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PETITIONER: JAGDISH SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NATTHU SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/11/1991

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1604            1991 SCR  Supl. (2) 567  1992 SCC  (1) 647        1991 SCALE  (2)1363

ACT: Specific   Relief   Act,  1963:  Section  21  (2),   (4)   & (5)---Proviso.     Suit  for  specific  performance--Acquisition  of   suit properties  during  the pendency  of  second  appeal--Effect of--Nature of relief available to plaintiff--Power of  Court to  grant  compensation--Held  where  the  contract  becomes impossible    of    performance    for    no    fault     of plaintiff-----Court  can  award  compensation  in  lieu  and substitution  of specific performance--Measure of  compensa- tions  by  the  standards  of Section  73  of  the  Contract Act--Scope  of  the Proviso  explained--Distinction  between Indian Law and English law discussed. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Section 100     Second  Appeal--High Court--Power to  reappreciate  evi- dence and disturb concurrent findings of fact----Held  find- ings  of fact vitiated by nonconsideration of relevant  evi- dence can be reversed. General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 27.     Suit for specific performance---Notice issued by  plain- tiff--Refusal  to  accept by defendant-Notice  returned  un- served---Held   notice  must  be  presumed  to   have   been served--Averments in the Notices could be treated as part to the plaint.

HEADNOTE:     By  an agreement dated 3.7.1973 the respondent sold  two plots to the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 15,000. By another  agreement, entered into between the parties on  the same day, the appellant agreed to reconvey the said  proper- ties to the respondent against payment of Rs. 15,000  within two  years.  Within  the stipulated  period  the  respondent (Plaintiff)  instituted  a  suit  for  specific  performance alleging that despite offer of performance and tendering the price, the Appellant (Defendant) refused reconveyance of the properties.     The  Trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that  the Respondent  was  not ready and willing to perform  the  con- tract, and 568 that the time was essence of the reconveyance agreement. The first Appellate Court dismissed the respondent’s appeal.

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   The  respondent preferred second appeal before the  High Court. Relying upon the two notices issued by the Respondent to  the appellant before filing of the suit which  contained the  averments that he was willing and ready to perform  the contract,  the High Court reversed the findings of  the  two courts  below and allowed the appeal and held that  Respond- ent-Plaintiff  was willing to perform the contract and  that the Appellant was the party in breach. Accordingly it passed a decree of specific performance of an agreement for sale of land.     During  the pendency of the Second Appeal, suit  proper- ties were acquired by the State for public purposes and  the High  Court rejected the plea that after the land  has  been acquired by the State corpus of the Land had ceased to exist and no decree for specific performance can be granted.     In defendant’s appeal to this Court it was contended  on his  behalf (1) that the High Court erred in  reappreciating the evidence in second appeal and in disturbing the  concur- rent  findings of fact that Respondent was not  willing  and ready  to  perform  the contract; (2) that in  view  of  the acquisition  of  the  suit-properties  the  contract  itself became incapable of specific performance and to such a  case the power to give compensation as an alternative to specific performance did not extend. Modifying the decree of the High Court, this Court,     HELD:1.  Where  the findings by the Court of  facts  are vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by  an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. [572-H]     1.1  The notices issued by the respondent to the  appel- lant containing the averments that he was ready and  willing to  perform the contract which were not actually  served  on the appellant because of his refusal to accept them must  be presumed  to have been served as contemplated by Section  27 of  the  General Clauses Act..Therefore the High  Court  was right  in  relying upon the averments in the  notices  which could  be  treated as part to the  plaint.  Accordingly  the finding  of the High Court that Respondent was  willing  and ready to 569 perform  the contract and that it was the Appellant who  was in breach is accordingly confirmed. [572 F-G, 578 H, 579-A]     2.  Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963  enables the  Plaintiff  in a suit for specific performance  also  to claim  compensation for its breach either in addition to  or in  substitution  of, such performance.  However,  when  the plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impos- sible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. That position  is common under the English and Indian Law  namely under  Section of Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 and Section  21  of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But under the Indian Law  the explanation to sub-section (5) of Section 21 makes a specif- ic departure  and the jurisdiction to award damages  remains unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the  plain- tiff,  the contract becomes incapable of  specific  perform- ance. [574-D, 577, H-C]     Piarey  Lal  v. Hori Lal, [1977] 2 S.C.R.  915,  distin- guished and held inapplicable.     Mohamad  Abdul  Jabbar & Ors. v. Lalmia &  Ors.,  A.I.R. (34) 1947 Nagpur 254, disapproved.     Ardeshir  H.  Mama v. Flora Sessoon, A.I.R.  1928  Privy Council 208, explained.     3.  However, so far as the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 is concerned, two positions must to kept  clearly distinguished.  If  the amendment relates to the  relief  of

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compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific  perform- ance  where  the plaintiff has not abandoned his  relief  of specific-performance  the Court will allow the amendment  at any  stage of the proceeding. That is a claim for  compensa- tion  failing under section 21 of the Specific  Relief  Act, 1963  and  the amendment is one under the  proviso  to  sub- section (5). But different and less liberal standards  apply if  what is sought by the amendment is the conversion  of  a suit  for  specific  performance into one  for  damages  for breach of contract in which case Section 73 of the  Contract is  invoked. This amendment is under the discipline of  Rule 17, Order 6, C.P.C. The fact that sub-section (4), in  turn, invokes Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act for the  prin- ciples of quanlification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinction. [575 B-C] 570      3.1  In the instant case, assuming that the  Respondent had  not  specifically sought for compensation  in  lieu  of specific  performance  the amendment is permitted  in  order that complete justice is done. [578-B]     3.2 The measure of the compensation is by the  standards of  Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. Here the  English Rule in Bain v. Fothergill that the purchaser, on breach  of the contract, cannot recover for the loss of his bargain  is not applicable. [578-C]     Bain v. Fothergill, 1874 L.R. 7 House of Lords 158, held inapplicable.     Pollock  & MuHa on Contract (10th edn.) p.663;  Nagardas v. Ahmedkhan, (1895) 21 Bom. 175, referred to.     3.3 In the instant case, the quantum of the compensation is ascertainable with reference to the determination of  the market  value in the land acquisition proceedings. The  com- pensation  awarded may safely be taken to be the measure  of damages  subject, of course, to the deduction  therefrom  of money value of the services, time and energy expended by the appellant  in  pursuing the claims of compensation  and  the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award. [578-G]     4.   Accordingly there will be a decree awarding to  the Respondent compensation in lieu and substitution of one  for specific performance which but for the acquisition  Respond- ent would have been entitled to; the quantum and the measure of the compensation being the entire amount of  compensation determined  for the acquisition of the  suit-properties  to- gether with all the solatium, accrued interest and all other payments  under the law authorising the acquisition  less  a sum of rupees one lakh fifty thousand only which shall go to the  Appellant towards his services, time and amounts  spent in  pursuing  the  claims for compensation as  well  as  the consideration stipulated for reconveyance. [579 E-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4916 of 1991     From the Judgment and Order dated 5.4.1991 of the  Alla- habad High Court in Second Appeal No. 3395 of 1978. Manoj Swarup and Ms. Lalita Kohli for the Appellants. 571 B.S. Nagar for Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATACHALIAH,  J.  Special leave ’is granted  and  the appeal  taken-up for final hearing and disposed of  by  this judgment. We have heard Sri Manoj Swamp, learned counsel for

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the Appellant and Shri Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondent.     2.   Appellant  was  Defendant in a  suit  for  specific performance. He seeks special leave to appeal to this  Court from the judgment and order dated 5.4.1991 of the High Court of Allahabad in Second Appeal No.3395 of 1978 decreeing,  in reversal  of  the decrees of dismissal entered  by  the  two courts below, specific performance of an agreement for  sale of land..    3.  On 3.7.1973 Respondent-Natthu Singh sold Plot  No.195 measuring 5 bighas and 18 biswas and Plot No.196 measuring 9 bighas and 8 biswas of Gulistapur Village, Pargana Dadri  to the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 15,000. On the very day,  i.e.,  3.7.1973, another agreement  was  entered  into between the parties whereunder Appellant agreed to  reconvey the said properties to the Respondent against payment of Rs. 15,000/- within two years.  On 2.6.1975, well within the period of two years stipulated for the performance of the agreement to re-sell,  Respondent instituted  the suit for specific performance alleging  that despite offer of performance and tendering the price, Appel- lant,  with  the dishonest intention  of  appropriating  the properties  to himself refused reconveyance.  The  Appellant contested the suit principally on the ground that Respondent was never ready and willing to perform the contract and that Respondent himself was in breach.    4.   The  trial court framed the necessary  and  relevant issues stemming from the pleadings and on its own  apprecia- tion  of  the evidence on record came to  find  against  the Respondent  that  he was ready and willing  to  perform  the contract; and that the agreement, being one of reconveyance, time was of its essence. The suit was accordingly dismissed. Respondent’s first appeal before the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahar was also unsuccessful.      5.   However, in Respondent’s second appeal,  the  High Court  reversed  the findings of the two  courts  below  and allowing the appeal held that Respondent-Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract; that the Appellant  was the  party  in breach; and that, therefore,  Respondent  was entitled  to a decree. This decree is assailed in  this  ap- peal. 572     6.  Sri Manoj Swarup appearing in support of the  appeal urged two contentions; the first is that the High Court  was in error in embarking upon a re-appraisal of the evidence in a second-appeal to distrub concurrent findings of fact  that Respondent  was-not  willing and ready to perform  the  con- tract. The second contention is that contract itself  became incapable  of specific performance in view of the fact  that during the pendency of second appeal the State had initiated proceedings  for compulsory acquisition of the  suit-proper- ties and the subject-matter of the suit itself ceased to  be available. Counsel says the power to give compensation as an alternative to specific performance did not extend to a case in  which  the  relief of specific  performance  had  itself become impossible.     7.   On the first question, as to the readiness  of  the Respondent  to perform his obligations, the High  Court  no- ticed that on 30th January, 1974 even before institution  of the suit Respondent and his brother had sold another proper- ty  belonging  to them for a price of Rs.  30,000  and  that Respondent had the necessary wherewithal to perform his part of the bargain. The High Court held:               "...Thus,  the  plaintiff admittedly  had  re-               ceived  Rs.  15,000/- on 30.1. 1974  and  soon               thereafter the first notice was issued to  the

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             defendant  asking him to indicate a  date  for               executing the saledeed and also expressing his               readiness  and willingness. There is  no  evi-               dence on the record that between 30.1.1974 and               the  date of suit or thereafter the  plaintiff               had parted with this money."     The  High Court also noticed that the two notices  dated 23.3. 1974 and 6.5. 1975 respectively issued by the Respond- ent to the Appellant before the suit contained the averments that  he was ready and willing to perform the contract.  The notices were, no doubt, not actually served on the appellant as  they had come back unserved upon the alleged refusal  by the appellant to accept them. The High Court relied upon the averments in the notices which could be treated as a part to the plaint having been referred to and relied upon therein.     8.   In  our opinion, the High Court was  right  in  its view.  The notices must be presumed to have been  served  as contemplated  by Section 27 of the General .Clauses Act.  As to  the jurisdiction of the High Court to reappreciate  evi- dence in a second appeal it is to be observed that where the findings by the Court of facts is vitiated by non-considera- tion  of  relevant evidence or by an  essentially  erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. We find no substance in the first contention. 573     9.   The second contention is, however, not without  its interesting  aspects.  During  the pendency  of  the  second appeal,  the  properties were acquired by the  State  for  a public purpose. This is not disputed. It would appear that a compensation  of Rs. 4 lakhs or thereabouts has been  deter- mined.  That sum, along with the generous solatium  and  the rates  of  interest provided by the statute would now  be  a much larger amount. Before the High Court, Appellant  sought to  rely  upon the decision of this Court in Piarey  Lal  v. Hori  Lal,  [1977] 2 S.C.R. 915. That was a  case  where  in proceedings of consolidation the subject-matter of an agree- ment to sell was allotted to a person other than the vendor, the relief of specific performance was held not to  survive. The  High Court rightly held that pronouncement was  distin- guishable and inapplicable to the present controversy.     As  to  the relief available to a  plaintiff  where  the subject  matter was acquired during the pendency of  a  suit for specific-performance the High Court said:               "...The learned counsel for the respondent has               vehemently urged that after the land has  been               acquired its corpus has ceased to exist and no               decree  for  specific performance can  now  be               granted.  In my opinion with  the  acquisition               of)the  land  plaintiffs  rights  do  not  get               extinguished in totality. The appellate  court               always  suitably  mould the relief  which  the               circumstances  of  the  case  may  require  or               permit. The power in this regard is ample  and               wide enough...               However, in the present case the property  has               not  been  totally lost. What happens  in  the               case  of  the  acquisition  is  that  for  the               property compensation payable in lieu there of               is substituted..."               The  High  Court  issued  these  consequential               directions:               "If  the  decree for specific  performance  of               contract  in  question is found  incapable  of               being  executed due to acquisition of  subject

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             land, the decree shall stand suitably  substi-               tuted by a decree for realisation of compensa-               tion payable in lieu thereof as may be or have               been determined under the relevant Act and the               plaintiff  shall have a right to recover  such               compensation together with solatium and inter-               est  due thereon. The plaintiff shall  have  a               right to recover it from the defendant if  the               defendant  has already realised these  amounts               and  in  that event’ ;the defendant  shall  be               further liable to pay interest at the rate               574               of  twelve per cent from the date of  realisa-               tion  by  him to the date of  payment  on  the               entire  amount  realised  in  respect  of  the               disputed land."     We are afraid the approach of the High Court is  perhaps somewhat  an over-simplification of an  otherwise  difficult area of law as to the nature of relief available to a plain- tiff  where  the  contract becomes  impossible  of  specific performance  and  where there is no alternative  prayer  for compensation  in lieu or substitution of  specific  perform- ance.  While the solution that has commended itself  to  the High Court might appear essentially just or equitable, there are  certain problems both of procedure and of substance  in the administration of the law of specific relief particular- ly in the area of award of an alternative relief in lieu  or substitute  of specific performance that require and  compel consideration, especially in view of some pronouncements  of the High Courts which have not perceived with precision, the nice distinctions between this branch of the law as adminis- tered in England and in India.     10.  Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963  corre- sponding to Section 19 of 1877 Act enables the plaintiff  in a  suit for specific performance also to claim  compensation for its breach either in addition to or in substitution  of, such  performance. Sub-sections (2), (4) and (5) of  Section 21 are material and they provide: "(2).   If, in any such suit, the Court decides that specif- ic performance ought not to be granted, but that there is  a contract  between the parties which has been broken  by  the defendant,  and that the plaintiff is entitled to  compensa- tion  for that breach, it shall award his such  compensation accordingly. (3) [ Omitted as unnecessary.] (4)  In determining the amount of any  compensation  awarded under this section, the Court shall be guided by the princi- ples  specified  in Section 73 of the Indian  Contract  Act, 1872, 9 of 1872. (5)  No  compensation shall be awarded  under  this  section unless  the plaintiff has claimed such compensation  in  his plaint: Provided  that where the plaintiff has not claimed any  such compensation in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such  terms as may be just, for including a claim for such compensation. Explanation-The circumstance that the contract has become 575 incapable  of  specific performance does  not  preclude  the Court  from  exercising the jurisdiction conferred  by  this section." (emphasis added)  So  far  as the proviso to sub-section  (5)  is  concerned, two  positions  must be kept clearly distinguished.  If  the amendment  relates to the relief of compensation in lieu  of

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or  in addition to specific performance where the  plaintiff has  not  abandoned his relief of  specific-performance  the court will allow the amendment at any stage of the  proceed- ing.  That is a claim for compensation failing under  Secion 21  of the Specific Relief Act, 1963  and the  amendment  is one under the proviso to sub-section (5). But different  and less liberal standards apply if what is sought by the amend- ment  is the Conversion of a suit for  specific  performance into  one for damages for breach of contract in  which  case Section 73 of the Contract Act is invoked. This amendment is under  the  discipline of Rule 17 Order 6, C.P.C.  The  fact that  sub-section  (4), in turn, invokes Section 73  of  the Indian Contract Act for the principles of quantification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinc- tion.     The  provisions  of Section 21 seem to  resolve  certain divergencies of judicial opinion in the High Courts on  some aspects  of the jurisdiction to award of compensation.  Sub- section (5) seeks to set at rest the divergence of  judicial opinion between High Courts whether a specific claim in  the plaint  is necessary to grant the compensation.  In  England Lord Cairn’s (Chancery Amendment) Act, 1858 sought to confer jurisdiction  upon  the Equity Courts to  award  damages  in substitution  or in addition to specific  performance.  This became  necessary  in view of the earlier dichotomy  in  the jurisdiction  between  common law and Equity Courts  in  the matter  of choice of the nature of remedies for  breach.  In common law the remedy for breach of a contract was  damages. The  Equity Court innovated the remedy of specific  perform- ance because the remedy of damages was found to be an inade- quate remedy. Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 conferred  jurisdiction upon  the Equity Courts to award damages also so  that  both the reliefs could be administered by one court. Section 2 of the Act provided:               "In  all cases in which the Court of  Chancery               has  jurisdiction to entertain an  application               for  specific  performance  of  any  covenant,               contract  or agreement it shall be lawful  for               the same Court if it shall think fit to  award               damages  to the party injured either in  addi-               tion  to or in substitution for such  specific               performance  and such damages may be  assessed               as the Court shall direct."               576     This  is the historical background to the provisions  of Section  21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and its  prede- cessor in Section 19 of the 1877 Act.     11. In Mohamad Abdul Jabbar & Others v. Lalmia  &Others. A.I.R (34) 1947 Nagpur 254 specific performance of an agree- ment  of  sale dated 16th January, 1934, was sought  by  the institution  of  a suit on 15th January,  1937.  During  the pendency  of the suit, on 20th April, 1937,  the  provincial Government  started land acquisition proceedings  respecting the  subject-matter of the suit and the same  was  acquired. The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit for specific performance and referred an amendment for award of  damages. On the obvious impermissibility of specific performance  the Nagpur High Court said:               "We  accordingly conclude that  specific  per-               formance  is  now  impossible  and  we  cannot               decree it for "equity like nature does nothing               in vain." We cannot hold the plaintiffs-appel-               lants entitled to the compensation money  into               which the property was converted because  they               had no right or interest in that property...."

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                 Refusing the amendment for the relief  for               payment of money the High Court held:               "We would not allow amendment also because  on               the facts found by the trial Court (with which               we  see  no reason, whatever,  to  differ)  we               would  have refused specific performance,  and               the  claim for damages on this  account  would               also have been negatived because damages could               have been awarded only if specific performance               could  rightly have been claimed. The  appeal,               therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs." .llm0                   Support  for these conclusions was  sought               from  the  oft quoted, but  perhaps  a  little               misunderstood,  case  of Ardeshir H.  Mama  v.               Flora  Sassoon A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council  208.               The  passage in Sassoon’s case relied upon  by               the Nagpur High Court is this:               "In a series of decisions it was  consistently               held  that just as its power to  give  damages               additional  was to be exercised in a  suit  in               which the Court had granted specific  perform-               ance,  so  the  power to give  damages  as  an               alternative  to specific performance  did  not               extend  to a case in which the  plaintiff  had               debarred  himself from claiming that  form  of               relief, nor to a case in which that relief had               become impossible.               577               The  case  of 52 Bombay 597  fell  within  the               first category of cases described above  under               the  alternative relief of damages. This  case               fails within the second part where the  relief               of    specific    performance    has    become               impossible."               (emphasis supplied)     The  second part of the observation of the  Nagpur  High Court, with great respect to the learned Judges proceeds  on a fallacy resulting from the non-perception of the  specific departure  in  the  Indian law. In Lord  Cairn’s  Act.  1858 damages  could  not be awarded when the  contract  had,  for whatever  reason, become incapable of specific  performance. But  under the Indian law the explanation makes  a  specific departure  and  the jurisdiction to  award  damages  remains unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the  plain- tiff,  the contract becomes incapable of  specific  perform- ance.  Indeed,  Sassoon’s  case is not  susceptible  of  the import attributed to it by the Nagpur High Court.  Sassoon’s case  itself indicated the departure made in Indian  Law  by the Explanation in Section 19 of the 1877 Act, which is  the same  as the Explanation to Section 21 of the 1963 Act.  The Judicial  Committee, no doubt, said that Section 19  of  the 1877  Act "embodies the same principle as Lord  Cairn’s  Act and  does not, any more than did the English Statute  enable the court in a specific performance suit to award ’compensa- tion  for  its breach’ where at the  hearing  the  plaintiff debarred himself by his own action from asking for a specif- ic decree"’, But what was overlooked was this observation of Lord Blanesburgh,               "except as the case provided for in the expla-               nation  us  10 which there  is  introduced  an               express  divergence from Lord Cairn’s  Act  as               expanded in England"                                      (emphasis supplied )                   Indeed  the following illustration of  the

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             Explanation appended to Section 19 of Specific               Relief Act, 1877 makes the position clear"               "Of  the Explanation-A, a purchaser,  sues  B,               his  vendor,  for specific  performance  of  a               contract for the sale of a patent. Before  the               hearing  of the suit the patent  expires.  The               Court   may  award  A  compensation  for   the               non--performance of the contract, and may,  if               necessary, amend the plaint for that purpose     When  the  plaintiff  by his option  has  made  specific performance  impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him  to seek  damages. That position is common to both Section 2  of Lord Cairn’s Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But in Indian Law where the contract, 578 for  no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible  of  per- formance  section 21 enables award of compensation  in  lieu and substitution of specific performance.     We,  therefore, hold that the second contention  of  Sri Manoj Swarup is not substantial either.     12.  Learned  counsel  were not specific  on  the  point whether  the Respondent had actually asked for  compensation in  lieu of specific performance. We may assume that it  was not so specifically sought. In order that formality in  this behalf be completed, we permit the amendment here and now so that complete justice is done.     13. The measure of the compensation is by the  standards of Section 73 of the Indian Contract. Here again the English Rule in Bain v. Fothergill, (1874) L.R. 7 House of Lords 158 that  the  purchaser,  on breach of  the  ,contract,  cannot recover,  for the loss of his bargain is not applicable.  In Pollock  &  Mulla  on Contract (10th Edn.) the  law  on  the matter is set out thus :               "Where, therefore, a purchaser of land  claims               damages  for  the  loss of  his  bargain,  the               question to be decided is whether the  damages               alleged to have been caused to him  ’naturally               arose in the Usual course of things from  such               breach’;  and in an ordinary case it would  be               difficult to hold otherwise." [p. 663]     Learned  Authors  adopt  the  following  observation  of Farran C.J. in Nagardas v. Ahmedkhan, (1895) 21 Bom. 175 :               "The Legislature has not prescribed a  differ-               ent  measure  of damages in the case  of  con-               tracts  dealing with land from that laid  down               in the case of contracts relating to  commodi-               ties"     In the present case there is no difficulty in  assessing the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable  with reference  to the determination of the market value  in  the land  acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded  may safely  be  taken to be the measure of damages  subject,  of course,  to  the deduction therefrom of money value  of  the services,  time  and  energy expended by  the  appellant  in pursuing  the  claims of compensation  and  the  expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.     14. We accordingly confirm the finding of the High Court that  Respondent was willing and ready to perform  the  con- tract and that it was the 579  Appellant  who was in breach. However, in  substitution  of the  decree for  specific performance, we make a decree  for compensation, equivalent to the amount of the land  acquisi- tion  compensation awarded for the suit lands together  with solatium  and  accrued interest, less a sum  of  Rs.1,50,000

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(one  lakh fifty thousand only) which, by a rough and  ready estimate, we quantify as the amount to be paid to the appel- lant in respect of his services, time and money expended  in pursuing the legal-claims for compensation.     15. We may here notice one other submission of Sri Manoj Swarup. He found fault with the operative part of the  judg- ment  of the High Court, Which, according to Sri Manoj  Swa- rup, had not even provided for the payment to the  appellant of Rs. 15,000 the stipulated consideration for reconveyance. There is this apparent omission in the operative part of the High Court’s judgment. But this is only a technicality.  The operative  part  granting  relief should be  read  with  the relevant  prayers in the plaint itself. But that is  not  of any  practical significance here in as much as we have  also taken  this  amount of Rs. 15,000 into account  in  somewhat generously   quantifying  the  litigation-expenses  at   Rs. 1,50,000 as payable to the appellant out of the sums awarded for  the  acquisition. Therefore, there is no need  for  Re- spondent to pay the sum of Rs. 15,000 additionally.     16. In the result there will be a decree awarding 10 the Respondent compensation in lieu and substitution of one  for specific performance which but for the acquisition  Respond- ent would have been entitled to the quantum and the  measure of the compensation being take entire amount of compensation determined  for take acquisition of the suit. properties  to gather  with   all the solatium, accrued  interest  and  all other payments   under the law authorising the  acquisition, less  a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty  thousand only) which shall go to the Appellant towards his  services, time and amounts spent in pursuing the claims for  compensa- tion  as well as the consideration stipulated for  reconvey- ance  ....      The  sum of Rs.1,50,000 is allowed to be.. paid to  the Appellant on his assurance that he has not received any part of the compensation earlier. If any amount has been received by the Appellant out of compensation awarded for the  acqui- sition,  such  sums  shall go in reduction  of  the  sum  of Rs.1,50,000, the difference being for the benefit of and  be paid to the Respondent additionally.      This  order shall be sufficient authority for the  land acquistion authorities or the Courts wherever the matter may be pending for the apportionment and payment of the  compen- sation for the acquisition of the suit 580 property  between  the Appellant and the Respondent  in  the manner  indicated above. These directions shall, of  course, not  affect  or prejudice the claim of other  claimants,  if any,  whose  claims are to be determined in  the  said  land acquistion  proceedings,  the assumption  implicit  in  this apportionment  being. that there are no other  claimants  in the land acquisition proceedings. If such apportionment  and withdrawal  is  not possible, the decree in  terms  of  this judgment shall be worked out in execution proceedings. The decree under appeal is modified accordingly. No costs. T.N.A.                                            Decree modified. 581