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PETITIONER: JAI LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/04/1968

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1969 AIR   15            1969 SCR  (1) 140

ACT: Indian Penal Code, 1860 s. 84-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: From  1958 the, appellant was a Railway employee  and  often lost  his temper and had altercations with other  clerks  in the  office.  In October 1960 he was found to  be  suffering from  a  mental  illness as he exhibited  symptom  of  acute schizophrenia  and showed disorder of thought,  emotion  and perception  of external realities.  He was treated  for  and was  cured of this illness by July 1961 when he resumed  his duties.  On the morning of November 25, he went to office as usual  but  as  he was late in  attendance,  he  was  marked absent.  ’He applied in writing for one -day’s casual  leave and  returned  home.  No one noticed any  symptoms  -of  any mental  disorder  at  that time.  Just after  1  o’clock  he entered his neighbour’s house and stabbed and killed a  girl 1 1/2 year old and later also stabbed and injured two  other persons  with  a  knife.  He  was  thereafter  arrested  and interrogated  on  the  same  day when  he  gave  normal  and intelligent  answers.  After his arrest and upon  a  medical examination, the appellant was declared to be lunatic though not  violent  and the psychiatrist found that he had  had  a relapse  of  schizophrenia.  On September 6,  1962,  he  was ,reported  as cured and was thereafter committed  for  trial ,in February 1963.  The trial court convicted him under  ss. 302’  and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him  to life  imprisonment.  During the trial and in the  subsequent appeal  to  the  High Court, the ,defence plea  was  one  of insanity which was concurrently rejected by both Courts. On appeal to this Court by special leave. HELD: dismissing the appeal: The appellant was not insane at the time of the killing  and stabbing  and  knew the consequences of his acts.   He  must therefore be held ,criminally responsible for his  acts.[144 H] To  establish that the acts done were not offences under  s. 84  it  must  be  proved clearly that at  the  time  of  the commission   of  the  acts  the  appellant,  by  reason   of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing that the  acts were  either  morally wrong or contrary to law.   There  was clear  evidence  that  on the morning  of  November  25  the

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appellant’s  mind was normal and also that he knew that  his act  of  stabbing  and  killing was  contrary  to  law.   He concealed  the weapon of offence.  He bolted the front  door of  his house to prevent arrest.  He then tried to run  away by  the back door.  When an atttempt was made  to  apprehend him  he an back to his house and bloted the door.   He  then tried  to disperse the crowd by throwing brickbats from  the roof.  His conduct immediately after he occurrence displaced consciousness of his guilt. [143 F; 144 D-E]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 38  of 1965. 141 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated July  28, 1964 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit  Bench)  in Criminal Appeal No. 40-D of 1963. S. N. Prasad, for the appellant. H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.-The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicted the  appellant under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal  Code  and sentenced  him to undergo imprisonment for life.  The  Judge also  convicted the appellant under sec. 324 of  the  Indian Penal  Code,  sentenced him to undergo six  months  rigorous imprisonment  and directed that the two sentences would  run concurrently.   An  appeal was filed in the  High  Court  of Punjab.  The High Court dismissed the appeal.  The appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave. The appellant lives at Sat Nagar in Delhi.  On November  25, 1961  at  1.45 p.m. he entered the house  of  his  neighbour Somawati  and  stabbed her daughter Leela aged 1  1/2  years with  a  knife.  He inflicted five stab wounds, one  on  the back  trunk,  one on the right gluteal region,  two  on  the right thigh and one on the chest.  The injury on the back of trunk,  proved fatal.  Leela died in the hospital at 4  p.m. The  appellant  then returned to his house  and  bolted  the front  door.   A  crowd collected near the  front  door  and raised an alarm.  After some time the appellant went out  by the back door and stabbed another neighbour Parbati and then Raghubir who tried to intervene on her behalf.  The injuries were  simple  incised wounds Rabhubir and  others  tried  to apprehend  him.  He then ran back to his house,  bolted  the door  and started throwing brickbats from the roof.  He  was later arrested by the police.  All these facts are proved by unimpeachable evidence. One Dhani Ram was the father of Leela.  Dhani Ram, his  wife Somawati,  his daughter Leela and his brother Baburam  lived together  in  the  same house.   Indra  is  the  appellant’s sister.   The,  appellant  and  his  father  suspected  that Baburam was prone to making illicit approaches to Indra.  On this  account,  the  appellant had a  long  standing  grudge against  Baburam.  This enmity is said to be the  motive  of the attack by the appellant on Leela, a member of the family of  Baburam.   The motive for the attack on Parbati  is  not clear.  Raghubir was attacked because he tried to intervene. The  defence plea was of insanity.  The Additional  Sessions Judge and the High Court concurrently rejected this defence. 142 We  may briefly notice the evidence bearing on the  plea  of insanity.   Since 1958 the appellant was an employee in  the Stores Branch of the Northern Railway Headquarters in Baroda House, New Delhi.  In 1958 and 1959 he had altercations with

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other  clerks in the office.  On May 20, 1959  his  superior officer  observed  that he was prone to, lose temper  in  no time.  In his moments of excitement he became dangerous  and used  to hit his colleagues with anything that he could  lay his hands on.  But at the time of his greatest excitement he could  distinguish between right and wrong.  After May  1959 he  worked  at his desk as a normal man.  In March  1960  he again  quarrelled with another clerk.  He was suspended  and sent  for  medical  examination.   At  this  stage  he   was suffering  from mental illness.  On October 12. 1960 he  was examined  by  a  psychiatrist who found  that  he  exhibited symptoms  of  acute  schizophrenia and  showed  disorder  of thought, emotion and perception of external realities.   The psychiatrist said that he was harbouring certain  delusions. The nature of the delusions is not stated.  It is not proved that the appellant suffered from any particular delusion  or hallucination.   The  appellant  was put  on  a  drug  named largactil and was given convulsive electrotherapy treatment. On  January  12, 1961 he was cured of his  illness  and  was advised  to  join his duties.  On resuming  his  duties  the appellant worked in the office in the normal manner. There  is some evidence that on the morning of November  25. 1961 and the preceding night, the appellant complained  that he  was  unwell and took medicine.  But on  the  morning  of November 25, he went to his office as usual.  He was late in attendance and was marked absent.  He applied in writing for one  day’s casual leave stating that he had an urgent  piece of work at home.  Nobody noticed  any  symptoms  of   mental disorder at that time.  He left    the office at about 11.30 a.m. and returned home alone.  At 1.45  p.m.   he    stabbed Leela,  Parbati and Raghubir with a knife.He  concealed  the knife  and  a search for it has proved fruitless.   At  2.45 p.m. the investigating officer arrived on the spot, arrested the  appellant  and  interrogated him.  He  was  then  found normal  and gave intelligent answers.  On the same  date  he was  produced  before a Magistrate.  His  brother  was  then present  but  the Magistrate was not informed  that  he  was insane.    On  November  27,  he  was  interrogated  by   an Inspector.  It does not appear that he was then insane. On November 30, the appellant’s brother filed an application before the committing magistrate stating that the  appellant was insane at the time of the occurrence.  The appellant was later  remanded to judicial custody.  On receipt of  another application  from  his  brother he was  kept  under  medical observation from December 16 to December 23.  On December 19 the medical 143 officer  noted  that the appellant was  indifferent  to  his surroundings  and personal cleanliness, preoccupied  in  his thoughts muttering to himself, making meaningless  gestures, losing   track  of  conversations,  given  to  delayed   and repetitive  answers and unable to give detailed  account  of incidents  leading  to his arrest.  On Decemher 23,  he  was declared   to  be  a  lunatic  though  not   violent.    The psychiatrist  noted  that  the appellant had  a  relapse  of schizophrenia  and was suffering from disorder  of  thought, emotion  and  loss  of contact  with  realities.   From  his attitude  and manner of talk he was found to be  aggressive. On  September  6, 1962 the psychiatrist  reported  that  the appellant  was  cured and was in a  position  to  understand proceedings  in  court.  The commitment order  was  made  on January  4, 1963.  The trial started in February 1963.   The appellant was sane at the time of the trial. The  group of ailments dubbed schizophrenia is discussed  in James  D. Page’s Abnormal Psychology, Ch.  XI, pages 236  to

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261  and Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and  Toxicology,  14th ed.,  pages  349 to 401.  Schizophrenia is  a  general  term referring to a group of severe mental disorders marked by  a splitting  or disintegration, of the personality.  The  most striking  clinical  features include  general  psychological disharmony,   emotional  impoverishment,   dilapidation   of thought  processes,  absence of social  rapport,  delusions, hallucinations and peculiarities of conduct. The   question  is  whether  the  appellant  is   criminally responsible for the acts done on November 25, 1961.  Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code says :-               "Nothing  is  an offence which is  done  by  a               person who, at the time of doing it, by reason               of  unsoundness  of  mind,  is  incapable   of               knowing  the nature of the act, or that he  is               doing  what  is either wrong  or  contrary  to               law." To establish that the acts done are not offences under  sec. 84  it  must  be  proved clearly that at  the  time  of  the commission of the act the appellant by reason of unsoundness of  mind was incapable of either knowing that the acts  were either  morally wrong or contrary to law.  The  question  is whether the appellant was suffering from such incapacity  at the  time of the commission of the acts.  On this  question, the  state of his mind before and after the crucial time  is relevant.   There  is evidence of a medical  character  that between  October  12,  1960  and January  12,  1961  he  was suffering  from schizophrenia.  He was completely  cured  of this disease, on January 12, 1961 when he resumed his normal duties.  He had another attack of this disease in the middle of  December  1961.  The attack lasted till  September  1962 when  he  was  found to be normal again.  But it  is  to  be observed  that  the defence witnesses do not say  that  even during  these  two periods the appellant  was  incapable  of discriminating between right and 144 wrong or of knowing the physical nature of the acts done  by him. After the appellant was cured of the disease on January  12, 1961 he was found to be normal.  He had a highly strung tem- perament  and was easily excitable.  But there  is  positive evidence that even at the moment of his greatest  excitement he could distinguish between right and wrong.  From  January 12,  upto  November  24, 1961 he  attended  his  office  and discharged his duties in a normal manner.  On the morning of November 25, 1961 his mind was normal.  He went to and  from his  office  all  alone.  He wrote  a  sensible  application asking  for  casual  leave for one day.   At  1.45  p.m.  he stabbed  and killed a child and soon thereafter  he  stabbed two  other persons.  On his arrest soon after 2.45  p.m.  he gave  normal  and intelligent answers to  the  investigating officers.  Nothing abnormal in him was noticed till December 16, 1961. The thing in favour of the appellant is that though he had a motive for attacking Baburam, no clear motive for  attacking the  child  Leela or Parbati is discernible.  But  there  is clear evidence to show that he knew that his act of stabbing and killing was wrong and contrary to law.  He concealed the weapon  of  offence.  The knife could not  be  recovered  in spite of searches.  He bolted the front door of his house to prevent arrest.  He then tried to run away by the back door. When an attempt was made to apprehend him he ran back to his house  and bolted the door.  He then tried to  disperse  the crowd  by  throwing brickbats from the, roof.   His  conduct immediately  after the occurrence displays consciousness  of

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his  guilt.   He knew the physical nature of  stabbing.   He knew that the stabbing would kill and maim his victims.   On a comprehensive review of the entire evidence the two courts below concurrently found that the defence of insanity  under sec.  84  was not made out.  We are unable to say  that  the verdict of the courts below is erroneous. If a person by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable of knowing  the nature of the act or that he is doing  what  is either  wrong or contrary to law he cannot be guilty of  any criminal intent.  Such a person lacks the requisite mens rea and is entitled to an acquittal.  But it is not  established in  the present case that the appellant was  suffering  from this  incapacity.  The general burden is on the  prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the actus reus but also   the   mens  rea.   The   prosecution   satisfactorily discharged this burden.  The appellant was not insane at the time   of  the  killing  and  stabbing  and  he   knew   the consequences  of  those  acts.   We must  hold  that  he  is criminally responsible for the acts. In  the  result, the appeal is dismissed.   R.K.P.S.  Appeal dismissed. 145