http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12  

PETITIONER: IQBAL SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. GURDAS SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/09/1975

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR   27            1976 SCR  (1) 884  1976 SCC  (3) 284  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC 271  (10)  C          1991 SC2001  (22,26)

ACT:      Representation of  the People  Act  (43  of  1951),  s. 123(1)-Corrupt  practice   of   bribery-Gratification’   and ’Bargaining for votes’, what amounts to.

HEADNOTE:      In the  election to  Parliament from  a constituency in Punjab the  respondent was  declared elected.  The appellant filed an election petition alleging, inter alia, (i) that at least 15,000  invalid and  void votes  had been included and counted in favour of the respondent, and (ii) that the Chief Minister of  Punjab, who  was the brother of the respondent, directed, (a)  the distribution to Harijans of large sums of money for construction of Dharamshalas, and (b) the issue of a  large  number  of  gun  licences,  as  gratification  for inducing voters to vote for the respondent and that thereby, the  corrupt   practice  of   bribery   under   s.   123(1), Representation of  the People  Act, 1951, was committed. The High Court dismissed the election petition      Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^      HELD: (1)  On the evidence, the High Court was right in holding that the appellant had not succeeded in establishing the allegation regarding the 15,000 votes. [889F]      (a) Rule  56 of  the  Conduct  of  Elections  Rules  as amended in 1971, provides that only a ballot paper which did not contain  both the  mark and the signature of the polling officer  would   be  invalid.   Even  then   it   does   not automatically become  invalid. If  the Returning Officer was satisifed that  the failure  to affix the stamp or signature was due  to the  fault of the polling officer but the ballot paper was itself genuine he could include it among the valid ballot papers,  because, under pressure of work, the polling officer might  have failed  either to affix the stamp or his signature. [887F-H]      (b) The  evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant is not consistent  as to the ground of invalidity of the ballot papers; as  to how  the number of 15,000 was arrived at; and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 12  

as to  whether they were counted in favour of the respondent or both the appellant and the respondent. [889E-F]      (c) There  cannot be  any hard  and fast rule as to the circumstances when  an order of recount would be permissible and it always depends upon the circumstances of the case. On the facts  of the  present case,  there is not the slightest justification for ordering a recount. [889G-H]      (2) In  the case  of  both  the  allegations  regarding Dharamshalas and  gun licences,  there was  no gratification offered and  there was  no bargaining  for votes,  and hence there was no corrupt practice. [896B]      (a) The  word ’gratification’  in s.  123(1) should  be deemed to  refer only  to cases  where a  gift  is  made  of something which gives a material advantage to the recipient. There  is  a  distinction  between  licences  which  give  a material advantage  and those  which do  not. For example, a licence in  a prohibition  area to deal in liqueur confers a material  advantage  on  the  licensee,  whereas  a  licence enabling a  person to  imbibe liqueur  in such an area gives him no  material advantage.  It is  only the  grant  of  the former that might amount to gratification. Arms licence is a licence for  regulatory purposes.  Its  possession  give  no material advantage to its possessor. [893C-G]      (b) To constitute the corrupt practice of bribery under s. 123(1)  there must  be a bargain for votes. But a bargain for the  purposes of  the section  does not  mean  that  the candidate or  his agent makes an offer and the voter accepts it in  the sense  that  he  promises  to  vote.  It  is  not necessary that the 885 voter should say that he would vote and that thereafter only the candidate  or his  agent should  pay the  money.  It  is enough if  the candidate  or his  agent makes  the  gift  or promise on that condition. [889G-890A]      (c) In  the present  case, the State Government had set apart a  sum of  Rs. 50 lacs for the purpose of construction of Dharamshalas  for Harijans. A sum of Rs. 3 lacs was spent towards the  end of  the financial  year, in the district in which  this   particular  parliamentary   constituency   was situate. Punjab  has 11  districts and it cannot, therefore, be said that, the amount is disproportionately large. [889H- 890A]      (d) The  anxiety to  spend the money towards the end of financial year is also natural. [890A-B]      (e) It may not be setting up a high standard and it may be very  desirable that  whatever is  done  for  the  people should be done by persons in authority throughout the period of their  office and  not when election time is approaching. But where a large section of the people get an amentiy which they ought,  in any case to get, and which they got probably a little more easily because it was election time, it cannot be said  that the  person in  authority making a promise and holding out  that he  would carry out many remedial measures to benefit the people was resorting to bribery or bargaining for votes. [890B-D]      (f) The  issue of  the unusually  large number  of  gun licences may  be an  improper use of power. But, there is no evidence regarding  bargaining for  votes by  the promise of gun licences. [890D-G, 893G]      (g) Maganlal Bagdi v. Hari Vishnu Kamath, 13 E.L.R. 205 Khadar Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder & Ors. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 775, Ghasi  Ram v.  Dal Singh  [1968] 3  S.C.R.  102,  Radha Krsihna Shukla  v.  Tara  Chand  Maheshwar  12  E.L.R.  276, amirchand v.  Surendra Lal  Dha E.L.R. 57, Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand & Anr. [1968] 3 S.C.R. 111,Bhanu Kumar v. Mohan

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 12  

Lal [1971] 3 S.C.R. 522, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1172 of 1973.      From the  Judgment and Order dated the 10th April, 1973 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Election Petition No. 1 of 1971.      Hardayal Hardy,  Bishamber Lal  and Mrs.  Indira Sahni, for the appellant.      H. L.  Sibal,  Kapil  Sibal,  P.  H.  Parekh,  Mrs.  S. Bhandare, Miss  Manju Jaitley and S. S. Kang, for respondent No. 1.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-      ALAGIRISWAMI, J. This appeal relates to the election to the Parliament  from the Fazilka constituency in Punjab held on 5th  March 1971. The Parliamentary constituency consisted of  eight   assembly  constituencies   of  Malout,  Muktsar, Gidderbha, Fazilka,  Jalalabad, Abohar,  Lambi and Faridkot. The votes  were counted  on 10th  and 11th  of March at five different places.  The counting  of the  votes of the Malout Assembly  constituency   was  held  on  10th  March  by  Mr. Aggarwal,  Assistant   Returning  Officer,  of  Muktsar  and Gidderbha on  10th and  11th by  Mr. Sayal,  of Fazilka  and Jalalabad on  the 10th and 11th by Mr. Mahajan, of Lambi and Abohar on the 10th and 11th 886 by Mr.  Ram Lal  and of  Faridkot on  the 11th  by Mr. Garg. 6,409 votes were declared invalid and the 1st respondent was declared  elected   having  secured   1,52,677  votes.   The appellant obtained  1,47,354 votes.  There  were  six  other candidates about whom it is not necessary to refer.      A number  of allegations  were  made  in  the  election petition about  many irregularities  that took  place on the date of the polling. It is not necessary to refer to them as the issues  concerned with them were not pressed even before the High  Court.  Only  two  issues,  issue  1  and  4  were considered by  the High Court and those are the issues urged before us also. They are:           "1.  Whether the  respondent No.  1 is  guilty  of                corrupt practices  specified in paras 19, 20,                22 and  23 and  26  to  29  of  the  election                petition as  amended ?  If so,  what  is  the                effect ?           4.   Whether 15000  ballot-papers were invalid and                were wrongly polled and counted ? If so, with                what effect ?" It is  also necessary  to refer  to issues  3 and 6 for they have some relevance in discussing issues 1 and 4:           "3.  Whether the  petitioner is  entitled  to  the                scrutiny of the ballot-papers alleged to have                been illegally  rejected  and  those  of  the                respondent alleged  to  have  been  illegally                accepted and on that account is entitled to a                recount?           6.   Whether the allegations made in para 7 of the                petition are  correct, and if so, what is the                effect ?" As issue  6 was  not  pressed  the  various  allegations  of irregularities at the time of polling including collusion by Polling Officers and consequent false voting and stuffing of ballot boxes  could not  be considered.  As issue  3 was not pressed recount  cannot be  asked for  on the  allegation of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 12  

wrong counting  of votes  that is that the appellant’s votes were wrongly  rejected and  the 1st  respondent’s votes were wrongly accepted.      With regard  to issue 1 the allegation was that corrupt practice of bribery was committed in the interest of the 1st respondent by  his brother Shri Parkash Singh Badal, who was at that  time the Chief Minister of Punjab. One of the items of bribery  alleged  was  that  large  sums  of  money  were distributed to Harijans in the form of contributions towards construction of  Dharamshalas for  the purpose  of  inducing them to  vote in  favour of  the 1st  respondent. The second allegation was  that Shri  Parkash Singh  Badal directed Mr. Sayal, one  of the  Assistant Returning  Officers, to  issue 3,304 gun  licences for  furthering the prospects of the 1st respondent’s election  and that this was a gratification for inducing the  electors  to  vote  for  the  1st  respondent. Similarly, Mr.  O.  P.  Garg,  another  Assistant  Returning Officer was  alleged to  have issued 485 gun licences in the months of February and March, 1971. Shri Parkash Singh Badal was alleged  to have  arranged and  addressed  a  number  of meetings in various 887 villages promising  to help  the voters in many ways if they would  vote  for  his  brother.  There  were  certain  other allegations of corrupt practices but the only ones canvassed before us  were those relating to gun licences and grants in respect of construction of Dharamshalas to Harijans.      The allegations  which relate  to issue  4, as found in the petition,  were that  at least  15,000 invalid  and void votes had  been  included  and  counted  in  favour  of  the returned candidate,  which should have been rejected and not counted at  all and  that in addition at least 3,000 invalid ballot papers  which should have been rejected under rule 56 had been  wrongly counted  as valid  votes in  favour of the returned candidate. The distinction between 15,000 and 3,000 votes was  this: The  15,000  ballot  papers  were  said  to consist of (i) spurious ballot papers (ii) ballot papers not bearing serial  number or  design authorised  for use at the particular polling  stations, and  (iii) ballot  papers  not bearing booth marks and the full signatures of the Presiding Officer. The  3,000 ballot  papers were said to have been so marked as  to render it doubtful to which candidate the vote is given,  or the  ballot papers  bore marks with instrument other than  the one  supplied for  the  purpose,  or  ballot papers marked  in favour of more than one candidate had been wrongly counted  in favour  of the  returned  candidate.  No evidence in  fact was let in respect of the 3,000 votes. The attack was  concentrated on  the  15,000  invalid  and  void votes. In  view of  issues 3 and 6 having been given up, the effect of  which we  have  earlier  referred  to,  the  only question that  arises is  whether these  15,000 votes should not have  been counted  at all, whether for the appellant or for the  1st respondent  on the basis that they bore neither the stamp nor the signature of the Polling Officer.      The whole  of the evidence let in was of a uniform type that a number of ballot papers did not bear the signature of the Polling  Officer or  the stamp  of the booth. Indeed the allegation in  the petition  on this point is "ballot papers not bearing booth marks and full signatures of the Presiding Officer were wrongly counted as valid votes". It is not said that the  ballot  papers  bore  neither  the  mark  nor  the signature of  the Presiding  Officer. The  rule in question, rule No.  56, was  amended in  1971 providing  that  only  a ballot paper  which  did  not  contain  both  the  mark  and signature would be deemed invalid but even then it is not as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 12  

though  it   automatically  became  invalid.  The  Returning Officer had  to scrutinise  it in  order to  see whether the ballot paper  was a genuine ballot paper. This provision was apparently put in because under pressure of work the Polling Officer might  have failed  either to affix the stamp or his signatur. If  the Returning  Officer was  satisfied that the failure to  affix the  stamp or the signature was due to the fault of the Polling Officer but the ballot paper was itself genuine he  could include  it among the valid ballot papers. Therefore, merely  by giving evidence that the ballot papers did not  contain both  the signature  and the stamp it would not be established that the ballot paper concerned was not a valid ballot  paper. But  that is  the only type of evidence which has been let in.      Apart from this the number 15,000 seems to be a case of wild guess.  The appellant’s  voting agents  were alleged to have kept a note 888 of the number of invalid ballot papers that they had noticed but none  was produced.  Some of  the counting  agents  gave evidence that  they brought  it to  the notice  of the chief counting agent  who sat on the dais along with the Assistant Returning Officer  at the  time of the counting. Neither the counting agents  nor the chief counting agent had complained in  writing  to  the  Assistant  Returning  Officer.  It  is impossible to  believe that  if there were as many as 15,000 invalid ballot  papers, which  amount to  about two thousand from every  assembly constituency they would have kept quiet without raising  hell. On  both  the  days  of  counting  an observer deputed by the Election Commissioner had gone round all the  places where  the votes  were counted.  No  serious infirmities were  pointed out  to him.  One  or  two  ballot papers which  did not  bear  either  the  signature  of  the Polling Officer  or the  stamp were shown to him only in the Lambi constituency  and he  scrutinised them  and found that the serial  numbers tallied and he was satisfied about their genuineness. He  as well  as the various Assistant Returning Officers had  offered that  if there were any complaints the candidates could  ask for  a recheck.  No such  recheck  was asked for. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the recheck offer  meant only  a check  on whether the number of votes had  been correctly  added. We  find it  impossible to accept this suggestion. The reference to the checking in the observer’s  report   shows  that  the  checking  meant  also scrutiny as  to whether  the ballot  paper was signed by the Presiding Officer.  The Returning Officer has also mentioned in his  order on the application made by the appellant for a recount that  he was  asked to  specify as to whether in any assembly segment  he or  any of his agents had asked for the recheck or  pointed out  any discrepancy  in the figures and that the  appellant had  failed to  cite any  such  specific instance, and that he was also asked as to whether he wanted the recounting  of any  specific  assembly  segment  but  he reiterated that he wanted a total recount.      Four of  the Assistant  Returning Officers,  Mr. Sayal, Mr. Ram  Lal, Mr.  Garg and  Mr. Aggarwal have been examined and they  did not  support the  appellant’s case  that there were such a large number of invalid ballot papers or that it was brought  to their  notice even  orally. Mr. Ram Lal said that at  the most  there might  be 200 such votes which were objected to; that is in respect of the two constituencies in which he  was the  Assistant Returning  Officer. This  would mean that  there might  have been about one thousand invalid ballot papers at the most and we have already mentioned that 6,409 votes  had been  declared invalid.  We do not know how

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 12  

many of them were ballot papers which did not contain either the signature or the stamp.      The way the appellant’s case has been developed is also very interesting.  We have  pointed out  that votes  of four constituencies were  counted on  the 10th  and of four other constituencies on  the 11th. The first move of the appellant was to  send a  telegram on  the 11th. By that time half the number of votes had been counted and probably more than half because we  do not  know  at  what  time  on  the  11th  the telegram, Ex.  B-2 was  sent. Even assuming that nearly half the number  of votes had been counted the appellant probably had an  inkling of the possibility of his being defeated. In this telegram he re- 889 ferred to about fifteen thousand ballot papers which did not contain either the signature of the Presiding Officer or the Polling Officer of the polling station and booth numbers. He also mentioned  that about  six thousand three hundred votes had been  wrongly rejected.  Apparently he  wanted to  imply that they  would otherwise  have gone in his favour. But his case of  six thousand votes which ought to have gone to him, but had  been wrongly rejected, had been completely given up later. Another  telegram sent  on the  13th March  1971  was similar to the telegram sent on the 11th. A similar telegram was sent  by the  appellant to  the General Secretary of the Congress Party  as also  the  Prime  Minister.  But  in  the petition given to the Returning Officer asking for a recount on the  same day  the complaint  was that some of the ballot papers did  not bear  the official  stamp on  their back  as provided by  rules and  they  seem  to  have  been  smuggled illegally and  the  number  given  in  "thousands".  Another complaint was  that some  of the  ballot papers did not bear the signatures  of the  Presiding Officer on the back, which were also  "in thousands"  and even more than five thousand. So here we do not find the allegation that the ballot papers contained neither  the  signature  nor  the  stamp.  In  his petition before  the Election  Commission asking for recount he mentioned  fifteen thousand  ballot papers as having been found which  bore no  distinction mark  or signature  of the Presiding Officer.  He also  mentioned the rejection of more than 6,000  votes. As  we have already pointed out, there is absolutely nothing  on record  to show how the figure 15,000 was arrived  at.  We  are,  therefore,  satisfied  that  the mention about  15,000 votes, 3,000 votes and 6,000 votes are only steps  in the  attempt to  secure a recount at any cost and to  fish for  evidence. As  we have already pointed out, the allegation in the petition was that 15,000 invalid votes were counted  in favour of the returned candidate but in the evidence as  well as  the arguments it was only claimed that there were  15,000 invalid ballot papers which were counted. There is  nothing to  show how  many of those 15,000 went to the appellant  and how many to the 1st respondent. Indeed as we have earlier explained what was asked for was elimination of the  15,000 votes altogether from the counting. The whole thing is  mere kite  flying. We  are therefore, in agreement with the  learned Judge of the High Court that the appellant has not succeeded in establishing the allegations covered by issue No. 4.      There are  a large number of decisions of this Court on the question  regarding  the  circumstances  under  which  a recount can  be ordered. It has been recognised in all those decisions that  there can never be any hard and fast rule as to the  circumstances when  an order  of  recount  would  be permissible  and   should  always   be  dependent  upon  the circumstances of  the case.  We do not therefore consider it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 12  

necessary to  refer to any of those decisions. Suffice it to say that  the facts  of this  case do  not  leave  even  the slighest justification for ordering a recount.      Now we  come to the question corrupt practice. We shall first of  all  deal  with  the  grant  for  construction  of Dharamshalas for  Harijans. The Punjab Government appears to have set apart a sum of Rs. 50,00,000 for this very purpose. All that  is established  is that  a sum of Rs. 3,00,000 was spent towards the end of the official 890 financial year 1970-71 in the district in which this Fazilka Parliamentary  Consituency   is  situate.   Punjab  has   11 districts and  it cannot  therefore be said that this sum is disproportionately large.  The anxiety  to spend  the  money towards the  end of  the financial  year is also natural. If the end  of the financial year also happens to be the period when an  election is  going on  parties in  power  naturally bestir themselves  to show  that they  are active in helping the people  to get  what they want. The election time is the time when  people in  power as  well as ordinary politicians are active  in trying  to show that they are out to help the people. They  address meetings  and hold  out all  sorts  of promises. Where a large section of the people are concerned, who only  get an amenity which they ought in any case to get and which  they get probably a little more easily because it happens to  be election  time, it  cannot be  said that  the person in authority making that promise and holding out that he would  carry out  many remedial  measures to  benefit the people was  resorting to bribery or bargaining for votes. It may not amount to setting up a very high standard and it may be very  desirable that  whatever is  done  for  the  people should be done by persons in authority throughout the period of their  office. But  they naturally  are  more  active  at election time  than other  times. That  cannot  be  said  to amount to corruption.      We then  come to  the question  of gun licences. It has been pointed out that during the months of January, February and March  1971 Mr.  Sayal had issued 3,304 gun licences and Mr. Garg  485 gun  licences, the usual number in an ordinary year being  about 300.  When every  explanation  offered  on behalf of  the officials  is taken  into consideration,  the fact remains  that an unusually large number of gun licences had been issued during that period. We are satisfied that to some extent  at least this amounts to improper use of power. We do not say that this is an abuse or misuse. In fact there is evidence  that the  proper procedure has been followed in these cases.  In one  case, for  instance,  a  man  who  had applied for  a gun  licence long  time back  approached  the Chief Minister  when he  had come  to the  village and he at once told  the District  Magistrate  and  the  man  got  his licence. We  can see  nothing improper in that instance. But the gun  licences themselves are issued by the officials and not by  the Chief  Minister. It  also appears  that a  large number of  relatives of  the Chief  Minister as  well as his Mukhtiar-e-Aam, his  maternal uncle,  and even  the returned candidate had  taken interest  in the issue of gun licences. It was  sought to  be proved  that the  Chief  Minister  had addressed a  number  of  meetings  promising  to  issue  gun licences if  they would  vote for his brother. But there was no allegation  in the  election  petition  relating  to  the meetings he  addressed or his having held out the promise in those meetings  that he  would issue  gun  licences  if  the people voted for his brother. The 1st respondent himself not having had  notice of the specific allegation of meetings at which such  promises were  held out  we  have  left  out  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 12  

consideration the  evidence regarding  the meetings  and the promises held out by the Chief Minister in those meetings as inadmissible.      Assuming that  it was  the returned  candidate  or  his agent that  had held  out an  inducement to get gun licences issued for people who vote 891 for the  returned candidate, does it amount to bribery under s. 123(1)  of the Representation of the People Act ? Bribery is defined thus:      "123(1)   ’Bribery’, that is to say,-           (A)  any gift,  offer or promise by a candidate or      his agent  or by any other person with the consent of a      candidate or  his election  agent of any gratification,      to any person  whomsoever, with the object, directly or      indirectly of in ducing-           (a) ........................           (b) an  elector to  vote or refrain from voting at      an election, or as a reward to-           (i)..........................           (ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from      voting;           (B) the  receipt of  or agreement  to receive, any      gratification, whether as a motive or a reward-           (a)..........................           (b) by  any person  whomsoever for  himself or any      other person  for voting  or refraining from voting, or      inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or      refrain from  voting, or  any candidate  to withdraw or      not to withdraw his candidature.           Explanation.-For the  purposes of  this clause the      term gratification’  is  not  restricted  to  pecuniary      gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and      it includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of      employment for  reward but  it  does  not  include  the      payment of  any expenses  bona fide incurred at, or for      the purpose  of any  election and  duly entered  in the      account of  election expenses  referred to  in  section      78." In order  to understand  the exact  implication of  the word ’gratification’ it may be useful to refer to another statute which has  been in  force for  over a  century, that is, the Indian  Penal  Code  as  most  legislations  tend  to  folow established precedents.  In section  161 of  the Code, which deals with bribery, one of the explanations is as follows:           "Gratification." The  word "gratification"  is not      restricted   to    pecuniary   gratification,   or   to      gratification estimaable in money." Illustration (a) to the section is as follows:           "(a) A,  a munsif,  obtains from  Z, a  banker,  a      situation in Z’s bank for A’s brother, as a reward to A      for deciding  a cause  in favour  of Z. A has committed      the offence defined in this section." We may  also quote  s. 171-B  of the Code and s. 171-E which find  a  place  in  the  Chapter  of  Offences  Relating  to Elections, which was inserted in the Code in the year 1920: 892      "171-B. (1) whoever-      (i) gives a gratification to any person with the object of  inducing  him  or  any  other  person  to  exercise  any electoral right  or  of  rewarding  any  person  for  having exercised any such right; or      (ii) accepts either for himself or for any other person any gratification  as a  reward to exercising any such right or for  inducing or attempting to induce any other person to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 12  

exercise any such right, commits the offence of bribery:      Provided that  a declaration  of  public  policy  or  a promise of  public action shall not be an offence under this section.      (2) A  person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers, or attempts  to procure,  a gratification shall be deemed to give a gratification.      (3) A  person  who  obtains  or  agrees  to  accept  or attempts to obtain a gratification shall be deemed to accept a gratification, and a person who accepts a gratification as a motive  for doing  what he  does not intend to do, or as a reward for  doing what  he has  not done, shall be deemed to have accepted the gratification as a reward."      "171-E. Whoever commits the offence of bribery shall be punished with  imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.      Provided that  bribery by  treating shall  be  punished with fine only.      Explanation.-"Treating"  means  that  form  of  bribery where   the   gratification   consists   in   food,   drink, entertainment, or provision." It would  be noticed  that the Explanation to section 123(1) of the  Representation of the People Act and the Explanation to  section  161  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  relating  to gratification are  similar. In  addition, the Representation of the  People Act  refers to all forms of entertainment and all forms  of employment  for  reward.  The  employment  for reward is  covered by  illustration (a)  to s.  161  of  the Indian Penal Code. The words "all forms of entertainment" in the Explanation  to section  123(1) of the Representation of the People Act apparently refer to offence of treating found in s.  171-E of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.  When  Parliament enacted   the    provision   regarding    bribery   in   the Representation of  the People  Act it should have had before it the  comparable provisions in the Penal Code. It is to be noticed that the giving of any gratification with the object of inducing  the receiver  or any other person to vote is an offence while acceptance of gratification by a person either for himself  or for  any other  person or  for inducing  any other person to vote is an offence. In other words giving is an offence  if paid  to the  voter or  such  giving  induces another person  to vote. It is not giving a gratification in order that  he may  induce another person to vote that is an offence whereas 893 receipt of a gratification in order to induce another person to vote  is an  offence.  The  reason  for  the  distinction between the  provision in s. 123(1) (A) and 123(1) (B) seems to be  this: In  the  former  case  a  person  standing  for election has  necessarily to have a number of people to work for him  and he  may have  to bear  their expenses.  That by itself should  not be  deemed to  be bribery.  In the latter case when  a person  takes money  offering to  induce  other people, of  course, induce  by wrong  means, to vote for the person who  pays him  the money he is really poking his nose into something which is no business of his and that practice should be  discouraged. See  Kalya Singh’s  case(1) and  our judgment  in   Harisingh  Pratapsingh   Chawda  v.  Popatlal Mulshanker Joshi  & Ors.(2)  So far  as we  are aware it has never been  held that  the issue of a gun licence amounts to bribery under  s. 171-B.  We are  of opinion  that the  word ’gratification’ should  be deemed  to refer  only  to  cases where a  gift is  made of  something which  gives a material advantage to  the recipient. There is hardly any need to say

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 12  

that giving of anything whose value is estimable in money is bribery. A  gun licence  gives no  material advantage to its recipient. It  might gratify  his sense  of importance if he has a  gun licence  in a village where nobody else has a gun licence. So  might the  conferment of  an honour  like Padma Bhushan. A  praise from  a high  quarter might  gratify  the sence of vanity of a person. But the word ’gratification’ as used in  s. 123(1) does not refer to such gratifications any more than  in s.  171-B of the Indian Penal Code. Taking the case of  licences: Possibly  the grant  of a  licence  which enables a  man to  do some  business and thus make money may confer a material advantage to him. We are not here speaking of licences  which are  insisted upon  merely for regulatory purposes like  municipal licences.  But a licence given to a person to  deal in  fertilizers  might  confer  a  financial advantage to  that person;  so might an import licence or an export licence.  Such  licences  differ  from  licences  for regulatory  purposes.   Arms  licence   is  a   licence  for regulatory  purposes.   Its  possession  gives  no  material advantage to its possessor. A licence in a prohibition  area to deal  in liqueur might confer a material advantage to the licensee. But  a licence enabling a person to imbibe liqueur in such  area gives the licensee no material advantage. Such a licence  is only regulatory. We must therefore distinguish between various  kinds of  licences and  hold that  where  a licence gives a material advantage to the licensee the grant of such  licences amounts  to a gratification. In that sense the  grant   of  gun  licences  to  voters  in  the  Fazilka Constituency would  not amount to bribery. We have discussed this question  on the  basis that  the authority  to grant a licence is  the returned  candidate or his brother the Chief Minister.      We have  already pointed  out that there is no evidence regarding bargaining for votes by promise of gun licences. A bargain for  the purposes of this section does not mean that the candidate  or his  agent makes  an offer  and the  voter accepts it  in the  sense that  he promises  to vote.  It is enough if  the candidate  or his  agent makes  the  gift  or promise on  that condition. If a candidate or his agent pays money to  a voter  saying that  he wants him to vote it is a bargain for the pur- 894 poses of  this section.  It is  not necessary that the voter should say  that he  would vote and thereafter the candidate or his  agent should  pay the money. Even in such a case the voter after receiving the money might or might not vote.      The law  regarding bribery  in elections in our country has been  discussed in  various decisions  of this Court. In Maganlal  Bagdi  v.  Hari  Vishnu  Kamath(1)  the  candidate offered to construct a well in a village if the voters voted for him  and not  for the  rival  candidate  and  money  was actually deposited  for this  purpose and  was to  await the result of  the election.  It was held that there was a clear bargain for votes. In Khader Sheriff v. Munnuswami Gounder & Ors.(2)it  was  observed  by  this  Court  that  it  may  be meritorious to  make a donation for a charitable purpose but on the  eve of  an election  such a  gift  may  be  open  to construction that  it was  made with the intention of buying votes. In Ghasi Ram v.Dal Singh(3) it was held that the gift must be  proved to have a direct or indirect connection with votes and  this must admit of no other reasonable excuse. In Radha Krishna  Shukla v.  Tara  Chand  Maheshwar(4)  general promises by  Ministers to  redress certain public grievances or to  erect certain  public amenities  like  hospitals,  if elected, were  held not  to amount to corrupt practice. They

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 12  

were treated  as  promises  of  general  public  action.  In Amirchand v.  Surendra Lal Jha(5) it was laid down that if a Minister redresses  the grievances  of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders them any help, on the eve of an  election, it  was not  corrupt practice unless he had obtained promises  from the voters in return, as a condition for their  help. The  promise to  grant gun  licences  would really amount to a redressal of the grievances of a class of the public  or rendering them any help. There is no evidence here of  obtaining a  promise from the voters in return. The observations made  in Ghasi Ram’s case (supra) regarding the action taken by a Minister which helps a class of the public may be noticed in this connection:           "The position  of a  Minister is  difficult. It is      obvious that  he cannot  cease  to  function  when  his      election is  due. He  must of  necessity attend  to the      grievances, otherwise he must fail. He must improve the      image of  his  administration  before  the  public.  If      everyone of  his official  acts done bona fide is to be      construed against him and an ulterior motive is spelled      out of  them, the  administration must necessarily come      to  a  standstill.  The  State  of  Haryana  came  into      existence on  November 1, 1966. With an election in the      near future,  the political  party had  to do acts of a      public nature.  The grant  of discretionary grants were      parts  of   the  general  scheme  to  better  community      development  projects   and  to  remove  the  immediate      grievances of  the public. The money was required to be      spent in  about 3  months’  time.  The  action  of  the      Minister had  often the  concurrence and recommendation      of his subordinate staff. It is for this reason 895      that the  orders about the improvement of the supply of      waters were  not pressed.  They were incapable of being      construed  against  the  first  respondent.  Therefore,      emphasis was placed upon the distribution of money. The      money was not distributed among the voters directly but      was given to Panchayats and the public at large. It was      to be  used for the good of those for and those against      the candidate.  No doubt they had the effect of pushinf      forward his  claims but  that was inevitable even if no      money was  spent, but  good administration  changed the      people’s condition.  We cannot,  therefore,  hold  that      there was  any corrupt  practice.  If  there  was  good      evidence  that   the  Minister  bargained  directly  or      indirectly  for   votes  the  result  might  have  been      different but there was no such evidence." The issue  for decision  in Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand & Anr.(1) was  similar to  the case  here in  respect  of  the grants for  Dharamshalas for  Harijans. It was held that the action of  the Minister  could not  be construed against her and that it was done in the ordinary course of her duties as Minister and  there was no evidence that it was, directly or indirectly, part  of a  bargain with  the voters.  In  Bhanu Kumar v. Mohan Lal(2) it was alleged that the Chief Minister by ordering  the covering of a nallah, the construction of a road, the installation of water taps and the grant of pattas to the  inhabitants of  a colony  for construction of houses had made  a bargain  with the  people  for  votes  and  thus committed corrupt  practice as  defined in  s. 123(1) of the Representation of  the People  Act. This  Court pointed  out that ordinarily  amelioration of grievances of the public is innocuous and cannot be construed against a candidate who is a Minister  but that  if there  is evidence to indicate that any candidate  at the election abused his power and position

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 12  

as a Minister in the Government by utilising public revenues for conferring advantage or benefit on a particular group of people for  the purpose  of obtaining their votes, different considerations will arise and it may be held to be a corrupt practice within  the meaning  of s.  123(1). In that case it was held  that in  all the  instances  relied  upon  by  the appellant the  evidence showed that there were long standing public grievances  and the  Government had from time to time made suggestions  and recommendations  for  redress  of  the grievances and  amelioration of  the condition of the people and that  it could  not be  said that on the eve of election there was  any sudden  or  spontaneous  outburst  of  public activity in the shape of 896 diverting money  to win  electors to  the side  of the Chief Minister by   throwing  baits or  giving them any particular and specially  favoured treatment.  These observations apply to the case of grants for Harijan dharamshalas.      We are  therefore saisfied  that the  case of  both the allegations of  corrupt practice  there was no gratification offered, that there was no bargaining for votes in the sense we have  explained earlier  and these  issues must  also  be found against the appellant.      The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. V.P.S                                      Appeal dismissed. 897