chartered  Accountant.   It  was  further  held  on  

consideration of the materials on record that the tenant would  

not face much hardship if the shop in dispute was released in  

favour  of  the  landlord  since  the  father  of  the  tenant  had  

sufficient  space  for  ‘lathe  work’  in  an  alternative  place.  

Keeping in view the professional requirement of the son of the  

landlord to start his office of chartered accountancy for which  

the landlord needed more space, the order of the Prescribed  

Authority  was set  aside and the application for  release was  

allowed by the Appellate Court.     

8. Aggrieved by this order of the Appellate Court, the tenant  

filed a writ petition, which came to be registered as Civil Misc.  

Writ  Petition  No.  1112  of  2001  before  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature  at  Allahabad.   During  the  pendency  of  the  writ  

petition,  the  original  applicant  for  release  of  the  shop  in  

dispute i.e. the father of the present appellant died and in his  

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place,  the  heirs  and  legal  representatives  of  the  original  

appellant  were  substituted  by  the  High  Court  by  an  order  

dated 25th of August, 2005.  During the pendency of the writ  

petition,  it  was  brought  on  record  that  the  mother  of  the  

appellant and the father of the tenant had also expired.  On  

23rd of May, 2007, the tenant, by a Supplementary Affidavit,  

alleged  that  after  the  death  of  the  original  appellant,  the  

present appellant, Mr. Manoj Kumar Gupta, the only son of  

the original  appellant  (since deceased),  has inherited all  his  

residential and commercial property and, therefore, the alleged  

need of the landlord had become fully satisfied, rendering the  

release  proceeding  infructuous.   The  tenant,  in  the  said  

Supplementary  Affidavit,  further  alleged  that  the  printing  

business  conducted  by  the  deceased  father  of  the  present  

landlord had ceased to exist and consequent thereupon, one  

big  hall  and  two  rooms  came  in  possession  of  the  present  

landlord.   

9.   Replying  to  this  supplementary  affidavit,  the  present  

landlord, by a counter affidavit, however, claimed that in 15  

years  of  litigation,  his  bonafide  need  had  become  more  

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pressing and genuine as he now has two sons aged about 17  

and  16  years  and  one  daughter  aged  about  13  years.  

Moreover, it was alleged in the counter affidavit that his wife  

was running an Education Centre on the first floor of the shop  

in dispute.  It was further alleged in the counter affidavit filed  

by the present landlord that after the death of the father of the  

tenant,  the  tenant  had  inherited  a  house  at  Khairanagar,  

Meerut, in which the tenant and his family members are now  

residing and also carrying on the workshop of ‘lathe machine’.  

Therefore,  the  present  landlord  alleged that  the  subsequent  

developments  brought  in  by  the  tenant  and  the  counter  

affidavit filed by the present landlord, were not at all material  

so as to nullify the need of the landlord.   

10. The writ  petition thereafter came up for hearing before  

the High Court of Allahabad on 11th of December, 2007 and  

the High Court had set aside the Judgment of the Appellate  

Court dated 14th of December, 2000 in view of the subsequent  

developments as noted in the supplementary affidavit filed by  

the tenant and the counter affidavit filed by the appellant and  

remanded the case back to the Appellate Court to consider the  

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effect of such subsequent developments on the bonafide need  

of  the  present  landlord  and  also  on  the  question  of  

comparative hardship of the parties.   

11. Feeling aggrieved, the present landlord has preferred this  

instant Special  Leave Petition, which on grant of  leave,  was  

heard in presence of the learned counsel for the parties.   

12. Before us, the learned counsel appearing for the present  

landlord  contended  that  the  subsequent  developments,  as  

stated in the supplementary affidavit as well as in the counter  

affidavit, were not at all material enough to negate the need of  

the  shop in  dispute  of  the  present  landlord  and,  therefore,  

there was no reason for the High Court in the exercise of its  

Writ Jurisdiction to remand the matter back to the Appellate  

Court, which in no way, can help the cause of justice, rather it  

will  aggravate  the  hardship  of  the  landlord  by delaying  the  

matter  for  another  15  years.   The  learned  counsel  for  the  

landlord  also  submitted  that  the  High  Court,  while  setting  

aside the Judgment of the Additional District Judge, Meerut  

and  remanding  the  matter  to  it,  had  failed  to  record  any  

reason as to why an order of remand was necessary and the  

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findings  already  arrived  at  by  the  Appellate  Court  were  

perverse, apart from relying on the sole subsequent event of  

the death of the parents of the appellant and also the father of  

the tenant along with the fact that the present landlord had  

acquired  house  behind  the  shop  in  dispute  in  a  vacant  

condition.   

13. As  noted  earlier,  no  one  has  entered  appearance  on  

behalf of the tenant at the time of hearing of this appeal to  

controvert the submissions made by the learned counsel for  

the present landlord.   

14. Having carefully examined the submission of the learned  

counsel for the landlord/appellant and after going through the  

impugned  Judgment  of  the  High  Court  as  well  as  of  the  

Appellate  Court  and  also  the  supplementary  affidavit  and  

counter affidavit  filed by the parties and other materials on  

record, we are of the view that the only question that needs to  

be  decided  is,  whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  

remanding the case back for disposal to the Appellate Court  

on  the  sole  reasoning  of  subsequent  developments,  without  

looking at the findings of the Appellate Court and secondly,  

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that even assuming the order of remand was necessary in the  

facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  and  in  view  of  the  

subsequent  developments  that  had  taken  place  in  the  

meantime, an order of  limited remand was required only to  

decide  the  question  of  bonafide  requirement  on  the  

subsequent developments that had taken place in respect of  

which supplementary affidavit and counter affidavit were filed  

by  the  parties  before  the  High Court.   From the  impugned  

Judgment, the High Court had noticed that since the parents  

of  the  present  appellant  were  dead,  more  accommodation  

would be available to the landlord not only from the inherited  

property  but  also  from  the  accommodation,  in  which  the  

parents used to reside.  It was also pointed out by the High  

Court  in the impugned order that the present landlord had  

acquired  a  house  behind  the  shop  in  dispute  in  a  vacant  

condition during the pendency of the proceedings.  From the  

counter  affidavit  filed  by  the  landlord/appellant,  it  appears  

that  at  the  present  moment,  two sons and a daughter  had  

grown up and, therefore, the requirement had also increased.  

Accordingly,  the  landlord/appellant  sought  to  contend  that  

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even if his parents had died and the accommodation that was  

available  to  his  parents  would  now  be  available  to  the  

landlord/appellant, but still then in view of his growing sons  

and  daughter,  the  need  of  the  shop  in  dispute  would  still  

remain.  Therefore,  now the question remains to be seen is  

whether the facts, as stated hereinearlier, would be relevant to  

decide  the  bonafide  need  of  the  landlord/appellant  and  

comparative  hardship  under  the  Act  after  amending  the  

pleadings in the original release application to bring on record  

the requirement of the two sons and one daughter.  It is true  

that  on the  death  of  the  parents  of  the  landlord/appellant,  

more space for accommodation would become available to the  

landlord/appellant,  the  question  would  still  be  there  to  

consider whether such space available now on the death of the  

parents  of  the  landlord/appellant  would  be  reasonable  and  

suitable for the purpose of starting an office for him.  It was  

brought to the notice of the High Court that the two sons and  

the daughter have grown up, therefore, the requirement of the  

landlord/appellant,  at  the  present  moment,  would  also  

increase.  It is a fact which may be gone into by the Court if  

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the  landlord/appellant  is  permitted  to  amend  his  pleading  

bringing the fact namely, the requirement of his two sons and  

a daughter.     

15. In our view, there cannot be any argument that the facts  

brought in by way of subsequent developments are relevant  

and it certainly needs to be gone into on evidence.  But since  

the litigation is pending for the last 15 years, that is to say,  

from 1992, we are of the view that instead of setting aside the  

entire order of the Appellate Court and sending the case back  

to the same for  fresh decision on subsequent developments  

which were brought before the High Court, only an order of  

limited  remand  to  the  Appellate  Court  ought  to  have  been  

passed by the High Court, keeping the file pending before it  

and after receiving the evidence on the effect of subsequent  

developments  on  the  question  of  bonafide  need  and  

comparative  hardship  from  the  Appellate  Court  and  the  

finding of the Appellate Court on such question, considering  

the entire evidence and also the supplementary affidavit and  

counter-affidavit  filed by the parties and other materials  on  

record, the Writ Petition can be decided afresh.   

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16. It is true that a suit or an original proceeding is to be  

tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the  

date of its commencement.  The only exception to this rule is  

that a Court may take notice of events, which have happened  

since the institution of the suit or the original proceeding and  

grant  relief  to  the  parties  on  the  basis  of  the  altered  

conditions,  is  applied  in  cases  where  it  is  shown  that  the  

original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of  

circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to  

base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in  

order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between  

the parties. [See  Rai Chand Mandal and another Vs. Biswa  

Nath Mandal and others;  XX CLJ 107].  This was the view  

expressed  by  Sir  Ashutosh  Mukherjee,  J.  (as  His  Lordship  

then  was)  on  this  question  when  subsequent  developments  

should be taken into consideration by the Court during the  

pendency of a proceeding or of a suit or even at the appellate  

stage.   

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17. The same view has been expressed yet in a later decision  

of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that where it is shown  

that the original relief claimed by reason of subsequent change  

of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary  

to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances  

in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between  

the parties. [See  Nuri Mian Vs. Ambica Singh and another  

24 CLJ 140]

18. Again in  Pratap Rai Tanwani Vs. Uttam Chand (2004  

(8)  SCC  490)  ,    this  Court  also  held  that  subsequent  

developments can be taken into consideration to afford relief  

to the parties, provided only when such developments had a  

material impact on those rights and obligations.   

19. Similar was the view expressed in  Ramesh Kumar Vs.  

Kesho  Ram  [1992  Supp.  (2)  SCC  623 where  this  Court  

observed as follows : -

“6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the   rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties  are   

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adjudicated  upon  as  they  obtain  at  the   commencement of the lis.  But this is subject to   an exception.   Wherever subsequent events of   fact or law which have a material  bearing on  the  entitlement  of  the  parties  to  relief  or  on  aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief   occur, the court is not precluded from taking a  ‘cautious  cognizance’  of  the  subsequent  changes of  fact  and  law to  mould the  relief.”  (Emphasis supplied).  

20. It  also reminds us of  a  celebrated Judgment of  a  Full  

Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chote Khan Vs.  

Mohammad  Obedalla  Khan  [AIR  1953  Nagpur  361],  in  

which the view of the Court to take note of the subsequent  

developments specially at the appellate stage was taken up for  

consideration.  Hidayatulla, J (as His Lordship then was) held  

as under :

“on a review of judicial opinion, that an action   must be tried in all its stages on the cause of   action as it existed at the commencement of   an  action.  No  doubt,  Courts  'can'  and  sometimes  'must'  take  notice  of  subsequent  events, but that is done merely 'inter partes'   to  shorten  litigation  but  not  to  give  to  a   defendant  an  advantage  because  a  third   party has  acquired the right of the plaintiff.  (Emphasis supplied)”    

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21. In  view  of  the  discussions  made  hereinabove,  it  is  

therefore,  a  settled  proposition  of  law  that  subsequent  

developments of fact or law which have a material bearing on  

the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear  

on the moulding of  the relief  occur,  the Court,  even at any  

stage  of  the  proceeding,  is  not  precluded  from  taking  a  

cautious cognizance of the subsequent developments of  fact  

and law to mould the relief.  Keeping these principles in mind  

and  considering  the  nature  of  subsequent  developments  as  

brought out by the parties during the pendency of  the writ  

petition, we are of  the view that we will  have to find out a  

solution within the scope of this exception.  Therefore, the test  

is  whether  the  subsequent  events  of  fact  have  a  material  

bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects  

which  bear  on  the  moulding  of  the  relief  awarded  before  

consideration of such subsequent events.

22. In  the  present  case,  the  death  of  the  father  of  the  

appellant is taken as a valid excuse by the tenant to argue  

that  since  the  present  landlord  had  other  options  for  

accommodation  and  for  starting  an  office  as  a  Chartered  

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Accountant, he could, without any hardship, forgo his claim to  

the shop in dispute.  Again, if it is an admitted position that  

the present landlord has acquired a house behind the shop in  

dispute, then he has to prove by evidence that the said house  

available  is  not  suitable  for  starting  an office  space  for  his  

Chartered  Accountancy  firm.   In  this  connection,  we  have  

examined  the  factual  findings  of  the  Appellate  Court  and  

concluded that the recorded findings are insufficient to decide  

the matter in the light of the subsequent developments.   The  

occurrence  of  the  subsequent  developments  has  not  been  

denied upon by the appellant, in fact, has been accepted by  

him.   But  the  landlord/appellant  has  also,  by  his  counter  

affidavit,  pleaded  that  in  view  of  the  long  pendency  of  the  

proceeding for release, his requirement has increased as the  

two sons and a daughter have grown up and, therefore, the  

requirement of the landlord/appellant has to be adjudged in  

the  light  of  the  statements  made  by  him  in  the  counter  

affidavit.  Thus, the issue that needs to be examined now is  

whether there is any change in the nature of the claim of the  

present appellant consequent upon the occupation of a house  

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in  vacant  condition  behind  the  suit  building  and  also  

consequent  upon  the  death  of  the  father  of  the  original  

landlord,  who was  running  a  business  in  the  suit  building  

which had fallen vacant because of the death of the father of  

the appellant and also the accommodation that was available  

to  the  parents  of  the  appellant  would  also  be  taken  into  

consideration  for  the  purpose  of  coming  to  a  finding  as  to  

whether the appellant still requires the shop in dispute or not.  

That  apart,  the  tenant  submitted,  the  occupation of  house,  

which  was  used  for  running  the  printing  business  of  his  

deceased father has come to the use of the landlord/appellant,  

and  therefore,  the  requirement  of  the  landlord  has  already  

been fulfilled.  Moreover, in the light of the fact that the tenant  

now has alternative space for his business, it has to be seen  

whether  such  alternative  space  is  suitable  enough  for  the  

tenant  and  whether  he  can  shift  there  without  substantial  

loss.  Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was  

fully justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Court  

in view of the fact that all the facts stated herein need to be  

gone into after taking evidence on such facts.  The effect of the  

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subsequent developments on the bonafide need of the present  

landlord as well as the comparative hardship of the parties on  

material  facts  could  not  be taken into consideration  by the  

Writ  Court  without  proper  evidence  on  record.   However,  

considering the age of the litigation i.e.  15 years and if  the  

matter is sent back to the Appellate Court, the proceeding may  

continue for another 15 years, we are of the view that the High  

Court  was  not  justified  in  sending  the  case  back  to  the  

Appellate  Court  for  fresh  decision  in  the  light  of  the  

subsequent developments as noted hereinabove.  In our view,  

it would have been appropriate and proper and in the interest  

of justice for the High Court to keep the Writ Petition pending  

before it and sent back the issue on the effect of subsequent  

developments  and  supplementary  affidavit  and  counter  

affidavit on bonafide requirement and comparative hardship to  

the  Appellate  Court  and  after  the  Appellate  Court  taking  

evidence, it shall send back to the High Court, the evidence  

that would be taken and also the findings arrived at thereon.  

In  the  event,  the  Appellate  Court  finds  it  difficult  to  take  

evidence on its own, it will be open to it to frame the issue and  

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send the same to take evidence to the Prescribed Authority  

who, in turn, will take the evidence of the parties and send the  

same to the Appellate Court for the purpose of considering the  

issue of bonafide requirement of the landlord/appellant and  

comparative hardship of the parties.  In view of the statements  

made in the counter affidavit filed by the landlord/appellant to  

the extent that he has got two grown up sons and a daughter  

and that being the position,  the requirement of  the present  

landlord has increased and, therefore, the tenant/respondent  

is  liable  to  be  evicted.   That  being  the  position,  we  are,  

therefore,  of  the  view  that  it  would  be  open  to  the  

landlord/appellant to file an application for amendment of the  

original  release  application  for  the  purpose  of  incorporating  

the  fact  of  the  requirement  of  two sons and a  daughter  by  

amending  the  same  to  which  it  would  be  open  to  the  

respondent/tenant to file written objection.       

23. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  we  are,  therefore,  of  the  

opinion that for the purpose of coming to a positive conclusion  

on  the  bonafide  need  of  the  present  landlord  and  the  

comparative  hardship  of  the  parties  on  the  basis  of  the  

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subsequent developments, as noted hereinearlier, the matter  

needs to be examined on further evidence after restoring the  

Writ  Petition  before  the  High Court  with  a  direction  in  the  

manner indicated above in view of the fact that the justice has  

already been delayed for a long time.   

24. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the Judgment of  

the High Court and restore the Writ  Petition and direct the  

High Court to decide the same in the manner indicated above.  

25. Accordingly,  the High Court  is  requested to decide the  

writ petition within 6 months from the date of the supply of a  

copy  of  this  order  to  it  without  granting  any  unnecessary  

adjournments  to  either  of  the  parties  in  the  light  of  the  

directions made hereinabove.   

26. The appeal is thus allowed to the extent indicated above.  

There will be no order as to costs.   

……………………..J.    [Tarun Chatterjee]  

New Delhi;           ……..………………..J. October 28, 2009.                  [Aftab Alam]

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