REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.           OF 2010 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.22224/09

J & K National Panthers Party  ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

The Union of India and others ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.  

2. Jammu  and  Kashmir  National  Panthers  Party,  a  

recognized political party in the State of Jammu  

and Kashmir has filed this appeal before this  

Court seeking to impugn the judgment of Jammu  

and Kashmir High Court, dated 2nd of June 2009.  1

The High Court dismissed both the writ petitions  

which  raised  identical  questions.  They  were  

heard together and disposed of by the impugned  

judgment.

3. The main thrust of the challenge before the High  

Court, as well as before this Court is on the  

following question: whether or not the action of  

the government in postponing the delimitation of  

territorial  constituencies  of  the  State  

pertaining to the Legislative Assembly until the  

relevant  figures  published  after  the  first  

census taken after 2026 is legally sustainable?

4. In  fact  the  appellant  is  aggrieved  by  an  

amendment  to  the  Jammu  and  Kashmir  

Representation  of  the  People  Act  1957,  

especially the amendment in Section 3 thereof.  

This amendment has been brought about in 2002.  

Section  3  of  the  Jammu  and  Kashmir  

Representation  of  the  People  Act  1957  

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(hereinafter the said Act), as amended from time  

to time, is set out below:- “3. Constitution of Delimitation Commission (1) {As soon as may be after the completion  of  each  census}  the  Government  shall  constitute a Commission to be called the  Delimitation Commission which shall consist  of three member as follows: (a) two members, each of whom shall be a  person  {who is or has} been a judge of the  Supreme Court or of a High Court in India;  and (b) a  Deputy  Election  Commissioner  nominated  by  the  Chief  Election  Commissioner: {Provided that until the relevant figures  for the first census taken after the year  2026 have been published, it shall not be  necessary  to  constitute  a  Commission  to  determine  the  delimitation  of  Assembly  Constituencies in the State under this sub- section} (2) The Governor shall nominate one of the  members appointed under clause (a) of sub- section  (1)  to  be  the  Chairman  of  the  Delimitation Commission. (3)  The  Delimitation  Commission  shall  determine  the  delimitation  of  Assembly  Constituencies  in  the  State  within  such  period  as  may  be  specified  by  the  Governor.”

5. There has been a corresponding amendment also in  

the  sub-section  3  of  Section  47  of  the  

Constitution  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  1957,  

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(hereinafter referred to as Constitution of J &  

K). Section 47 (3) as amended is set out below:- “47(3) Upon the completion of each census,  the number, extent and boundaries of the  territorial  constituencies  shall  be  readjusted by such authority and in such  manner  as  the  Legislature  may  by  law  determine:

Provided that such readjustment shall  not  effect  representation  in  the  Legislative Assembly until the dissolution  of the then existing Assembly {;Provided  that  until  the  relevant  figures  for  the  first  census  taken  after  the  year  2026  have  been  published,  it  shall  not  be  necessary to readjust the total number of  seats in the Legislative Assembly of the  State and the division of the State into  territorial constituencies under this sub- section}.”

6. The main grievance of the appellant seems to be  

that  in  view  of  the  postponing  of  the  

delimitation of the constituencies as a result  

of  the  aforesaid  amendments,  the  growing  

imbalance  in  the  matter  of  composition  of  

various  constituencies  would  continue  despite  

the census operation being carried out. It has  

been argued before this Court that normally the  

delimitation  exercise  is  consequent  upon  a  

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census  operation.  As  a  result  of  the  census  

operation the composition of the population is  

reflected. That gives rise to an exercise in  

delimitation  for  a  proper  representation  of  

rights of the people in a democratic polity. The  

further  contention  is  that  without  these  

demographical changes being properly reflected  

in the composition of constituencies by way of a  

delimitation exercise, the essence of democracy  

will be defeated in the election. The appellant,  

therefore,  urge  that  without  an  exercise  in  

delimitation immediately upon the completion of  

census operation, the election in the State of  

Jammu  and  Kashmir  will  not  reflect  the  true  

voice of democracy and the popular view would,  

therefore, be gagged and would not find a proper  

representation.

7. In this case we are not concerned much with any  

factual controversy. In this case the Court has  

been called upon to decide the correctness or  

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otherwise of contention of the appellant in the  

context  of  the  relevant  laws  and  the  

constitutional provisions.

8. Admittedly, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,  

the census operation was completed in 2001, but  

the delimitation was done in 1995.

9. At present in the State of Jammu and Kashmir  

there are 87 constituencies. Out of that 46 are  

in Kashmir Valley, 37 in Jammu and 4 are in  

Ladakh  region.  Under  Section  47(1)  of  the  

Constitution of  J & K, it is provided that the  

Legislative  Assembly  shall  consist  of  111  

members  chosen  by  direct  election  from  

territorial constituencies of the State. Under  

proviso to Section 47 of the Constitution of J &  

K, it is provided that if the Governor is of the  

opinion  that  women  are  not  adequately  

represented in the assembly, he may nominate not  

more than two women members.  However, it is  

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provided in Section 48 of the Constitution that  

until the area of the State which is under the  

occupation of Pakistan ceases to be so occupied  

and the people residing in that area elect their  

representatives,  those  24  seats  in  the  

Legislative  Assembly  shall  remain  vacant  for  

Pakistan occupied Kashmir and will not be taken  

into account for counting the total membership  

of the assembly. The said area would be excluded  

in delimiting the territorial constituencies of  

the state.

10. The  learned  Counsel,  Professor  Bhim  Singh,  

appearing for the appellant submits that of the  

37 constituencies in Jammu, some are reserved  

for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  

whereas  of  the  46  constituencies  in  Kashmir  

valley,  not  a  single  one  is  reserved  for  

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. But if  

the  census  operation  is  properly  perused,  it  

becomes clear that some of the constituencies in  

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the  Kashmir  valley  should  also  have  been  

reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  

Tribes,  had  a  delimitation  exercise  been  

conducted on the basis of census operation. The  

impugned  amendment  is,  therefore,  unfair,  

undemocratic and unconstitutional as it seeks to  

defer the delimitation exercise only upon the  

declaration of census results after 2026.

11. In the writ petition filed before the High Court  

no substantial challenge has been made to the  

amendment of the Constitution of the J & K. In  

the writ petition in paragraph 16, very vaguely  

this challenge has been made and which is set  

out below:

“16.  If  no  Delimitation  Commission  is  constituted till 2026, it would mean that  there will be no rotation of the Assembly  constituencies till the census in 2031. It  would  mean  that  reserved  Assembly  constituencies shall not be rotated from  1996 to 2031 i.e. for 35 years reserved  seats  shall  not  be  changed.  This  is  an  unparallel (sic) instance of the massacre  of the rule of law, the principles of the  natural justice and of course, denial of  justice and equity guaranteed by Article  

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14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of  India.  This  Act  violates  the  letter  of  spirit  of  Section  47  among  other  provisions as well as that of the J & K  Representation of the People Act.”

12. In  the  prayers  made  in  that  Writ  Petition,  

prayers B and C have become infructuous. Prayer  

D is aimed at Section 47 of the Constitution of  

J  &  K  but  we  do  not  find  adequate  pleading  

challenging the amendment to Section 47 of the  

Constitution of J & K.

13. Professor  Bhim  Singh  submitted  that  he  was  

arguing this case on behalf of about 10, 143,  

700 people (as per 2001 Census) of Jammu and  

Kashmir. He stated that on 27th October 1947,  

Jammu and Kashmir became a part of India and on  

26th January 1957, the Constitution of Jammu and  

Kashmir was adopted. He also urged that in view  

of Article 370 of the Constitution of India,  

autonomy has been granted to the State of Jammu  

and  Kashmir.  The  learned  counsel  repeatedly  

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harped on the question that not holding of a  

delimitation  exercise  immediately  after  the  

completion  of  the  census  as  a  result  of  the  

aforesaid  amendment  is  unconstitutional.  In  

fact, the learned counsel argued that the said  

amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  J  &  K  was  

itself violative of the Basic Structure of the  

Constitution of India as applicable to the State  

of  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  as  well  as  the  

Constitution of J & K.

14. Dealing  with  the  aforesaid  arguments  of  the  

appellant  (petitioner  before  the  High  Court),  

the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court,  inter  

alia, held that delimitation for the purpose of  

dividing  the  State  into  single  member  

territorial constituency maybe a Basic Feature  

of democracy contemplated in the Constitution.  

However, High Court opined that the readjustment  

of the extent and boundaries of such territorial  

constituency upon completion of each census was  

neither a mandate of the Constitution, nor the  

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essence of democracy as per the Basic Structure  

doctrine of the Indian Constitution.

15. The High Court dealt with the decision of the  

Supreme Court of the United States of America in  

the case of  Charles W. Baker vs.  Joe C. Carr  

reported in 369 US 186. In this decision, the  

plaintiffs who were entitled to vote to elect  

members of Tennessee legislature filed a class  

action  for  a  declaration  that  Tennessee  

Apportionment Act of 1901 was unconstitutional  

as  it  violated  the  14th  Amendment  of  the  

Constitution  of  the  United  States.  It  was  

alleged that the impugned act sought to bring  

about a gross disproportion of representation to  

the members of the public in respect of their  

voting  right.  Thus,  the  Act  placed  the  

plaintiffs  in  a  position  of  constitutionally  

unjustifiable equality. Initially the District  

Court, where the case was filed, held that it  

lacked  jurisdiction  to  decide  the  issue.  

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Thereupon, on appeal the Supreme Court reversed  

the  judgment  and  remanded  the  case  to  the  

District  Court  holding,  inter  alia,  that  the  

District  Court  has  the  jurisdiction  in  the  

matter and also held that the plaintiffs had the  

locus to challenge the Tennessee Apportionment  

act.

16. However, Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan  

dissented  and  held  that  the  nature  of  

controversy  is  unfit  for  federal  judicial  

action, and that the existing apportionment was  

not so unreasonable so as to offend the equal  

protection clause. The majority opinion in that  

case was, however, based on the principle of  

approximate  equality  in  the  voice  of  every  

voter.

17. In the judgment impugned herein, the High Court  

held  that  our  Constitution  never  contemplated  

equality in the value of vote in view of the  

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several  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  

Supporting the judgment, the learned Solicitor  

General  of  India  drew  the  attention  of  this  

Court  to  the  various  provisions  of  the  

Constitution of India namely, Articles 81, 82  

and  170.  The  learned  Solicitor  General  also  

referred to a decision of the Constitution Bench  

of this Court in  R. C. Poudyal and others vs.  

Union of India and others, (1994) Supp 1 SCC  

324, wherein this Court examined Article 170 (2)  

while dealing with the reservation of 12 seats  

for  Sikkimese  of  Bhutia-Lepcha  origin  in  the  

State of Sikkim. One of the main questions which  

were raised in that case is as follows:

“Whether Section 7(1-A) and Section 25-A  of the Representation of the People Act,  1950  [as  inserted  by  Election  Laws  (Extension  to  Sikkim)  Act,  1976  and  Representation  of  the  People  (Amendment)  Act,  1980  respectively]  and  section  5-A  (2)  of  the  Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951  [as  inserted  by  the  Representation  of  the  People  (Amendment)  Act, 1980] providing for reservation of 12  seats,  out  of  32  seats  in  the  Sikkim  Legislative Assembly in favour of Bhutias- Lepchas, are unconstitutional as violative  of  the  basic  features  of  democracy  and  

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republicanism  under  the  Indian  Constitution?” (Para 85, page 373 of the  report)

18. While deciding the said issue, this Court took  

into consideration the decisions of the Supreme  

Court of the United States in Charles W. Baker  

[supra], and B. A. Reynolds etc. vs. M. O. Sims  

- 377 US 533.

19. This  Court  relied  on  the  opinion  of  Chief  

Justice Earl Warren in B.A. Reynolds (supra). At  page 536 of the report the learned Chief Justice  

held as follows:-

“……We  realize  that  it  is  a  practical  impossibility  to  arrange  legislative  districts  so  that  each  one  has  an  identical  number  of  residents,  or  citizens,  or  voters.  Mathematical  exactness  or  precision  is  hardly  a  workable constitutional requirement.”

20. The  learned  Chief  Justice  also  relied  on  

historical factors in support of his opinion and  

held:-

“History  indicates,  however,  that  many  States  have  deviated,  to  a  greater  or  

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lesser  degree,  from  the  equal-population  principle in the apportionment of seats in  at least one house of their legislatures.  So long as the divergences from a strict  population  standard  are  based  on  legitimate considerations incident to the  effectuation of a rational state policy,  some deviations from the equal-population  principle are constitutionally permissible  with respect to the apportionment of seats  in either or both of the two houses of a  bicameral state legislature.” (page 537 of  the report)

21. After  relying  on  the  aforesaid  judgments  and  

noticing the position in Australian Constitution  

the majority opinion of this Court was rendered  

by Justice Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then  

was).  By a remarkably erudite formulation of  

principles, His Lordship held:-

“It  is  true  that  the  right  to  vote  is  central to the right of participation in  the democratic process. However, there is  less  consensus  amongst  theorists  on  the  propriety  of  judicial  activism  in  the  voting  area.  In  India,  the  Delimitation  Laws  made  under  Article  327  of  the  Constitution of India, are immune from the  judicial  test  of  their  validity  and  the  process  of  allotment  of  seats  and  constituencies is not liable to be called  in  question  in  any  court  by  virtue  of  Article  329  (a)  of  the  Constitution.”  (Para 119, page 383 of the report)  

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22. It was repeatedly held in  Poudyal (supra) that  

“a perfectly arithmetical equality of value of  

votes  is  not  a  constitutionally  mandated  

imperative of democracy and, secondly, that even  

if the impugned provisions make a departure from  

tolerance  limits  and  the  constitutionally  

permissible  latitudes,  the  discriminations  

arising  are  justifiable  on  the  basis  of  the  

historical  considerations  peculiar  to  and  

characteristic  of  the  evolution  of  Sikkim’s  

political institutions.”

23. In this case the same is true of the evolution  

of  the  political  institutions  of  Jammu  and  

Kashmir. This position has been again reiterated  

in para 126 in Poudyal’s case in the following  

words:

“An  examination  of  the  constitutional  scheme would indicate that the concept of  ‘one  person  one  vote’  is  in  its  very  nature considerably tolerant of imbalances  and  departures  from  a  very  strict  

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application and enforcement. The provision  in  the  Constitution  indicating  proportionality  of  representation  is  necessarily a broad, general and logical  principle but not intended to be expressed  with  arithmetical  precision…The  principle  of  mathematical  proportionality  of  representation  is  not  a  declared  basic  requirement in each and every part of the  territory  of  India.  Accommodations  and  adjustments,  having  regard  to  the  political  maturity,  awareness  and  degree  of  political  development  in  different  parts  of  India,  might  supply  the  justification  for  even  non-elected  Assemblies wholly or in part, in certain  parts  of  the  country.  The  differing  degrees  of  political  development  and  maturity of various parts of the country,  may  not  justify  standards  based  on  mathematical accuracy.” (Page 385 of the  report)

24. Even Justice S.C. Agrawal, who partly dissented  

with  the  majority,  agreed  with  the  majority  

opinion on this aspect of the matter by holding  

as under:-

“The  principle  of  one  man  one  vote  envisages that there should be parity in  the  value  of  votes  of  electors.  Such  a  parity though ideal for a representative  democracy is difficult to achieve. There  is  some  departure  in  every  system  following  this  democratic  path.  In  the  matter of delimitation of constituencies,  it  often  happens  that  the  population  of  one constituency differs from that of the  other  constituency  and  as  a  result  

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although both the constituencies elect one  member,  the  value  of  the  vote  of  the  elector in the constituency having lesser  population is more than the value of the  vote  of  the  elector  of  the  constituency  having a larger population…”. (para 182,  page 402 of the report)

25. On a perusal of the aforesaid principles as laid  

down by this Court in the Constitution Bench  

judgment, we are of the opinion that a right to  

caste vote is a valuable right but to demand any  

uniform value of one’s voting right through the  

process  of  delimitation,  disregarding  the  

statutory and constitutional dispensation based  

on  historical  reasons  is  not  a  justiciable  

right.

26. In the context of this question we must keep in  

mind  the  constitutional  scheme  in  Part  XV  

relating  to  election.   Article  327  of  the  

Constitution empowers the Parliament to make a  

law relating to delimitation of constituencies.  

The  mandate  of  Article  329A  is  that  any  law  

relating to the delimitation of constituencies  

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or the allotment of seats to such constituencies  

shall not be called in question in any Court.  

Identical provisions have been made in Section  

142 of the Constitution of J & K. Section 142(a)  

is set out below:-

“142. Bar to interference by courts in electoral  matters.  –  Notwithstanding  anything in this constitution- (a) the validity of any law relating to  the  delimitation  of  territorial  constituencies for the purpose of electing  members of the Legislative Assembly or the  allotment of seats to such constituencies,  made  or  purporting  to  be  made  under  section  141,  shall  not  be  called  in  question in any court;”

27. It is, therefore, clear that there is an express  

constitutional bar to any challenge being made  

to  the  delimitation  law  which  is  made  under  

Constitutional  provisions.  Therefore,  the  

substantial challenge of the appellant in this  

proceeding  is  not  to  be  entertained  by  any  

Court, including this Court. The other aspect of  

the question is that the amendment to Section  

47(3)  of  the  Constitution  of  J  &  K  violates  

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Basic  Structure  of  the  Constitution.   This  

challenge  is  also  not  based  on  a  sound  

principle.

28. The  judgment  of  this  Court  in  His  Holiness  Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v.  State of  Kerala  and  another,  (1973)  4  SCC  225,  which  introduced the concept of Basic Structure in our  

constitutional jurisprudence is the spontaneous  

response of an activist Court after working with  

our Constitution for about 25 years.  This Court  

felt that in the absence of such a stance by the  

constitutional Court there are clear tendencies  

that  the  tumultuous  tides  of  democratic  

majoritarianism of our country may engulf the  

constitutional values of our nascent democracy.  

The judgment in  Kesavananda Bharti (supra) is  possibly  an  “auxiliary  precaution  against  a  

possible tidal wave in the vast ocean of Indian  

democracy”.

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29. But we must have a clear perception of what the  

Basic Structure is. It is hazardous to define  

what is the Basic Structure of the Constitution  

as what is basic does not remain static for all  

time to come. However, the basic features have  

been culled out from various pronouncements of  

this  Court.   In  the  14th Edition  of  Shorter  

Constitution  of  India  by  D.D.  Basu,  these  

features have been noted as under:-

“(a)Supremacy of the Constitution. (a) Rule of law. (b) The  principle  of  Separation  of  

Powers. (c) The  principles  behind  fundamental  

rights. (d) The  objectives  specified  in  the  

Preamble to the Constitution. (e) Judicial  review;  Art.32.;  

Arts.226/227. (f) Federalism (g) Secularism. (h) The sovereign, democratic, republican  

structure. (i) Freedom  and  dignity  of  the  

individual. (j) Unity and integrity of the Nation. (k) The principle of equality; not every  

feature  of  equality,  but  the  quintessence of equal justice

(l) The  rule  of  equality  in  public  employment.

(m) The  ‘essence’  of  other  Fundamental  Rights in Part III.

(n) The  concept  of  social  and  economic  justice-to  build  a  welfare  State;  part IV in toto.

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(o) The  balance  between  Fundamental  Rights and Directive Principles.

(p) The  Parliamentary  system  of  government.

(q) The  principle  of  free  and  fair  elections.

(r) Limitations upon the amending power  conferred by Art. 368.

(s) Independence  of  the  judiciary;  but  within  the  four  corners  of  the  Constitution and not beyond that.

(t) Independent  and  efficient  judicial  system.

(u) Powers  of  the  Supreme  Court  under  Arts. 32, 136, 141, 142.

(v) Effective access to justice.” (see page 2236-2238)

30. Of these features ‘free and fair election’ in  

Clause  (r)  comes  closest  with  the  question  

discussed in this case.

31. This  Court  has  already  held  relying  on  the  

Constitution Bench judgment in  Poudyal  (supra)  that ensuring uniformity in the value of votes  

is not a constitutionally mandated imperative of  

free and fair election under our constitutional  

dispensation.  Therefore, the argument on the  

question  of  Basic  Structure  is  also  without  

substance and is rejected.

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32. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not  

find  any  merit  in  the  appeal  and  which  is  

accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear  

their own costs.   

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi November 09, 2010

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