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PETITIONER: JAGANNATH BEHERA AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA HARIHAR SINGHMARDARAJ BHRAMARBARA ROY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/1957

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  239            1958 SCR 1067

ACT:   Merger Agreement-Private Property  of  Ruler-Legislation restricting  ejectment of tenants-If violates  guarantee  of full ownership, use and enjoyment-jurisdiction of Courts  in dispute  between Ruler and tenants-Ruler whether a landlord- Orissa  Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (Orissa III  of  1948), SS.  2(a)  and  (g)-Orissa Merged States  (Laws)  Act,  1950 (Orissa  IV  of  1950), SS. 7(a) and  (h)  -Constitution  of India, Arts. 19(1)(f), 363.

HEADNOTE:    The   respondent was the Ruler of the erstwhile State  of Khandapara which merged in the State of Orissa on August  1, 1949.  Article 3 of the Agreement of Merger guaranteed  that "the  Raja  shall  be entitled to full  ownership,  use  and enjoyment of all his private properties".  The Orissa Merged States’  (Laws)  Act,  1950  extended  the  Orissa  Tenant’s Protection  Act,  1948  to the merged areas.   In  1951  the respondents evicted certain tenants.  The tenants applied to the Revenue Officer under the 1948 Act for being restored to possession on the allegations that the respondent was  their landlord  and  that  he had unlawfully  evicted  them.   The Revenue  Officer  allowed  the  applications  and   directed restoration of possession.  The respondent filed a  petition under  Art.  226 of the Constitution in the High  Court  for quashing  the orders of the Revenue Officer contending,  (1) that  the application of the provisions of the 1948  Act  to his  private properties violated the guarantee  given  under the Agreement, (2) that Art. 363 Of the Constitution  barred the  Court from dealing with any dispute arising out of  the Agreement, and (3) that the 1948 Act did not apply to him as he  was  not  a landlord.  The  High  Court  accepted  these contentions and quashed the proceedings taken under the 1948 Act:    Held,  that the extension of the 1948 Act did not  affect the  full  ownership, use and enjoyment  of  his  properties guaranteed  to  the  respondent under  the  Agreement.   The provisions of the Agreement only protected his rights to the properties  declared  to be his private properties  so  that

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they  could  not be claimed at anytime thereafter  as  State properties.   The guarantee given under the Agreement  could not  be  absolute but could only be  co-extensive  with  the right  to  acquire, hold and dispose of  property  which  is guaranteed  to  all  citizens under  Art.  19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution.    State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of 136 1068 Darbhanga, [1952] S.C.R. 889 and Visheshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R. 1020, followed.    Held,  that the jurisdiction of the Courts  to  entertain the applications under the 1948 Act, was not barred by  Art. 363 Of the Constitution.  The dispute between the appellants and  respondent  was not a dispute which arose  out  of  the Agreement of Merger, and so was not covered by Art. 363.    Held further, that the respondent was a landlord to  whom the  provisions of the 1948 Act applied.  Whatever may  have been the definition of the terms landlord and tenant in  SS. 2(C) and (g) of the 1948 Act the definitions contained in s. 7(a) of the 1950 Act, made the appellants ’the tenants’  and the  respondent  ’the landlord’ in regard to  the  lands  in question.

JUDGMENT:    CIVIL  APPFLLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  No.309  of 1955.    Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1953, of  the  Orissa  High  Court  in  O.J.C.  No.  37  of  1952.    C.K.Daphtary,  Solicitor-General of India and  B.Sen  (B. M.   Patnik,  Advocate,  Orissa  High  Court  with   Special Permission  of  the  Court  and  R.  H.  Dhebar),  for   the appellants, Nos. 1, 3 to 9 and 11 to 16 and the intervener. H.   Mahapatra and Gyan Chand Mathur, for the respondent.    1957.   December 6. The following Judgment of  the  Court was delivered by    BHAGWATI  J.-This appeal with a certificate  under  Arts. 132  and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution arises out of a  writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court of Orissa under  Art.  226 seeking to quash the proceedings  taken  by certain tenants of his private lands under the provisions of the  Orissa  Tenants’ Protection Act, 1948  (Orissa  III  of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act.    The respondent was the ruler of the erstwhile  Khandapara State  which  merged with the Province of Orissa  under  the States’  Merger  (Governor’s  Provinces)  Order,  1949  with effect from August 1, 1949.  The respondent had on  December 14, 1947 entered into an agreement with the Governor-General of India art, 3 Whereof provided that:                             1069    " The Raja shall be entitled to full ownership, use,  and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from  State Properties) belonging to him on the date of the agreement."    That  article further provided that if any dispute  arose as to whether any item of property was the private  property of the Raja or State property, it shall be referred to  such officer with judicial experience as the Dominion  Government might  nominate  and the decision of that officer  shall  be final and binding on both parties.  The respondent claimed a number  of  properties and the matter was  referred  to  the Adviser  for Orissa States for determining whether  all  the items  claimed by him could be regarded as his private  pro- perties.   On  June 10, 1949, the Adviser  communicated  his

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decision that the respondent was entitled to 1,643 acres  as his Khamar lands and 29 and odd acres as lands settled  with his tenants.  The lands comprised in the present proceedings taken  under the 1948 Act as aforesaid were declared  to  be the private properties of the respondent.    On  March  3,  1950, the Orissa  Legislature  passed  the Orissa  Merged States’ (Laws) Act, 1950 (Orissa IV of  1950) hereinafter  referred to as " the 1950 Act ". Section  4  of that  Act  extended  inter alia the 1948 Act  to  the  areas merged  in  the  absorbing Province of  Orissa.   Section  7 provided  for the modification of tenancy laws in  force  in the merged States.  The relevant provisions of that  section so far as they are material for the purposes of this  appeal may be set out herein:    " Notwithstanding anything contained in the tenancy  laws of  the  merged States as continued in force  by  virtue  of article 4 of the States Merger (Governor’s Provinces) Order, 1949:   (a)all suits and. proceedings between landlord and  tenant as such shall be instituted and tried in revenue courts.   Explanation:In  this  clause the  expression  "  landlord" shall  mean a person immediately under whom a  tenant  holds land, and the expression " tenant " shall mean a person  who holds land under another 1070 person  and  is  or, but for a special  contract,  would  be liable to pay rent for that land to that person:    (h)    when a person holds Khamar, nij-jote or any  other private lands of a Ruler, which has been recognised as  such by  the  Provincial Government, he shall not  be  liable  to ejectment but shall be liable to pay such fair and equitable rent as may be fixed by any competent authority appointed in this behalf by the Revenue Commissioner or the Commissioner, Northern Division, as the case may be and thereupon he shall acquire right of occupancy in respect of such lands: "    On  April  14,  1951, the State  Legislature  passed  the Orissa Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Orissa XVII of 1951) whereby the date the " 1st day of September, 1947 " wherever it was used in the 1950 Act, was substituted by the "I  st day of August, 1949" for the purposes of  the  merged States areas and it was further provided that in such  areas where  neither  the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,  nor  the Orissa  Tenancy Act, 1913 was in force the special  laws  or customs prevailing therein shall be taken into consideration for the application of that Act.    It appears that certain tenants who were in occupation of the  private  lands of the respondent were  evicted  by  him during the year 1951 and other tenants were inducted by  him and  put in possession of the lands.  The tenants  who  were thus  evicted  applied to the Revenue Officer some  time  in 1952 for being restored to possession of their tenancy lands under  the  provisions of the 1948 Act,  alleging  that  the respondent  was  their landlord and that he  had  unlawfully evicted  them  from  their lands.  These  were  numbered  as O.T.P. Act Cases Nos. 21 to 25 of 1952, 26 to 28 of 1952, 29 to  32 of 1952 and 33 to 41 of 1952.  Notice was  issued  to the respondent but it appears that be did not care to  enter appearance  before  the Revenue Officer or  to  contest  the applications.   On the ex parte evidence of  the  Applicants the  Revenue Officer directed restoration of  possession  to them holding that they                             1071 were in possession of the lands as tenants on the 1st day of August,  1949,  and as such were entitled  to  the  benefits conferred by the 1948 Act, as amended in its application  to

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the merged States.    The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition under Art. 226  of the Constitution in the High Court seeking to  quash the entire proceedings on the ground that in respect of  the disputed lands he was not a " landlord " within the  meaning of  the  1948 Act.  The petition as filed averred  that  the fundamental  right conferred upon the respondent by Art.  19 of  the Constitution was infringed, that the  provisions  of the 1948 Act which were inconsistent with that article  were void  as being ultra vires the Constitution and  the  orders passed  thereunder by the Revenue Officer were  illegal  and liable to be set aside.    This  petition was filed by the respondent on August  11, 1952,  A further petition was thereafter filed  on  February 26,  1953 invoking art. 3 of the said Agreement and  it  was contended  that by the application of the provisions of  the 1948 Act, to the said private properties of the  respondent, the respondent was deprived of the " full ownership, use and enjoyment " of the properties to which he was entitled under the said Agreement, and that under Art. 363 of the Constitu- tion,  no  Court had jurisdiction to deal with  any  dispute arising  out of any provisions of the said  Agreement.   The decision of the Revenue Officer was thus called in  question and  it was contended that he had no jurisdiction to  decide the  dispute as to whether the tenants had any right to  the personal  properties  of  the respondent  and  as  such  the proceedings  were  liable  to be quashed  as  being  without jurisdiction.    The   High  Court  accepted  these  contentions  of   the respondent  and allowed the writ petition.   It  accordingly directed the issue of a writ declaring that the  proceedings under the 1948 Act taken by the Revenue Officer were void as being without jurisdiction and that they should be quashed.    The  tenants  then filed an application before  the  High Court asking for a certificate under Arts. 132 and 1072 133(1)(c) of the Constitution which was granted by the  High Court.  The State of Orissa asked for leave to intervene  in the  appeal  which leave was granted by this Court  and  the learned Solicitor-General has appeared before us in  support of  the  appeal, both on behalf of the tenants who  are  the appellants herein, and the State of Orissa, the Intervener.    It  may be noted at the outset that no question has  been raised  in  regard  to  the vires of  the  1950  Act,  which extended inter alia the 1948 Act to the areas merged in  the absorbing Province of orissa.  That being so, s. 7(h) of the 1950  Act in terms would apply to the appellants  before  us and they would not be liable to ejectment.    The  answer of the respondent, however, is that  (1)  the Revenue Court had by virtue of Art. 363 of the  Constitution no  jurisdiction in the disputes between the appellants  and him  arising  out of the provisions of  the  said  Agreement dated  December 14, 1947, (2) that the full  ownership,  use and enjoyment of the properties which was guaranteed to  him under  art.  3  of the said Agreement was  affected  by  the application  of the provisions of the 1948 Act, to the  said lands  and  (3)  that, he was not a "  landlord  "  and  the appellants  were not the " tenants " within the  meaning  of the  terms  as  defined in the 1948 Act, and,  that  in  any event,  these  lands  were not recognised  as  such  by  the Provincial  Government  which recognition  was  a  condition precedent  to the application of s. 7(h) of the 1950 Act  to these  lands  and  that therefore the  appellants  were  not entitled to the protection thereof.    The  first two contentions are inter-related and  can  be

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disposed  of together.  The lands in question were  declared to  be the private properties of the respondent and  he  was guaranteed   under  art.  3  of  the  said  Agreement   full ownership,  use  and enjoyment thereof.   Article  363  only ousted  the  jurisdiction  of the courts in  regard  to  the disputes  arising  out of any provisions  of  the  Agreement entered  into  by  the  Rulers of  Indian  States  with  the Government  of India.  The dispute which had arisen  between the appellants and the respondent in the present case  could hardly be said to                             1073 be  a  dispute  arising out of any provisions  of  the  said Agreement.   The  full Ownership, use and enjoyment  of  the properties which were declared to be the private  properties of the respondent was not sought to be affected by extending the  1948  Act,  to the merged  State  of  Khandapara.   The properties  which  had  been  declared  to  be  the  private properties  of  the  respondent were not  claimed  as  State properties but the whole legislation proceeded on the  basis that  the  respondent  was the  owner  of  these  properties wherein  he had inducted tenants and what was sought  to  be done  was  to enact a measure for the  protection  of  those tenants.   A  measure  for the  protection  of  the  tenants inducted  by the respondent could hardly be said  to  affect the full ownership, use and enjoyment of these properties by the respondent.  It no doubt imposed certain restrictions on the  absolute rights which the respondent claimed in  regard to the user and enjoyment of the said properties; but  these measures  were  imposed  upon him in  common  with  all  the citizens  of  the Union and the justification for  the  same could be sought under cl. 5 of Art. 19 of the Constitution.    Similar  contentions which had been raised on  behalf  of the  erstwhile  Rulers,  whose States had  merged  with  the Provinces, were answered by this Court in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (1)  and in Visweshwar Rao v. The State   of  Madhya   Pradesh   (2). PatanjaliSastri  C.  J.observed in the former case  at  page 915:     "But  a  short and obvious answer is that there  was  no contravention  of  any guarantee or assurance given  by  the Government  under the covenant of merger, as the estates  in question  are  sought to be acquired only as the  "  private property   "   of  the  Rulers  and  not   otherwise.    The compensation provided for, such as it is, is in  recognition of their private proprietorship, as in the case of any other owner."     Mahajan J. (as he then was) observed in the latter  case at page 1041 :     " It is true that by the covenant of merger the [1952] S.C.R. 889, 915. (2)   [1952] S.C.R, 1020, 1041, I054. 1074 properties  of the petitioner became his private  properties as distinguished from properties of the State but in respect of  them  he is in no better position than any  other  owner possessing private property.  Article 362 does not  prohibit the acquisition of properties declared as private properties by  the  covenant  of merger and does  not  guarantee  their perpetual existence.  The guarantee contained in the article is  of a limited extent only.  It assures that  the  Rulers’ properties declared as their private properties will not  be claimed as State properties.  The guarantee has -no  greater scope than this.  That guarantee has been fully respected by the impugned statute, as it treats those properties as their private  properties  and  seeks  to  acquire  them  on  that

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assumption.   Moreover, it seems to me that in view  of  the comprehensive  language  of article 363 this  issue  is  not justiciable." Das  J. (as he then was) also observed in that case at  page 1054:    " The guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to be had is limited to personal rights, privileges and  dignities of  the Ruler qua a Ruler.  It does not extend  to  personal property which is different from personal rights.   Further, this article does not import any legal obligation but is  an assurance only.  All that the covenant does is to  recognise the  title of the Ruler as owner of certain properties.   To say that the Ruler is the owner of certain properties is not to  say that those properties shall in no  circumstances  be acquired by the State.   The   fact   that   his    personal properties are sought    to   be  acquired  on  payment   of compensation clearly     recognises  his title just  as  the titles of other proprietors are recognised."    It is clear therefore that neither Art. 363 nor Art.  362 of  the  Constitution  would avail the  respondent  and  the courts  would  have jurisdiction to  entertain  the  dispute between the appellants and him which arose out of his action in ejecting them from his private lands.  The provisions  of the  said  Agreement  only  protected  his  rights  in   the properties  declared  to be his private properties  so  that they  could not be claimed at any time thereafter  as  State properties.  The 1948 Act                             1075 did not dispute his ownership over the same but proceeded on the  basis that they were his private properties and  sought to  impose upon him certain obligations in order to  protect the  rights of the tenants whom he had inducted therein  and there  was  no infringement of the guarantee  or  assurances which  had  been  given  to him under art.  3  of  the  said Agreement.   It  could not also be urged  that  by  imposing reasonable  restrictions in the interests of the tenants  on his  right to acquire, hold and dispose of properties  under cl. 5 of Art. 19 of the Constitution, the 1948 Act  affected his  rights  of full ownership, use and enjoyment  of  those properties.  If anything was done by extending the 1948  Act to  the  merged  State of Khandapara, it  was  done  in  the interests of the tenants and it was done for the  protection of   the  tenants  who  were  inducted  by  him   and   such restrictions  did  not affect the full  ownership,  use  and enjoyment of his private properties, any more than they  did in the case of other owners of lands.  As a matter of  fact, under the terms of the 1950 Act which extended the 1948  Act to  the merged State of Khandapara, he was entitled  to  the payment  by "he tenants of such fair and equitable  rent  as may  be fixed by any competent authority appointed  in  this behalf  by the Revenue Commissioner or the  Commissioner  of the Northern Division as the case may be and so long as  the tenants continued to pay such rent he was no worse off  than were other proprietors of lands.  The tenants would no doubt acquire rights of occupancy in respect of such lands but the acquisition of the occupancy rights by the tenants would not be calculated to affect his right to full ownership, use and enjoyment  of  his lands, because he would  be  entitled  to eject  the  occupancy tenants also if the tenants  used  the lands  comprised  in  their holdings  in  any  manner  which rendered  them  unfit  for the purposes of  the  tenancy  or committed  a  breach  of  conditions  consistent  with   the provisions of the tenancy laws in force in the merged  State concerned on breach whereof they were under the terms of the contract  between themselves and the landlord liable  to  be

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ejected.  As already stated I37 1076 these  restrictions were for the protection of  the  tenants who  were  inducted  on the lands by  the  erstwhile  Rulers themselves  and  by  the extension of the 1948  Act  to  the merged  State of Khandapara, the respondent was  treated  in the  same manner as any other citizen of the Union.   If  at all  there  was  any  infringement of  his  rights  to  full ownership, use and enjoyment of his properties that was also in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution itself and whatever may have been the guarantee or assurance  given to  him under the terms of the said Agreement, it could  not be absolute but would only be co-extensive with the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property which is guaranteed to all  the  citizens of the Union under Art. 19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution.  These contentions of the respondent therefore are of no avail.    If, then, the provisions of the 1950 Act could be validly applied to the merged State of Khandapara in spite of art. 3 of  the said Agreement thus attracting the operation of  the 1948 Act to his private lands it remains to consider whether the  respondent was a landlord and the appellants  were  his tenants  within the meaning of the terms as defined in  that Act.    The contention of the respondent, in the first  instance, is  that under the terms of s. 2(ii) of the  Orissa  Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Orissa XVII of 1951) which added sub-s. 5 to s. I of the 1948 Act, in such areas  where neither  the Madras Estates Lands Act, 1908, nor the  Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913, was in force-and the State of  Khandapara was  such  an area-the special laws  or  customs  prevailing therein   shall   be  taken  into  consideration   for   the application of that Act.  It is urged that the  relationship between the respondent and the tenants whom he had  inducted on  his private properties was governed by special laws  and customs  and that therefore the application of the  Act  was excluded  .  It  is, however, to be observed  that  no  such contention  was  ever taken in the  proceedings  before  the Revenue  Officer or before the High Court and it  was  urged for the first time in the course of the arguments before us. The question is one of fact,                             1077 whether any such special laws or customs were prevailing  in the  merged  State of Khandapara, and we  cannot  allow  the respondent to urge this contention for the first time before us.  We shall, therefore, proceed on the basis that the 1948 Act  was  quite  properly extended to the  merged  State  of Khandapara.    It is next contended that the definition of landlord  and tenant  given  in s. 2(c) and (g) of the 1948  Act  did  not apply   to  the  relationship  between  the  parties.    The definitions of these terms are as under:   Section  2  (c).-"landlord"  means  a  person,  whether  a proprietor,  sub-proprietor,  tenure-holder  or  raiyat   or under-raiyat,  either  in  the raiyatwari  area  or  in  the zamindari  area  or land-holder  or  permanent  undertenure- holder,  whose  land  a  person,  whether  immediately,   or mediately cultivates as a tenant;   Section  2  (g).-"tenant" means a person  who,  under  the system generally known as Bhag, Sanja, Kata or such  similar expression,  cultivates  the  land  of  another  person   on condition of delivering to that person-   (i)     either a share of the produce of such land, or   (ii)    the estimated value of a portion of the cropraised

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on the land, or   (iii)   a  fixed quantity of produce irrespective  of  the yield from the land, or   (iv)    produce  or its estimated value partly in any  one of the ways described above and partly in another; but shall not include................... "   It  is  urged that the tenants who were  inducted  by  the respondent  on these lands did not fulfil the terms of  this definition  and  they were therefore not tenants and,  as  a logical  corollary  to that, the respondent could not  be  a landlord  qua them.  It is also contended that  even  though these  lands were declared to be the private  properties  of the  Respondent  under the decision of the Adviser  for  the Orissa  States, that was a recognition of the lands as  such by  the  Dominion  Government  and  not  by  the  Provincial Government;  which recognition was a condition precedent  of the  application of s. 7(h) of the 1950 Act to these  lands. Here 1078 also, the respondent is confronted with this difficulty that these  questions were not mooted either before  the  Revenue Officer  or  the High Court in the manner in  which  it  was sought to be done before us.  It was all along assumed  that the  appellants had been the tenants of the  respondent  but had  been ejected by him in the year 1951 and other  tenants were  inducted in their place some time in 1952.  The  lands in question were also assumed to have been recognised as the private  lands of the respondent by the  Government  without making  any distinction between the Dominion Government  and the  Provincial Government as was sought to be  done  before us.   Reliance  was mainly placed by the respondent  in  the High Court on his plea that the jurisdiction of the  Revenue Officer was barred under Art. 363 of the Constitution and it was  nowhere urged that the appellants were not the  tenants and  be  was  not  the landlord  within  the  terms  of  the definitions contained in the 1948 Act or that in the absence of recognition of these private lands of his as such by  the Provincial  Government,  the  condition  precedent  to   the application of s. 7(b) of the 1950 Act was not fulfilled and that section has no application at all to these lands.   The determination  of these questions also requires evidence  in regard  to the same and it would not be legitimate to  allow these  questions to be agitated for the first time  at  this late stage.    The matter is, however, concluded by the provisions of s. 7(a)  of  the  1950 Act.  That section  enacts  a  statutory extension of the definition of the terms landlord and tenant and  provides  that the expression  ’Jandlord’shall  mean  a person  immediately under whom a tenant holds land, and  the expression ’tenant’ shall mean a person who holds land under another person and is or, but for a special contract,  would be  liable  to  pay  rent for  that  land  to  that  person. Whatever may have been the definitions of the terms landlord and  tenant  in  s.  2(c) and (g)  of  the  1948  Act,  this definition  contained in the explanation to s. 7(a)  of  the 1950  Act  makes  the  appellants  ’the  tenants  ’and   the respondents  ’  a  landlord  ’ in regard  to  the  lands  in question.  This statutory extension of the definition of the terms                             1079 ’landlord’  and  ’ tenant’ therefore is sufficient,  in  our opinion, to repel the last contention urged on behalf of the respondent before us.   The  respondent further contends that in spite of s. 7  of the  1950  Act,  enacting that  all  suits  and  proceedings

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between landlord and tenant as such shall be instituted  and tried  in revenue courts, the provisions of the 1948 Act  in regard to the hierarchy of revenue courts and the  procedure and the penalties provided therein are not attracted to  the merged  State  of Khandapara.  The contention  is  that  the provisions contained in the 1950 Act are special  provisions which  eliminate  the operation of  the  general  provisions contained in the 1948 Act, and in so far as nothing more  is stated in regard to how the revenue courts are to act in the matter  of the institution and trial of all suits  and  pro- ceedings between landlord and tenant, there is a lacuna  and the  revenue  courts as envisaged by the 1948 Act,  have  no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings in question.    The simple answer to this contention of the respondent is that both these Acts have to be read together.  The 1950 Act is an Act to extend certain Acts and regulations to  certain areas  administered as part of the Province of Orissa.   The merged State of Khandapara is one of such areas.  By  virtue of  s. 4 of this Act the 1948 Act is inter alia extended  to the  merged State of Khandapara and the  provisions  thereof are  made  applicable in that area.  The other  sections  of this  Act enact further provisions which are  applicable  to these merged States including the merged State of Khandapara and  s.  7, in particular, enacts the  modification  of  the tenancy  laws  in  force  in  those  merged  States.   These provisions are therefore supplementary to those contained in the 1948 Act, and it follows that not only the provisions of the  1948  Act but also the provisions of the 1950  Act  are applicable to the merged State of Khandapara.  If both these Acts are thus read together, as they should be, there is  no inconsistency between the provisions of these Acts and it is clear  that the provisions of sub-s. (a) and (h) of s. 7  of the 1950 Act 1080 which  applied  to  the  dispute  which  arose  between  the appellants  and  the  respondent  read  together  with   the relevant  provisions in regard to the procedure,  penalties, etc., contained in the 1948 Act did give jurisdiction to the Revenue  Officer  to  entertain  the  dispute  between   the parties.   This contention of the respondent also  therefore fails.    We  are  therefore, of opinion that the judgment  of  the High Court was clearly wrong and is liable to be set aside.    We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order made by  the  High Court, and restore the orders  passed  by  the Revenue  Officer  in the O.T.P. Act Cases Nos. 21 to  25  of 1952,  26  to 28 of 1952, 29 to 32 of 1952 and 33 to  41  of 1952.  The respondent will pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal as also of the writ petition in the High Court.   The State of Orissa will, of course, bear and pay its own costs.                       Appeal allowed.