http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: IQBAL SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/11/1977

BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. BENCH: GUPTA, A.C. KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2437            1978 SCR  (2) 174  1977 SCC  (4) 536

ACT: Criminal  Law Amendment Act, 1952, s.  8(1)-Jurisdiction  of Special  Judge  whether  limited by a  grant  of  pardon  by Magistrate   u/s.   337(1),   Cr.P.C.,   1898    Post-pardon application  of  s. 8(1), whether violative of  Article  14, Constitution of India.

HEADNOTE: A  charge-sheet  against the appellant and two  others,  was filed before the Special Judge Delhi u/s. 120-B I.P.C.  read with ss. 161 and 165-A, I.P.C. and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of  Corruption  Act, 1947.  Earlier,  at  the  Investigation stage,  the  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi,  had  granted pardon  to,  an approver u/s. 337(1) Cr.   P.C.,  1898.  :Me appellant  applied for getting the Proceeding  quashed,  but his  application was dismissed, first by the Special  Judge, and  thereafter  by  the  High  Court  u/Art.  227  of   the Constitution and s. 482.  Cr.P.C.. 1898. The  appellant  contended before  this Court, that,  on  the grant  of such a, pardon, the application of a. 8(1) of  the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ceases for the reason  that on  the  charge sheet being tiled before a  Magistrate,  the accused can have the approver’s evidence at the trial tested against  his  statement before the Magistrate, while  he  is denied  this  opportunity where the charge  sheet  is  filed before  the  Special Judge, thus rendering s.  8(1)  of  the Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act  if applied  to  such  a  case discriminatory,   and   violative   of  Art.   14   of   the Constitution. Dismissing the appeal the Court, HELD : (1) Section 337 (2-B), under which the Magistrate  is required  to send the case for trial to the  Special  Judge. after examining the approver, does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Special Judge.  By enacting  sub-section (2B)  in-1955, if the legislature sought to curb  the  power given  to, the Special Judge by s. 8(1) of the Criminal  Law Amendment  Act, 1952, it would have expressed its  intention clearly. [177 B-C] (2)The fact that the approver’s evidence cannot be  tested against  any previous statement does not make  any  material difference  to the detriment of the  accused,  transgressing Article  14 of the Constitution.  The Special Judge, in  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

case, will have to apply the well established tests for  the appreciation   of  the  accomplice’s  evidence.   The   mere availability  of  two  procedures  would  not  justify   the quashing  of  a  provision as being violative  of  Art.  14, unless  there  is  substantial  and  qualitative  difference between  the  two  procedures  so that  one  is  really  and substantially  more drastic and prejudicial than the  other. (177 D-F] Magantal  Chagganlal  (P) Ltd. v. Municipal  Corporation  of Greater Bombay and Ors. [1975] 1 SCR 1, applied.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 60  of 1977. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated 10.9.76 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal M/s. (Main) No,. 84 of 1976. A.   K. Sen, Bishamberlal and B. B. Lal for the Appellant. P.   N. Lekhi and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 1. 175 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GUPTA  J., This appeal by special leave is directed  against an  order  of  the  Delhi High Court  refusing  to  quash  a proceeding   pending against the appellant in the  Court  of the Special Judge, Delhi. On  or  about November 28, 1973 a charge sheet  against  the appellant  and  two  others was filed  before,  the  Special Judge,  Tis  Hazari,  Delhi,  alleging  facts   constituting offences   punishable under section 120-B Indian Penal  Code read  with sections 161 and 165A of the, Indian  Penal  Code and  section  5(2) of the  Prevention     of      Corruption Act,      1947.        One Martin Joseph Fernandez had  been arrested  in  correction with the case when it  was  at  the stage  of investigation.  He was produced before the,  Chief Judicial  Magistrate,  Delhi, who tendered a pardon  to  him under section 337(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code). On December 12,  1975 the appellant applied to the Special Judgefor    quashing the proceeding for want of sanction under section 197of the  Code and also on the ground of failure to  examine  the said  Martin  Joseph Fernandez as a witness as  required  by sub-sections  (2) and (2B) of section 337 of the Code.   The Special   Judge  having  dismissed  the   application,   the appellant  moved the Delhi High Court under Art. 227 of  the Constitution-  and  section  482 of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1973 for setting aside the order passed  by  the Special  Judge and quashing the proceeding.  On September  1 0,  1976 the High Court dismissed the  appellant’s  petition and  upheld  the order of the Special  Judge  rejecting  the prayer for quashing the proceeding. Mr.  A. K. Sen appearing for the appellant has  not  pressed the ground of want of sanction and has confined his argument to  the other ground.  His contention is that once a  pardon has  be-en  tendered  to  a  person  at  the  stage  of  the investigation   under  section  337(1)  of  the  Code,   the provision  of  section 8(1) of the, Criminal  Law  Amendment Act,  1952 empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance  of offences  without  the accused being committed  to  him  for trial,  ceases to apply and the charge sheet in such a  case must  be filed before a competent magistrate.  It is  argued that  in  such  a  case  letting  the  Special  Judge   take cognizance of the offence under section 8(1) of the Criminal Law  Amendment Act would make the  provision  discriminatory

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

offending  Article 14 of the Constitution.  The argument  is built  on sub-section (2B) of section 337 of the Code  under which the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence has to examine  the approver as a witness before sending  the  case for trial to the Court of the Special Judge. To  test this argument we may refer briefly to the  relevant provisions of the Code. Section  3  3 7 ( 1 ) of  the  Code provides that in the case of any offence specified  therein, the  District  Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate,  a  Sub- Divisional  Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first  class may  at any stage of the investigation or enquiry  into,  or the  trial of the offence may tender a pardon to any  person supposed to have been concerned in the offence in any way on condition  of his making a full an(] true disclosure of  the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative  to the offence.  Sub-section. (2) of the section requires 176 every  person  accepting  a tender.  of  pardon  under  this section  to  be examined as a witness in the  Court  of  the Magistrate  taking  cognizance  of the offence  and  in  the subsequent  trial,  if any.  Under subsection (2A)  where  a person has accepted a tender of pardon and has been examined under  sub-section  (2),  the  Magistrate  before  whom  the proceedings  are pending if he finds reasonable grounds  for believing  that  the accused is guilty of an  offence  shall commit him for trial to the Court of Sessions or, High Court as the case may be.  Subsection (2B) on which the  appellant relies reads:               "In every case where the offence is punishable               under  section 161 or section 165  or  section               165A  of the Indian Penal Code or  sub-section               (2)   of  section  5  of  the  Prevention   of               Corruption  Act, 1947, and where a person  has               accepted  a.  tender of pardon  and  has  been               examined   under   sub-section   (2),    then,               notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-               section  (2A),  a  Magistrate  shall,  without               making any further inquiry, send the case  for               trial  to  the  Court  of  the  Special  Judge               appointed  under  the Criminal  Law  Amendment               Act, 1952." Thus  under  subsection  (2B)  in the  case  of  an  offence mentioned in them subsection the Magistrate has to send  the case  for  trial to the Court of the Special  Judge  without making   any  further  inquiry  as  to  whether  there   are reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  the  accused   is guilty,. but after the approved has been examined under sub- section (2). From  these provisions it would appear that where  a  person has.  accepted a tender of pardon under sub-section  (1)  of section  337  at  the  stage  of  investigation  in  a  case involving any of the offences specified in sub-section (2B), the  prosecution  can file the charge sheet  either  in  the court of a competent Magistrate or before the Special  Judge who,  under section 8(1) of,the Criminal Law Amendment  Act, 1952  has, power to take cognizance of the  offence  without the  accused being committed to him for trial.   It  follows that if the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence,  the approver will have to bet examined as a witness twice,  once in the court of the Magistrate and again in the court of the Special  Judge to, whom the Magistrate has to send the  case for trial, but if the charge sheet is filed directly in  the court  of  the Special Judge, he can be examined  once  only before. the Special Judge.  This means that in a case  where the charge sheet is filed in the court of a Magistrate,  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

accused gets an opportunity of, having the evidence of  the, approver at the trial tested against what he had said before the Magistrate the accused is denied this opportunity  where the charge sheet is filed in the court of the Special Judge. Whether the accused will get the advantage of the  procedure which according to the appellant is more, beneficial to  the accused thus depends on the court in which the proceeding is initiated,  and, it is contended, if the choice of forum  is left  to the prosecution, it will result in  discrimination. Mr. Sen submits that the only way to avoid this position  is to  read subsection (1), (2) and (2B) of section 337 of  the Code  and  section 8(1) of the Criminal Law  Amendment  Act, 1952 together and to construe them in a way to require  that in  every  case where an accomplice is granted  pardon,  the charge sheet must be filed in the court of a Magistrate. 177 We  are unable to accept the contention.  It is  clear  from the  scheme of section 337 that what is required is  that  a person who accepts a tender of pardon must be examined as  a witness at the different stages of tile proceeding.   Where, however,  a Special Judge takes cognizance of the case,  the occasion for examining the approver as a witness arises only once.   It  is true that in such a case there would  be  no, previous evidence of the approver against which his evidence at  the  trial  could  be  tested,  which  would  have  been available to the accused had the, proceeding been  initiated in  the court of a Magistrate who under subsection  (2B)  of section  337  of the Code is required to send  the  case  to trial  to the special Judge, after examining  the  approver. But  we do not find anything in sub-section (2B) of  section 337  to suggest that it affects in any way the  jurisdiction of  the  Special  Judge to take  cognizance  of  an  offence without the accused being committed to him for trial.   Sub- section  (2B)  was  inserted  in  section  337  in  1955  by Amendment  Act 26 of 1955.  If by enacting sub-section  (2B) in 1955 the legislature sought to curb the power even to the Special Judge by ,section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, there is no reason why the legislature should not have  expressed its intention clearly.  Also, the-fact  that the  approver’s  evidence  cannot  be  tested  against   any previous statement does not seem to us to make any  material difference  to  the detriment of the  accused  transgressing Article  14 of the Constitution.  The special Judge, in  any case  will have to apply the well established tests for  the appreciation  of the accomplice’s evidence.  This  Court  in Maganlal  Chhagganlal (P) Ltd.  V. Municipal Corporation  of Greater Bombay and others(1) held that mere availability  of two procedures would not justify the quashing of a provision as being violative of Article 14 and that "what is necessary to attract the inhibition of the Article is that there  must be  substantial and qualitative difference between  the  two procedure  so  that  one is really  and  substantially  more drastic  and  prejudicial  than the, other. .  .  "  In  our opinion, there is no such qualitative difference in the  two procedures whither a witness is examined-once or twice  does not in our opinion make any such substantial difference here that one of them could be described as more drastic than the other.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed. M.R. Appeal dismissed. (1,) [1975] 1 S.C.R. I 178