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PETITIONER: JAGDISH PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  911            1974 SCR  (3) 369  1974 SCC  (4) 455  CITATOR INFO :  E&R        1974 SC 917  (10,16)  D          1974 SC2305  (1)  RF         1975 SC 522  (21)  RF         1987 SC1977  (4)  R          1990 SC1597  (19)

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act  1971,  Sec.  3(1)(a) (iii)--Order   of   detention   under   sec.   3   (1)   (a) (iii)--Grounds--Maintenance   of   Supplies   and   Services essential to the community--Legality of order. Words   and   phrases  "Supplies   and   Services"   meaning of--Constitution  of India, Art. 32--Practice--Petition  for habeas corpus--Return to Rule Nisi. Affidavit--on behalf of State--Who should file.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner, a licensed wholesale dealer,  was  detained pursuant  to  an  order  passed u/s 33 of  the  Act  by  the District  Magistrate,  Ranchi for  his  antisocial  activity prejudicial  to  the maintenance of  supplies  and  services essential to the community.  The particulars of the  grounds supplied  to  him u/s 8 stated that he  was  found  secretly transporting  50  bags  of rice in his  truck  at  mid-night contrary  to the conditions of his wholesaler’s licence  and that,  when  caught red handed, he gave  false  excuses  and imaginary  numbers  of  licence dealers,  some  of  whom  on verification had no current licence and all of whom disowned the  alleged  purchases.   The  petitioner  challenged   the validity of the order by a petition for habeas corpus.   The affidavit in return filed by the State was sworn by an Upper Division  Assistant  (Special)  Home  Department.   In  that affidavit  the  words "and services" after  "maintenance  of supplies", were struck off. The  petitioner raised two contentions before this  Court  : (i)  The  District Magistrate was uncertain whether  he  was detaining   the   petitioner  to   prevent   disruption   of maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community and such a mindless order was bad in law. (ii) Supplies  and Services are two distinct concepts and  though services being disrupted was one of the precise reasons  for the  detention,  no particulars which would  make  out  that

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ground,  apart  from  the  distinct  ground  of   preventing supplies, had been given; therefore, the order was illegal. Dismissing the petition held 1.   The  District  Magistrate  when  passing  an  order  of detention u/s 3 of the Act has to be fair and clear and  not doubtful about why he is detaining the man.  "Either or" ill fits into s. 3. Not so, when it is cumulative.  A man may be detained  on grounds A and B but not A or B. In the  present case, illicit transport of food grains in the still  secrecy of  night by one whose business licence does not  permit  it and who gives false explanation when confronted does indulge in  an  activity  with  impact  on  supplies  and  services. Supplies  and stocks if hijacked by wholesalers  upsets  the delicate  control scheme. go also transport and delivery  to each  centre according to its requirements is thrown out  of gear  by  these  private  operations.   For  example,  Bihar hopping  harrowingly from drought to floods, can  ill-afford to  have the wheels of distribution, of which  supplies  and services  are two facets, wobble or break down.   Therefore, the order of detention cannot be held to bad in economics of law. [373 D, 377 H] Rameshwar  Lal  v. State of Bihar [1968] 2  S.C.R.  505  and Prabhu  Dayal V. District Magistrate, Kamrup, W.P. No.  1946 of 1973 dated October 11, 1973, referred to. 11.  In  interpreting  expressions  such  as  "supplies  and services"  basically the statutory subjects  matter  colours the concept.  The complex needs and amenities of modern life and  the multifarious obligations of a welfare state  mingle supplies and services.  For example, an essential  commodity is at once a supply and a service.  The touchstone of social control is that it must be a 370 thing  essential  for the existence of the  community;  when crystallised it is supplies, when sublimated it is services. It  depends in most cases on the angle from which  you  view and  the  lens you use.  There can be no  dichotomy  between "supplies  and services" in the special context of  a  State being  called  upon in an emergency to supply  that  primary necessity  of existence, viz., food, which’ is  perhaps  the basic  service which Government must render to  the  people. In the present case, the allegation is of nocturnal, illegal rice  transport intercepted by officials and no violence  is done to language to describe that activity as prejudicial to supplies and services.  Rushing food supplies to a nation in hunger  is  a composite operation of supplies  and  services essential to the life of the community and the order is  not bad because it telescopes both.  An intelligent fore-,  cast made by the District Magistrate that the detenu would  break the  control’  system  and blackmarket  in  rice  cannot  be castigated as irrational. [372 C-H, 376 F] Ram  Manohar  Lohia v. State of Bihar and another  [1966]  1 S.C.R. 709, Prabhu Dayal v. Dist.  Magistrate, Kamrup,  W.P. No. 1496 of 1973 dt. 11-10-73 and Keshav Talpade v.  Emperor A.I.R. 1943 F.C.R. 1, 8 distinguished on facts. III. (obiter dicta) It  is difficult to appreciate why in return to a rule  nisi in  the  habeas  corpus motion, it is  not  thought  serious enough even where liberty of a citizen is choked off, to get the   District   Magistrate  to   explain   his   subjective satisfaction  and the grounds therefor.  Not even why he  is not  available,  nor  the next best, the oath  of  a  senior officer in the Secretariat who had been associated with  the handling  of  the  case  at  Government  level.   Mechanical affidavits,  miniaturising the files into a few  paragraphs, by  some one handy in the Secretariat cannot be regarded  as

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satisfactory.  This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a probative requirement of substance.  T373 B] The  above  observations stand only as obiter dicta  in  the present  case since counsel made no point about this  aspect of  the  affidavit.  However, in a  subsequent  judgment  in Mohd.   Alam  v. State of West Bengal, W.P. Nos.  1678  and’ 1855/1973  dt.  14-2-74, this Court comprised  of  the  same Bench  has specifically laid down that the proper person  to file the counter-affidavit in return to Rule, nisi  issuedby the Supreme Court in habeas corpus petition is the  District Magistrate who had passed the order of detention or a senior officer who personally dealt with the case of the detenu  in the Government Secretariat, or had to put up the file to the Minister for orders.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1972 of 1973. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the  issue of Writ in the nature of habeas corpus. Frank Anthony and S. K. Gambhir, for the petitioner. K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. KRISHNA IYER, J. The petitioner detained by the order of the District  Magistrate for anti-social proclivity  prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community  challenges  its  validity in  this  petition  for habeas corpus. Mr. Frank Anthony has vigorously urged two vital defects  as vitiating the detention order incarcerating the  petitioner, based  mainly  on the, unreported ruling of  this  Court  in Prabhu  Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrup(1),  the  well- known Lohia(2) case and a few other peripheral (1)  W.  P.  No. 1496 of 1973; judgment  dated  October  11, 1973. (2)  A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 633. 371 observations  in other decisions.  The  District  Magistrate was  uncertain  whether he would detain  the  petitioner  to prevent disruption of maintenance of supplies or of services essential  to the life of the community and such a  mindless order  suffered  from a fatal genetic disease  diagnosed  by this Court in many decisions as fatal, runs the submission. Now, the admitted facts and the authoritative law and  their interaction.   It is best to begin with the  impugned  order itself which reads               "No.  1182/C  dated, the  9th  October,  1973.               Whereas  I  am satisfied that with a  view  to               preventing Shri Jagdish Prasad, Proprietor M/s               Lachmi  Bhandar,  North  Market  Road,   Upper               Bazar,  Ranchi,  from  acting  in  any  manner               prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and               services  essential  to the community,  it  is               necessary  to  make an order that  he  be  de-               tained.   Now, therefore, in exercise  of  the               powers  conferred  by Sub-section (2)  of  the               Section  3  of  the  Maintenance  of  Internal               Security Act, 1971 (No. 26 of 1971), 1  hereby               direct  that the said Shri Jagdish  Prasad  be               detained.               He  shall  be treated in detention  in  Ranchi               Jail and classified as Class Y and in division               IB.                               (S. N. Sinha)

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             District Magistrate, Ran-.hi."               The   executive  interdict  on  the   trader’s               freedom is issued to inhibit his acting in any               manner  prejudicial  to  the  maintenance   of               supplies   and  services  essential   to   the               community.   The semantics of  ’supplies’  and               ’services’   in  this  context,   argued   Sri               Anthony,   serves   to   show   that   certain               activities  bear  upon  supplies  only,  e.g.,               hoarding   or  blackmarketing,   while   other                             actings   may  disrupt  services  only ,   e.g.,               sabotage  of  railway  tracks  or  scavenger’s               strike.  He argued that some misconduct may be               ambidextral as for example, huge quantities of               telegraph  wires  being poached or  a  railway               wagon  being  looted in an  organised  manner.               The  cornerstone  of his  contention,  in  the               first   stage,  is  that   blackmarketing   in               foodgrains  belongs  to  the  first   species-               essential  supplies-and  not  to  the  second-               essential  services In Rameshwar Lal v.  State               of Bihar(1) this Court pointed out :               "No  doubt  blackmarketing has at its  base  a               shortening  of  supplies  because  blackmarket               flourishes  best  when  the  availability   of               commodities  is rendered difficult.  It has  a               definite  tendency  to disrupt  supplies  when               scarcity   exists  or  scarcity   is   created               artificially    by    hoarding    to    attain               illegitimate     profits.     Indulging     in               blackmarketing is conduct which is prejudicial               to the maintenance of supplies.  It is  hardly               necessary to read supplies conjunctively  with               services, as was contended although cases  may               exist where supplies and services may both  be               affected.    The  word  ’and’  is   not   used               conjunctively but disjunctively.  If  sweepers               strike, no question of disrupting sup-               (1)   [1968]2 S. C. R. 505.               372               plies  arises  but services essential  to  the               life  of  the  community  will  certainly   be               disrupted."  he  familiar imagery in Lohia’s case of concentric  circles in  the  context of Law and Order (the  larger  circle)  and public order (the smaller but graver one) was projected here with  a  little readjustment.  Similies and  metaphors  land literary grace to legal argument but are apt to play  tricks in  areas  of strict logic or cold law.  Courts have  to  be cautious  while transplanting picturesque  projections  from one  situation  to another.  So let us take  an  independent close-up  of  the  profiles  of  essential  ,supplies’   and ’services’  to  discover  common  morphology  and  divergent features.   Basically, the statutory subject-matter  colours the  concept.  Counsel traced the pedigree of the Act,  with special  reference  to essential supplies and  services,  to substantiate his thesis of compartmentalisation and marginal overlapping.   May  be, counsel is right in  his  contention that all supplies are not services and all services are  not supplies but the complex needs and amenities of modern  life and  the multifarious obligations of a welfare state  mingle supplies  and  services so much that the  concentric  circle geometry  becomes  a misleading stroke of  conceptualism  in this jural area.  For example, an essential commodity is  at

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once  a supply and a service.  Section 36(3) of the  Defence of India Rules, 1971 defines it to mean "essential commodity" means food, water, fuel, light,  power or  any  other  thing essential for  the  existence  of  the community which is notified in this behalf by Government;" "Light  and  power" thus are commodities; so also  food  and water.   Yet  who  will  deny that light  is  a  service  or drinking water, for that matter ?  The touchstone of  social control  is  that  it  must be a  thing  essential  for  the existence   of  the  community;  when  crystallised  it   is supplies,  when  sublimated it is services.  It  depends  in most cases an the angle from which you view and the lens you use.  Food is supplies, so is shipping and wagons,  kerosine and  gasoline.   And yet they are services.   At  a  feeding centre  for starving children you supply food, serve  gruel. In  other words, food is supplies, feeding is services.   In Blackpool   Corporation  v.  Lovkar(1)  it  was  held   that providing  housing  accommodation fell within the  scope  of "supplies and services" in Regulation 51 (1) of the  Defence (General)  Regulation,  1939.   We  see  no  force  in   the dichotomy  between  the  two attempted  by  counsel  in  the special  context  of  a  State  being  called  upon  in.  an emergency  to  supply that primary necessity  of  existence, viz.,  food,  which  is  perhaps  the  basic  service  which Government must render to the people.  In the present  case, the  allegation  is of nocturnal, illegal,  rice  transport, intercepted by officials, and you do no violence to language to  describe  that activity as prejudicial to  supplies  and services.   Anyway,  rushing food supplies to  a  nation  in hunger  is  a composite operation of supplies  and  services essential to the life of the community and the order is  not bad because it telescopes both. Shri  Anthony  relied  on  the  mental  vacillation  of  the detaining  officer as disclosed in the affidavit  in  return filed by the State where ’and services’ is struck off  after "maintenance of supplies".  If this reflects the (1)  [1948] 1 K.B, 349. 373 slippery  satisfaction  of  the District  Magistrate  it  is unfortunate.  Here some Upper Division Assistant  (Special), Home  Department, has sworn an affidavit, not with  personal knowledge  but  with  paper  wisdom.   It  is  difficult  to appreciate  why in return to a rule nisi in a habeas  corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even where  liberty of  a citizen is choked off, to get the District  Magistrate to  explain  his  subjective satisfaction  and  the  grounds therefor.   Not even why he is not available, not  the  next best,  the oath of a senior officer in the  Secretariat  who had  been  associated  with  the handling  of  the  case  at Government level.  Mechanical affidavits, miniaturising  the files  into  a  few paragraphs, by some  one  handy  in  the Secretariat cannot be regarded as satisfactory.  This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but a probative requirement of substance.   However,  in this case, counsel made  no  point about  this  aspect of the affidavit  because  the  relevant material  recited in the detention order is almost  admitted in  the  petitioner’s  averments.   Even  so,  the   curious striking off in the affidavit of one ground relied on by the District Magistrate in his order is obscure. Had  the authority used one or other of the grounds  in  the alternative, such for example as ’public order’ or ’security of State’ or ’maintenance of supplies’, it would have failed in law.  Ile has to be firm and clear and not doubtful about why he is detaining the man.  ’Either or’ ill fits into s.3. Not  so,  when it is cumulative.  A man may be  detained  on

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grounds  A and B but not A or B. Here, the  cumulative,  not the  alternative,  is the tenor of the order.  Had  it  been otherwise due care would stand negatived and the order would fail.  Fundamental rights are fundamental and administrative indifference is impermissible to encroach beyond the  strict lines  of  the law.  Rameshwar Lal(1)  elicited  some  stern observations  from  Hidayatullah, J., as he then  was.   The learned Judge said : "However, the detention of a person without a trial,  merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, is  a serious matter.  It must require the closest  scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving  no room  for  errors or at least avoidable  errors.   The  very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the  opinion  formed or the sufficiency of the  material  on which  it  is  based, indicates the need  for  the  greatest circumspection  on  the part of those who wield  this  power over  others.   Since  the detenu is  not  placed  before  a Magistrate  and  has  only a right  of  being  supplied  the grounds   of  detention  with  a  view  to  his   making   a representation  to the Advisory Board, the grounds must  not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention.  Similarly,  if a vital ground is shown to be, non-existing so that it could not have and ought not to have played a part in the material for  consideration, the court may attach some importance  to this fact." The  present  case  hardly  fails  for  this  reason   since particulars  of grounds are given which cover  supplies  and services  to  the  community,  prejudice  to  which  is  the rationale stated in the order.  But it is con- (1)  [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505. 374 tended  that  the particulars furnished relate  to  supplies only  and how services are affected is left vague.   If  one ground  is vague, the order fails.  In Rameshwar  Lal(1)  it was pointed out : "  where some grounds are found to be non are  cancelled  or given  up,  the detention cannot be justified  ....  if  the grounds  are  not sufficiently precise and  do  not  furnish details  for the purpose of making effective  representation the detention can be questioned." In  this connection, Shri Anthony forcefully urged his  case that services being disrupted was one of the precise reasons for  the detention, but no particulars which would make  out that  ground, apart from the distinct ground  of  preventing supplies, have been given.  On the reasoning in Prabhu Dayal the order is illegal, he argued. Mathew, J., brought out the fatal flaw in Prabhu Dayal thus "The  fact that one of the grounds mentions that  paddy  and rice  had  been unearthed and seized from  the  unauthorised possession of the petitioners from the rice mill in question on  the  date of the detention order would  not  necessarily lead  to  the  inference  that  the  petitioners  have  been indulging  in unauthorized milling of paddy, much less  that they  were  smuggling the resultant rice  to  Maghalaya  for earning  undue profit.  It cannot, therefore, be  said  that the   first  ground,  namely,  that  the   petitioners   are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and  smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit, is  a conclusion reached from the fact of seizure  of  paddy and  rice on 25-7-1973 or the seizure of rice  on  16-5-1972 from  their  unauthorized possession  at  Messrs.   Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati." These  are  not only cases where one of the grounds  of  de-

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tention was vague, but also cases where the detaining autho- rity did not apply its mind at all to one of the grounds  of detention.   If the detaining authority had  no  particulars before  it  as regards the smuggling operation  how  was  it possible for it to have been satisfied that the  petitioners were smuggling rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit  ? If  there  was any particular instance of smuggling  of  the kind  in the mind of the detaining authority, it would  have been  possible for it to specify the particular instance  at least in the grounds." Reference  was  also made in the above case by  the  learned Judge to Keshav Talpade v. Emperor(2) where it was said "If a detaining authority gave four reasons for detaining  a man,  without  distinguishing between them, and any  two  or three  of  the reasons are held to be bad, it can  never  be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the  mind of the (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 505. (2)  A.I.R. 1943 F.C.R.1,8. 375. authority  or  whether the detention order would  have  been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been  before them." The  law is thus indubitable that if one ground is vague  of denuded’ of any detail the order, even if other good grounds exist,  is  bad.   The  sole  enquiry  then  is  whether  in substance  no  material has been set out here from  which  a rational  inference  regarding perverting  services  to  the community  has  been  given at all, as  happened  in  Prabhu Dayal(1), case.  We demur. The order detailing grounds of detention reads thus "In  pursuance of section 8 of the Maintenance  of  Internal Security  Act, 1971 (No. 26 of 1971), Shri  Jagdish  Prasad, Proprietor  M/s  Lachmi Bhandar, North  Market  Road,  Upper Bazar, Ranchi is informed that he has been ordered to be de- tained  in my order No. 1182/C dated 9th October, 73 on  the following grounds - 1.   That  you on 2-10-72 at about 12 O’Clock at night  were transporting 50 bags of rice weighing on truck No. BRV  6627 which  was checked by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,  Sadar, Ranchi. 2.   That  you  produced at the time of checking  cash  memo book and you asserted that out of 50 bags of rice seized oil the said truck, 15 bags of rice were sold to Biswanath Floor Mill, Khelari, 10 bags of rice to Pramod Floor Mill, Khelari and 10 bags to Shri Kundanlal Khelari. 3.   That in support of your assertion as stated in Para No. 2  above,  you  produced Cash memo No.  1134  dated  2-10-73 showing sale of 15 bags of rice to M/s Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari  and you mentioned licence Number of  M/s  Biswanath Flour  as  34/69  (R) On verification by  a  Magistrate  1st Class, Ranchi, at Khelari from Shri Jagi Ram, Proprietor  of M/s  Biswanath Flour Mill, Khelari, it has been  established that the licence number of the firm is 63/68 and not  34/69. Shri Jagi Ram has also asserted that he did not purchase any rice from you or from any other place on 2-10-73. 4.   That  similarly  in support of assertion as  stated  in Para 2 above, you produced Cash memo No. 1135 dated  2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice to M/s Pramod Flour Mill  of Khelari  showing their licence number as 31/68 (R).  On  ac- tual  verification  at Khalari by a  Magistrate  1st  Class, Ranchi,  from Shri Bhagwan Singh, Proprietor of  M/s  Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari it has been established that the licence of M/s Pramod Flour Mill, Khelari is 9/72 and not 31/69.  It has  also  been  established that  M/s  Pramod  Flour  Mill,

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Khelari   had  no  license  in  1969.   It  has  also   been established  that on 2-10-73 M/s Flour Mill Khelari did  not make any purchase of rice from you or from any other shop. (1)  W.P. 1496 of 1973; Judgment dated October 11, 1973. 376 5.   That  similarly in support of your assertion as  stated in  Para No. 2 above, you produced cash memo No. 1137  dated 2-10-73 showing sale of 10 bags of rice. to Shri Kundan  Lal of  Khelari  showing  his licence number  as  26/67(R).   On actual  verification at Khelari by a Magistrate  1st  Class, Ranchi,  from Shri Kundan Lal of Khelari it has been  estab- lished that Shri Kundan Lal of Khelari has got no  foodgrain dealer’s  licence, nor he deals in foodgrains.  It has  also been established that the said Kundan Lal of Khelari did not purchase any rice from you on 2-10-73. In the circumstances I am satisfied that it he is allowed to remain  at large, he will indulge in activities  prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community  for prevention of such activities I consider  his detention necessary. . . . " He  who runs and reads will be satisfied, if the  statements are  true,  it  is  not for the  Court  to  investigate  the veracity  of  these averments that  prolix  particulars  are communicated about the midnight movement of 50 bags of rice- a  clandestine  misadventure contrary to the  conditions  of this  wholesaler’s licence-and, when challenged, reeled  off imaginary  numbers of licences of dealers some of  whom,  on verification,  had  no current licence and all of  whom  had disowned the alleged purchases.  May be, the petitioner  has a  good defence but the imprisonment is preventive  and  not punitive,  the  conclusion  is  based  on  the   executive’s subjective   satisfaction,   not   the   court’s   objective assessment.   Even  the admitted facts are  tell-tale.   The petitioner is a licensed wholesale dealer.  He can carry  on his  business only at a place mentioned in his  licence  and not  do transport and sale outside those premises.   He  can sell  only to a wholesale or retail merchant holding a  per- mit.   He shall issue ’to every customer a  correct  receipt giving the name, address and licence number of the customer’ and other details and keep a duplicate of the same.  On  the recitals  in the annexure to the order, the petitioner  has, in  violation of all these safeguards, attempted to run  the gauntlet  of the law.  An intelligent forecast made  by  the District Magistrate that the detenu would break the  control system  and  blackmarket  in rice cannot  be  castigated  as irrational.   The  argument is that all this is  germane  to supplies,  not services.  Therefore, as  earlier  explained, the whole order breaks down. We  do  not  dismiss this argument as  merely  technical  or procedural  for the eloquent reason given by Mathew, J.,  if we may say, with deep deference in Prabhu Dayal’s case : "The facts of the case might induce mournful reflection  how an  honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty  of taking  prophylactic  measure to secure the  maintenance  of supplies  and services essential to the community  has  been frustrated  by what is popularly called a  technical  error. We  say  and we think it is necessary to  repeat,  that  the gravity  of the evil to the community resulting  from  anti- social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for 377 invading  the  personal  liberty of  a  citizen,  except  in accordance   with   the   procedure   established   by   the Constitution and the laws.  The history of personal  liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of proce- dure.  Observance of procedure has been the bastion  against

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wanton  assaults on personal liberty over the years.   Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a  person is that he shall not be deprived of it  except  in accordance with the procedure established by law.  The  need today for maintenance of supplies and services essential  to the  community cannot be over-emphasised.  There will be  no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community.  But social security is not  the only goal of good society.  There are other  values in  a society.  Our country is taking singular pride in  the democratic  ideals in personal liberty.  It would indeed  be ironic if, in the name of social security, we would sanction the subversion of this liberty.  We do not pause to consider whether  social  security  is more  precious  than  personal liberty  in  the  scale of values.   For,  any  judgment  as regards that would be but a value judgment on which opinions might differ.  But whatever be its impact on the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, when  a certain  procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or  the Laws  for  depriving a citizen of his personal  liberty,  we think  it  our  duty to see  that  procedure  is  rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears." Part IV of the Constitution projects a value judgment  which some, jurists have interpreted to mean that in the hierarchy of  human rights the right to life ranks highest and if  the liberty  of  the few starve the life of the many  the  jural order may break down, an aspect on which we do not now  need to speak. The  position of law is plain but does not apply  here.   We have,  been  at pains to explain that illicit  transport  of foodgrains  in  the  still secrecy of  night  by  one  whose business  license  does not permit it and  who  gives  false excuses  when confronted, does indulge in an  activity  with impact  on supplies and services.  Supplies and  stocks,  if hijacked by wholesalers, upsets the delicate control scheme. SO  also transport and delivery to each centre according  to its  requirements  thrown  out  of  gear  by  these  private operations.  And Bihar, hopping harrowingly from drought  to floods, can ill-afford to have the wheels 378 of  distribution,  of which supplies and  services  are  two facets,  wobble  or break down.  Anyway, we cannot hold  the order bad, in economics or law. Counsel referred to the quantity being but 50 bags of  rice- too  small to thwart supplies to the community.  While  that is  of  little avail  legally, it  suggests  cynically  that larger  black-marketers  are  easy  in  their  bosom   while deserving  to be behind bars.  That is not our pro vince  as judges, and our views as citizens are out of place. In conclusion, we would like to express concern at prolonged detentions  without trial without periodical review of  each individual   case in changing circumstances.   The  petition fails and is dismissed. S. B. W.         Petition dismissed. 379