IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8031 OF 2001

Shri Jagjit Singh and others …Appellants  

Versus

Mrs. Pamela Manmohan Singh …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. Whether the appellants, who claim to have purchased the property  

described as 6-B, Jangpura, Mathura Road, New Delhi from Major K.V.  

Kohli (one of the two heirs of Mrs. Rasheel Kohli) are entitled to contest  

the application filed by the respondent - Mrs. Pamela Manmohan Singh  

(the other heir of Mrs. Rasheel Kohli) for grant of letter of administration  

is the question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against  

order dated 22.1.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge of Delhi High  

Court in Civil Revision No.791 of 1994 whereby he set aside the order  

passed by Additional District Judge allowing an application filed by the

appellants under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for  

permission to file objections in Probate Case No.272 of 1993.   

2. The property  in  question  was leased  out  by  the  Government  of  

India to Mrs. Rasheel Kohli sometime in 1957 for a period of 90 years.  

Mrs. Rasheel Kohli availed loans from Oriental Bank of Commerce and  

Grindlays  Bank  and  mortgaged  the  suit  property.   Oriental  Bank  of  

Commerce filed Suit No.75 of 1979 in the High Court of Delhi against  

M/s. Zirconium, K.V. Kohli and Mrs. Rasheel Kohli for the recovery of  

their dues.  Grindlays Bank also filed Suit No.259 of 1978 against K.V.  

Kohli  and others  for  recovery of  Rs.9,58,195/-.   In the  second suit,  a  

statement was made by the counsel for the defendants that his clients will  

not  alienate  property  No.198,  Golf  Links,  New  Delhi  and  plot  No.6,  

Block – B, Jangpura, New Delhi or encumber the same till the next date.  

After  taking note of the counsel’s  statement,  the learned Single Judge  

directed  the  defendants  in  the  suit  not  to  alienate  or  encumber  the  

property or realise or appropriate the rent.  

3. In 1979, Mrs. Rasheel Kohli filed Suit No.180 of 1979 for eviction  

of Khairati Lal, who had been inducted as a tenant.  During the pendency  

of the suit, Khairati Lal made a statement before the Court on 6.8.1984,  

the relevant portion of which is extracted below:

2

“A decree for possession of  the plot  in dispute  be passed  against me in favour of the plaintiff together with a decree  for Rs.25,000/- as mesne profits upto 31st August, 1979.  I  may be allowed time to vacate the plot in dispute upto 31st  October, 1986.  I give an undertaking to the Court that I shall  deliver  vacant  possession  of  the  plot  in  dispute  to  the  plaintiff  on  1st November,  1986.   I  further  give  an  undertaking that I will not alienate, transfer, in any manner,  or part with its possession in favour of any one, nor shall  create any charge till  the vacant possession of the same is  delivered by me to the plaintiff.  I also agree to pay mesne  profits at the rate of Rs.1250/- per month from 1st September,  1979 onwards.”

4. However, instead of abiding by the undertaking given by him in  

the Court, Khairati Lal handed over possession of the suit property to the  

partners of M/s. Texla Service Center with whom Mrs. Rasheel Kohli is  

said to have entered into an agreement dated 30.8.1984 for sale of the suit  

property for a sum of Rs.11 lacs and received a sum of Rs.5 lacs in cash  

and Rs.6 lacs in the form of bank guarantee.

5. After  taking  possession  from  Khairati  Lal,  M/s  Texla  Service  

Center  filed  Suit  No.182  of  1986  for  specific  performance  of  the  

agreement for sale.  In that suit, the High Court directed the parties to  

maintain status quo.

6. Mrs. Rasheel Kohli died on 11.10.1987.  After about one month,  

Shri  K.V.  Kohli  (son  of  the  deceased)  executed  three  registered  sale  

3

deeds dated 6.12.1988 in favour of the appellants, though, at that time,  

warrant of attachment issued pursuant to order dated 2.11.1988 passed by  

the Bombay High Court in Suit No.2951 of 1987 was in force.    

7. On 30.11.1987, K.V. Kohli filed application for grant of probate by  

claiming that his mother had executed Will dated 7.3.1986 in his favour.  

The same was registered as Suit No.379 of 1987.  The respondent also  

filed an application dated 6.3.1989 for grant of letter of administration by  

claiming that her mother had executed Will dated 7.3.1987 in her favour.  

The application of the respondent was registered as P.C. No.106 of 1989.  

Later  on,  the  same  was  re-numbered  as  P.C.  No.272  of  1993.   The  

appellants filed an application under Section 151 CPC for permission to  

file objections to the grant  of letter  of administration in favour of the  

respondent.  By  an  order  dated  26.3.1994,  learned  Additional  District  

Judge allowed the application.   The relevant portions of that order are  

extracted below:

“In the present  case,  deceased Smt. Raseel  Kohli  was the  owner of the property.  She died leaving a son K.V. Kohli  and a daughter Pamela Manmohan Singh.  Shri K.V. Kohli  is alleged to have acquired right in the property by virtue of  will of his mother dated 7.3.1986 and had sold one of the  properties to the present applicants by means of a registered  Sale-deeds dated 6.12.1988.  Whereas the petitioner in the  present  case  claims  that  her  mother  had executed  another  will dated 23.9.1987, which is a later will in her favour.  The  

4

applicants who are the purchasers from the vendor legatee of  the first will, would be affected if the later will is upheld,  and  as  such  they  have  locus  standi  to  safeguard  their  interests.

It was then contended that the sale was made after the  injunction order was granted.  A perusal of the file shows  that the present petition though purports to have been drafted  on 30.9.1989 the respondent was restrained from transferring  the property till further orders, then proceedings on 23.3.89.  However,  the present  property has been transferred before  23.3.1989 and this circumstance will not affect the rights of  the applicants.

As regards delay, no doubt it appears that some other  litigation is pending between the parties, and the applicants  had knowledge of the present proceedings as appears from  the written statement dated November, 1990, filed by them  in suit No.695 of 1990, pending in Delhi High Court, and it  has been contended that the application is belated and mala  fide.   However,  as  held  above,  the  applicants  have  locus  standi to file caveat and to oppose the present proceedings  and as such they will also be entitled to move later on for  setting aside if  the present  petition for grant  of probate is  allowed as that will affect their rights if the decision is taken  in  their  absence.   That  would  unnecessarily  involve  the  parties  in  fresh  litigation.   It  is  also  seen  that  original  objector Shri K.V. Kohli has since died and the proceedings  against his LRs are ex-parte.  However, an application for  setting aside is pending.  Otherwise, also the case is at initial  stages  and  even  issues  have  yet  not  been  framed.   The  petitioner can be compensated by costs in delay.”

8. The  respondent  challenged  the  aforementioned  order  in  Civil  

Revision No.791 of 1994, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge  

on the following grounds:

5

(i) Probate case filed by K.V. Kohli was dismissed on 13.5.1992 in  

default and, therefore, there was no question of any Will being  

propounded by him.   

(ii) The  appellants  had  committed  fraud  in  obtaining  possession  

from Khairati Lal contrary to the undertaking given by him on  

6.8.1984  and  they  effectively  prevented  Mrs.  Rasheel  Kohli  

from taking possession of the property.

(iii) K.V. Kohli executed the sale deed when there was an order of  

injunction  restraining  him  from  alienating  the  property  in  

question and the whole case of the applicants is based on the  

possession of the property through fraud committed by them.

(iv) When the applicants’ rights are under investigation, they cannot  

claim  to  have  any  caveatable  interest  in  the  estate  of  Mrs.  

Rasheel Kohli.  

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.  It is not in dispute  

that the parties are governed by the provisions of the Indian Succession  

Act, 1925 (for short, ‘the Act’).  Section 283 of the Act reads as under:

“283.  Powers  of  District  Judge.– (1)  In  all  cases  the  District Judge or District Delegate may, if he thinks proper,–

(a) examine the petitioner in person, upon oath; (b) require further evidence of the due execution of  

the  Will  or  the  right  of  the  petitioner  to  the  letters of administration, as the case may be;

6

(c) issue citations calling upon all persons claiming  to have any interest in the estate of the deceased  to  come  and  see  the  proceedings  before  the  grant of probate or letters of administration.

(2) The citation  shall  be fixed up in  some conspicuous  part  of  the  court-house,  and  also  the  office  of  the  Collector  of  the  district  and otherwise  published or  made known in such manner as the Judge or District  Delegate issuing the same may direct.

(3) Where any portion of the assets has been stated by the  petitioner  to  be  situate  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  District  Judge  in  another  State,  the  District  Judge  issuing the same shall cause a copy of the citation to  be sent to such other District Judge, who shall publish  the same in the same manner as if it were a citation  issued by himself, and shall certify such publication to  the District Judge who issued the citation.”

The term “caveatable interest” has not been defined in the Act, but  

the same has been used and interpreted in some of the judicial decisions.  

In  Nobeen Chunder Sil and others v. Bhobosoonduri Dabee (1881)  

ILR 6 Cal 460, a two-Judge Bench of Calcutta High Court considered  

whether the persons who had obtained money-decree and got attached  

share  of  one  of  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  and  mortgagees  of  the  

immovable property left by the testator were entitled to oppose the grant  

of probate on the basis of Will executed by the owner in favour of his  

wife purporting to grant his entire property for her life and after her death  

to his sons.  The respondent applied for grant of probate of the Will of  

Nobo Coomar Ganguli, who had died on 21.10.1877 leaving behind his  

7

widow  and  two  sons.   The  appellant  Nobeen  Chunder  Sil,  who  had  

obtained money-decree against one of the sons and Brojo Mohun Ghose  

and Obhoy Churn Sen in whose favour mortgage was executed by two  

sons filed caveat against the grant of probate.  The District Judge refused  

to allow them to take part in the proceedings or oppose the grant.  The  

appeal preferred against the order of the District Judge was allowed by  

the High Court of Calcutta.  White, J., who was member of two-Judge  

Bench referred to the judgments of Baijnath Shahai v. Desputty Singh  

ILR 2 Cal 208 and Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle ILR 4 Cal  

360 and observed:

“It  cannot  be  disputed  that  the  appellants  have  a  direct  interest in disputing the will. They alleged that the will is a  forgery,  and  has  been  concocted  for  the  purpose  of  overriding  their  mortgage  and attachment.  The  authorities  show that,  so long as the  probate remains  unrevoked,  the  attaching creditor could not bring the attached property to  sale, nor could the mortgagees by any suit get the benefit of  their  mortgage.  Their  proceedings  in  each  case  would  be  defeated by the production of the probate, for they could not  raise  the  issue  that  the  will  was  forged.  "A  probate  unrevoked," says Mr. Justice Williams in Vol. I Williams on  Executors,  7th  edition,  p.  549,  "is  conclusive  both  in  the  Courts of law and equity, not only as to the appointment of  executors, but as to the validity and contents of the will, so  far as it extends to personal property." As a probate in India  extends to immoveable property, the doctrine applies in this  country to all  the property left  by the deceased. The only  grounds on which the appellants could impeach the probate  in a Civil Court would be those stated in the 44th section of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  namely,-that  the  probate  was  granted by a Court not competent to grant it, or that it was  obtained  by  fraud  or  collusion,  which  means  fraud  or  collusion upon the Court, and perhaps also fraud upon the  

8

person disinherited by the will - Barnesly v. Powel; but they  could  not  show that  the  will  was  never  executed  by  the  testator or was procured by a fraud practised upon him. It is  obvious, therefore, that, unless the appellants have a  locus  standi in  the  Probate  Court,  they  are  without  remedy,  supposing their case against the will to be true.

Markby  and  Prinsep,  JJ.  in  Komollochun  Dutt  v.   Nilruttun Mundle have virtually decided the question before  us,  so far as the mortgagee-appellants  are concerned.  The  plaintiff there had purchased from a widow an estate which  she  was  supposed  to  have  inherited  from  her  husband.  Afterwards  the  brother  of  the  husband  obtained  and  produced at the trial  probate of a will  of the husband, by  which he bequeathed the whole property to his brother. The  plaintiff sued to recover the property from the possession of  the brother, alleging that the will was a forgery. This Court  reversed  a  remand  order  of  the  District  Judge,  which  directed the first Court to try the question of the genuineness  of the will, and directed that the trial should be postponed in  order that the plaintiff might apply to the Probate Court of  the District Judge to revoke the grant of probate.

Markby,  J.  apparently  based  his  decision  upon  the  language of Section 242 of the Indian Succession Act. But  that  section,  whilst  stating  that  the  probate  shall  be  conclusive  as  to  the  representative  title,  is  silent  as  to  its  effect with respect to the validity and contents of the will. Its  conclusive  effect  in  the  latter  respects  is  really  the  legal  consequence  of  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Probate,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Williams  in  Vol.  I,  Williams on Executors, p. 549. In the mofussil the District  Judges  are  the  sole  Courts  of  Probate,  and  it  would  be  obviously  inconsistent  with  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  conferred upon them, that probates until revoked should not  be conclusive as to the due execution of the will to which  the grants relate.

The  mortgagee-appellants  in  the  present  case  stand  substantially  in  the  same  position  as  the  plaintiff  in  Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle; they are purchasers  pro  tanto and  assigns  of  the  immoveable  estate  of  the  deceased, although only for the limited purpose of securing  

9

money which they have advanced to the testator's heirs. If,  according  to  the  authority  just  cited,  they  might  apply  to  revoke the probate that has issued, it follows that they may  also enter a caveat and oppose the grant.   

The case of an attaching creditor  of the next-of-kin  was not before the Court in Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun   Mundle,  but  Markby,  J.,  intimated  an  opinion  that  an  attaching  creditor  was  also  entitled  to  apply  to  revoke  probate. This point has been, recently decided in favour of  the  attaching  creditor  in  Umanath  Mookhopadhya  v.   Nilmoney Singh.

I  am of opinion, therefore,  that the appellants claim  respectively such interests in the estate of the deceased as  entitle them, upon proof of their interests,  to file a caveat  and oppose the grant of probate of the will of Nobo Coomar  Ganguli, deceased.”

   Field, J., who was the other member of the Bench referred to the  

law prevailing in England, the provisions of the Indian Succession Act,  

1865 and observed:  

“………I am, therefore, of opinion that, whether the persons  interested came in the first instance to oppose the grant of  probate,  or  subsequently  to  have  a  grant  revoked  or  annulled, they must come to the Court of the District Judge;  and as this Court has thus an exclusive jurisdiction, it must  be careful not to deny all remedy to persons interested by  refusing to allow them to be made parties to its proceedings.  As  to  the  text  of  what  constitutes  a  sufficient  interest  to  entitle any particular person to be made a party, according to  the view which I have already stated, I think it comes to this,  that any person has a sufficient interest who can show that  he is entitled to maintain a suit  in respect of the property  over  which  the  probate  would  have  affect  under  the  provisions of Section 242 of the Indian Succession Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

10

10. In  G. Jayakumar v. R. Ramaratanam A.I.R. 1972 Madras 212,  

the learned Single Judge referred to some earlier judgments including the  

judgment in Nobeen Chunder Sil and others v. Bhobosoonduri Dabee  

(supra) and observed:

“I  shall  therefore  examine  the  language  of  the  relevant  sections of the Indian Succession Act in order to ascertain  the competency of both or either of the caveators in these  proceedings.

Section 283(1) of the Indian Succession Act provides  as follows:-

“In  all  cases  the  District  Judge or  District  Delegate  may, if he thinks proper,……  

(a) examine the petitioner in person, upon oath; (b) require further evidence of the due execution of the  

will or the right of the petitioner to the letters of  administration, as the case may be;

(c) issue citations calling upon all persons, claiming to  have any interest in the estate of the deceased to  come and see the proceedings before the grant of  probate or letters of administration”

It follows from clause (c) of Section 283(1) that “all persons  claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased”  may be issued citations.  “Any interest in the estate of the  deceased”  does  not  mean  such interest  in  the  estate  as  is  claimed through  the  deceased  or  as  heir  of  the  deceased.  The  intention  of  the  legislature  as  gatherable  from  the  expression  is  that  any  interest  in  the  estate  in  respect  of  which the deceased is alleged to have executed a testament  would entitle the holder of that interest to attend and oppose  the probate proceedings.

In my view, the words “of the deceased” have been used  only to identify and describe the estate in respect of which  the caveator claims interest and is not intended to limit the  caveator’s interest to or equate it with the interest which the  

11

deceased held in the estate.  The provision of Section 283 is  intended to give the widest possible publicity to the probate  proceedings and to give an opportunity to any person having  the slightest and even the bare possibility of an interest in the  proceedings  to  challenge  the  genuineness  of  the  will  and  place before the court all the relevant circumstances before a  grant  in  rem  is  made  in  favour  of  the  person  claiming  probate.  If this is the proper interpretation to be placed upon  Section 283(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act, I have little  doubt  that  both  the  caveators  in  this  case  are  entitled  to  intervene in these proceedings and challenge the proponent  of the will to give it in solemn form.

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

It is true that in that suit Ramaratnam claims the property of  Ratnavelu  Mudaliar  in  derogation  of  the  settlement  deed  executed in favour of Amaravathi Ammal.  In other words,  he  claims  title  paramount  to  Amaravathi  Ammal  and  contends that the testament executed by Amaravathi Ammal  in respect of the properties settled upon her by her husband  cannot affect him.  If the more liberal interpretation which I  have  put  upon  Section  283(1)(c)  is  correct,  inasmuch  as  Ramaratnam claims  an  interest  in  the  estate  in  respect  of  which Amaravathi  Ammal is alleged to have executed the  testament, he would be a person entitled to a citation.

Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner,  however,  relied  upon a Division Bench ruling of Ramesam and Cornish, JJ.,  reported  in  Komalngiammal  v.  Sowbhagiammal,  ILR  54  Mad 24 = (AIR 1931 Mad 37) in support of the proposition  that the interest which entitles a person to lodge a caveat in  an application for the probate of a Will must be an interest in  the estate of the deceased, that is to say, there must be no  dispute as to the title of the deceased to the estate.  It is true  that this ruling would entail the dismissal of Ramaratnam’s  caveat  because  he  claims  title  paramount  and  is  not  possessed  of  any  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased  entitling him to oppose the grant of probate.  But with great  respect, I must say I am unable to follow this ruling, because  it is in direct conflict with an earlier Division Bench ruling  

12

of this court reported in Hanmantha Rao v. Latchamma, ILR  49 Mad 960 = (AIR 1926 Mad 1193).  There, Devadoss and  Waller,  JJ.  construed  the  meaning  of  Section  69  of  the  Probate and Administration Act which ran as follows:

“In all cases it shall be lawful for the District Judge, if  he thinks fit, to issue citations calling upon all persons  claiming  to  have  any  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased to come and see the proceedings before the  grant of probate or letters of administration.”

It  may  be  noticed  that  Section  69  of  the  Probate  and  Administration Act, is identical with Section 283(1)(c) of the  Indian Succession Act.   Their  Lordships,  while construing  Section 69 of the Act, observed as follows:

“The words of Section 69 are ‘claiming to have any  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased’.   There  is  nothing in the wording of the section to show that the  caveator  should  claim  interest  through  the  testator.  All that is necessary to entitle a person to enter caveat  is to claim interest in the estate of the deceased.  The  words  “interest  in  the  estate”  do  not  necessarily  convey  the  idea  that  the  interest  should  be  claimed  through the testator.  If that was the intention of the  Legislature,  the  clause  could  have  been  differently  worded so as to make the meaning clear.”

In  support  of  this  view,  their  Lordships  quoted  the  observations  of  Field  J.,  in  the  matter  of  the  petition  of  Bhobosoonduri  Dabee,  ILR  (1881)  6  Cal  460  to  the  following effect:-

“As to the test of what constitutes a sufficient interest  to  entitle  any particular  person to  be made a  party,  according to the view which I have already stated, I  think it comes to this that any person has a sufficient  interest who can show that he is entitled to maintain a  suit in respect of the property over which the probate  would have effect under the provisions of Section 242  of the Indian Succession Act.”

13

11. In  Krishna Kumar Birla v. Rajendra Singh Lodha and others  

(2008)  4  SCC  300,  a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  categorized  

caveatable  interest,  referred  to  the  dictionary  meanings  of  the  words  

‘caveat’  and  ‘interest’  and  large  number  of  precedents  including  

Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera (1990) 3  

SCC 333,  Kanwarjit Singh Dhillon v. Hardyal Singh Dhillon (2007)  

11  SCC  357,  Basanti  Devi  v.  Ravi  Prakash  Ram  Prasad  Jaiswal  

(2008) 1 SCC 267 and held that  the probate court  exercises  a limited  

jurisdiction and is not concerned with the question of title.  If the probate  

is granted, an application for revocation can be filed.   The Court then  

noticed  the  judgments  of  Calcutta  and  Madras  High  Courts  to  which  

reference has been made hereinabove and observed:

“77. To the same effect is a decision of the Calcutta High  Court in Nabin Chandra Guha v.  Nibaran Chandra Biswas.   As would appear from the discussions made hereinafter, the  said view, to our mind, is not entirely correct. A caveatable  interest was claimed therein on the basis of acquisition of a  subsequent  interest  from the daughter  of  the  testator.  The  District Judge held that he did not have a caveatable interest.  The Calcutta High Court, interpreting Section 283(1)(c) of  the 1925 Act, held:  

“… And ‘possibility of an interest’ does not apply to  possibility of a party filling a character which would give  him an interest but to the possibility of his having an interest  in the result of setting aside the will.” As the caveator acquired an interest from the daughter, he  was said to have a caveatable interest.”

14

The two-Judge Bench then referred to some judgments relating to  

caveatable interest of the reversioners and held:    

“84. Section 283 of the 1925 Act confers a discretion upon  the court to invite some persons to watch the proceedings.  Who are they? They must have an interest in the estate of the  deceased. Those who pray for joining the proceeding cannot  do so despite saying that they had no interest in the estate of  the deceased. They must be persons who have an interest in  the estate left by the deceased. An interest may be a wide  one but such an interest must not be one which would not  (sic) have the effect of destroying the estate of the testator  itself.  Filing of  a  suit  is  contemplated inter  alia  in  a  case  where  a  question  relating  to  the  succession  of  an  estate  arises.

85. We  may,  by  way  of  example  notice  that  a  testator  might  have entered into an agreement of sale entitling the  vendee to file a suit for specific performance of contract. On  the  basis  thereof,  however,  a  caveatable  interest  is  not  created, as such an agreement would be binding both on the  executor, if the probate is granted, and on the heirs and legal  representatives of the deceased, if the same is refused.

86. The propositions of law which in our considered view  may be applied in a case of this nature are:

(i) To sustain a caveat, a caveatable interest must be  shown. (ii) The test required to be applied is: Does the claim  of grant of probate prejudice his right because it defeats  some  other  line  of  succession  in  terms  whereof  the  caveator asserted his right? (iii) It is a fundamental nature of a probate proceeding  that whatever would be the interest of the testator, the  same must be accepted and the rules laid down therein  must be followed. The logical corollary whereof would  be that any person questioning the existence of title in  respect  of  the  estate  or  capacity  of  the  testator  to  dispose of the property by will on ground outside the  law of succession would be a stranger to the probate  

15

proceeding  inasmuch  as  none  of  such  rights  can  effectively be adjudicated therein.”

However,  the  propositions  culled  out  in  paragraph  86  were  

substantially diluted by making the following observations in paragraph  

103:

“What would be the caveatable interest would, thus, depend  upon the fact situation obtaining in each case.  No hard-and- fast rule, as such, can be laid down.  We have merely made  attempts to lay down certain broad legal principles.”  

The Bench then discussed the judgments of Calcutta High Court  

and observed:

“92. In the context of the laws governing inheritance and  succession, as they then stood, the widest possible meaning  to the term “interest” might have been given in a series of  decisions which the learned counsel for the appellants rely  upon  ranging  from  Nobeen  Chunder  Sil to  Radharaman  Chowdhuri v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarty so as to hold that  a  caveat  would be maintainable  even at  the  instance  of  a  person  who  had  been  able  to  establish  “some  sort  of  relationship”  and  howsoever  distant  he  may  be  from  the  deceased  which  per  se  cannot  have  any  application  after  coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Ordinarily,  therefore, a caveatable interest would mean an interest in the  estate of the deceased to which the caveator would otherwise  be entitled to, subject of course, to having a special interest  therein.

106. The decisions which were rendered prior  to coming  into force of the Hindu Succession Act, thus, may not be of  much relevance. Now, if on the interpretation of law, as it  then stood, a reversioner or a distant relative who could have  succeeded to the interest of the testator was entitled to file a  caveat, they would not be now, as the law of inheritance and  succession is governed by a parliamentary Act.

16

109. It is in that backdrop the question which is required to  be posed is: Did the Calcutta High Court or the other High  Court opine that even a busybody or an interloper having no  legitimate concern in the outcome of the probate proceedings  would be entitled to lodge a caveat and oppose the probate?  The answer thereto, in our opinion, must be rendered in the  negative. If anybody and everybody including a busybody or  an interloper is  found to be entitled to enter a caveat  and  oppose grant of a probate, then Sections 283(1)(c) and 284  of the 1925 Act would have been differently worded. Such  an interpretation would lead to an anomalous situation. It is,  therefore, not possible for us to accede to the submission of  the  learned  counsel  that  caveatable  interest  should  be  construed very widely.

110. A caveatable interest is not synonymous with the word  “contention”. A “contention” can be raised only by a person  who has  a  caveatable  interest.  The  dictionary  meaning  of  “contention”,  therefore,  in  the  aforementioned  context  cannot have any application in a proceeding under the 1925  Act.”

12. A  little  later  another  two-Judge  Bench  expressed  an  apparently  

contrary view in G. Gopal v. C. Baskar and others (2008) 10 SCC 489.  

This is evinced from paragraph 5 of the judgment, which is reproduced  

below:

“The  only  question  that  was  agitated  before  us  by  Mr  Thiagarajan,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  challenging  the  judgment  of  the  High Court  revoking  the  probate  granted  in  respect  of  the  will  executed  by  the  testator,  was  that  the  respondents  having  no  caveatable  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased,  the  application  for  revocation  filed  by  them  could  not  be  allowed.  We  are  unable to accept these submissions made by Mr Thiagarajan,  

17

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant only for  the  simple  reason  that  admittedly  the  respondents  were  grandchildren  of  the  testator  and  they  have  claimed  the  estate  of  the  deceased  on  the  basis  of  a  settlement  deed  executed  by  the  testator  himself  which  admittedly  was  revoked by the  testator.  That  being the  position,  we must  hold that the respondents had caveatable interest in the estate  of the testator and, therefore, they are entitled to be served  before the final order is passed.  It  is well settled that if a  person who has even a  slight  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  testator  is  entitled  to  file  caveat  and  contest  the  grant  of  probate of the will of the testator.

(emphasis supplied)

13. It  is  thus  evident  that  apparently  conflicting  views  have  been  

expressed by coordinate Benches of this Court on the interpretation of the  

expression “caveatable interest”.  In  Krishna Kumar Birla’s  case, the  

Bench  did  not  approve  the  judgments  of  Calcutta  High  Court  in  

Bhobosoonduri  Dabee’s  case  and  Madras  High  Court  in  G.  

Jayakumar’s  case  wherein  it  was  held  that  any  person  having  some  

interest in the estate of the deceased can come forward and oppose the  

grant of probate.  As against this, in G. Gopal’s  case, the dictum that a  

person  who is  having  a  slight  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  testator  is  

entitled to file caveat and contest the grant of probate has been reiterated.  

This being the position, we feel that the issue deserves to be considered  

and decided by a larger Bench.

18

14. The Registry  is  directed  to  place  the  matter  before Hon’ble  the  

Chief Justice for appropriate order.

….………………….…J.       [G.S. Singhvi]

….………………….…J.       [C.K. Prasad]

New Delhi March 10, 2010.

19