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PETITIONER: JAGANNATH SONU PARKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/10/1962

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1963 AIR  728            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 573  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC1382  (111)

ACT: Criminal  Trial-Special  Judicial   Magistrates-Notification constituting  and  conferring powers on-Change In  venue  of trial and appeal-If discriminatory-Notification dated Decem- ber  29, 1961, of Bombay Government-Code of Criminal  Proce- dure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 14-Bombay Separation of Judi- cial  and Executive Functions Act, 1951 (Bom. 23  of  1951)- Constitution of India, Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended  by Bombay  Act  23 of 1951, empowered the State  Government  to appoint  a qualified person as a special Magistrate  and  to confer   upon  him  powers  conferrable  upon   a   judicial Magistrate  in respect of a particular case or a  particular class or classes of cases or in regard to cases generally in any local area.  By a notification dated December 29,  1961, the  Government  appointed Mr. G to be  a  Special  Judicial Magistrate  for  the  area  comprising  Greater  Bombay  and Ratnagiri District and conferred upon him all the powers  of a  Presidency  Magistrate  in respect of the  trial  of  the Deogad Gold Seizure case.  The petitioners, who are  accused in  the  case,  moved  the  Supreme  Court  for  a  writ  of certiorari for quashing the notification on the ground  that the notification and the amended s.14 infringed Art. 14  of’ the Constitution. Held, that the amended s. 14 does not offend Art. 14 and  is valid.   There  is substantially no difference  between  the powers conferrable by the unmended and by the amended s. 14. M.   K. Gopalan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1  S.C.R. 168, relied on. Held,  further that the notification constituting a  Special Magistrate  for  the  trial  of  the  petitioners  was   not discriminatory.   Amended  s. 14 contemplates  both  a  case which  is pending and one which may be instituted after  the date  of  the constitution of the Special  Magistrate.   The constitution  of  a  Special  Magistrate  does  not   amount

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directly or indirectly to a transfer of any 574 case.  The fact that Mr. G may hold the trial at Bombay  and not at Deogad while other similarly situated would be  tried at Deogod may result in inconvenience to the petitioners but this  could  not sustain the plea  of  discrimination.   The charge  against the petitioners is in respect of  conspiracy at Bombay, Deogad and other places and the petitioners could have  been  lawfully  tried  at  Bombay.   The  notification constituted a Special Magistrate and conferred  jurisdiction on him both over the place where the petitioners are alleged to  have  conspired  and the place where  the  offences  are alleged to have been actually committed.  It did not  amount to  discrimination  that from the judgment  of  the  Special Magistrate  an appeal would lie to the High Court  while  if the  petitioners  were tried by a Magistrate at  Deogad,  an appeal  would lie to the Sessions judge and then a  revision would  lie to the High Court.  The difference of  the  venue results from the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate trying the case and not from any unequal  dealing by the notification.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ PEtitioN  No. 65 of 1962. Petition under Art. 32 of the CoNstitution of India for  the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A.   S. R. Chari, R. K. Garg avid K. R. Chaudhri, for  the petitioners. N.   S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebat, for the respondents. 1962.  October 11.  The judgment of the Court was  delivered by SHAH,   J.-Being   in  possession  of  evidence   that   the petitioners  and others were concerned in the commission  of offences   of  conspiracy  to  smuggle  gold  from   foreign countries  into  thE  port  of Deogad  in  the  District  of Ratnagiri, contrary to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and  the Foreien Exchange Regulation Act, P. N.-  Kalyankar, Sub-Inspector.of  Customs and Central Excise,  arrested  the petitioners and produced them before the judicial Magistrate F Class,  575 Deogad.  On December 29, 1961, the Government of Maharashtra promulgated  a  notification  in  exercise  of  the   powers conferred  by s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1898 (as  amended by Bombay Act XXIII of 1951 in its  application to the State of Maharashtra) appointing Mr. V. M, Gehani  to be  a Special judicial Magistrate having  jurisdiction  over the  area comprising Greater Bombay and Ratnagiri  District, and  conferred  upon  him all the  powers  of  a  Presidency Magistrate in respect of the trial in the case involving the seizure  of approximately 49,990 tolas of foreign  gold  and known as the "Deogad Gold Seizure Case.’ On  January  10, 1962, the Government  of  Maharashtra  gave consent  in writing as required by s. 196-A sub-section  (2) of  the  Code of Criminal Procedure to  the  institution  of criminal  proceedings  against  the  petitioners  and  eight others for offences punishable "under s. 120B of the  Indian Penal  Code,  1860 read with s. 167(81) of the  Sea  Customs Act, 1878 (as amended) and s. 120B of the Indian Penal  Code read  with  s.  167(81) of the Sea  Customs  Act,  1878  (as amended) and s. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 1947 (as amended) and s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code read s.  8(1) with and s. 23 of the Foreign  Exchange  Regulation

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Act, 1947 (as amended)".  Thereafter H. R. Jokhi,  Assistant Collector  of Customs & Central Excise, Marine &  Prevention Division, Collectorate of Central Excise Bombay instituted a complaint  in the Court of the Special Magistrate  appointed under  the Notification dated December 29, 1961, against  16 persons (including the petitioners) alleging that they  were parties  to  a  conspiracy at Bombay,  janjira,  Dabhol  and Deogad  (the  latter three places being in the  District  of Ratnagiri)  and other places to smuggle large quantities  of gold  into India, with a view to evade or attempt  to  evade payment of duty thereon and to evade or attempt to evade the prohibition and 576 restrictions  in  force relating thereto during  the  period from  about  October  1959  to the end  of  April  1961.  or thereabout  in breach of the provisions of the  Sea  Customs Act, 1878 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and that  the said persons had in pursuance of  the  "conspiracy and  with  continuing purpose and design" in  or  about  the month of April 1961 acquired or were concerned in  importing and  acquiring possession, contrary to the Sea  Customs  Act and  the  Foreign Exchange Regulation  Act,  gold  totalling 49,990   tolas   valued  at  over  Rs.   70,00,000/-.    The petitioners  applied to the Special Magistrate that they  be tried  at  Deogad or at Ratangiri the  headquarters  of  the District,  for  they  were  permanent  residents  of  Deogad carrying  on  their respective occupations at  Deogad,  that they  had  already made their  individual  arrangements  for their  defence  at  Deogad and that it  would  be  just  and convenient  that  their  trial  should  take  place  in  the District of Ratnagiri.  The Magistrate rejected their appli- cation.   The  petitioners  then moved  the  High  Court  of judicature  at  Bombay praying for an order  that  the  case against  the  petitioners be transferred for  trial  to  the court of some judicial Magistrate at Deogad or at  Ratnagiri competent  to  try  the  case  :  in  the  alternative   the petitioners prayed that the Special Magistrate Mr. Gehani be directed  to  try  the  said case either  at  Deogad  or  at Ratnagiri  at which place all ’facilities’  were  available. The High Court dismissed their application.  The petitioners then moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution  for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or  direction quashing  the Notification dated December 29, 1961.,  issued by  the  Government  of Maharashtra or  in  the  alternative declaring s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Bombay Act 23 of 1951 ultra vires and void and for an order  that the case be heard at Deogad or at  Ratnagiri  in the  State  of Maharashtra by any  Magistrate  competent  to enquire into or try the case.  By this petition  577 the petitioners submitted that s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Bombay Legislature by Act 23  of 1951 and the Notification dated December 29, 1961, issued by the  Government  of  Maharashtra appointing  Mr.  Gehani  as Special  judicial  Magistrate  and investing  him  with  the powers of a Presidency Magistrate, infringed Art. 14 of  the Constitution. Sub-section  (1) of s. 14 of the Code as amended, in so  far as it is material, provides               "14.  Special Magistrates.-          The State               Government  may in consultation with the  High               Court, confer upon any person who holds or has               held  any judicial post under the Union  or  a               State, or possesses such other  qualifications               as  may, in consultation with the High  Court,

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             be  specified  in  this behalf  by  the  State               Government  by  notification in  the  Official               Gazette, all or any of the powers conferred or               conferrable  by  or  under  this  Code  on   a               judicial  Magistrate in respect to  particular               cases  or to a particular class or classes  of               cases, or in regard to cases generally in  any               local area." By  s. 6-A which was also added by Bombay Act 23 of 1951  in the  Code,  constitution of different classes  of  ,Judicial Magistrates was provided, and under that head were  included Presidency Magistrates.  The State Government was, under the amended  Code,  competent  to  appoint  a  person  with  the requisite qualifications a Special Magistrate and to  confer upon him the powers conferred or conferrable under the  Code on a judicial Magistrate in respect of a particular case  or a particular class or classes of cases or in regard to cases generally  in  any local area.  Section 14 of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure as originally enacted prohibited the 578 appointment of a Special Magistrate to function in any local area  within the Presidency towns, but that limitation  upon the power of the State Government has, by the amendment made by  Bombay Act 23 of 1951, been removed, and it is now  open to  the  Government of Maharashtra to constitute  a  Special judicial Magistrate with power to function in any local area including  Greater  Bombay.   The  expression  ,local  area’ includes any part of a State, and it may cover more than one District.   The  Government of Maharashtra  therefore  could appoint  Mr. Gehani a Special,’ judicial Magistrate,  having jurisdiction  over  Greater  Bombay  and  the  District   of Ratnagiri  and  could  confer  upon  him  the  powers  of  a Presidency  Magistrate in respect of the trial of  the  case known as the Deogad Gold Seizure Case. In M. K. Gopalan v. The state of Madhya Pradesh the validity of s. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (V of 1898.) was  challenged  on  the plea that it was  void  because  it infringed  the fundamental right of equality before the  law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.  This Court  held that  a law vesting discretion in an authority to appoint  a Special  Magistrate  under  s. 14 of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  to try cases entirely under the normal  Procedure cannot be regarded as discriminatory and is not hit by  Art. 14   of  the  Constitution.   There  is   substantially   no difference  between the powers conferrable by s. 14  of  the Code  as originally enacted and s. 14 as amended  by  Bombay Act 23 of 1951.  Apart from certain procedural matters  such as  consultation with the High Court before  entrustment  of the said powers, the only difference made by the Bombay  Act is  that  a  Special Magistrate may  be  appointed  even  in respect of a Presidency town.  Section 14 contemplates  that a Special ’Magistrate may be entrusted with powers which are conferrable  by or under the Code on a judicial  Magistrate. A Presidency Magistrate being a Judicial Magistrate under (1)  [1955] 1 S. C. R. 168.                             579 s.   6-A   as  added  by  the  Bombay  Legislature,   powers conferrable  on  a  Presidency Magistrate  may  lawfully  be conferred  upon a Special judicial Magistrate who  has  been appointed  for  the  Presidency town  with  or  without  any additional  locality.   Section 20 of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  provides that every Presidency  Magistrate  shall exercise  jurisdiction in all places within the  presidency- town for which he is appointed, and within the limits of the port  of  such town and of any navigable  river  or  channel

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leading  thereto, as such limits are defined under  the  law for the time being in force for the regulation of ports  and port-dues.  There is, however, nothing in this section which detracts  from the authority which may be exercised  by  the State  Government under s. 14 to appoint a Special  judicial Magistrate in respect of a Presidency Town nor is there  any prohibition   against  the  investiture  of  powers   of   a Presidency  Magistrate upon such Magistrate in respect of  a locality  outside  the  Presidency town so long  as  he  has jurisdiction also over a Presidency Town.  On the  principle of  M. K. Gopalan’s case (1), s. 14 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, as amended, cannot be regarded as infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution. Validity  of  the Notification issued by the  Government  of Maharashtra  directing  the  trial by  Mr.  Gehani  who  had jurisdiction  both  over  the Greater Bombay  area  and  the District  of Ratnagiri may now be considered.  Relying  upon the  judgment  of this Court in Bidi Supply Company  v.  The Union  of  India  (2), it was submitted  that  the  impugned Notification  was  unauthorised.  That was a case  where  an assessee  who  was  ordinarily  assessed  to  income-tax  by Officers within the town of Calcutta was informed by  letter dated  January 25, 1955, in pursuance of s. 5 (7-A)  of  the Income-tax  Act, 1922 (Xl of 1922) as amended by Act  XL  of 1940 the assessment records of the assessee were transferred from the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta to the Income- (1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 168. (2) [1956] S. C. R. 267. 580 tax  Officer, Special Circle, Ranchi in the State  of  Bihar and that he do correspond in future regarding the assessment proceedings with that Income-tax officer.  The assessee  had received no previous notice of the intention of the  Income- tax authorities to transfer the assessment proceedings  from Calcutta  to Ranchi, nor had he any opportunity to make  any representation  against  the said  decision.   The  assessee challenged  by a petition to this Court the validity of  the order  of  transfer contending that it  violated  the  equal protection  clause of the Constitution.  Section 64  of  the Income-tax  Act provides for the normal place of  assessment of  assesses.  By subsection (1) it provides that  where  an assessee  carries on a business, profession or  vocation  at any place, he shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the  area  in  which that place is situate,  or,  where  the business,  profession  or  vocation is carried  on  in  more places  than one, by the Income-tax Officer of tile area  in which  the  principal place of his business,  profession  or vocation is situate.  In all other cases, in assessee  shall be  assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in  which he  resides.   By subsection (5) of s. 64  it  is  provided, inter alia, that the provisions of sub-s. (1) and (2)  shall not  apply where by any direction given or any  distribution or allocation of work made by the Commissioner of Income-tax under  sub-s.  (5) of section 5, or in  consequence  of  any transfer  made  under  sub-s. (7A) of  s.  5,  a  particular Income-tax  Officer  has been charged with the  function  of assessing that assessee.  This Court held in the Bidi supply Company’s case (1) that sub-s. 5 (7A) of s. 5 as it stood at the  material time contemplated transfer of a  pending  case for a particular year.  It was observed that "the  provision that  such  a  transfer may be made ’at  any  stage  of  the proceedings’   obviously  postulates  proceedings   actually pending,  and  ’stage’  refers to a  point  in  between  the commencement  and  the  termination  of  those  proceedings. Further  the provision that such transfer shall  not  render

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necessary (1)  [1956] S. C. R. 267.                             581 the  reissue  of  notice already issued  by  the  Income-tax Officer  from  whom the case is  transferred  quite  clearly indicates that the transfer contemplated by the  sub-section is the transfer of a particular case actually pending before an income-tax Officer of one place to the Income-tax Officer of  another place." The decision of the Court turned on  the meaning  of the word ’case’ used in sub-s. 5(7A) as  enacted by  the  Income-tax Act Amendment Act, 1940 and  this  Court held that the expression ’case’ meant an assessment case  of a  particular  year.  After this  decision  the  Legislature intervened and by the Income-tax Amendment Act 26 of 1956 it added an explanation that the word ’case’ in relation to any person  whose  name is specified in the  order  of  transfer means all proceedings under the Income-tax Act in respect of any  year which may be pending on the date of the  transfer, and  includes  all proceedings under this Act which  may  be commenced  after the date of the transfer in respect of  any year.  The principle of the case in Bidi Supply Company  (1) has  no  relevance  in   considering  the  validity  of  the Notification  issued  under s. 14 of the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  as  amended by the Bombay Act 23  of  1951.   The assessee in the Bidi Supply Company’s case (1) obtained  the benefit of a lacuna in the provisions of the Indian  Income- tax Act, there being apart from a provision for transfer  of a  pending  case,  no  general  power  to  transfer   future assessment  proceedings.  A Notification Under s. 14 of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure is  an  order  constituting  a Special  Magistrate with jurisdiction over a  certain  local area  and  with powers which are normally exercisable  by  a Judicial   Magistrate.   The  constitution  of   a   Special Magistrate does not amount either directly or indirectly  to a   transfer  of  any  ’case’:  nor  are  there   any   such considerations present in that order as were pointed out  by this Court in the Bidi Supply Company’s case (1) relating to the  meaning of the word "case’ used in the Income-tax  Act, as would compel us to (1)  [1956] S. C R. 267. 582 hold  that  a  "case’ within the meaning of s.  14  means  a pending  case  only.  Under s. 14 the  State  Government  is competent  to  appoint  a  special  Judicial  Magistrate  in respect  of  ’any particular case or a particular  class  or classes  of  cases or in regard to cases  generally  in  any local area’.  The words used in s. 14 must mean a case which is either pending or which may be instituted after the  date of the constitution of the Special Magistrate. It  was  then submitted that the Notification  appointing  a Special  Magistrate,  for trial of  the  intended  complaint against the petitioners, having regard to the  circumstances of  this  case,  and conferring upon him  the  powers  of  a Presidency Magistrate operated discriminatively against  the petitioners,  for,  it  was said,  other  persons  similarly situated  as  the petitioners were ordinarily liable  to  be tried  by  the  Magistrate  within  whose  jurisdiction  the offence  was  alleged  to be committed,  and  could  not  be required  to  go to a distance of more  than  three  hundred miles  from their normal place of residence to defend  them- selves.   It  was urged that Mr. Gehani being  a  Presidency Magistrate for the trial of the case against the petitioners and  others he would be sitting in Bombay where he  normally functions, and it would result in great inconvenience to the petitioners to be called upon to attend the sittings of  the

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Court in Bombay specially when there are Magistrates availa- ble in Deogad who are competent to hear and decide the  case against the petitioners.  By the Notification Mr. Gehani has been  invested  with  the powers  over  Greater  Bombay  and Ratnagiri District.  His jurisdiction therefore extends over the  whole  of the Greater Bombay area and the  District  of Ratnagiri.   There is no provision in the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  which enjoins upon a Magistrate the duty to  hold his  sitting in any particular place.  Under s. 9(2) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure the State Government is  required to direct at what place or  583 places  the  Court  of Session  shall  ordinarily  hold  its sitting,  but  if,  in any particular  case,  the  Court  of Session  is  of  opinion that it will tend to  the  general convenience of the parties and witnesses to hold its sitting at any other place in the sessions division, it may with the consent  of  the prosecution and the accused,  sit  at  that place for the disposal of the case or the examination of any witness or witnesses therein.  There is, however, no similar provision  in  respect  of  the  sittings  to  be  held   by Magistrates.   The  Special judicial Magistrate  Mr.  Gehani having  the power therefore to sit at any place  within  his local area as defined by the terms of his appointment,  this Court  cannot  speculate as to what place  Mr.  Gehani  will function in the exercise of his jurisdiction.  The  question is  one for his discretion.  It may be remembered  that  the petitioners  had moved the High Court of Bombay  asking  for the transfer of the case from the Court of Mr. Gehani to any Magistrate functioning in the District of Ratnagiri, because of the alleged ground of inconvenience, and that application was  rejected by the High Court.  It cannot be now  urge  by the petitioners that the trial at Bombay is inconvenient  to them and may prejudice a fair trial.  It is true that  under the   Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  "every  offence   shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Magistrate of the local  area in whose jurisdiction it was committed" but  the charge  in this case against the accused is in respect of  a conspiracy  at  Bombay, Deogad, Dabhol,  janjira  and  other places to commit offences under the Sea Customs Act and  the Foreign  Exchange Regulation Act and also of  commission  in pursuance  of the conspiracy of substantive  offences  under those Acts.  It is the prosecution case that importation  of gold  contrary to law took place in the area of Deogad  port whereas   the  offenders  conspired  at   different   places including  Bombay.  By designating a Special Magistrate  who would  have  jurisdiction  both over  the  place  where  the offenders are alleged to have conspired and the place  where offences were 584 actually committed, the State has taken care to see that the trial  of  the  case  is  held  by  a  Magistrate  who   has territorial    jurisdiction  in  both areas.     It  is  not suggested that the Notification was issued for any  ulterior purpose.   The  State  has  having  regard  to  the  special circumstances  constituted a Special Magistrate, as  it  was entitled to, and the Notification does and even suggest  the place  where  the Magistrate is to hold his  sittings.   The ground   of  inconvenience  in  support  of  the   plea   of discrimination cannot therefore be sustained. It  is urged that against the order of conviction which  may be passed by Mr. Gehani whole is invested with the powers of a Presidency Magistrate an appeal would lie only to the High Court whereas if the case were tried before a Magistrate  of Ratnagiri  District  an  appeal would lie to  the  Court  of

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Session  and  a  further revision application  to  the  High Court.    This  it  was  pointed  out  made  a   substantial difference of procedure between persons similarly  situated. It  is true that if the complaint was filed in the Court  of Magistrate  having  jurisdiction over Deogad  alone,  as  it could  lawfully be filed, an appeal would, against an  order of conviction, lie to the Court of Session, Ratnagiri and an application  in the exercise of revisional  jurisdiction  to the High Court from the order of the Court of Session.   But it   is  difficult  to  hold  that  this  amounts   to   any discrimination.   Apart  from the fact that the trial  by  a special Magistrate and an appeal directly to the High  Court against the order of the Magistrate may be regarded normally as more advantageous to the accused persons, the distinction between Courts to which the appeal may lie arises out of the constitution  of the Special Magistrate and not any  special procedure  evolved by the Notification.  On  the  allegation made  in  the  complaint,  the  complainant  could  lawfully institute   proceedings  in  the  Court  of   a   Presidency Magistrate  at Bombay or of any competent Magistrate in  the District of Ratnagiri.  585 Such  Magistrates would by virtue of s. 182 of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure entertain the complaint and appeals  from orders of conviction recorded by them would lie to the  High Court, or the Court of Session, according as the Magistrate, trying- the case was a Presidency Magistrate, or a  judicial Magistrate of the First Class.  The difference of the  venue results from the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate trying the case, and not from any unequal dealing by   the’   executive  constituting  the   Courts   of   the Magistrates.    It  is  because  Powers  exercisable  by   a Presidency   Magistrate  are  conferred  upon  the   Special Magistrate,  as  they may lawfully be  conferred,  that  the incidental  right  of appeal, which is  prescribed,  by  the statute  is  exercisable in the High Court and  not  in  the Court  of  Session.   We  do not think  that  there  is  any discrimination practised by the Notification constituting  a Special  Magistrate  for the trial of the case  against  the petitioners and others. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed.                                        Petition dismissed. 586