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PETITIONER: ISHA VALIMOHAMAD & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HAJI GULAM MOHAMAD & HAJI DADA TRUST

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/08/1974

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN RAY, A.N. (CJ)

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2061            1975 SCR  (1) 720  1974 SCC  (2) 484  CITATOR INFO :  O          1979 SC1745  (16)  R          1987 SC1217  (13)  RF         1991 SC2156  (10)

ACT: Saurashtra  Rent  Control Act 1951- Whether  termination  of tenancy  under  Transfer of Property  Act  necessary  before filing   a   suit   for   eviction   on   the   grounds   of subletting--Repeal  and  saving  clause-Meaning  of   right, privilege acquired, accrued or- incurred.

HEADNOTE: The  respondents let out the premises to the  appellants  in the  year  1951 in a place governed by the  Saurashtra  Rent Control Act, 1951 which prohibited a tenant from  subletting the   premises.   The  appellant  sublet  the  premises   in violation  of the Saurashtra Act at a time  when  Saurashtra Act was in force.  In 1963, the Saurashtra Act was  repealed and  the Bombay Rent Act was made applicable to the area  in question.   Under  the Bombay Act there  is  no  prohibition against  subletting  by the tenant unless  the  contract  of tenancy  prohibited  it.   The  respondent  terminated   the tenancy  of  the  appellant after  the  Saurashtra  Act  was repealed  and, thereafter, a suit was filed for recovery  of possession  on  the ground of subletting.  The  High  ’Court held that the suit to recover possession was competent under Saurashtra  Act  after its repeal as the respondent  had  an accrued right within the meaning of section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act.  The High Court assumed that the notice under  the Transfer  of  Property act was necessary  to  terminate  the tenancy. HELD  : (1) The High Court was not right in  its  assumption that  the  notice  under the Transfer of  Property  Act  was necessary  to terminate the tenancy on the ground  that  the appellants  had sublet the premises.  Under the Transfer  of Property  Act  a  mere subletting by  a  tenant  unless  the contract of tenancy so provides is no ground for terminating the tenancy.  The respondent could not have issued a  notice under the Transfer of Property Act to determine the  tenancy as  the contract of tenancy did not prohibit  subletting  by the tenant.  The Saurashtra Act unconditionally prohibited a tenant  from subletting and it was under that Act  that  the

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landlord was entitled to recover possession of the  premises on  the  basis that the tenant had sublet the  premises.   A right  accrued to the landlord to recover  possession  under the  Saurashtra Act when the tenant sublet the premises  and the  right survived the repeal of that Act under section  51 of the Bombay Rent Act.  Therefore, the suit for recovery of possession of the premises was maintainable after the repeal of the Saurashtra Act. [726-727D] (2) The right of a landlord to recover possession is not  an accrued  right it before the issue of a notice if under  any law  it was necessary for the landlord to issue tile  notice to  determine  the  tenancy.  Privilege  and  inability  are correlatives.   Where  there is a privilege  there  must  be inability.  Privilege is a’ legal freedom on the part of one person  as  against  another to do a given act  or  a  legal freedom not to do a ,certain act. [724B,-725H; 726A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL Appeal No. 1915 of 1970 (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated the 2nd/3rd  March, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court  in  Revision Appln.  No. 371 of 1966.) V.N. Ganpule and Urmila Sirur for the appellants. D. V. Patel, KL.  Hathi, A.R. Chaphekar and P.C. Kapur,  for respondent No. 1. 721 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW,  J. In this appeal, by special leave,  the  question for  consideration  is whether the High Court was  right  in dismissing  a revision petition filed by the appellants  and thereby  upholding  the  judgment of  the  learned  District Judge, Jamnagar, decreeing the suit filed by respondent  No. 1 for possession of the suit premises. The suit premises consisted of a building known as Abdul Rat man  Manzil and it belonged to one Haji Mohamad,  Haji  Dada Wakf  (Trust).  The building was leased to Osman  Jamal  and Company  under  a rent note dated January 15, 1947.   In  or about the year 1951, the firm of Osman Jamal and Company was wound  up and the appellants took the premises on rent on  a monthly  rent of Rs. 320/-.  The respondent,  the  landlord, purported  to  terminate  this tenancy by  a.  notice  dated February  12,  1964  on  the  ground  that  the   appellants (tenants) had defaulted in the payment of rent and had  sub- let  the premises.  At the trial of the suit, the plea  that the  appellants  committed default in payment  of  rent  was given up and, therefore, the sole issue before the Court was whether  the  appellants  had  sub-let  the  premises.   The contention of the appellants was that under the contract  of lease,  they  had  the right to sub-let  the  promises  and, there-fore,  the  respondent  was not  entitled  to  recover possession of the premises. The trial court held that the contract of tenancy  contained no  prohibition against the tenant sub-letting the  premises and   so,  the  respondent  was  not  entitled  to   recover possession   of  the  premises  for  the  reason  that   the appellants had sub-let the premises and dismissed the suit. The  respondent. filed an appeal against this decree  before the  District Judge.  He held that s. 15 of  the  Saurashtra Rent  Control  Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred  to  as  "the Saurashtra Act") which prohibited a tenant from  Sub-letting the premises superseded the contract of tenancy between  the parties  as that section was not subject to any contract  to the contrary and, therefore, the landlord obtained the right

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to  recover  possession  of the premises  by  virtue  of  s. 13(1)(e)  of the Saurashtra Act.  He further held  that  the repeal of the Saurashtra Act by the Bombay Rents, Hotel  and Lodging   House  Rates  (Control)  Act,  1947   (hereinafter referred  to as "The Bombay Act") on December 31, 1963,  did not affect the rights, privileges, obligations or  liability acquired,  accrued  or incurred under the former  Act  and,. therefore,  the  liability of the  appellants  to  ejectment under  s.  13(1)(e) of the Saurashtra Act on the  ground  of sub-letting could be enforced by a suit, notwithstanding the repeal of that Act.  The District Judge, therefore,  allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Against  this  judgment,  the appellants  filed  a  revision before the High Court of Gujarat.  When the application  for revision  came up for hearing before a learned single  judge of the High Court, he referred it to a Division Bench.   The question before the )Division Bench was :               "Whether the landlord is entitled to  maintain               a  suit  for recovery of possession  from  the               tenant.  On the ground 722               of  sub-letting under section 13(1)(e) of  the               Bombay  Rent Act (No. 57 of 1947), as  applied               to  Gujarat State on 31 December 1963),  where               the  sub-letting was made during the  pendency               of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act and neither               the notice to terminate the contract was given               nor  the  suit was filed before  the  date  on               which  the  Saurashtra Rent  Control  Act  was               repealed ?" The  Division Bench, by its judgment, held that the suit  to recover  possession of the premises was competent  under  s. 13(1)(e)  of the ’Saurashtra Act notwithstanding the  repeal of  that Act as the respondent had an accrued  right  within the  meaning  of s. 51, proviso (2) of the  Bombay  Act  and confirmed  the  decree  for  ejectment.   It  is  from  this judgment that the present appeal has been filed. As  already  stated,  the Saurashtra  Act  was  repealed  on December 31, 1963; the Bombay Act was made applicable to the area in question on January 1, 1964.  The appellants sub-let the  premises while the ’Saurashtra Act was in force in  the area.    That   Act   by  s.   15   prohibited   sub-letting notwithstanding  anything  contained in  any  law.   Section 13(1)(e) of the Saurashtra Act provided :               "13.  When landlord may recover possession-               (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in  this               Act,  a landlord shall be entitled to  recover               possession  of  any premises if the  Court  is                             satisfied-               *   *    *    *    *    *               (e) that the tenant has, since the coming into               operation  of this Act, sub-let the whole.  or               part   of   the  premises   or   assigned   or               transferred  in any other manner his  interest               therein." Therefore,  there can be no doubt that the respondent  could have  filed a suit to recover possession under S.  13(1)  of the  Saurashtra  Act on the ground that the  appellants  had sub-let  the premises while that Act was in force.  But  the appellants  submitted that since no notice ,terminating  the tenancy  was given before the repeal of the Saurashtra  Act, the  respondent-landlord  had no accrued  right  to  recover possession  which could survive the repeal and therefore  he was not entitled .to file the suit after the repeal of  that Act,  as under the corresponding ,provisions of  the  Bombay

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Act, the suit was not maintainable.               Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Act provides :               "13.   When landlord may recover  Possession.-               (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in this               Act but subject to the provisions of s. 15,  a               landlord  shall  be entitled to  recover  pos-               session  of  any  premises  if  the  Court  is               satisfied-               *   *    *     *     *    *               (e) that the tenant has, since the coming into               operation  of this Act unlawfully sub-let  the               whole  or part of the premises or assigned  or               transferred  in any other manner his  interest               therein." It  may  be  noted that under the Bombay Act,  there  is  no prohibition   against  sub-letting  by  tenant  unless   the contract of tenancy prohibited it.  That idea is conveyed by the words "unlawfully subject" in 723 the sub-section.  That apart, the section can obviously have no application as the subletting was before the coming  into operation of that Act. The  notice  to  terminate the tenancy  was  issued  by  the landlord on February 12, 1964 i.e., after the Saurashtra Act was  repealed  and  the  suit  was  filed  for  recovery  of possession  of the premises after the Bombay Act  came  into force.  As already stated, the Division Bench took the  view that the landlord had an accrued right within the meaning of proviso  (2)  to s. 51 of the Bombay Act, and  therefore,  a suit could be instituted for recovery of possession under s. 13(1)(e)  of the Saurashtra Act.  Section 51 of  the  Bombay Act, so far as it is material, provides :               "51.  Repeal of Sau.  Act XXII of 1951 and  of               Bombay LVII of 1947 as extended to Kutch  Area               and saying.-               The  Saurashtra Rent Control Act,  1951  (San.               Act XXII of 1951) and the Bombay Rents,  Hotel               and  Lodging  House Rates  Control  Act,  1947               (Bom.  LVII of 1947) as extended to the  Kutch               area of the State of Gujarat by the Government               of India, Ministry of States, Notification No.               215-J.  dated  the  10th  September  1951  are               hereby repealed               Provided that               *    *     *     *     *     *               (ii)  affect any right, privilege,  obligation               or  liability  acquired, accrued  or  incurred               under any law so repealed;               (2)  any such investigation, legal  proceeding               or  remedy  may be  continued,  instituted  or               enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture  and               punishment,   may  be  imposed,  as   if   the               aforesaid law had not been repealed." As   already  stated,  the  submission  on  behalf  of   the appellants  was that before the issue of notice  terminating the tenancy, the landlord had no accrued right to  institute a  suit for recovery of possession as the issue of a  notice determining  the tenancy on the ground of subletting  was  a sine qua non for filing a suit under s. 13(1)(e) of the Sau- rashtra Act.  In other words, the argument was that the sub- letting  by the tenant when the Saurashtra Act was in  force only gave the landlord a right to terminate the tenancy  and that until the tenancy was terminated by a notice under  the Transfer  of Property Act, it cannot be said that any  right accrued  to  the  landlord  to  recover  possession  of  the

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premises  which would survive the repeal of  the  Saurashtra Act. if a notice under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to determine the tenancy on the ground  of sub-letting,  we do not think that the High Court was  right in its view that a right accrued to the landlord to  recover possession  of  the  premises  under  s.  13(i)(e)  of   the Saurashtra  Act  merely  because  the  tenant  sub-let   the premises  and that was prohibited by s. 15 of that Act.   In other  words,  if the assumption of the High  Court  that  a notice terminating 724 the  tenancy on the ground of sub-letting was necessary  for filing  a suit under s. 13(1)(e) of the Saurashtra  Act  was correct,  then we do not think that the  respondent-landlord had an accrued right which would survive the repeal of  that Act  unless  the notice was issued determining  the  tenancy during  the currency of that Act.  We do not think that  the right of a landlord to recover possession on the ground that the  tenant  has sub-let the premises is  an  accrued  right before  the  issue  of a notice, if under  any  law  it  was necessary for the landlord to issue the notice to  determine the tenancy on the ground of sub-letting. In  Hamilton  Coll v. While (1) Atkin L. J.  said  that  the provision of   s.  38(f)(c)  of the  English  Interpretation Act, corresponding to s. 51, proviso (2), of the Bombay Act, was  not intended to preserve abstract fights  conferred  by the  repealed Act and that it applies only to  the  specific rights  given to an individual upon the happening of one  or more  events  specified in the statute.  The Court  held  in that case that a tenant’s general right to compensation  for disturbance would not survive the repeal of the Agricultural Holdings  Act,  1908.   But, where a  landlord,  before  the repeal, had given his tenant notice to  quit, the tenant had ’acquired a  right’ which would ’accrue’ when he quitted his holding-the  right  to  receive  compensation.   In   Abbott v.Minister of Lands (2) where the appellant claimed that. as a purchaser of Crown  land  in New South Wales  in  1871  he became entitled under the Crown Lands Alienation Act 1861 to make further purchases of Crown land adjoining his  original holding.   The Act of 1861 was repealed by the  Crown  Lands Act, 1884 which, however, provided that notwithstanding  the repeal  ’all  rights  accrued’ by  virtue  of  the  repealed enactment should remain unaffected.  The Judicial  Committee held  that  the  mere  right existing at  the  date  of  the repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the Act repealed was not a ’right accrued’ within the meaning of the  saying  clause.  In Director of Public Works v.  Ho  Po Sang  (3),  the  Privy  Council  has  had  to  consider  the question.   It was held that the fact that the  Director  of Public  Works  had  given  a  Crown  lessee  notice  of  his intention  to  grant a rebuilding certificate,  which  would enable  the  lessee to recover vacant  possession  from  the persons  in occupation of the premises, did not  confer  any right  to  the  certificate on  the  lessee,  since  various conditions   had  remained  to  be  fulfilled   before   the certificate could be granted, so that the lessee had no more than a hope that it would be granted.  Lord Morris of Borth- y-Gest said :               "It   may  be,  therefore,  that  under   some               repealed enactment a right has been given  but               that  in respect of it some  investigation  or               legal  proceeding is necessary.  The right  is               then  unaffected  and preserved.  It  will  be               preserved even if a process of  quantification

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             is   necessary.   But  there  is  a   manifest               distinction   between  an   investigation   in               respect of a right and an investigation  which               is  to  decide whether some  right  should  or               should not be given.  Upon a repeal the former               is  preserved by the Interpretation  Act,  The               latter is not." (2) [1895] A.C. 425. (1) [1922] 2 K.B. 422. (3) [1961] A.C. 9011 725 In  Free  Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v.  Ranasinghe  (1)  Lord Evershed  said  that the distinction between what  was,  and what was not, a right must often be one of great finance and the  Court held that a claim given by the Ceylon  Motor  Car Ordinance  of  1936 to an injured person against  the  other party  involved  in an accident was "something more  than  a mere  hope or expectation....he had in truth a  right....al- though  that  right  might  fairly  be  called  inchoate  or contingent". We do not, however, think that the right of the landlord  to terminate the tenancy by giving a notice on the ground  that the  tenant  has sub-let the premises was an  accrued  right within the meaning of s. 51  of the Bombay Act  which  would survive the repeal of the Saurashtra    Act. Mr. Patel for respondent contended that even if the landlord had  no  accrued  right, he at least had  a  ’privilege’  as visualised  in s. 51, proviso (1)(ii) of the Bombay Act  and that the privilege should survive the repeal.               "A  privilegium,  in short, is a  special  act               affecting  special persons with  an  anomalous               advantage,  or with an anomalous burthen.   It               is derived from privatum, which, as opposed to               publicum,  signified  anything  which  regards               persons   considered  individually;   publicum               being  anything  which  regards  persons  con-               sidered collectively, and forming a society" (See Austin’s Jurisprudence, Vol. II, 5th ed. (1911) P. 519) The  meaning  of that word in  jurisprudence  has  undergone considerable  change  after  Austin  wrote.   According   to Hohfeld :               "....a  privilege is the opposite of  a  duty,               and  the  correlative of a  ’no-right"’.   For               instance,  where "X has a right or claim  that               Y  ....  should stay off the land (of  X),  he               himself  has the I privilege’ of  entering  on               the land; or, in equivalent words,  X does not               have a duty to stay off." Fundamental Legal Conceptions, (1923) pp. 38-39) Arthur L. Corbin writes               "We  know that those results would not  occur.               In such case we say that B had no right that A               should  stay out and that A had the  privilege               of entering."               (See "Legal Analysis and Terminology", 29 Yale               Law Journal 163) According to Kocourek               "Privilege  and  inability  are  correlatives.               Where  there  is  a privilege  there  must  be               inability.  The term-, are correlatives.   The               dominus of a Privilege may prevent the  servus               of the Inability from exacting an act from the               dominus"               (See "Jural Relations", 2nd ed., P. 24) (1) [1964] A.C. 541.

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726 Paton says :               "The  Restatement  of  the  law  of   Property               defines a privilege as a legal freedom on  the               part of one person as against another to do  a               given  act  or  a legal freedom not  to  do  a               certain act". (See Jurisdiction, 3rd ed.(1964), p.256) We think that the respondent-landlord had the legal  freedom as  against the appellants to terminate the tenancy or  not. The  appellants  had no right or claim that  the  respondent should  not  terminate the tenancy and the  respondent  had, therefore,  the privilege of terminanating it on the  ground that  appellants had sub-let the premises.   This  privilege would  survive the repeal.  But the problem would still  re- main  whether  the  respondent  had  an  accrued  right   or privilege  to  recover possession of the premises  under  S. 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act on the ground of the sub-letting before the repeal of that Act.  The fact that the  privilege to  terminate  the  tenancy on  the  ground  of  sub-letting survived  the repeal does not mean that the landlord had  an accrued  right   privilege to recover  possession  under  s. 13(1)  of  that Act as that right or privilege  could  arise only  if the tenancy had been validly terminated before  the repeal of the Saurashtra Act. Be  that as it may, we do not, however, think that the  High Court  was right in its assumption that a notice  under  the Transfer  of  Property Act was necessary  to  terminate  the tenancy  on the ground that the appellant s had sub-let  the premises;  or, for that matter, the landlord  could  legally have  terminated the tenancy by giving a notice, unless  the contract  of tenancy prohibited the tenant  from  subletting the premises. Under  the Transfer of Property Act, mere sub-letting, by  a tenant,  unless the contract of tenancy so provides,  is  no ground  for  terminating  the tenancy.   Under  that  Act  a landlord  cannot terminate a tenancy on the ground that  the tenant  had  sub-let  the premises unless  the  contract  of tenancy prohibits him from doing so.  The respondentlandlord therefore  could not have issued a notice under any  of  the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to determine  the tenancy,  as the contract of tenancy did not  prohibit  sub- letting  by  the tenant.  To put it, differently  under  the Transfer  of  Property Act, it is only if  the  contract  of tenancy prohibits sub-letting by tenant that a landlord  can forfeit  the tenancy on the ground that the tenant has  sub- let  the promises and recover possession of the  same  after issuing  a notice.  Section III of the Transfer of  Property Act  provides that a lease- may be determined by  forfeiture if the tenant commits breach of any of the conditions of the contract  of  tenancy  which entails  a  forfeiture  of  the tenancy.   If  sub-letting  is  not  prohibited  under   the contract  of tenancy, sub-letting would not be a  breach  of any condition in the contract of tenancy which would  enable the landlord to forfeit the tenancy on that score by issuing a  notice.   If  that be so, there was no  question  of  the respondent  landlord  terminating  the  tenancy  under   the Transfer  of Property Act on the ground that the tenant  had sub-let  the premises.  It is only under s. 13(1)(e) of  the Saurashtra 727 Act  that a landlord was entitled to recover  possession  of the  property on the basis that the tenant had  sub-let  the premises;   and,  that  is  because,  s.  15  of  that   Act unconditionally  prohibited a tenant from sub-letting.   The

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Saurashtra  Act  nowhere insists that  the  landlord  should issue a notice and terminate the tenancy before  instituting a  suit for recovery of possession under s. 13(1)(e) on  the ground  that  the  tenant had  sub-lot  the  premises.   The position,  therefore, was that the landlord was entitled  to recover  possession  of the promises under s. 13(1)  of  the Saurashtra  Act  on the ground that the tenant  sub-let  the premises.   It  would  follow that a right  accrued  to  the landlord  to  recover  possession  under  s.  13(1)  of  the Saurashtra  Act when the tenant sub-let the premises  during the  currency of that Act and the right survived the  repeal of  that  Act under proviso (2) to s. 51 of the  Bombay  Act and,  therefore, the suit for recovery of possession of  the premises  under  s. 13(1) read with clause (e) of  the  Sau- rashtra Act after the repeal of that Act on the basis of the sub-letting  during the currency of the Saurashtra  Act  was maintainable.   In this view, we think that the judgment  of the High Court must be up held and we do so. The appeal is dismissed, but we make no order as to costs.                                 Appeal dismissed. P.H.P. 728