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PETITIONER: JAGE RAM AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/03/1971

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1033            1971 SCR  (3) 871  1971 SCC  (1)  71  CITATOR INFO :  F          1984 SC1721  (8)

ACT: Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 ss. 17(2) (c), 38 to  44B-Public purpose  Declaration  by Government not, open  to  challenge unless  acquisition  is  for  collateral  purpose  or  is  a colourable  exercise of power-Acquisition for  Company-State contributing  towards  cost-Proceedings need  not  be  taken under ss. 38 to 44B-Section 17(2) (c) cannot be  interpreted ejusdem   Generis-Scope  of  s.   17(2)   (c)-Maxims-Ejusdem Generis-Scope of Rule.

HEADNOTE: In  March 1969, the respondent State issued  a  notification under  section  4  of the Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  as amended  by the Punjab Legislature, for acquisition  of  the appellants’ land.  The notification stated that the land was likely  to be required to be taken by Government, at  public expense, for a public purpose, namely,. the setting up of  a factory  for the starting of an industry and,  further  that action under section 17(2)(c) would be taken on the,  ground of urgency and provisions of s. 5A will not apply in  regard to  the  said  acquisition.  The  appellants  filed  a  writ petition  in the High Court questioning the validity of  the acquisition  on  the ground, inter alia, that  there  was-no urgency  in the mattelr, of requiring the land  ’,-therefore recourse  to s. 17 was not justified.  The state  government pleaded that since the Government of India had extended  the time for completion of the project till April 30, 1969,  it, had become necessary to take immediate steps to acquire  the land.  The High Court dismissed the petition.  In the appeal to  this Court it was contended that (i) the acquisition  in question being one for the benefit of a Company, proceedings should have been taken under ss. 38 to 44B of the Act,,  and that there was no public purpose involved in the case;  (ii) there was no urgency and hence recourse could not be had  to section  17  of  the  Act;  and  (iii)  S.  17(2)  (c)   was inapplicable  to the facts of the case, because,  though  s. 17(2)(c) read by itself covered a very large field, applying the  ejusdem generis Rule that provision had to be  given  a narrower  meaning because of the provisions of s.  17(2)(a) and (b). Dismissing the appeal,

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HELD  : (i) On the facts of the case the purpose  for  which land  was  acquired  was a  public  purpose.   The  question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by  the Government.   So  long  as it is not  established  that  the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose or  that  there  is  a  colourable  exercise  of  power  the declaration  of the government that it is made for a  public purpose is- not open to challenge. [874 E-G] Smt; Somavanti and Ors v.  State of Punjab, [1963] 2  S.C.R. 774  and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P.,  [1967]  1 S.C.R. 373, referred to. In   view  of  the  fact  that  the  State  Government   had contributed  towards  the  cost of acquisition  it  was  not necessary to proceed with the acquisition under Part VII  of the Act. [875 A] 8 7 2 (ii) On  the  facts  of the case  there  was  urgency.   The conclusion of the Government in a given case that there  was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusive. (iii)     In  interpreting cl. (c) of s. 17(2) the  rule  of ejusdem  generis, ,cannot be applied.  If a given  provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear there is no occasion to call into aid that rule.  Under cls. (a),  (b)  and (c) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17  the  decision  to acquire,  land has not to be made by the same authority  but by  different  authorities.  Further, the  conditions  under which the acquisition has to be made differ from clause  to clause.   Therefore,  there  is no basis  to  say  that  the general words in cl. (c) follow the particular and  specific words in cls. (b) and (c). [877 E; 879 H] State  of Bomby v. Ali Gulshan, [1952] S.C.R. 867,  Lilavati Bai  v. Stat of Bombay, [1957] S.C.R. 721, K, K. Kochuni  v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1050, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2034 of 1969. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1969 of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 850 of 1969. K.   L.  Gosain N. N. Goswamy, S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta  and K.  R. Nagaraja, for the appellant. Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondent No. 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J.  This  appeal  by  certificate  arises  from  the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana  High Court  in a writ petition wherein the appellants  challenged the validity of proceedings under ss. 4, 6, 9 and 17 (2) (c) of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the  Punjab Legislature.   For convenience sake we shall refer  to  that amended Act as ’the Act’.  The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It appears that several contentions were sought to be advan- ced before the High Court but in this Court only three  con- tentions  have been pressed for our consideration  i.e.  (1) the  acquisition  in  question  being  one  for  a   company proceedings should have been taken under ss. 38 to 44(B)  of the  Act,  the same having not been taken,  the  Proceedings taken are void; (2) there was no urgency and hence  recourse should not have been had to s. 17 of the Act and (3) Section 17(2) (c) is inapplicable to the facts of the case. Now  we  may  state the facts,relevant for  the  purpose  of

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deciding the questions in dispute.                             873 On  14/17  March,  1969,  Government  of  Haryana  issued  a notification under s. 4 of the Act notifying for acquisition the  land concerned in this case.  The notification  further directed that action under s. 17 (2) (c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of urgency and the provisions of s.  5-A shall  not  apply in regard to the  said  acquisition.   The preamble  to  the said notification says  that  "whereas  it appears to the Governor of Haryana that land is likely to be required to be taken by Government, at public expenses,  for a  public purpose, namely for the setting up a  factory  for the  manufacture of Chine-ware and Porcelain ware  including Wall  Glazed Tiles etc. at village Kasser.. Tehsil  Jhajjar, District Rohtak, it is here by notified that the land in the locality  described in the specification below is likely  to be  required for the above purpose".  On March 18, 1969  the Government  isued  a  notification under s.  6  of  the  Act acquiring  the land for a public purpose- On March 28,  1969 notices under s. 9 of the Act were served on the appellants. On  April  8, 1969, the appellants filed the  writ  petition giving rise to this appeal. The  allegations in the writ petition include the  assertion that  there  was no urgency in the matter of  acquiring  the land  in question and therefore there was  no  justification for having recourse to s. 17 and thus deprive the appellants of  the  benefit  of, s. 5-A of- the Act.   It  was  further alleged  therein that the acquisition in question  was  made for  the benefit of a company and hence  proceedings  should have  been taken under ss. 38 to 44(B) of the Act  and  that there  was no public purpose involved in the case.   It  was further  pleaded  that the land acquired was not  waste  and parable  land  and that s. 2 (c) of the Act did  not  confer power  on  the Government to dispense with  the  proceedings under s. 5-A.  In the counter-affidavit filed by the  Deputy Director  of  Industries  (Administration),  Government   of Haryana  On  behalf  of  the State  of  Haryana,  the  above allegations  were all denied.  Therein it is stated that  at the  instance of the State of Haryana, Government  of  India had issued a letter of intent to a company for setting up  a factory for the manufacture of Glazed Tiles etc. in  village Kasser.    That   project  was  to  be  started   with   the collaboration  of  a foreign company,  known  as  Pilkington Tiles  Ltd.  The scheme for setting up the project had  been finalised  and  approved by the  concerned  authorities.  on November  26, 1968, the Government wrote to one of the  pro- moters of the project, Shri H. L. Somany asking him to  com- plete the "arrangements for the import of capital  equipment and acquisition of land in Haryana State-- for setting up of the  proPosed  factory".   It was  further  stated  in  that communication the Government was pleased to extend the  time for compleing the Project upto April 30, 1969.  Under  those circumstances it 8 74 had become necessary for the State of Haryana to take  imme- diate  steps  to acquire the required land.   It  was  under those  circumstances the Government was constrained to  have recourse  to  s. 17 of the Act.  The Government  denied  the allegation  that the facts of this case did not come  within the scope of s. 17 (2) (c).   It  was also denied  that  the acquisition in question was not made    for     a     public purpose. We  have earlier seen that in the notification issued  under s.  4, it had been stated that the acquisition was made  "at public  expenses,  for  a public  purpose"  namely  for  the

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setting  up a factory for the manufacture of China-ware  and Porcelain-ware including Wall Glazed Tiles etc. In the writ petition it was not denied that the  acquisition in  question  was made at "public expenses".  All  that  was challenged  in  the writ petition was that the  purpose  for which the acquisition was made not a public purpose. There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest.  It is stated in the affidavit filed on  behalf  of the State Government that the  now  State  of Haryana  was lacking in industries and consequently  it  was become  difficult  to tackle the  problem  of  unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest.  That apart, the  question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by  the Government.   That is a socioeconomic question.  This  Court is  not in a position to go into that question.  So long  as it  is not established that the acquisition is sought to  be made  for  some collateral purpose, the declaration  of  the Govern. men+ it is made for a public purpose is ’not open to challenge,  Section  6(3) says that the declaration  of  the Government  that the acquisition made is for public  purpose shall  be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for  a public  purpose.   Unless  it  is shown  that  there  was  a colorable exercise of power, it is not open to this Court to go  behind  that  declaration  and find  out  whether  in  a particular  case the purpose for which the land  was  needed was a public purpose or not-see Smt.  Somavanti and ors.  v. The State of Punjab(1) and Raja  Anand Brahma Shah v.  State of  U.p.(2). On the facts of this case there can  be  hardly any  doubt that the purpose for which the land was  acquired is a public purpose. In view of the pleadings referred to earlier it is not  open to  the appellant to contend that the State  Government  had not contributed any Amount towards the cost of  acquisition, We  were informed at the bar that the State  Government  had contributed (1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774. (2) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 373.                             875 a  sum of Rs. 100/- towards the cost of the land which  fact is also mentioned in the award of Land Acquisition  Officer. That  being  so it was not necessary for the  Government  to proceed  with the acquisition under Part VII of the  Act-see Somavanti’s case(1). Now coming to the question of urgency, it is clear from  the facts set out earlier that there was urgency, The Government of  India was pleased to extend time for the  completion  of the of project upto April 30, 1969.  Therefore urgent  steps had  to be taken for pushing through the project.  The  fact that  the  St-ate  Government or  the  party  concerned  was lethargic  at  an  earlier stage is not  very  relevant  for deciding  the  question  whether on the date  on  which  the notification  was  issued,  there was  urgency  or  not  the conclusion of the Government in a given case that there  was urgency entitled to weight, if not conclusive. This takes us to the question of applicability of s. 17  (2) (c)  to the facts of the case.  The appellant had denied  in the affidavit that the entire land acquired is either  waste or arable Iand That contention of his has not been  examined by  the  High Court.  Therefore we have to  proceed  on  the basis  that  the case does not come within the scope  of  s. 17(1).  The State has also not purported to act under s.  17 (1).   It  has  purported  to  act  under  s.  17  (2)  (c). Therefore  we  have  to see whether  the  State  could  have

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proceeded  on  the facts of this case under s. 17  (1)  (c). Section  17 as amended by the Punjab Act 2 of  1954,  Punjab Act  17  of  1956 and Punjab Act 47 of 1956  to  the  extent necessary for our present purpose reads thus :               "17  (1)  In cases of  urgency  whenever,  the               appropriate   Government   so   directs,   the               Collector, though no such award has been made,               may,  on the expiration of fifteen  days  from               the  publication  of the notice  mentioned  in               section 9, sub-section (1) take possession  of               any  waste  or arable land needed  for  public               purposes  or for a Company.  Such  land  shall               there  upon,vest absolutely in the  Government               free from all encumbrances.               Explanation               (2)   In the following cases, that is to say               (a)   Whenever  owing to any sudden change  in               the  channel of any navigable river  or  other               unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for               any  Railway  Administration  to  acquire  the               ’immediate  possession  of any  land  for  the               maintenance  of  their  traffic  or  for   the               purpose  of  making thereon  a  river-side  or               ghat, station or of               (1) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774.               876               providing convenient connection with or access               to any such station;               (b)   Whenever in the opinion of the Collector               it becomes necessary to acquire the  immediate               possession of any land for the purpose of  any               library or educational institution or for  the               construction, extension or improvement of  any               building or other structure in any village for               the  common  use of the  inhabitants  of  such               village,  or  any  godown  for,  any   society               registered  under the  Co-operative  Societies               Act,  1912 (Act 11 of 1912), or any  dwelling-               house  for  the poor, or the  construction  of               labour colonies or houses for any other  class               of   people   under   a   Govermnent-sponsored               ’Housing   Scheme  or  any  irrigation   tank,               irrigation  or drainage channel, or any  well,               or any public road;               (c)   Whenever  land is required for a  public               purpose   which   in  the   opinion   of   the               appropriate    Government   is    of    urgent               importance,  the  Collector  may,  immediately               after the, publication of the notice mentioned               in  sub-section  (1)  and  with  the  previous               sanction  of the appropriate Government  enter               upon  and take possession of such land,  which               shall   thereupon  vest  absolutely   in   the               Government free from all encumbrances.               Provided  that  the Collector shall  not  take               possession of any building or part of a build-               ing  under this sub-section Without giving  to               the  occupier  thereof at  least’  forty-eight               hour’s notice of his intention so to do . . .               (3)   In  every  case  under  either  of   the               preceding  subsections the Collector shall  at               the  time  of taking possession offer  to  the               persons   interested  compensation   for   the               standing crop and three (if any) on such  land               and  for  any other damage sustained  by  them

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             caused by sudden dispossession ....               (4)   In the case of any land to which in the,               opinion  of  the appropriate  Government,  the               provisions  of subsection (1)  or  sub-section               (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government               may direct that the provisions of section  5-A               shall not apply....                             877 Herein we are only concerned with the scope of s. 17 (2) (c) as  the  vires  of  s. 17(2)  is  not  challenged.   Section 17(2)(c) if read by itself is plain.  It seems to permit the appropriate  Government  to direct that  the  provisions  of Section  5-A shall not apply whenever land is  required  for public  purpose  which  in the opinion  of  the  appropriate Government   is  of  urgent  importance.    The   conditions precedent  for  the application of s. 17 (2) (c) are (  1  ) that the land must be required for a public purpose and  (2) the appropriate Government must be of the ,opinion that  the purpose  in  question is of urgent importance.  But  it  was urged  on  behalf  of the appellants that  we  should  apply ejusdem  generie  rule in interpreting s. 17 (2)  (c).   The contention on behalf of the appellants was that though s. 17 (2)  (c)  read by itself covers a very  large  field,  that provision should be given a narrower meaning because of  the provisions  in s. 17(2) (a) and (b).  It was urged that  as the  general  words contained in s. 17 (2)  (c)  follow  the specific words of the same nature, in S.     17 (2) (a)  and (b), those general words must be understood as    applying to cases similar to those mentioned in s. 17 (2) (a) and  (b). The ejusdem generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a  rule  of construction to aid the courts to find  out  the true  intention of the legislature.  If a given I  provision is  plain  and  unambiguous and the  legislative  intent  is clear,  there  is  no occasion to call into  aid  that  rule ejusdem  generis  rule is explained in  Halsbury’s  Laws  of England (3rd Edn.). Vol. 36 p. 397 paragraph 599 thus               "As  a  rule,  Where in a  statute  there  are               general   words   following   particular   and               specific  words,,  the general words  must  be               confined  to things of the same kind as  those               specified,  although  this,’  as  a  rule   of               construction,  must be applied  with  caution,               subject to the primary rule that- statutes are               to   be  construed  in  accordance  with   the               intention of Parliament.  For the ejusdem rule               to apply, the specific words must constitute a               category,   class   or  genus;  if   they   do               constitute  such a category, class  or  genus,               then   only  things  which  belongs  to   that               category,  class  or  genus  fall  within  the               general words......               It  is observed in Craies on Statute Law  (6th               Edn.) p. 181 that :               "The ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied               With caution and not pushed too far, as in the               case  of  many decisions, which  treat  it  as               automatically appli-               878               cable,  and not as being, what it is,  a  mere               presumption   in   the   absence   of    other               indications   of   the   intention   of    the               legislature.   The modem tendency of the  law,               it was said, is "to attenuate the  application               of  the rule of ejusdem generis".   To  invoke               the  application of the ejusdem  generis  rule

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             there  must be a distinct genus  or  category.               The specific words must apply not to different               objects of a widely differing character but to               something which can be, called a class or kind                             of objects. According  to Sutherland Statutory Construction  (3rd  Edn.) Vol.   II  p. 395, for the application of  the  doctrine  of ejusdem  generis, the following conditions must exist.               (i)   The  statute contains an enumeration  by               specific words;               (ii)  The    members   of   the    enumeration               constitute a class;               (iii) The  class  is  not  exhausted  by   the               enumeration;               (iv) A general term follows the enumeration and               (v)   There  is  not  clearly  manifested   an               intent  that  the  general  term  be  given  a               broader meaning than the doctrine requires. The scope of the ejusdem generis rule has been considered by this Court in several decisions.  In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan(1); it was observed:               "Apart  from  the fact that the rule  must  be               confined within narrow limits, and general  or               comprehensive  words should recive their  full               and  natural meaning unless they  are  clearly               restrictive   in  their  intendment,   it   is               requisite that there must be a distinct genus,               which  must  comprise more than  one  species,               before the rule can be applied.".               In Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay,(2)  it               was observed                "The  rule of ejusdem generis is intended  to               be applied where general words have been  used               following particular and specific words of the               same   nature  on  the  established  rule   of               construction that the legislature presumed  to               use the general words in a restricted  sense,;               that  is  to  say, as belonging  to  the  same               genus’ as the particular and specific  words.               Such a restricted mean-               (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867.               (2) [1957] S.C.R. 721.               879               ing has to be given to words of general import               only where the context of the whole scheme  of               legislation   requires  it.   But  where   the               content  and  the object and mischief  of  the               enactment  do  not  require  such   restricted               meaning  to  be attached to words  of  general               import,  it becomes the duty of the courts  to               give  those  words their  plain  and  ordinary               meaning," The same view was reiterated by this Court in K. K. Kochini v.   State of Madras and Kerala(1). Bearing in mind the principles set out earlier, we shall now consider  whether the general import of the words, in s.  17 (2) (e) should be cut down in view of s. 17 (2) (a) and (b). Under cl. (a) of s. 17(2), the acquisition is to be made  by the  Railway Administration when owing to any sudden  change ’in the, channel of any navigable river or other  unforeseen emergency  it  becomes necessary for the  administration  to acquire  the  immediate  possession  of  any  land  for  the maintenance  of  the traffic or for the  purpose  of  making thereon  a  river-side  or ghat  station  or  for  providing convenient  connection with or access to any  such  station.

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We  would like to emphasize that under this  provision,  the acquisition  can only be made by the Railway  Administration and that when it considers that immediate possession (of any land is necessary for the purposes mentioned therein,  Under el. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 17, before an acquisition can be made, the Collector must form an opinion that it has  become necessary  to acquire the immiediate possession of the  land concerned  for the’ purposes mentioned therein.   Under  cl. (c)  of s. 17(2), the acquisition can be made only when  the appropriate  Government  forms the opinion that  because  of urgent importance, the concerned land has to be acquired for the purposes mentioned in that provision.  Under el. (a) the derision   to  acquire  has  to  be  made  by  the   Railway Administration.  Under el. (b), the acquisition can be  made only  on  the  formation  of the  required  opinion  by  the Collector.   Under el. (c) the acquisition can be made  only when  the  requisite opinion is formed  by  the  appropriate Government.  Further under el. (a) the acquisition has to be made  to  meet certain unforeseen emergency as a  result  of which  the  immediate possession of the land  is  necessary. Under el. (b) the Collector must form an opinion that it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of land but  under el. (c) the requirement is that  the  appropriate Government must form the opinion that the acquisition is  of urgent  importance.  Under cls. (a), (b) and (c)  of  sub-s. (2)  of s. 17, the decision to acquire land has, not  to  be made by the (1)  A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 105.0. (1) A.I.R. 1960 s.c. 1050 880 same  authority but by different authorities.   Further  the conditions  under  which  the acquisition has  to  be,  made differ  from clause to clause.  Therefore there is no  basis to  say  that  the  general words  in  cl.  (c)  follow  the particular and specific words in cls. (b) and (c).  Nor  can it  be said that the specific words contained in  cls.  (a) and  (b) constitute a category, ’class or genus.   Hence  we are unable to accept the contention that in interpreting cl. (c)  of  s.  17(2),  we should apply  the  rule  of  ejusdem generis. As  none of the contentions taken by the appellants are  ac- ceptable,  thise appeal fails and is dismissed.  But in  the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. K.B.N.         Appeal dismissed. 881