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PETITIONER: ISHWAR CHAND JAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/05/1988

BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1395            1988 SCR  Supl. (1) 396  1988 SCC  (3) 370        JT 1988 (2)   473  1988 SCALE  (1)1188  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC 496  (26)

ACT:      Service matter-Whether  the High  Court  was  right  in recommending termination of the services of the appellant, a judicial officer,  on probation, on the ground that his work and conduct were not satisfactory, on complaints of trifling nature   and    complaints   motivated    and    allegations unsubstantiated, against the appellant.

HEADNOTE:      This appeal  by special  leave was directed against the Judgment of  the High Court, dismissing the appellant’s writ petition challenging the order dispensing with his services.      The appellant  was  appointed  as  Addl.  District  and Sessions Judge  on probation  for two years. While he was on probation, there were certain complaints against him, and an inquiry was  held by  a Judge of the High Court, as a result whereof the  High Court  by its  resolution recommended  the termination  of   the  appellant’s  services  to  the  State Government. The  appellant filed  a writ petition before the High Court,  challenging the  said resolution  of  the  High Court. The  High Court dismissed the writ petition whereupon the  State   Government  issued   orders   terminating   the appellant’s services.  Aggrieved, the  appellant moved  this Court, challenging  the orders  of the  High Court  and  the State government above said.      The appellant  contended that  since the High Court had resolved that his services should be terminated on the basis of  the   inquiry  report,   the  constitutional  protection available to  him under  Article 311(2)  of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice had been violated.      Counsel for  the High  Court submitted that the inquiry held was  merely to  judge the  appellant’s suitability  for service,  and   the  appellant   was  not  entitled  to  the constitutional  protection   of  Article   311(2)   of   the Constitution, or to any opportunity of hearing before taking the decision  regarding the  termination of his probationary period.      Allowing the appeal, the Court, 397

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^      HELD: The High Court had no relevant material in coming to the  conclusion that the appellant’s work and conduct was not  satisfactory   during  his   probationary  period.  The material taken  into consideration  was non-existent,  while the other  material was  not relevant,  and the  allegations taken    into    consideration    against    him    remained unsubstantiated.  The   High  Court  erred  in  holding  the appellant’s work  and conduct  to be  unsatisfactory, and in terminating his services. [401 A-C]      In one case, adverse remarks made against the appellant by the  High Court  (Bains, J.)  had been  directed by  this Court in  appeal to  be expunged  as they  were found  to be unjustified and unwarranted. In another case, members of the Bar Association  had  passed  a  resolution  condemning  the appellant on  a trifling  matter without applying their mind to the  question involved. The members of the Bar practising before the  Court should  be aware of the legal position and they should  not have  passed the  resolution condemning the appellant without  there being any justifiable cause. If the members of  the Bar Association pass resolutions against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts without any justifiable cause,  it would  be difficult  for the judicial officers to  perform their  judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities  in an objective and unbiased manner. The  High   Court,  instead  of  protecting  the  appellant, distressingly took  the Bar resolution into consideration in assessing the appellant’s work and conduct. [402B; 404B-D]      The complaints against the appellant were enquired into by Justice  Surinder Singh,  Vigilance Judge, and his report had formed  the foundation  for the action taken by the High Court against  the appellant.  An analysis  of the report of the Vigilance  Judge showed  that out of four complaints, in respect of two of them the Vigilance Judge had expressed the opinion that  the matter  needed further  investigation  and enquiry and  he was not in a position to record any definite finding on  the allegations  made in  those  complaints.  As regards the third complaint, officers had committed no wrong in postponing the pronouncement of the order, with a view to give time  to the  parties to  compromise.  As  regards  the fourth matter-Khem Chand’s complaint-the Vigilance Judge had not expressed any opinion. The report of the Vigilance Judge did not show that the work and conduct of the appellant were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a judicial officer. The  complaints in  respect of  which the Vigilance Judge had  observed that  the same  needed further  inquiry, could not  at all  be considered  against the appellant. The High Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding that  the appellant’s  work and  conduct was  not satisfactory. [407H; 408A-D] 398      So  far   as  the   annual  entry  on  the  appellant’s confidential roll  was A  concerned, there  was no  material against  him   to  show   that  his  work  and  conduct  was unsatisfactory. [408G-H]      While considering  complaints of irregularities against the judicial  officer on  probation, the  High Court  should have kept  in mind  that the  incidents related  to the very first year of appellant’s service. Every Judicial officer is likely to  commit mistakes  of some  kind or  the  other  in passing orders  in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial  officer would  not do.  If the  orders  are passed without  any  corrupt  motive,  the  same  should  be overlooked by  the High  Court and proper guidance should be provided to  him. If  after the  warning and  guidance,  the

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officer on  probation is  not able  to improve, his services may be terminated. [409C-E]      While exercising control over the subordinate judiciary under  the   Constitution,  the   High  Court   is  under  a constitutional obligation  to  guide  and  protect  judicial officers. An  honest, strict  judicial officer  is likely to have adversaries.  If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating  to judicial  orders which  may  have  been upheld by  the High  Court on  the judicial side, and if the judicial officers  are under  constant threat  of complaints and enquiry  on trifling  matters, and  if  the  High  Court encourages anonymous  complaints, no  judicial officer would feel, secure, and it would be difficult for him to discharge his  duties   in  an   honest  and  independent  manner.  An independent and  honest judiciary  is a sine qua non for the Rule of  law. It  is imperative  that the  High Court should take steps  to  protect  its  honest  judicial  officers  by ignoring  ill-conceived  or  motivated  complaints  made  by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. [409E-G]      In  this   case,  the  resolution  passed  by  the  Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints  made by  others were motivated which did not deserve credit.  Even the Vigilance Judge did not record any finding that  the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. [409H; 410A]      The orders  of the  High Court and the State Government were set  aside. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with  continuity  of  service  and  arrears  of  salary  and allowances and other benefits. [410B-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 811 of 1988. 399      From the  Judgment and  order dated  9.12.1986  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 2213 of 1986 and C.M.P. No 1519 of 1986.      P.P. Rao,  K.K. Patel, P.S. Pradhan and Rajiv Dutta for the Appellant.      Dr.  Y.S.   Chitale,  S.C.  Mahanta,  S.  Ramachandran, Mahabir Singh and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SINGH, J. Special Leave granted.      This appeal  is directed against the judgment and order of the  High Court  of Punjab  and Haryana  dated  9.12.1986 dismissing the  appellant’s writ  petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution challenging the order dated 30. 12.1986 dispensing with  the appellant’s  services as Addl. District and Sessions  Judge in  terms of  Rule 10(3)  of the  Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963.      Initially, the appellant was an advocate practising law in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. He was selected for appointment to  the Haryana Superior Judicial Service by the High Court.  On the  recommendation of  the High  Court  the State Government  by its order dated 14.4.1983 appointed the appellant as  Addl. District and Sessions Judge on probation for a  period of  two years in accordance with Rule 10(1) of the Punjab  Superior Judicial Service Rules 1963, as adopted by the  State of  Haryana (hereinafter  referred to  as  the Rules). The  High Court  by its order dated 27.4.1983 posted the appellant to Hissar as Addl. District and Sessions Judge where he joined his duties on 2.5. 1983. While he was posted at Hissar  certain incidents took place as a result of which

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the Bar  Association of  Hissar passed  a resolution against the appellant  and as  a result  of which he was transferred from Hissar  to Narnaul  as Addl.  District & Sessions Judge where he assumed charge of his office on 5.5.1984. While the appellant  was   posted  at  Narnaul  inquiry  into  certain complaints against  him was  held by  a Judge  of  the  High Court. After  the inquiry the High Court at its meeting held on 21.3.1985  resolved that the appellant’s work and conduct was not  satisfactory during  his probationary period and as such his  services deserved  to be dispensed with forthwith. The High  Court forwarded its recommendation for terminating the appellant’s  services to  the State  Government  by  its letter dated 28.3.1985. Before the State 400 Government could  issue any  orders, the  appellant filed  a writ petition  under Article  32 of  the Constitution before this  Court   challenging  the  High  Court’s  decision.  On 14.4.1985 this court permitted the appellant to withdraw the petition with  liberty to  file the  same  before  the  High Court. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition before the High  Court challenging the resolution of the High Court as well  as certain  other  consequential  orders  to  which reference shall  be made  at a later stage. A Division Bench of the  High Court  by its  elaborate order  dated 9.12.1986 dismissed  the  writ  petition  on  the  findings  that  the appellant’s work  and conduct was not satisfactory and as he was  on  probation  his  services  were  rightly  terminated without giving any opportunity to the appellant. Thereafter, the State  Government pursuant  to the recommendation of the High Court  issued  orders  on  30.12.1986  terminating  the appellant’s  services   in  accordance   with  Rule   10(3). Aggrieved, the  appellant has  challenged the  order of  the High Court  under appeal  as well  as the order of the State Government terminating his services.      Before the High Court the appellant laid main stress on the question  that the  order of  termination which had been passed  without   holding  an   enquiry  giving   reasonable opportunity to  him  to  defend  himself  was  violative  of Article 311(2)  of the Constitution as the same was based on a number of complaints and allegations as well as the report of a Judge of the High Court who had made inquiries into the complaints against  the appellant. The High Court considered the question  in detail  and recorded its finding that since the appellant  was  a  probationer  his  services  could  be discharged  without   giving  any   opportunity  to  him  in accordance with  the Rules. The High Court further held that the inquiry  which was held by a judge of the High Court was not for  the purpose  of taking any disciplinary proceedings or imposing  any punishment  on the  appellant  instead  the inquiry was  held to find out the appellant’s suitability to the  service.   Shri  P.P.  Rao,  learned  counsel  for  the appellant, challenged  the findings  of the  High Court  and urged that  since the  High Court  resolved to terminate the appellant’s services  on the  basis of  the  inquiry  report submitted  by  a  learned  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  the constitutional protection  available to  the appellant under Article 311(2)  of the  Constitution, and  the principles of natural justice  had been  violated. On  the other hand, Dr. Y.S. Chitale appearing for the High Court submitted that the resolution of the High Court did not cause any stigma to the appellant and  the inquiry held by the High Court was merely to judge  his suitability for the service. The appellant was not entitled  to the  constitutional protection  of  Article 311(2) of the Constitution nor he was entitled to 401

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any opportunity  of hearing  before taking  the decision for terminating the  appellant’s probationary  period. We do not consider it  necessary to  deal with these rival submissions as in our opinion the High Court had no relevant material in coming to  the conclusion  that  the  appellant’s  work  and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary period. It appears  to us  as  we  shall  presently  show  that  the material which  was taken  into  account  was  non-existent, while the  other material  was not  relevant and further the allegations which  were taken  into  consideration  remained unsubstantiated. Having  perused the  entire material placed before us  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  High  Court committed error  in holding  that the  appellant’s work  and conduct was  not satisfactory  and that  his  services  were liable to be terminated.      We would now consider the facts and circumstances which persuaded the  High Court  on  its  administrative  side  in taking  the   decision  to  dispense  with  the  appellant’s services. On  his selection the appellant was firstly posted at Hissar  where he  joined his duties on 2.5.1983. While at Hissar the  appellant decided a criminal case under Sections 363/366 IPC (State v. Ram Niwas) on l0.9.1983. The appellant acquitted the  accused for the offence under Section 366 IPC but convicted  him under Section 363 IPC and released him on one year’s  probation. The  accused preferred appeal against his conviction  to the High Court. Justice A.S. Bains by his order dated  5.4.1984 allowed  the appeal on the ground that the prosecution  had failed  to prove  its case  against the accused beyond  reasonable doubt  and therefore  it was  not safe to  maintain his  conviction.  In  the  course  of  his judgment  Justice  Bains  made  the  following  observations against the appellant:           "I am  constrained to  remark  that  the  judgment           recorded by  the trial court is extremely poor and           is not  based on  the evidence  on the record. The           trial court  seems to  have wrongly  convicted the           appellant." The appellant  made  representation  against  the  aforesaid remarks but  the High  Court refused  to grant any relief to the appellant  on the ground that the remarks awarded to him had been  made in judicial proceedings. The appellant made a representation for  placing his  representation  before  the learned Judge  who had  awarded remarks against him but that too was  not accepted. The appellant, thereafter, approached the  High  Court  in  the  judicial  side  by  means  of  an application under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure for  expunging the  aforesaid remarks but he could not get  any relief.  Ultimately, the  appellant  approached this court by means of Criminal Misc. Peti- 402 tion No.  1377 of  1987 for expunging the aforesaid remarks. This Court A by its order dated 7th September 1987 held that from the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that  the order  and judgment  of the  Addl. District & Sessions Judge  was not  based on the evidence on record and the remarks  made by  Justice Bains  were unwarranted.  This Court directed that the aforesaid remarks should be expunged from the  judgment in  appeal. These  facts  show  that  the remarks made  by Justice  Bains against  the appellant  were unjustified, unwarranted and they ceased to be in force.      On 26.9.1983  while the  petitioner was  recording  the statement of  an Assistant  Sub-inspector  of  police  in  a sessions case,  an advocate of Hissar Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi, came into  the appellant’s  court and  made a request to the appellant that  Thakur Dass,  the Assistant Sub-inspector of

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police whose  statement was being recorded as a witness in a sessions case  should be  directed to  appear in a complaint case against  him (the  Assistant Sub-inspector  of  police) pending in  the court  of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar. The appellant  told the  Advocate Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi that the Chief  Judicial Magistrate should direct Thakur Dass the witness to  appear in  his  court  and  Shri  Bishnoi  might himself bring summons and serve the same on Thakur Dass. Sh. Bishnoi went  to the  court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for bringing summons  meanwhile the statement of Thakur Dass was recorded and  on being  discharged from  the witness  box he became free. The appellant waited for more than half an hour but Shri Bishnoi did not turn up with the summons. Thereupon he discharged Thakur Dass. It was not strictly his duty as a Judge to  detain the witness after his evidence was recorded for the  purpose of  serving summons  in a complaint case on him. Shortly,  thereafter Sh. Bishnoi, advocate, came to the appellant’s court  and finding  that the witness had already left the  court he expressed his anger towards the appellant who was  still presiding  over his  court and threatened him saying that he would see that no judicial officer would dare to act  in such  a manner.  Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi, advocate, thereupon  addressed  a  letter  to  the  President  of  Bar Association requesting that a meeting of the Bar Association should be held which read as follows:           "To                The President,                Distt. Bar Association Hissar,                Subject: To  consider the  behaviour  of  Sh.                I.C. Jain, Additional Sessions Judge. 403      Sir,           It is  submitted that  today i.e.  On 26.9.1983, I      had presented  an application  in the court of Sh. I.C.      Jain, Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar in the presence      and on  behalf of  my  client,  Sh.  Punam  Chand,  for      effecting the service of summons on accused Thakur Dass      S.I. At  that time  Thakur Dass  S.I. was  appearing as      witness in  the witness  box in  the court  of Sh. I.C.      Jain, and  I.C. Jain  refused to  pass any  order on my      application and  I was asked to bring the summons. When      after obtaining the Dasti summons from the court of Sh.      L.N. Mittal,  C.J.M. Hissar,  in whose  court complaint      was pending,  I went  to the court of Sh. I.C. Jain, by      that time  Thakur Dass had already fled away and he was      seen going on Motor Cycle by my client. Behaviour meted      out to  me by  Shri I.C  Jain  is  in  fact  wrong  and      mishehaviour with  the lawyers  community at  large.  I      pray to all the members of Bar Association, Hissar that      matter may be considered by calling for urgent meeting.                                                         Sd/-                                  Nar Singh Bishnoi, Advocate                                                      Hissar" On the aforesaid letter a meeting of the Bar was convened on 27.9.1983 and the following resolution was passed:           "Resolved that  the attitude  and the behaviour of           Shri I.C.  Jain, Additional  District  &  Sessions           Judge, Hissar  towards the  members of  the Bar is           most deplorable,  verges (sic) and condemnable for           being rude un-cooperative and insulting."      The Bar  Association forwarded a copy of the resolution to the  High Court  and also  to the  District and  Sessions Judge, Hissar.  The appellant  on getting  information about the resolution  addressed a  letter to  the Registrar of the High  Court  on  8.10.1983  giving  his  version  about  the

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incident and  he further  sought advice of the High Court as to whether  in the  circumstances the  witness (Thakur Dass) should have  been detained on the request of the counsel for a party to enable him to bring summons for effecting service on him  and further whether it was the duty of the appellant as an  Addl. District  & Sessions  Judge to  get the service effected without their being any requisition from the 404 court of  the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It appears that the High Court  did not  give any reply to the appellant and the guidance sought  for by  the appellant  remained unattended. These  facts  clearly  show  how  the  members  of  the  Bar Association passed  the  resolution  condemning  a  judicial officer on  trifling matter  without applying  their mind to the question.  The appellant  being an  Additional  Sessions Judge was  not bound  by law to detain the witness to enable counsel of  a private  party  to  bring  Dasti  summons  for effecting service  on the  said witness.  The members of the Bar practising before the court should be aware of the legal position and  they should  not have  indulged in  passing  a resolution condemning  the appellant without there being any justifiable cause  for the  same. If  the members of the Bar Association pass  resolution against  the presiding officers working  in  subordinate  courts  without  there  being  any justifiable  cause   it  would  be  difficult  for  judicial officers to  perform their  judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities  in an objective and unbiased manner. We are  distressed to  find that  the High  Court instead of protecting   the   appellant   took   this   incident   into consideration in assessing the appellant’s work and conduct.      In May  1984 the  appellant was  transferred to Narnaul and it appears that some incidents took place there also and complaints  were   made  to   the  High  Court  against  the appellant. On  14.9.1984 Ram Nath Mehlawat, an advocate-cum- journalist publishing  a local  weekly newspaper  named ’Jan Hirdey’and who was also connected with a social organisation ’Janata Kalyan  Samiti’ was assaulted by certain persons. On a complaint  made by  Sh.  Mehlawat,  a  criminal  case  was registered and  it was  committed to sessions for trial. The appellant convicted  the accused  persons except  one  under Sections 325/324  read with  Section 34  of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant rejected the plea of the complainant Sh. Ram Nath  Mehlawat that  he was  a public  servant that  the injuries were  caused to  him while  performing public duty. The appellant  held that  no offence  under Sections 332/353 IPC was  made out. Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat made a complaint to the High  Court against  the  appellant  alleging  that  the appellant had adjourned the case on several dates and he had acquitted the  accused of  offence punishable under Sections 332/353 IPC  on extraneous consideration. He further alleged that the  appellant had  accepted illegal  gratification  in acquitting the  accused and further releasing the convicting accused persons  on probation.  The allegations contained in the complaint of Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat were enquired into by Justice  Surinder  Singh.  As  regards  correctness  of  the judgment is  concerned it  is relevant  to note that Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat filed appeal before the High Court 405 against the  appellant’s order  releasing accused persons on probation and  also a criminal revision against the order of acquittal on  the charges under Sections 332/353/149 and 148 of Indian Penal Code and also against the order of releasing the convicted  accused persons  on probation. The appeal was dismissed on  merits by Justice Tiwana, who observed that he found no  infirmity in  the conclusion recorded by the trial

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judge. The  learned  Judge  held  that  Ram  Nath  Mehlawat, Advocate, was not a public servant though he may have been a Project Director  of Adult Education Project run by a social organisation.  The  learned  Judge  further  held  that  the conclusion of  the trial  judge (appellant)  was correct and there was  no merit  in the appeal. In this view both appeal and revision  filed by  Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat were dismissed and the order passed by the appellant was upheld.      These facts  show that  Ram Nath Mehlawat failed in his attempt to  get the  appellant’s order set aside by the High Court. Having  failed to  do so on the judicial side he made several  complaints   against  the   appellant  making  wild allegations  against  him  about  the  aforesaid  cases.  It appears he was instrumental in getting complaints made about other matters  also. These  complaints were  referred to the vigilance judge,  who enquired  into those  matters and  the report of  the vigilance  judge was  placed before  the full court of  the High Court on 27.7.1985. After considering the appellant’s confidential  roll the  High Court  resolved  to dispense with the appellant’s services.      It is  asserted on  behalf of the High Court that since the appellant’s work and conduct were not found satisfactory during the  period of  probation  of  two  years  the  court decided   to   dispense   with   his   services   forthwith. Consequently it  made recommendation to the State Government for issuing  necessary orders. The decision to dispense with the appellant’s services was taken at the full court meeting of the  High Court  held on  21st March,  1980.  Along  with agenda  a   note  was  circulated  to  the  Hon’ble  Judges, referring to  five complaints  out of  which four complaints had been  inquired into  by Justice  Surinder Singh  and the fifth complaint  remained without any inquiry. The report of Justice Surinder  Singh was  considered by  the  High  Court along with appellant’s service record. The High Court formed opinion that  the  appellant’s  work  and  conduct  was  not satisfactory. Since  the report  of Justice  Surinder  Singh vigilance judge  formed foundation for taking action against the appellant, we consider it necessary to refer to the same in detail. A copy of the report is on file on perusal of the same we  find that  in all  four complaints were referred to Justice Surinder  Singh who was Vigilance Judge for inquiry. The first complaint was by R.N. 406 Mehlawat, Project  Director, Adult  Education. He  raised  a grievance A  that on  July 25,  1984 the appellant convicted the four  accused but he went out of the way to institute an inquiry against  Ranjit Singh  accused and  also against the defence witness  for forging a document. He further released all  the   convicted  accused  persons  on  probation.  Shri Mehlawat was  aggrieved that  though he was a public servant the accused  were not  convicted under  Section 332  of  the Indian  Penal   Code.  He   alleged  that  he  had  received information  that   the  appellant   had  received   illegal gratification to  the tune of Rs.25,000 from the accused for taking lenient  view in  the  matter.  The  vigilance  judge recorded the  statement of  the appellant and other relevant persons in  his report  he stated  that it was difficult for him to  come to  a definite finding although the allegations contained in  the complaint filed by Shri Mehlawat could not be said  without any  basis  but  he  recommended  that  the complaint required  further investigation.  We have  earlier noted that  Mehlawat had  filed appeal  and revision against the appellant’s order but he failed. Justice Tiwana found no merit in  the appeal and revision and he upheld the order of the appellant.  Justice Tiwana  expressly held that Mehlawat

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was not  a public  servant even  though  he  was  a  project Director of  the Adult Education Project, and the conclusion of the trial court was correct and there was no merit in the appeal and  revision. We  are distressed to notice that even though the  High Court  had upheld  the appellant’s order on the judicial  side it  took  exception  to  the  appellant’s conduct in  passing the  orders against  Sh.  Mehlawat.  Sh. Mehlawat had  also made  allegations that  the appellant had accepted illegal  gratification  in  instalments  in  giving judgment in his case but during the enquiry by the vigilance judge he  could not  produce any evidence to that effect. It is a  matter of  common knowledge  that many  a time  when a litigant is  unsuccessful he  makes allegations  against the presiding officer  stating  that  he  had  received  illegal gratification. Sh. Mehlawat was an unsuccessful litigant and he was  highly prejudiced  and biased against the appellant. Any complaint made by him against the appellant could not be taken at  its face  value specially  so when the appellant’s order had been upheld by the High Court. The vigilance judge did  not  record  any  finding  against  the  appellant.  He observed that the complaint required further investigation.      The second  matter in  respect of  which the  vigilance judge held  inquiry  was  on  the  basis  of  an  annonymous complaint pertaining to a civil appeal entitled Sher Singh & ors v.  Mahender Singh  in which  it was  alleged  that  the appellant had  during  the  course  of  arguments  tried  to persuade the  respondent to  compromise the  matter. It  was alleged 407 that  after  the  arguments  were  concluded  the  case  was adjourned for  several dates  for  judgment.  There  was  no allegation  of  any  corruption  or  dishonest  motive.  The vigilance judge  came to the conclusion that the adjournment of the  case was unnecessary as the case was a very old one. However the vigilance judge, further held that the complaint being  annoymous   it  required  further  probe.  The  third complaint was  made by  Mukut Bihari  Sanghi,  an  advocate, practising at  Narnaul. He  alleged that the appellant heard civil appeal  entitled  Mohan  Lal  v.  Honda  Ram  on  20th September 1984  and fixed  the  same  for  orders  for  22nd September, 1984  but the  judgment was  pronounced  on  10th october, 1984.  We have  perused the  copy of  the complaint made by  Shri Sanghi  but there  is no  allegation that  the appellant committed  any misconduct  or that he acted on any extraneous reasons  in granting  adjournment. The  appellant stated before  the vigilance judge that after arguments were completed he  had fixed  a date for order but as the parties wanted to  compromise, he postponed the delivery of judgment for few  days in  order to  enable the parties to settle the dispute but  since no  settlement was  communicated  to  the court he  pronounced the judgment on 10th october, 1984. The vigilance judge,  however, made an observation that the case was  glaring  example  of  the  manner  of  working  of  the appellant  in   judicial  cases.   In  the  absence  of  any extraneous circumstances,  we do not find any impropriety in a judicial officer postponing the pronouncement of the order to  enable   the  parties  to  settle  the  dispute.  It  is interesting to  note that Sh. Mukut Bihari Singhi, advocate, was  twice  held  guilty  for  contempt  of  court.  He  was convicted for contempt of court by the High Court. He wanted to browbeat  the appellant.  His complaint, however, did not contain any  allegation of corruption. The High Court failed to appreciate  that no  appeal  was  preferred  against  the appellant’s judgment  in the  case of Mohan Lal v. Honda Ram as the  parties were  satisfied with  the judgment.  In  our

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opinion the  complaint deserved  no consideration  it should have been  rejected out-right. The fourth complaint had been made by one Khem Chand, his grievance had been that his Rent Control Appeal  had been  dismissed by the appellant on 24th November 1984  and he  had allowed  him two  months time  to vacate the  premises. He  applied for  obtaining a certified copy of  the judgment but he could not get the same. Instead he got  the same,  after inordinate  delay. The  appellant’s explanation was  that the  copying section was not under his control or  supervision therefore he could not be blamed for the delay caused in supplying certified copy of the judgment to Khem  Chand. The  vigilance judge  did  not  express  any opinion on this matter.       The  above analysis  of the  report of  the  Vigilance Judge would 408 show  that  out  of  four  complaints  the  vigilance  judge expressed opinion  that matter  relating to item no. 1 and 2 needed further  investigation and enquiry as he was not in a position to  record any  definite finding on the allegations made in  those complaints. As regards the third complaint of Mukut Bihari  Sanghi there  was nothing  wrong in postponing the pronouncement  of the  order with a view to give time to the parties  to compromise  the matter.  Finally, as regards Khem Chand’s  complaint the  vigilance judge did not express am, opinion on the matter. The report of the vigilance judge does not show that the appellant’s work and conduct were not satisfactory or  that he  was not  fit to  act as a Judicial officer. While  considering this question it must be kept in mind that  complaints, in respect of which the learned Judge observed that  the same  needed  further  inquiry  into  the matter,  could   not  at   all  be  considered  against  the appellant. If  the inquiry  had been  held and the appellant had been  given opportunity  to place his version before the inquiry officer,  correct facts  would have  emerged. But in the absence  of any  further inquiry  as  suggested  by  the vigilance  judge,  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in considering those matters in concluding that the appellant’s work and conduct was not satisfactory.      As regards  the confidential  roll of  the appellant is concerned  it   is  noteworthy  that  when  the  High  Court considered the  matter on  2 1.3.1985 the appellant’s annual report was  available only for the first year of his service namely 1983-84.  The report  for that year was satisfactory. Entry for the year 1984-85 was awarded by Justice S.P. Goyal who was  Inspecting Judge on 15.4.1985. He awarded Grade ’B’ plus to  the appellant which means that appellant’s work was good. But  this entry  could not be taken into consideration by the  High Court  as it  had already taken the decision on 21.3.1985 to  dispense with the appellant’s services. We are distressed to find that when the aforesaid entry for 1984-85 came up  for consideration before the full court of the High Court it  modified the  same and  down-graded the entry from ’B’  plus   to  ’C’   which  means   appellant’s  work   was unsatisfactory. During  the hearing  we  asked  the  learned counsel appearing  for the High Court to produce material on the basis  of which  the High Court modified the entry given by Justice S.P. Goyal for the year 1984-85 but he was unable to place  any material  before us to support the decision of the High  Court in  modifing the  entry. The modification of the entry  is therefore  without any  material  and  is  not sustainable in  law. It  is thus clear that so far as annual entry on  the appellant’s  confidential  roll  is  concerned there was  no material against him which could show that the appellant’s work  and conduct  was unsatisfactory. The facts

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and circumstances  discussed earlier  clearly show  that the appellant’s 409 services were  terminated merely  on the basis of the report made by  the vigilance  judge which  we  have  discussed  in detail earlier.  The note  appended to  the  agenda  of  the meeting referred  only to  the inquiry report and it did not refer to  any other  matter. The  Vigilance Judge  failed to express any  positive opinion  against the appellant instead he   observed   that   the   complaints   required   further investigation. If  the High  Court  wanted  to  take  action against the  appellant on  the basis of the complaints which were the  subject of  enquiry by  the  vigilance  judge,  it should have  initiated disciplinary  proceedings against the appellant, then the appellant could get opportunity to prove his innocense.  We have already discussed in detail that the facts stated  in the  complaints and the report submitted by the vigilance  judge did  not show any defect in appellant’s work as  a judicial officer. While considering complaints of irregularities against  a judicial  officer on probation the High Court should have kept in mind that the incidents which were subject  matter of  enquiry related  to the  very first year of  appellant’s  service.  Every  judicial  officer  is likely to  commit mistake  of some  kind  or  the  other  in passing orders  in the  initial stage of his service which a mature judicial  offficer would  not  do.  However,  if  the orders are  passed without  there being  any corrupt motive, the same  should be over-looked by the High Court and proper guidance should  be provided  to him.  If after  warning and guidance the  officer on  probation is  not able to improve, his services should be terminated.      Under the  Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate  judiciary. While exercising that control it is under  a constitutional  obligation to  guide and protect judicial officers.  An honest  strict  judicial  officer  is likely to  have  adversaries  in  the  mofussil  courts.  If complaints are  entertained on  trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on  the   judicial  side  no  judicial  officer  would  feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in  an honest  and independent manner. An independent and honest  judiciary is  a sine qua non for Rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on  trifling matters  and if  High Court  encourages annonymous complaints  to hold  the  field  the  subordinate judiciary will  not be  able to  administer  justice  in  an independent and  honest manner.  It is  therefore imperative that the  High Court  should also  take steps to protect its honest  officers  by  ignoring  ill-conceived  or  motivated complaints made  by the  unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. Having regard to facts and circumstances of the instant case we have  no doubt  in our mind that the resolution passed by the  Bar   Association  against  the  appellant  was  wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Sh. Mehalawat and 410 others were motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the vigilance judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that  the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that  he had  not acted  judicially. All  that  was  said against him  was that  he had  acted improperly  in granting adjournments.      In view  of our  discussion we  allow the  appeal,  set aside the  order dated  9.12.1986 and  order  of  the  State Government dated  30.12.1986. We direct that appellant shall be reinstated  in service,  with continuity  of service  and

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arrears of  salary and  allowances and  other benefits.  The appellant is  entitled to  the costs  which we  quantify  at Rs.5,000. S.L.                                    Appeal allowed. 411