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PETITIONER: JAI KAUR & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHER SINGH & OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/05/1960

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1960 AIR 1118  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1961 SC1374  (4)  R          1966 SC1555  (4)  RF         1980 SC2138  (5)

ACT: Hindu  Law-Jats of Grewal got-Customary law of  succession-- Non-ancestral    Property-Daughter,   if    preferrted    to collateyals-Doctrine of surrender-Gift to daughter by widow, if  accelerates succession-Rattigan’s Customary Law  of  the Punjab, Para 23-Riwaji-am, 1882, Question 43.

HEADNOTE: Under the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats  of Grewal got in Ludhiana, a daughter is a preferential heir to her father in respect of his self -acquired property to  his collaterals.  Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law,  paragraph 23,  which records the correct law on the point, is  not  in conflict with Riwaji-am, 1882, Question NO. 43, which refers only  to  ancestral  property  and  not  to  self  -acquired property at all. Mt.  Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21, approved. Mohinder  Singh v. Kher Singh, A.I.R. 1949 East Punjab  328, disapproved. Mt.  Subhani v. Nawab, A.I.R. 1941 (P.C.) 21, referred to. Case-law discussed. The doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a  theory of  complete self-effacement by the widow in favour  of  the reversioner and in order that such surrender can  accelerate the  reversion,  it must be of the entire  interest  in  the entire property.  The law does not recognise a partial self- effacement  nor  a  division  between  ancestral  and   non- ancestral  property.   The exception made in  respect  of  a small  portion  of  the property retained  for  the  widow’s maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the rule. Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Phool Kaur v. Prem Kaur, [1952] S.C.R. 793,  referred to. Consequently,  in  a  case where a Hindu widow  of  the  Jat Grewal got made a gift only of the self-acquired property of her husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a  surrender  in  law so as  to  accelerate  the  daughters’

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succession  and  the  gift could not  be  valid  beyond  her lifetime. 976

JUDGMENT:  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 108/ 56.  Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and decree  dated  May  27,  1953, of the Punjab High Court in  Regular  Second  Appeal  No.  176 of 1949, against the  judgment  and  decree  dated  December 20, 1948, of the District  Judge,  Ludhiana,  arising  out  of the Judgment and decree dated  February  6,  1948, of the Subordinate Judge, 11 Class, Ludhiana, in  Suit  No. 918 of 1946.  Gopal Singh, for the appellants.  C.   B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the respondents.  1960.  May 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  DAS  GUPTA, J.-The suit out of which this appeal has  arisen  was  instituted  by the respondents I and 2 Sher  Singh  and  Labh  Singh, for a declaration that a deed of gift  executed  by  the  first appellant, Jai Kaur, in respect of  8  (1-10)  Bighas of land which she had inherited from her husband, Dev  Singh,  in  favour  of  her two daughters,  the  2nd  &  3rd  appellants  before us, " shall be null and void against  the  reversionary rights of the plaintiffs ", and defendant  Nos.  4  to 6 after the death of defendant No. 1 (i.e., Jai  Kaur)  and  shall not be binding upon them.  The  plaintiffs’  case  was  that these lands left by Dev Singh were  all  ancestral  lands qua the plaintiffs and according to the customary  law  which  governs  the Jats belonging to Grewal  got  to  which  these  parties belong daughters do not succeed  to  property  left by sonless fathers and so the gift by Dev Singh’s widow  in favour of her daughters would be null and void as against  the  plaintiffs  and  others who would be  entitled  on  Jai  Kaur’s  death to succeed to the estate as reversioners.   In  the  alternative, the plaintiffs contended that even if  the  land in suit was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs then  also  the  deed  of gift would be null and void as  against  their  reversionary   interests   inasmuch  as  even   as   regards  nonancestral  property  daughters do not succeed  among  the  Grewal Jats.  The main contention of defendants 1 to 3  (the  appellants  before  us)  was  that the  suit  land  was  not  ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendants  977  Nos.  4  to  6,  and that according  to  the  customary  law  governing  the  Jats of the Grewal  got,  daughters  exclude  collaterals as regards non-ancestral property and a widow is  competent  to make a gift of such property in favour of  her  daughters.   It was pleaded on behalf of the  two  daughters  that they being preferential heirs in respect of the land in  suit  as against the plaintiffs, the gift is  tantamount  to  acceleration  of succession and is valid in every way.   The  Trial Judge held that 2B-2B,14-B out of the land in suit was  ancestral  and the gift was invalid to that extent,  because  as regards ancestral property a daughter does not succeed in  the  presence of collaterals.  As regards the  remainder  of  the  suit land which he held was non-ancestral, the  learned  Judge   was  of  opinion  that  the  gift  was   merely   an  acceleration  of  succession  as  under  the  customary  law  governing  the  parties  daughters  exclude  collaterals  as  regards  succession to non-ancestral property.   Accordingly  he  gave  the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for  as  regards  2-B-2B,  14-B  out of the land in suit and dismissed  it  as  regards the remaining portion of the land in suit.

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The  plaintiffs  appealed to the District  Judge,  Ludhiana,  against  this decree and cross-objections were filed by  the  defendants  Nos. 1 to 3. The Trial Court’s finding  about  a  portion  -of  the  land being ancestral and  the  rest  non-  ancestral was not disputed before the appeal court.  On  the  question  of custom the learned District Judge  agreed  with  the  Trial  Judge’s  view  that among  the  Grewal  Jats  of  Ludhiana  the daughter excluded collaterals as regards  non-  ancestral  property.  He held, therefore, agreeing with  the  Trial  Judge that as regards the non-ancestral property  the  deed of gift was merely an act of acceleration of succession  and  was,  therefore,  valid and binding.   The  appeal  was  accordingly dismissed and so also were the  cross-objections  which appear not to have been pressed.  On second appeal the learned judges of the East Punjab  High  Court  accepted  the  contention  urged  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiffs  that a special custom was proved to be in  force  among  the  Grewal Jats under which the  daughter  does  not  inherit even as regards  978  non-ancestral property.  In that view they held that even as  regards  the  non-ancestral property the gift  by  Jai  Kaur  would  be  valid only during her lifetime, and  allowed  the  appeal.  Against  this decree of the High Court defendants Nos. 1  to  3-Jai Kaur and her two daughters, the donees-have filed this  appeal  on  the strength of special leave  granted  by  this  Court.  Two  questions arise for consideration in this appeal.   The  first is whether under the customary law governing the  Jats  of  the Grewal got in Ludhiana to which the parties  belong,  the  daughter or the collaterals are the preferential  heirs  as  regards non-ancestral property.  If the answer  to  this  question be that daughters have preference over  collaterals  (the  plaintiffs here), the other question which  arises  is  whether  this  gift is such acceleration  of  succession  in  favour of the daughters as is permissible under the law.  On  the  question  of  custom the  appellants  rely  on  the  statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan’s Digest of Customary  Law  (Thirteenth  Edition) that in regard  to  the  acquired  property  of  her  father  the  daughter  is  preferred   to  collaterals.  It is not disputed that nonancestral  property  is  "  acquired  property  "  within  the  meaning  of  this  statement   by  Rattigan.   Against  this  the   plaintiffs-  respondents rely on the answers to question No. 43  relating  to Hindu Grewal Jats of Ludhiana as appear in the  Riwaji-am  prepared  at the revised settlement of 1882.   The  question  and the answer are in these words:-  Question:  " Under what circumstances can daughters inherit ? If  there  are  sons, widows or near collaterals, do they  exclude  the  daughter  ?  If the collaterals exclude her,  is  there  any  fixed limit of relationship or degree within which such Dear  kindred must stand  Answer:  "  In  our  tribe the daughter does not  succeed  under  any  circumstances.   If a person dies sonless,  his  collaterals  succeed  him.  There is no fixed limit of  relationship  for  purposes of excluding her.  979  If  there are no collaterals of the deceased, the owners  of  the  Thulla  or  Patti or village would  be  owners  of  his  property."  The   authoritative  value  of  Rattigan’s  compilation   of  customary  law  is  now  beyond  controversy,  having   been

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recognised  in the judicial decisions of the  Punjab  courts  too  numerous  to  mention, which  have  also  received  the  approval  of  the Judicial Committee of the  Privy  Council.  Therefore  it is not, and cannot be disputed that under  the  general  customary  law  of  the  Punjab  daughters  exclude  collaterals  in succession to non-ancestral  property.   The  value  of entries in the Riwaj-i-am has, also however,  been  repeatedly stressed.  That they are relevant evidence  under  s.  35  of the Evidence Act is clear and the fact  that  the  entries  therein  the  the result  of  careful  research  of  persons who might also be considered to have become  experts  in these matters, after an open and public enquiry has given  them  a  value which should not be  lightly  underestimated.  There is ’, therefore, an initial presumption of correctness  as regards the entries in the Riwaj-i-am and when the custom  as  recorded  in  the Riwaj-i-am is  in  conflict  with  the  general   custom  as  recorded  in  Rattigan’s   Digest   or  ascertained otherwise, the entries in the Riwaj-i-am  should  ordinarily  prevail  except that as was pointed out  by  the  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a recent decision  in Mt.  Subhani v. Nawab (1), that where, as in the  present  case, the Riwaj-i-am affects adversely the rights of females  who  had  no opportunity whatever of  appearing  before  the  revenue authorities, the presumption would be weak, and only  a few instances would suffice to rebut it.  In the present appeal the oral. testimony given on behalf of  either party is practically valueless to show an-,, instance  in favour of the custom pleaded by them.  If, therefore, the  -Riwaj-i-am does show as urged by the plaintiffs a custom of  daughters  being excluded by collaterals in respect of  non-  ancestral  property,  it  is clear  that  Riwaji-i-am  would  prevail.   The  real  controversy  in  this  litigation  is,  however, on the question whether the entries in the Riwaj-i-  am on which  (1)  A.I. R. 1941 (P.C.) 21.  980  the  plaintiffs rely refer at all to non-ancestral  property  or not.  This controversy has ’engaged the attention of  the  courts in Punjab for a number of years beginning with  1916.  In that year in Mst.  Raj Kaur v. Talok Singh (1) Sir Donald  Johnstone,  the  Chief Justice held that the  Riwaj-i-am  as  compiled,  did  not cover self-acquired  property  and  that  where the Riwaj-i-am talked about succession to land without  discrimination between ancestral and self-acquired, the rule  laid down could usually only be taken to apply to  ancestral  property.   A similar view was taken by Shadilal and Wil  be  force, JJ., in Budhi Prakash v. Chandra Bhan (2 ). The  view  taken  in  these cases was followed by other judges  of  the  High Court in Narain v. Mst.  Gaindo (3 ) and Fatima Bibi v.  Shah  Nawaz (4).  In Sham Das v. Moolu Bai (5)  the  learned  judges (LeRossignol and Fforde, JJ.) also laid down the same  principles, without any reference to the previous decisions,  in these words :-  "It  is  true  in the Riwaj-i-ain  no  distinction  is  made  between  ancestral and acquired property, but it is a  well-  recognised  rule that unless there are clear indications  to  the  contrary,  such an entry in a record of  custom  refers  only to the succession to ancestral property.  "  After this view had been followed in several other decisions  a  different  line was struck in Jatan v. Jiwan  Singh  (6).  That  was  a case between Grewal Jats and  the  contest  lay  between collaterals of the last male holder and his  married  daughter  with respect to his non-ancestral  property.   The  learned  judges were of opinion that the Question No. 43  in  the  Riwaj-i-am related to both ancestral and  non-ancestral

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property  and  so  the answer to the  question  recorded  in  Riwaj-iam proved that as regards the non-ancestral  property  also the daughter was excluded by collaterals.  In coming to  this  conclusion  they laid stress on the fact that  in  two  previous decisions, Ishar Kuar v. Raja Singh (7) and  Pratap  Singh  v.  Panjabu  (8) the questions  and  answers  in  the  Riwajiam as regards daughter’s  (1)  A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 343.  (3)  A.I.R 1918 Lah. 304  (5)  A.I.R. 1926; Lah. 210  (7)  (1911) 9 I.C. 608.  (2)  A.T.R. 19T8 Lah. 225.  (4)  A.I.R. 1921 Lah. 180.  (6)  A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553.  (8)  (1911) 13 I.C. 177  981  right   to   succession   were   interpreted   as   covering  nonancestral property also and if it was contemplated that a  daughter should succeed to self-acquired property, one would  have  expected that fact to be mentioned in the answer.   It  was  in view of the conflicting views which had thus  arisen  on  the question whether Question No. 43 in the  Riwaj-i-ani  in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary related  to  ancestral  property only or to both ancestral  and  non-  ancestral property that a reference was made by Mr.  Justice  Abdur  Rahman in Mt.  Hurmate v. Hoshiaru 1 to a Full  Bench  of  the  High Court.  The Full Bench reviewed  the  numerous  decisions of the Punjab courts in this matter and also  took  into  consideration the fact that Mr. Gordon Walker who  had  prepared  the Riwaj-i-am in 1882 had stated in  the  preface  that no distinction between self-acquired and inherited pro-  perty  in  land appeared to be recognised and the  rules  of  succession, restriction on alienation, etc., applied to both  alike; and after a careful consideration of all the relevant  factors recorded their conclusion that " Question No. 43  of  the Customary Law of Ludhiana district relates to  ancestral  property only and can in no circumstances be so  interpreted  as  to cover self acquired property as well.  " Mr.  Justice  Din Mohammad who delivered the leading judgment observed :"  The  raison d’ entre of those cases which lay down that  the  manuals  of  Customary Law were  ordinarily  concerned  with  ancestral property only is quite intelligible.   Collaterals  are,  as  stated  by Addison, J., in  13  Lab.  458,  really  speaking  interested  in that property only  which  descends  from their common ancestor and this is the only basis of the  agnatic  theory.   What a male-holder  acquires  himself  is  really  no concern of theirs.  It is reasonable,  therefore,  to assume that when manuals of Customary Law were originally  prepared  and subsequently revised, the persons  questioned,  unless  specific-ally told to the contrary,  could  normally  reply in the light of their own interest alone and that,  as  stated  above, was confined to the ancestral property  only.  The fact that on some occasions  (1) A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21,  127  982  the  questioner  had  particularly  drawn  some  distinction  between ancestral and non-ancestral property would not  have  put  them  on their guard in every case,  considering  their  lack  of  education  and lack of  intelligence  in  general.  Similarly, the use of the terms " in no case " or " under no  circumstances  " would refer to ancestral property only  and  not be extended so as to cover self-acquired property unless  the context favoured that construction.  "  One  would have thought that after this pronouncement  by  a

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Full Bench of the High Court the controversy would have been  set  at rest for at least the Punjab courts.   Surprisingly,  however, only a few years after the above pronouncement, the  question  was  raised again before a Division Bench  of  the  East  Punjab High Court in Mohinder Singh v. Kher  Singh(1).  The learned judges there chose to consider the matter afresh  and in fact disregarded the pronouncement of the Full  Bench  in  a  manner which can only be said  to  be  unceremonious.  Teja Singh, J., who delivered the leading judgment said that  the  Full Bench, though noticing the cases of Ishar Kaur  v.  Raja  Singh  (2) and Pratap Singh v.  Panjabu (3),  had  not  said  that those cases had been wrongly decided.  It has  to  be  noticed  that  the  Full Bench  in  no  uncertain  terms  expressed  their  conclusion  that question No.  43  of  the  Customary Law of the Ludhiana district related to  ancestral  property   only  and  could  in  no  circumstances   be   so  interpreted as to cover self-acquired property as well.   In  coming  to  that  conclusion they  had  considered  numerous  decisions  of  the Punjab courts in support of  the  general  proposition  that unless there are clear indications to  the  contrary   the  questions  relate  to  ancestral   property,  considered the cases in which a contrary view had been taken  including  the  three cases of Jattan v.  Jiwan  Singh  (4),  Ishar  Kaur v. Raja Singh (2 ) and Pratap Singh  v.  Panjabu  (3)  and  gave their own reasons why the  view  that  unless  there  are clear indications to the contrary the manuals  of  customary law should be taken to refer to ancestral property  only, and after considering the  (1)  A.I.R. 1949.  East Punjab 328  (3)  (1911) 13 I.C. 177.  (2)  (1911) 9 I.C. 608.  (4)  A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553.  983  question  and answer in question No. 43 in the  case  before  them as regards the Mohammadan Rajputs, recorded their final  conclusion.  It is neither correct nor fair to say that  the  learned judges of the Full Bench did not hold Jattan’s Case,  Pratap  Singh’s  Case  and Ishar Kaur’s Case  to  have  been  wrongly  decided  in  so far as  these  decisions  held  the  question  No. 43 of the Customary Law of the  Ludhiana  dis-  trict to refer both to ancestral and non-ancestral property.  It is true that they did not say in so many words that these  cases were wrongly decided; but when a Full Bench decides  a  question  in a particular way every previous decision  which  had answered the same question in a different way cannot but  he  held  to  have been wrongly decided.   We  had  recently  occasion to disapprove of the action of a Division Bench  in  another High Court in taking it upon themselves to hold that  a contrary decision of another Division Bench on a  question  of law was erroneous and stressed the importance of the well  recognised  judicial  practice that when  a  Division  Bench  differs from the decision of a previous decision of  another  Division  Bench  the matter should be referred to  a  larger  Bench  for  final decision.  If, as we  pointed  out  there,  considerations  of  judicial  decorum  and  legal  propriety  require   that  Division  Benches  should   not   themselves  pronounce  decisions of other Division Benches to be  wrong,  such considerations should stand even more firmly in the way  of Division Benches disagreeing with a previous decision  of  the Full Bench of the same court.  In  our  opinion, the view taken by the Full  Bench  in  Mt.  Hurmate  v.  Hoshiaru  (1) is  consonant  with  reasons  and  consistent  with  probability.   The  fact  that  the  great  majority of judges, who brought to bear on the question,  an  intimate  knowledge  of the ways and habits  of  the  Punjab

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peasantry  thought  that  when tribesmen  were  asked  about  succession  to  property, they would ordinarily  think  that  they   were  being  asked  about  succession  to   ancestral  property, is entitled to great weight.  It cannot, we think,  be seriously disputed that at least in the early years  (1)  A.I.R. 1944 Lah 21.  984  when the Riwaj-i-am was in course of preparation most of the  property  in the countryside was ancestral property,  and  "  self-acquisitions " were few and far between.  This fact, it  is reasonable to think, had the consequence of concentrating  the  attention of the tribesmen on the importance of  having  the  tribal  custom  correctly recorded  by  the  Settlement  Officers   and  their  agents,  as  regards  succession   to  ancestral  property, and of attracting little attention,  if  any,  to matters regarding non-ancestral  property.   Unless  the questions put to these simple folk, were so framed as to  draw  pointed attention to the fact that the enquiries  were  in  respect of non-ancestral property also, they  could  not  reasonably  be expected to understand from the mere fact  of  user  of general words in the questions that these  referred  to  both  ancestral  and  non-ancestral  property.   As  Din  Mohammad,  J., said in his judgment in the Full Bench,  even  the  fact that on some occasions, the questioner  had  drawn  some   distinction   between  ancestral   and   nonancestral  property,  could  not  have  put  them-(i.e.,  the   persons  questioned)-on their guard in every case, considering  their  lack of intelligence in general.  Their minds being obsessed  with  the  idea  that such enquiries  would  only  refer  to  ancestral  property,  they  would direct  their  answers  to  matters in respect of ancestral property only, and in  using  forceful  terms  like  "  in  no  case  "  and  "  under  no  circumstances these persons were really saying that " in  no  case  would ancestral property devolve in a  particular  way  and  have  a  particular  incidence; and  under  no  "  cir-  cumstances   "  would  ancestral  property  devolve   in   a  particular way, and have a particular incidence.  These considerations, we think, outweigh the statement  made  by  Mr.  Gordon  Walker that no  distinction  between  self-  acquired  and  inherited  property in land  appeared  to  be  recognised,  and  the rules of  succession,  restriction  on  alienation, etc., applied to both alike.  We think, therefore,, that the view taken by the Full Bench,  and the many previous cases mentioned in the judgment of the  Full  Bench,  that questions and answers in  the  Riwaj-i-am  refer ordinarily to  985  ancestral property, unless there is clear indication to  the  contrary,  is  correct.   Question No. 43  in  the  Ludhiana  district, appears to be the same for all the tribes.   There  is  not the slightest indication there that  the  questioner  wanted  information about nonancestral property  also.   The  answer given by the Grewal Jats to this question also  gives  no reason to think that the persons questioned were thinking  in  giving the answers of both ancestral  and  non-ancestral  property.  We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the  entries  in  the Riwaj-i-am on which the plaintiffs respondents  rely  do  not  refer at all to non-ancestral  property,  and  are,  therefore,  not  even  relevant evidence  to  establish  the  existence  of  a  custom  among  Grewal  Jats  of   Ludhiana  district,  entitling  collaterals  to  succession  to   non-  ancestral property, in preference to daughters.  Reliance  was next placed on behalf of these respondents  on  the fact that the existence of such a custom was  recognised

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in  a  number of judicial decisions, viz., Jattan  v.  Jiwan  Singh (1), I shar Kaur v. Raja Singh (2) and Pratap Singh v.  Panjabu  (3).   If  these  decisions  in  so  far  as   they  recognised  the existence of such a custom, had been  solely  or even mainly based on evidence, other than entries in  the  Riwaji-i-am,  they  might  have  been  of  some  assistance.  Examination of these cases, however, shows unmistakably that  they  were either wholly, or mainly based on the entries  in  the Riwaj-i-am on the assumption that these entries referred  to   both  ancestral  and  non-ancestral   property.    This  assumption  having  been established to be  baseless,  these  decisions are valueless, to show that the custom as  alleged  by  the  plaintiffs-respondents did exist  as  regards  non-  ancestral property.  Further, the oral evidence produced  in  the  present  case is wholly insufficient to  prove  such  a  custom.  It must, therefore, be held that the customary law among the  Grewal  Jats of Ludhiana district as regards  succession  to  non-ancestral property is the same as recorded generally for  the  Punjab in Paragraph 23 of Rattigan’s  Digest-i.e.,  the  daughter is preferred to  (1) A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553.      (2) (1911) 9 I.C. 608.                    (3) (1911) 13 I.C. 177.  986  collaterals,  and  consequently, the second  and  the  third  appellants,  were the next reversioners to that  portion  of  Dev  Singh’s  property  which  has been  found  to  be  non-  ancestral.  This  brings  us to the question whether the  gift  of  this  portion, by the first appellant to these reversioners, gives  them a good title, beyond the widow’s lifetime.  We have  to  remember  in this connection that as regards  the  ancestral  property, these daughters were not the reversioners, and the  further  fact that out of the ancestral property, the  house  was  not  included  in  the deed  of  gift.   The  position,  therefore,  is that out of the property in which  the  first  appellant  held  a widow’s estate, she gave by the  deed  of  gift a portion to the reversioners as regards that  portion,  a portion to persons who were strangers to the reversion  as  regards that portion and a portion was retained by her.  The  doctrine  of Hindu law according to which, a  limited  owner  can accelerate the reversion, by surrendering her  interest,  to  the  next  reversioner, is based on a  theory  of  self-  effacement  of the limited owner.  That is why it  has  been  laid down that in order that a surrender by a limited  owner  to a reversioner, may be effective, the surrender must be of  the  entire  interest  of the limited owner  in  the  entire  property.  The exception made in favour of the retention  of  a  small portion of the property for her  maintenance,  does  not affect the strictness of the requirement that a  surren-  der  to be effective, must be of the entire interest in  the  entire property: Vide Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden  (1) and Phool Kaur v. Pem Kaur (2).)  In  so  far  as there is gift to a  stranger,  there  is  no  effacement of the limited owner; nor is there any effacement  in  respect of the property which is retained.  We  find  it  impossible to say, therefore, that there is such  effacement  of  the limited owner in this case, as would accelerate  the  daughter’s rights by converting the future contingent  right  into a present vested right.  On  behalf  of  the appellants it is argued  that  there  is  certainly a total effacement in respect of the  nonancestral  property,  so  that the right of the  next  reversioners-the  daughters-in that property has  (1) (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72.

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(2) [1952] S.C.R. 793,  987  been accelerated.  We do not think we shall be justified  in  recognising  this  novel  doctrine  of  the  possibility  of  effacement   of  the  limited  owner  vis-a-vis   the   next  reversioner  of the non-ancestral property when there is  no  effacement  vis-a-vis  the  reversioner  of  the   ancestral  property,  and vice versa.  Effacement cannot be  broken  up  into two or more parts in this manner; and however much  the  limited  owner  may wish to efface  herself  only  vis-a-vis  those next reversioners whom she wants to benefit, law  does  not recognise such " partial effacement ".  The  Hindu  Law doctrine of surrender does  not,  therefore,  make the gift of the non-ancestral property to the daughters  valid beyond the widow’s lifetime.  It  is  not suggested that there is any  customary  law,  by  which such surrender can be made.  Though,  therefore,  we  have  found  disagreeing  with  the  learned  judges of the High Court that tinder the  customary  law  governing the Grewal got of Jats to which  the  parties  belong,  the daughters-the second and the third  appellants-  are  preferential heirs to the non-ancestral portion of  the  suit  land, we hold that their conclusion that this deed  of  gift in favour of the daughters is not valid even as regards  the  non-ancestral property, beyond the donor’s lifetime  is  correct and must be maintained.  As  a  last  attempt  Mr.  Gopal  Singh,  counsel  for   the  appellants, wanted us to hold that under s. 14 of the  Hindu  Succession Act, which became law in 1956, either the  mother  or  the daughters have become full owners of this  property,  and  so  the plaintiffs’ suit should be dismissed.   As  the  Hindu  Succession Act was not on the statute-book, when  the  written  statement was filed or at any time before the  suit  was disposed of in the courts below, the defence under s. 14  of that Act could not be thought of and was not raised.  The  necessary consequence is that evidence was not adduced, with  the facts material for the application of s. 14 in view,  by  either   party.   Mr.  Agarwala  has,  on  behalf   of   the  plaintiffs-respondents, contended that as the record  stands  the mother had ceased to be in possession and could not  get  the  benefit of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and  that  the  988  daughters in possession, would not become full owners  under  s. 14.  We do not think it would be proper to consider these  questions in the present suit in this haphazard manner  when  on the all-important question of possession, the  appellants  themselves  do  not wish to say whether the  mother  was  in  possession   actually   or   constructively,   whether   the  daughters’ possession was merely permissive, or whether  the  daughters  were  in  independent possession,  on  their  own  behalf These and other questions of fact, and the  questions  of law that have to be considered in deciding a claim by the  first  appellant or the other two appellants under s. 14  of  the  Hindu Succession Act, should properly be considered  in  any suit that -they may bring in future, if so advised.   We  express no opinion on any of these questions.  For  the reasons which have been mentioned earlier, we  hold  that  the High Court rightly decreed the suit in  favour  of  the plaintiffs in respect of the nonancestral property also,  and  dismiss the appeal.  In the circumstances of the  case,  we  order  that  the  parties  will  bear  their  own  costs  throughout.  Appeal dismissed.

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