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PETITIONER: J. C. JAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.   A. PATHAK AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/01/1960

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1960 AIR  619            1960 SCR  (2) 701

ACT: Payment  of Wages-Employer’s right of  appeal--When  accrues -Payment  of  Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936),  ss.  15(3),  16, 17(1) (a).

HEADNOTE: The expression " the total sum directed to be paid " used in s.  17(1)  (a) of the Payment of Wages Act,  1936,  properly construed,  does not mean the total sum directed to be  paid to  each  individual applicant.  Consequently,  an  employer against whom a direction for payment is made under s.  15(3) of the Act has a right of appeal under S. 17(1) (a) not only when  a single applicant is awarded a sum exceeding Rs.  300 but also when an award of a like amount is made on a  single application  made  under s. 16(2) of the Act  on  behalf  of several  employees belonging to the same unpaid group or  on several  applications consolidated into one under  s.  16(3) thereof.  Section 17(1) (a) does not contemplate that before the right to appeal can accrue to the employer in the latter case  each individual applicant must be awarded Rs.  300  or more. Since  the language of the statute is clear and  unambiguous no consideration of any possible hypothetical anomaly can be allowed to affect its plain meaning. Laxman Pandu and Others v. Chief Mechanical Engineer,  West- ern Railway (B.  B. and C. I. Railway), Lower Parel, Bombay. (1957) 57 B.L.R. 399, overruled. Union  of India, Owning the South Indian Railway by  General Manager  v.  S.  P. Nataraja Sastrigal & Ors.   A.I.K.  1952 Mad.  808; A. C. Arumugam & Ors. v. Manager,  Jawahar  Mills Ltd.,  Salem  junction, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 79;  Promod  Ranjan Sarkar v. R. N. Mullick, A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 318 and Cachar Cha Sramik  Union  v.  Manager, Martycherra Tea  Estate  &  Anr. A.I.R. 1959 Assam 13, approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal’.  No.75 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from judgment and order dated  March 17, 1955, of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, in Appeal No. 1

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of 1955. M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. N. Andley,  J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant. K.   B. Choudhuri, for the respondents. 702 1960.  January 12.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-When does an employer get  a   right    to prefer  an appeal against a direction made under sub-s.  (3) of  s.  15 of the Payment of Wages Act,   1936  (4  of 1936) (hereinafter  called the Act)?  That is the  short  question which  arises for our decision in the present group of  four appeals.   The  decision  of this question  depends  on  the construction  of s. 17 (1)(a) of the Act.  In  dealing  with the  question thus posed by the present group of appeals  we will refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 75 of 1956,  and our decision in it would govern the three remaining appeals. Civil  Appeal No.75 of 1956 which has been brought  to  this Court  by  special leave arises from a dispute  between  the General Manager of the Times of India Press., Bombay,  owned by  Benett  Coleman  & Co,  Ltd.,  (hereinafter  called  the appellant)  and  some  of  the  employees  in  his   service (hereinafter  called  the respondents).  In  November  1953, 1,066  applications were made by the Vice-President  of  the Times  of India Indian Employees Union on behalf of some  of the  respondents before Mr. C. P. Fernandes,  the  authority appointed  under  the  Act in which a  claim  was  made  for arrears  of increments alleged to have been withheld by  the appellant from July 1, 1951, to September 30, 1953, as  also for  increased dearness allowance from January 1,  1953,  to August  31, 1953.  The authority dealt with the whole  group of  the said applications as a single application  under  s. 16(3)  of  the  Act, and held that the  claim  made  by  the respondents   for  increased  dearness  allowance  was   not justified.- In regard to the claim of arrears of  increments alleged  to  have been withheld the authority  rejected  the claim made by 761 employees and allowed the same in  respect of  305  employees.  In the result the order passed  by  the authority  on 31-12-1954 directed the appellant  to  deposit Rs. 22,698 for payment to the said 305 employees. The direction thus issued by the authority gave rise to  two appeals  before the Small Causes Court at Bombay,  which  is the appellate authority appointed                             703 under  the  Act.   Appeal No. 11 of 1955 was  filed  by  the appellant  while  Appeal No. 187 of 1954 was  filed  by  the respondents.  Meanwhile the question about the extent of the right  conferred on the employer to prefer an appeal  by  s. 17(1)(a)  of the Act had been considered by the Bombay  High Court  in Laxman Pandu & Ors. v. Chief Mechanical  Engineer, Western  Railway (B.B. & C.I. Railway), Lower Parel,  Bombay (1);  and it had been held that under the said  section  the employer  gets  a right of appeal only if the order  of  the authority  under the Act awards payment of an amount of  Rs. 300  or more in respect of a single individual  worker;  the right does not exist if the order awards a sum exceeding Rs. 300 collectively to an unpaid group of workers every one  of whom gets an amount under Rs. 300.  Following this  decision the  appellate authority held that the appeal  preferred  by the  appellant  was incompetent and so  dismissed  it.   The appellant  then applied for and obtained special leave  from this  Court to prefer an appeal against the  said  appellate decision;  and  so the main point raised by  the  appeal  is about the construction of s. 17(1)(a) of the Act. The Act has been passed in 1936 with a view to regulate  the

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payment  of wages to certain classes of persons employed  in industry.   Section  15(1) of the Act authorises  the  State Government  by  notification  in  the  official  Gazette  to appoint any Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as  a stipendiary  Magistrate  to  be the authority  to  hear  and decide  for  any specified area all claims  arising  out  of deductions  from the wages, or delay in payment of wages  of persons  employed  or  paid in that  area.   Section  7  has provided  for deductions which may be made from wages.   Any deductions made not in accordance with the said section  and contrary  to the provisions of the Act as well as wages  the payment of which has been delayed can be brought before  the authority under sub-s- (2) of s. 15.  Sub-section (3) of  s. 15 empowers the authority to deal with the applications made under sub-s. (2) and to direct a refund to (1) (1953) 57 B.L.R. 399, 704 the employed person of the amount deducted or the payment of delayed wages together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times  the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding Rs.  10 in the latter.  Sub-section (4) provides that in cases where the authority is satisfied that the application made by  the employee  was  either malicious or vexatious it  may  direct that a penalty not exceeding Rs. 50 be paid to the  employer or other persons responsible for the payment of wages by the applicant.   It would thus be seen that s. 15  provides  for the  making of applications by the employees and  for  their decision  in accordance with the provisions of the Act.   It is  necessary to refer to s. 16 as well before dealing  with the question of the construction of s. 17(1)(a).  Section 16 provides  for the making of a single application in  respect of  claims from unpaid group.  Section 16(1)  provides  that employed persons are said to belong to the same unpaid group if  they  are borne on the same establishment and  if  their wages  for the same period or periods have  remained  unpaid after  the day fixed by s. 5. Sub-section (2)  provides  for the making of a single application under s. 15 on behalf  of or in respect of any number of employed persons belonging to the  same unpaid group, and prescribes that in such  a  case the  maximum compensation that may be awarded  under  sub-s. (3) of s. 15 shall be Rs. 10 per head.  Subsection (3)  then provides  that  the authority may deal with  any  number  of separate  pending  applications  presented under  s.  15  in respect  of persons belonging to the same unpaid group as  a single  application presented under sub-s. (2) of  the  said section, and the provisions of that sub-section shall  apply accordingly.   Thus  the effect of s. 16 is  that  a  single application may be made on behalf of any number of  employed persons  belonging to the same unpaid group, or if  separate applications  are made by employed persons belonging to  the same  unpaid group they may be consolidated and tried  as  a single application. Let  us now read s. 17 which provides for appeals.   Section 17(1) provides that an appeal against a                             705 direction made under sub-s. (3) or sub-s. (4) of s 15 may be preferred  within  thirty  days of the  date  on  which  the direction was made, in a Presidency-town before the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the District Court-(a)  by the employer or other person responsible for the payment  of wages  under s. 3, if the total sum directed to be  paid  by way of wages and compensation exceeds Rs. 300, or (b) by  an employed  person,  if the total amount of wages  claimed  to

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have  been  withheld from him or from the  unpaid  group  to which  he  belonged  exceeds Rs. 50, or (c)  by  any  person directed  to pay a penalty under sub.s. (4) of s. 15.   Sub- section (2) of s. 17 makes the directions made under  sub-s. (3) -and sub-s. (4) of s. 15 final save as provided in  sub- s. (1). On a plain reading of s. 17(1)(a) it seems fairly clear that the  only  test which has to be satisfied by  the  appellant before preferring an appeal against a direction issued under s.  15(3) is that the total sum directed to be paid  by  him should exceed Rs. 300.  Where a single application has  been made on behalf of a number of employed persons belonging  to the  same  unpaid  group  under s. 16,  sub-s.  (2),  and  a direction  has been issued for the payment of the  specified amount,  it  is  the  said specified  amount  that  must  be considered  in  deciding whether the test prescribed  by  s. 17(1)(a) is satisfied or not.  The view taken by the  Bombay High Court, however, is that s. 17(1)(a) is applicable  only where  the  amount  directed  to  be  paid  to  each  single applicant exceeds Rs. 300.  In other words, on this view the expression " the total sum directed to be paid " used in  s. 17(1)(a)  is construed to mean the total sum directed to  be paid to each individual applicant, and that clearly involves the  addition  of  certain words in  the  section.   If  the application  is made by a single employee an appeal  can  be preferred  by the employer against the direction  issued  in such an application if the total sum directed to be paid  to the  applicant exceeds Rs. 300; but if a single  application is made on behalf of several employees belonging to the same unpaid  group  the  test  to be applied  is  not  whether  a direction has been issued that the employer 99 706 should  pay Rs. 300 or more to each one of  the  applicants; the test clearly is whether a direction has been  issued  on the said single application calling upon the employer to pay to the applicants Rs. 300 or more.      Reading s.  17(1)(a) by itself we feel no difficulty in reaching this conclusion. It  is,  however, urged that in construing  s.  17(1)(a)  it would  be relevant and material to compare and contrast  its provisions  with  those  of cl. (b) of s.  17,  sub-s.  (1). Providing  for  the right of an employee to make  an  appeal this clause requires that the total amount of wages  claimed to  have been withheld from him or from the unpaid group  to which  he belonged should exceed Rs. 50.  It  is  emphasised that  this  clause  refers  expressly  to  the  case  of  an individual  employee  as  well as  the  cases  of  employees belonging to an unpaid group; and the argument is that since cl. (a) does not use the words " unpaid group " it indicates that   the  direction  about  the  payment  of  the   amount prescribed  by  the  said  clause  has  reference  to   each individual employee.  We are not impressed by this argument. Since  the  Act  has provided for the  making  of  a  single application  on  behalf  of a  number  of  employed  persons belonging  to  the  same unpaid group as  well  as  separate applications  made by individual workmen it was  unnecessary to  refer to the persons employed in the unpaid group  while providing  for  appeals  against directions  made  under  s. 15(3).   On the other hand, if the Legislature had  intended that  the  right to prefer an appeal should  accrue  to  the employer only if Rs. 300 or more are directed to be paid  to each  individual  employee it would  have  used  appropriate additional  words in cl. (a).  Therefore the argument  based upon the use of the words " unpaid group " in cl. (b) is not of any assistance in construing cl. (a).

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We  are also inclined to think that it could not  have  been the  intention of the Legislature to confer on the  employer the  right to prefer an appeal only if Rs. 300 or  more  are ordered  to  be paid to each one of the applicants.   It  is true  that  the policy of the Act is to provide  for  speedy remedy   to  the  employees  in  respect   of   unauthorised deductions made by the employer or 707 in  respect of delayed wages; and with that object  the  Act provides for the appointment of the authority and prescribes the      summary     procedure     for     the      decision of  the claims;butitseemsveryunlikelythatwhereas   an appeal by  the employee has been permitted by cl. (b) whenever  the amount in dispute happens to be Rs. 50 or more in respect of an  individual applicant  or in respect of the  unpaid group the Legislature could have intended that the employer should have  no  right  of appeal against a direction  made  on  a; single  consolidated  application,  even  though  the  total liability  flowing  from the said direction may  exceed  the specified  amount of Rs. 300 by several thousands.   In  the present case the amount directed to be paid is more than Rs. 22,000  but  it  has been held that since each  one  of  the employees is not ordered to be paid Rs. 300 or more there is no  right of appeal.  On general considerations,  therefore, the  conclusion  which  we  have  reached  on  a  fair   and reasonable  construction  of  cl. (a) appears  to  be  well- founded. There  is  another point to which reference  must  be  made. Section 16(3) empowers the authority to consolidate  several applications made by individual employees and bear them as a single application as though it was presented under- s.  16, sub-s.  (2); and it is urged that this procedural  provision cannot  and  should  not  have  a  decisive  effect  on  the employer’s right to prefer an appeal under s. 17(1)(a).   If several  applications made by individual employees  are  not consolidated  and  heard as a single  application  under  s. 16(3) and separate directions are issued, then the  employer would  have  the right to prefer an appeal  only  where  the total  amount directed to be paid exceeds Rs. 300.   On  the other   hand,  if  the  authority  consolidates   the   said applications  and makes a direction in respect of the  total amount  to be paid to the employees belonging to the  unpaid group  the employer may be entitled to make an  appeal  even though each one of the employees receives less than Rs. 300. It would be anomalous, it is said, that the right to  appeal should depend upon the exercise of discretion vested in  the authority under s. 16(3).  We are unable to see the force of this argument.  We apprehend that 708 ordinarily  when  several  applications  are  made  by   the employees belonging to the same unpaid group the  authority would prefer to treat the said applications  as   a   single application under s. 16(3); but apart from   this  practical aspect of the matter, if s. 16(3) permits the  consolidation of   the  several  applications  and  in    consequence   of consolidation  they  are assimilated to the  position  of  a single  application  contemplated  by  s.  16(2),  the  only question  which  has to be considered in  dealing  with  the competence  of  the appeal is to see whether  the  direction appealed  against satisfies the test of s. 17(1)(a), and  on that  point we feel no hesitation in holding that  the  test prescribed  by s. 17(1)(a) is that the direction  should  be for the payment of an amount exceeding Rs. 300. Besides, we think it would not be right to assume that it is anomalous if different consequences follow from the adoption

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of  different procedures in trying employees’ claims and  an appeal  does  not lie where several applications  are  tried separately  while  it lies where  similar  applications  are heard  as  a  single  application  under  s.  16(3).    This difference  is  clearly  intended  by  the  Legislature.   A similar different consequence is prescribed in the matter of the  award  of  compensation by s. 15,  sub-s.  (3)  and  s. 16,sub-s.  (2) respectively.  Therefore, the argument  based on the alleged anomaly cannot have any validity inconstruing s. 17(1)(a). Incidentally,  if one or more employees in the  same  unpaid group are paid an amount exceeding Rs. 300 and the rest  are paid less than Rs. 300, on the alternative construction, the employer would be entitled to make an appeal only in respect of a workman to whom more than Rs. 300 is ordered to be paid and not against the others though the total amount  directed to be paid to them may exceed by far the amount of Rs.  300. In  such a case, if the appeal preferred by the employer  in respect  of  the amount ordered to be paid to  some  of  the workmen   succeeds   that  would   leave   outstanding   two conflicting  decisions, with the result that a large  number of  employees  in the same unpaid group may get  the  amount under  the direction of the authority while those  who  were awarded more 709 than  Rs.  300 by the authority would get a  smaller  amount under  the  decision  of the appellate  authority.   We  are referring  to this anomalous aspect of the matter  only  for the  purpose  of showing that where the words  used  in  the relevant clause are clear and unambiguous considerations  of a  possible  hypothetical anomaly cannot  affect  its  plain meaning.   That is why we prefer to leave anomalies on  both sides   out  of  account  and  confine  ourselves   to   the construction of the words used in s. 17(1)(a).  If the  said words  had been reasonably capable of two  constructions  it would  have  been  relevant to consider  which  of  the  two constructions would avoid any possible anomalies.  We would, therefore, hold that the appellate authority was in error in dismissing  the appeal preferred before it by the  appellant on the ground that it was incompetent under s. 17(1)(a).  We would  like to add that the question about the  construction of s. 17(1)(a) has been considered by the Madras High  Court (Union  of  India, owning the South Indian  Railway  by  the General  Manager v. S. P. Nataraja Sastrigal & Ors. (1)  and A. C. Arumugam & Ors. v. Manager, Jawahar Mills Ltd.,  Salem Junction (2), the Calcutta High Court (Promod Ranjan  Sarkar v. R.N. Munllick (3) and Assam High Court (Cachar Cha Sramik Union v. Manager, Martycherra Tea Estate & Anr. (4) and they have  all  differed from the view taken by the  Bombay  High Court  and have construed s. 17(1)(a) in the same manner  as we have done.  The result is the appeal is allowed, the order of dismissal passed  by  the  appellate authority is set  aside  and  the appeal sent back to it for disposal in accordance with  law. Since  the  hearing of the appeal has been thus  delayed  we would direct that the appellate authority should dispose  of the   appeal  as  expeditiously  as  possible.   Under   the circumstances of this case we would direct that the  parties should bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. (1) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 808.  (3) A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 318 S.C.; 63 C.W.N. 6. (2) A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 79.  (4) A.I.R. 1959 Assam 13. 710

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