http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3377 of 2001

PETITIONER: Jagadeesh & Anr

RESPONDENT: State of Karnataka & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/2008

BENCH: TARUN CHATTERJEE & AFTAB ALAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3377 OF 2001

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. 1.      In our view, although the High Court had set aside the concurrent  findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunals below under the Karnataka  Land Reforms Act, 1974 (in short ’the Act’) in the exercise of its  revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, even then, this is  not a fit case where this Court, in the exercise of its power under Article  136 of the Constitution would interfere with such an order of the High  Court.   2.      The appellants in this appeal, claiming to be the tenants of  agricultural land, bearing Survey No. 125/1, measuring 3 acres 11  Gunthas (hereinafter called as the "scheduled land") situated in  Lingabahalli Village, Madhugiri Taluk in the State of Karnataka, filed  Form No.7 before the Land Tribunal praying for a declaration that they  had acquired occupancy rights in respect of the scheduled land. They  alleged that they were cultivating the scheduled land from 1968 till the  notified date under the Act on Wara basis giving 1/3rd of the share in the  foodgrains to respondent No.4. Accordingly, the appellants prayed for an  order of occupancy right in respect of the scheduled land alleging that  they and their father were cultivating the scheduled land as occupancy  right holders relying, inter alia, on the entries under the RTC record. 3.       The case of the appellants, as made out, was disputed by the  respondent No. 4. The case of respondent No.4 was that the scheduled  land was mortgaged to the 3rd respondent, Rajashankar, in the year 1968  and after the expiry of the said mortgage, the mortgagee was liable to  deliver possession of the same. The case of tenancy as made out by the  appellants or their father was denied. It was alleged by the respondent  No.4 that since the respondent No.3 was a film actor and had settled in  Madras (now Chennai), with the consent of the respondent No. 3, the  scheduled land was given to the father of the appellants and the father of  the appellants was cultivating the same from the year 1968 but not as a  tenant.  Accordingly, they prayed for rejection of the application filed by  the father of the appellants claiming occupancy rights under the Act.  Initially, the Land Tribunal allowed the application of the father of the  appellants and feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed against the said  order. The High Court had set aside the order of the Land Tribunal and  remanded the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. The Land  Tribunal, after remand, relying on the entries in the RTC record and some  other materials on record, granted occupancy rights in favour of the  appellants.                     4.      Feeling aggrieved, the respondent No. 4 filed an appeal before the  Appellate Authority, which was also dismissed.  A revision petition,  thereafter, was moved before the High Court and the High Court, by the  impugned judgment, had set aside the concurrent findings of fact and  rejected the application filed by the father, since deceased, of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

appellants holding, inter alia, that the appellants or their father had failed  to prove the tenancy in respect of the scheduled land.  A special leave  petition was filed against the judgment of the High Court, setting aside  the concurrent orders allowing the application, in respect of which leave  has already been granted.   5.      We have heard Mr. Raju, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the appellants and Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the respondents.  We have examined the impugned judgment of the High  Court as well as the orders of the Tribunals below. It is true that the High  Court, while exercising its revisional power under Section 121A of the  Act, had set aside the concurrent findings of fact of the Land Tribunal as  well as of the appellate authority, even then, examining the findings of  the High Court and considering the power conferred on it in the  revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, we do not find any  reason to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court in the  exercise of our power under Article 136 of the Constitution. While  setting aside the findings of the Tribunal, the High Court, at paragraph 7  of the impugned judgment made the following findings :- "It is an undisputed fact that the revision petitioner  has mortgaged the land in dispute in favour of the 5th  respondent, Rajashankar in the year 1968 and after  the expiry of the mortgage period, since the 5th  respondent failed to deliver back the possession of the  land in dispute to him, he filed the suit for redemption  and obtained a decree for redemption.  When the  matter stood thus, the father of the respondent Nos. 3  and 4 Gondappa, who is the uncle of the 5th  respondent, Rajashankar, filed Form No. 7 before the  Land Tribunal claiming occupancy rights in respect  of the land in dispute contending that he is the tenant  of the said land, under the 5th respondent from the  year 1968, i.e. subsequent to the date of mortgage.  To  prove this fact, he relied upon the entries in the R.T.C.  extract for the years 1968 to 1974 wherein his name is  shown as the person in cultivation of the land in  dispute.  But, it is significant to note that the nature of  cultivation of the land is not shown as that of a tenant  in the said R.T.C. extracts.  In one year, the nature of  cultivation is described as "Swantha"and in the  years, the column is left blank.  Thus the R.T.C.  extracts produced by him do not support his  contention that he was cultivating the land in dispute  as a tenant.  He has not produced any Geni receipts  or any Lease Agreement to show that the 5th  respondent has leased out the land in dispute in his  favour on crop share basis and that he paid the Geni  to the 5th respondent.  Thus, he has no documentary  evidence in respect of his claim that he came in  possession of the land in dispute as a tenant under the  5th respondent and that he was cultivating the land in  dispute as a tenant.  It is further significant to note  that in the evidence given by the respondent No. 3  before the Land Tribunal, he claimed that his father  has taken the land in dispute on lease in the year  1962, from the father of the petitioners, Gundu Rao.   Even in respect of the said claim, he failed to produce  any documentary evidence evidencing the said lease  of land in dispute from Gundu Rao.  On the other  hand, in Form No. 7 filed by Gondappa, the father of  the respondents 3 and 4, he alleged that he was the  tenant under the 5th respondent in respect of the land  in dispute from the year 1968.  Thus, there is no  consistent stand regarding the year of commencement  of tenancy or under whom, Gondappa, the father of  the respondents 3 and 4 became the tenant.  So, the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

only question which arises for consideration is  whether the said cultivation of the land in dispute by  the father of the respondents 3 and 4 during the years  1968 to 1974 can be presumed to be that of a tenant  under the provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka  Land Reforms Act.  Section 4 of the Act makes it clear  that a member of the owner’s family cannot be  considered as a deemed tenant, even if he is lawfully  cultivating the land belonging to owner.  In the  present case, since the father of the respondents 3 and  4, is the uncle of the respondent No. 5, it cannot be  said that he is not a member of the family of the  respondent No. 5.  Though there is no evidence on  record to show that there are any joint family  properties belonging to the joint family of respondent  No. 5 and his uncle, there is nothing on record to  show that they are not living as members of the joint  family.  So, it is not possible to presume that the  father of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 Gondappa, who  is the uncle of respondent No. 5 was not the member  of the family of the mortgagee, respondent No. 5."                 

6.      Again, the High Court, while setting aside the findings of fact also  made the following findings :-   "But in the instant case, since the respondents 3 and 4  failed to produce any evidence to show that their  father was cultivating the land in dispute as a tenant  under the 5th respondent mortgagee and even when  the entries in the R.T.C. extract produced do not  support the claim of tenancy set up by the father of the  respondents 3 and 4, the question of drawing  presumption of deemed tenancy in his favour under  Section 4 of the Act does not arise.  The father of the  respondents 3 and 4, being the uncle of respondent  No. 5-Mortgagee, it is also quite possible that he  might have been allowed to cultivate the land in  dispute under the personal supervision of respondent  No. 5 by assisting him in cultivation of the said land.   

       \005\005

       In the present case also, the respondents 3 and 4  failed to prove that their father was cultivating the  land in dispute from the year 1968 as a tenant under  the respondent No. 5 and that after the death of their  father, they continued as tenants in respect of the land  in dispute\005\005\005..It is also significant to note that the  respondent No. 5, who was alive when the enquiry  was pending before the Land Tribunal has not given  evidence in favour of the respondents 3 and 4 stating  that he has leased out the land in dispute in favour of  the respondents 3 and 4.  Except the interested  testimony of respondents 3 and 4, there is nothing else  on record to show that their father was inducted as a  tenant to cultivate the land in dispute by the 5th  respondent after the land is dispute was taken on  mortgage by him.  So, it is not possible to presume  that the father of the respondents 3 and 4 was  inducted as a tenant by the mortgagee, the 5th  respondent, in respect of the land in  dispute\005\005\005\005\005.Since the respondents 3 and 4  failed to produce any documentary evidence to show  that their father was put in possession of the land in  dispute by the 5th respondent, mortgagee as a ’tenant’  and that they are continuing as tenants in respect of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

the said land after the death of their father, I find that  they are not entitled to grant of occupational  rights\005\005\005\005..The earlier decision of this Court  reported in ILR 1996 KAR page 2340 that when a  person fails to prove that he is cultivating the land as  tenant, he cannot be granted occupational right  notwithstanding the fact that he might be in  possession of the land and cultivating the same, is  applicable to the facts of the present case on all  fours".        

6.      From a careful examination of the findings given by the High  Court, as quoted hereinabove, in upsetting the concurrent findings of  fact arrived at by the Tribunals below, we are not in a position to hold  that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the concurrent  orders of the Tribunals below in the exercise of its revisional power  under Section 121A of the Act.  The power conferred on the High  Court to revise the orders of the tribunals below has been provided in  Section 121A of the Act, which runs as under:- "The High Court may at any time call for the  records of any order or proceeding recorded by the  Appellate authority under this Act or any other law  for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality  of such order or as to the regularity of such  proceeding and may pass such order with respect  thereto as it thinks fit"  

8.      From a plain reading of Section 121A of the Act, under which  revisional jurisdiction can be exercised, it would be clear that the High  Court, while exercising such power is entitled to re-appreciate the  evidence when it finds that the conclusion arrived at by the appellate  authority runs contrary to the materials on record and when it finds that  there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the appellate authority  or when it finds that the reasons given by the appellate authority are  absolutely perverse and cannot be supported by the evidence on record. It  would also be clear from a plain reading of Section 121A of the Act that  the High Court is also entitled to interfere with the orders of the  Tribunals below when the material evidence on record was ignored or a  finding was such that no court would come to such conclusion or that the  decision of the Tribunals below was manifestly unjust.  9.      We have carefully examined the provisions under Section 121A of  the Act, which is the revisional power under the Act, and also the  provisions under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short  "the Code"). So far as Section 115 of the Code is concerned, it has been  made clear that it is only in case of a jurisdictional error or when the  courts below had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of their  jurisdiction that the question of interfering with such an order can arise,  otherwise, the High Court is not entitled to interfere with any other order  which does not satisfy the conditions laid down for interference under  Section 115 of the Code. On the other hand, in our view, under Section  121A of the Act, it would be open to the High Court to interfere with the  orders of the tribunals below as the High Court is empowered to look into  the legality of the order or regularity of the proceedings although, in the  exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code, the  High Court is not entitled to look into the legality of the order or the  regularity of the proceedings but only entitled to interfere with the orders  of the Tribunals or the courts below when it finds that they have a)  exercised a jurisdiction not vested in them by law, or b) failed to exercise  a jurisdiction so vested, or c) acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction  illegally or with material irregularity.  Reading the aforesaid provisions  viz., Section 121A of the Act and Section 115 of the Code, we have no  hesitation in our mind to hold that the revisional power exercised by the  High Court under section 121A of the Act is wider than the one exercised  by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the  Code. As noted herein earlier, since section 121A of the Act clearly

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

empowers the High Court to look into the legality of the orders  impugned, therefore, it would be open to the High Court to consider the  material evidence on record, when it finds that such evidence was not at  all considered by the tribunals below or when the conclusion arrived at  by the tribunals below run contrary to the materials on record or when it  finds that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the tribunals  below or that the reasons given by the tribunals below are absolutely  perverse or a finding was such that no court would come to such a  conclusion or that the decisions of the tribunals below were manifestly  unjust. Therefore, under section 121A of the Act, in the presence of any  of the abovementioned circumstances, the High Court is empowered to  look into the legality of the orders impugned in deciding the question  whether the appellants could be held to be the tenants under the  respondent Nos. 3 or 4.  10.     Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind as to when the High  Court would be justified, in the exercise of its power under Section 121A  of the Act, to examine the legality of the orders of the tribunals below in  an appropriate case, let us now examine the findings of the High Court,  while setting aside the concurrent findings of fact of the Tribunals below.  In our view, on a careful examination of the findings of the High Court,  which were based on consideration of the material evidence on record, it  is difficult for us to hold that the High Court was not justified in setting  aside the concurrent findings of fact of the tribunals below in the exercise  of its jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act. 11.     We have already noted the findings made by the High Court in the  impugned judgment on the question whether the appellants could be held  to be the tenants on the evidence and materials on record. While doing  so, in our view, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion  that the evidence and material on record would clearly establish that the  appellants were not able to prove that they were the tenants in respect of  the scheduled land under the respondents. One of the main criteria for  deciding whether a particular person is a tenant or not is to see whether  there was payment of rent, either in cash or in kind. In this case, while  rejecting the claim of the appellants, the High Court had considered that  the appellants had failed to satisfy the court that any payment of rent was  made either by the father of the appellants or by the appellants  themselves. 12.     The tribunals below, while accepting the case of the appellants,  had relied on the entries made in the RTC record in respect of certain  period. While considering such entries, the High Court had rightly held  that from the entries in the RTC record for the years 1968 to 1974, the  name of the appellants was not shown as the person in cultivation of the  land in dispute and also the nature of cultivation of the scheduled land  was not shown as that of the tenants in the said RTC record. That being  the position, the High Court had come to a proper conclusion that the  entries in the RTC extracts produced by the appellants could not support  the contention that they were cultivating the land in dispute as the  tenants. In our view also, the High Court was fully justified in drawing an  adverse inference against the appellants for not producing any Geni  receipts or any lease agreement to show that the 5th respondent before the  High Court (respondent No. 3 herein) had, in fact, leased out the  scheduled land in favour of the appellants or their father, since deceased,  on crop share basis and that the appellants had paid the Geni to the 5th  respondent. Such being the findings arrived at by the High Court with  which we are in concurrence, it is difficult to hold that the tenancy   claimed by the appellants in respect of the scheduled land could be  established. 13.     Considering the above aspect of the matter and after considering  the scope of Section 121A of the Act, we are, therefore, unable to agree  with the learned counsel for the appellants that in the exercise of  revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, the High Court was  not entitled to set aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the  appellate authority and the land tribunal. Such being the position, we do  not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court,  although the High Court, in the exercise of its power under Section 121A

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

of the Act, had set aside the concurrent orders of the appellate authority  as well as the land tribunal. 14.     Mr.Raju, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,  however, contended before us that it was not open to the High Court, in  the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act,  to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate  authority and the Land Tribunal. In support of his contention, he had  relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Dahya Lal & Ors. vs.  Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim [1963 (3) SCR 1]. He also relied on a  decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Balaku Patil & Ors. vs.  Krishnoji Bhaurao Hundre (Dead) By Lrs. [(2000) 1 SCC 518] and  Krishtappa Yellappa Pujar & Ors. vs. Ram Samsthan Beladhadi  [(1999) 1 SCC 74]. In our view, so far as the decision in the case of  Mohan Balaku Patil & Ors. vs. Krishnoji Bhaurao Hundre (Dead) By  Lrs. [(2000) 1 SCC 518] is concerned, it is difficult to conceive how this  decision could be of any help to the appellants. In that case, the findings  recorded by the appellate authority as affirmed by the High Court by  placing reliance on the entries made in the record of rights to the effect  that the appellants were not in possession of the land on the relevant date  nor were they cultivating the same, were not accepted by this court. In  any view of the matter, in that decision, relying on the aforesaid findings,  this Court also had set aside the order made by the appellate authority as  affirmed by the High Court in revision and restored the order made by  the land tribunal. If that case is of any help to the facts of the present  case, it would be in favour of the respondents. So far as Krishtappa  Yellapa Pujar & Ors. vs. Ram Samsthan Beladhadi [(1999) 1 SCC 74]  is concerned, we again fail to understand that how this could be of any  help to the appellants. In that decision, it has been made clear that the  High Court was entitled to interfere with the orders of the appellate  authority only on question of law or irregularity in procedure and on no  other aspect. In our view, we have already held that the High Court was  entitled to interfere with the concurrent orders of the tribunals below as  material evidence on record was not considered at all and non  consideration of the material evidence on record is a question of law and,  therefore, the High Court was entitled to interfere. Accordingly, this  decision is of no help to the appellants. Lastly, in our view, in view of the  discussion made herein above, the decision relied on by the learned  counsel for the appellant in the case of Dahya Lal & Ors. vs. Rasul  Mohammed Abdul Rahim [1963 (3) SCR 1] need not be discussed.  15.     There is another aspect of this matter. Even assuming that the High  Court was not justified in setting aside the concurrent findings of fact in  the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act,  then also, we are of the view that it is not a fit case where this Court  should interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court in the  exercise of our power under Article 136 of the Constitution. 16.     In Union of India & Ors. vs. Gangadhar Narsingdas Aggarwal &  Anr. [(1997) 10 SCC 305], this Court, while declining to interfere with  the order of the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 136  of the Constitution, held that even if two views are possible, the view  taken by the High Court being a plausible one, it would not call for  intervention by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.  Considering the concurrent orders of the appellate authority and the land  tribunal and the impugned order of the High Court, we are in agreement  with the High Court because the view taken by it was plausible and  therefore, the question of interference by us under Article 136 of the  Constitution is not warranted. 17.      Again in Jai Mangal Oraon vs. Mira Nayak (Smt.) & Ors.  [(2000) 5 SCC 141], this Court had laid down that when there was  nothing illegal and wrong in the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by  the High Court and the same appeared to be well merited and in  accordance with the interpretation of statutory provisions, this Court  would not interfere with the order of the High Court under Article 136 of  the Constitution. We have already considered the findings made by the  High Court while setting aside the concurrent orders of the tribunals  below and found that the same appear to be well merited and in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

accordance with the material evidence on record, therefore, this Court  would not interfere with the order of the High Court under Article 136 of  the Constitution. Finally in Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. Vs. Salambin  Mohammad [(1992) 2 SCC 635], this Court at paragraph 20 has  observed as follows : "In view of the above decisions, even though we are  now dealing with the appeal after grant of special  leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if  we do so and declare the law or point out the error- still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on  facts does not require interference or if we feel that  the relief could be moulded in a different fashion\005.."

   18.     In view of the aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that this is  not a fit case where this Court shall interfere with the order passed by the  High Court under Section 121A of the Act.   19.     For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails and is dismissed without  any order as to costs.