REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5743-5745 OF 2005

Infosys Technologies Ltd.                                     ……  Appellant

   Vs.

Jupiter Infosys Ltd. & Anr.          ……  Respondents  

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, J.  

These three appeals by special leave are directed against  

the order dated September 9, 2004 passed by Intellectual Property  

Appellate Board (for short, ‘IPAB’) whereby it ordered the removal of  

appellant’s mark ‘Infosys’ from the register of trade marks in respect  

of  computer  stationery,  computer  manuals,  printed  matter  for  

computer,  instructional  and teaching materials,  computer  hardware  

and peripherals and machine and machine tools.

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2. The  appellant  is  Infosys  Technologies  Limited.   It  was  

incorporated and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 on July  

2,  1981  in  the  name  of  Infosys  Consultants  Private  Limited.  The  

appellant got the trade mark ‘Infosys’ registered in  1987 in classes  

16 and 9   in connection with computer stationery, computer manuals,  

printed  manual  for  computer  instruction  and  teaching  materials;  

computer  hardwares,  computer  interface,  computer  peripherals,  

electronics telex interface and  in 1988 in class 7 in connection with  

machine and machine  tools and motors (not for land vehicles). The  

particulars  with  reference  to  the  trade  mark  registered  by  the  

appellant are as follows :

Date Registration  No.

Class Goods

15.07.1987 475269 Class 16 Computer  Stationery,  Computer  Manuals,  Printed  Manuals  for  Computer  Instruction  and  teaching  materials  etc.

15.07.1987 475267 Class 09 Computer  Hardwares,  Computer  Interface,  Computer  Peripherals,  Electronics  Telex  Interface  and  all  goods  covered in class 09.

27.01.1988 484837 Class 07 Machine  and  Machine  Tools and Motors (not for  land vehicles) included in  class 07.

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3. On April  21,  1992,  the  name of  the  company—Infosys  

Consultants Pvt. Limited—was changed to Infosys Technologies Pvt.  

Ltd. and thereafter on June 2, 1992, the name was changed to the  

present name, i.e. Infosys Technologies Limited.

4. The first respondent is Jupiter Infosys  Limited. The first  

respondent  was  incorporated  and  registered  in  September  1978  

under the name  of Jupiter Agencies Pvt. Limited.  The name of the  

first respondent was changed to Jupiter Infosys (P) Limited in August,  

1995  and  now since  July,  2003,  the  name is  changed  to  Jupiter  

International Limited.  

5. On October 11, 1996, the appellant instituted a suit in the  

Calcutta High Court for perpetual injunction, inter alia, restraining the  

first respondent from infringing the appellant’s mark ‘Infosys’ by using  

the  mark  ‘Infosys’  by  itself  or  in  combination  with  other  marks  in  

course of its trade. The appellant also prayed for an interim order in  

the suit. On November 22, 1996, the Calcutta High Court by an ad-

interim  order  restrained  the  first  respondent  from  using  the  word  

‘Infosys’ in any manner in relation to the goods for the time being.  

The ad-interim order was confirmed on November 29, 1996.

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6. The appellant  having come to know of several instances  

of misuse of mark ‘Infosys’ also filed a writ petition (being writ petition  

no. 14214 of 2000) before the Calcutta High Court, inter alia, praying  

that the Registrar of Companies be restrained from registering the  

companies bearing the name ‘Infosys’. On September 13, 2000, the  

Calcutta High Court restrained the Department of Company Affairs  

and Registrar of Companies from incorporating any company bearing  

the name ‘Infosys’ without the permission of the appellant.

7. In  January  2001,  the  appellant  filed  yet  another  suit  

before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  for  permanent  

injunction restraining the first respondent from offering shares to the  

public as claimed in the Initial Public Offer (IPO) using ‘Infosys’. The  

Single Judge of the Madras High Court passed an interim restraint  

order  on  February  1,  2001  against  the  first  respondent.  The said  

order was confirmed on May 22, 2001 to remain operative till disposal  

of suit.

8. The first respondent then filed three separate applications  

before the Madras High Court, inter alia,  under Sections 46 and  56  

of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (‘the 1958 Act’).  In  

O.P.  No.  764  of  2001,  the  first  respondent  prayed  for  the  

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removal/rectification  of  the  entry  in  the  register  of  trade  mark  in  

respect of trade mark No. 475269 in Class 16 while in the other two  

applications being O.P. No. 765 of 2001 and O.P. No. 766 of 2001,  

the first respondent prayed for removal/rectification of trade mark No.  

475267  in  Class  9  and  trade  mark  No.  484837  in  Class  7  

respectively.  

9. The  appellant  opposed  these  applications  on  diverse  

grounds by filing counter affidavits.

10. On August 12, 2003, the Madras High Court framed the  

following issues:

a) Whether the mark applied for registration was used in  respect of the goods for which the mark was registered?

b) Whether the respondent had a bonafide intention to use  the mark applied for under section 18 of the Trade and  Merchandise Marks Act?

c) Whether the mark registered in favour of the respondent  is a service mark?

d) Whether there is a non use of registered trade mark by  the  respondent  for  a  period  of  over  5  years  and  1  month.

e) Whether  the  registered  trade  mark  is  disentitled  for  protection in a Court of Law under Section 11(e) of the  Trade and Merchandise Marks Act?

f) Whether  the  registered  trade  mark  has  lost  its  distinctiveness  and  is  liable  to  be  removed  under  section 32(c)?

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g) Whether  the  respondent  has  committed  fraud  while  obtaining registration of the mark? And

h) To what further relief?

 11. The 1958 Act was repealed by the Trade Marks Act, 1999  

(for short, ‘the 1999 Act’). In terms of Section 100 of the 1999 Act, the  

three petitions filed by the first respondent before the Madras High  

Court for rectification/removal of registered trade mark Nos. 475269,  

475267 and 484837 were transferred to the IPAB.

12. Some more facts may be noticed. The appellant filed yet  

another suit (being suit no. 2115 of 2002) before  Delhi High Court for  

infringement  of  trade  mark  and  passing  off  against  the  first  

respondent. In that suit, the appellant also made an application for  

grant of temporary injunction. The vacation Judge of the Delhi High  

Court,  on  December  27,  2002  passed  an  order  of  temporary  

injunction against the first respondent as follows:

“Notice for 24th March, 2003 before the Joint Registrar.

Heard.  Perused  the  averments  made in  the  suit  and  application which are duly supported by documents on record.  I am of the opinion that in case ex-parte ad-interim orders are  not  granted,  the  relief  claimed  itself  may  be  rendered  infructuous.  Accordingly  it  is  directed  that  pending  further  consideration of  the matter  after  notice for  the next  date of  hearing,  the  defendants  are restrained by themselves,  their  

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directors,  employees,  agents  and/or  others  acting  on  its  behalf, from using the trade mark/corporate name INFOSYS  or  any  other  mark/name  deceptively  similar  trade  mark  or  colourable imitation thereof as a mark and/or  corporate name  or  as  part  of  a  mark  and/or  business  name,  in  respect  of  goods  and/or  services,  for  publicity  on  propaganda,  on  websites and or in domain names, in any way,  whatsoever,  thereby  causing  infringement  of  the  registered  trade  mark  INFOSYS of  the plaintiff  in  isolation  or  in  combination  with  words/letters/numbers  their  advertisements  as  part  of  their  corporate name either in isolation or in goods and services, or  in or by way of any advertisement/publicity campaigns etc.

Compliance of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC within three  days.”  

The said suit was transferred to the Court of the Additional District  

Judge, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. In that suit, an affidavit came to be  

filed by the first respondent wherein it was stated that the name of  

the  company has been changed from Jupiter  Infosys  Limited   to  

Jupiter International Limited and a certificate to that effect has been  

issued by the Registrar of Companies, Kolkata under the Companies  

Act,  1956 and no dispute remains between the parties under the  

trade mark. The relevant statement made in the affidavit dated July  

14, 2003 (we were informed that the date of the affidavit is July 14,  

2004) reads as follows:

“4. That  in  the  meantime  the  defendant  has  already  changed the Trade Mark namely “Jupiter International  Ltd.” in place of “Jupiter Infosys Ltd.” The copy of the  incorporation on change of name   which was issued by  

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the registrar of the Companies are being marked and  annexed herewith as Annexure A.

5. That now there is no dispute between the plaintiff and  defendant under the Trade Mark.”

Based on this affidavit, the suit was partially decreed in favour of the  

appellant on November 10, 2004.

13. In  2007, however, the first respondent filed a suit in the  

Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi for setting aside the decree  

dated November 10, 2004. That suit is said to be pending.

14. The IPAB proceeded with the matter in light of the issues  

that were already framed by the High Court and heard the parties.  

The  IPAB  in  the  impugned  order  while  dealing  with  the  plea  of  

limitation raised by the appellant held that the first respondent was  

the appropriate aggrieved party in the matter in view of the fresh  

cause of action having arisen to the first respondent on filing of Civil  

Suit No. 71 of 2001 by the appellant before the Madras High Court.  

The  IPAB  in  the  impugned  order  held  that  the  trade  mark  Nos.  

475269, 475267 and 484837 have not been used by the appellant  

for more than a period of five years and one month and the appellant  

also failed to make out that it had been in manufacturing or trading  

of  the  goods  for  which  it  had  taken  Registration  Nos.  475269,  

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475267  and  484837.  Consequently,  the  IPAB  allowed  the  

applications made by the first respondent purportedly under Section  

46(1)(b) of the 1958 Act and directed the Registrar to remove these  

registrations from the register.

15. We  heard  Mr.  Akhil  Sibal,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant  and Mr.   Vaibhav Gaggar,  learned counsel  for  the  first  

respondent at quite some length.

16. Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned counsel for the appellant argued  

that  an  application  for  rectification,  whether  under  Section  46  or  

Section  56  of  the  1958  Act,   can  only  be preferred  by a  ‘person  

aggrieved’; the applicant must not only be a person aggrieved on the  

date  of  the  application  but  must  continue  to  remain  a  person  

aggrieved  until  such  time  as  the  rectification  application  is  finally  

decided.   He  contended that the first respondent is not shown to  

have ever traded or intended to trade in any goods covered by the  

appellant’s registrations under Classes 7 and 16 and as such the first  

respondent is not a ‘person aggrieved’ with regard to the appellant’s  

registrations under these two classes. As regards Class 9 he would  

submit that in view of the affidavit filed by the first respondent on July  

14,  2004  in  the  Court  of  Additional  District  Judge,  Delhi  the  first  

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respondent  ceases  to  be  an   aggrieved  person  on  the  date  of  

consideration of the rectification application. Learned counsel heavily  

relied upon two decisions of this Court: (1)  Hardie Trading Ltd. &  

Anr. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd.1  and (2)  Kabushiki Kaisha  

Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company & Ors.2.

17. Assailing the finding of the IPAB as regards non-use by  

the  appellant  during  the  relevant  period,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant argued  that the said finding was  erroneous on legal as  

well  as factual  premise.    He contended  that  the IPAB erred in  

holding that software was a ‘service’ and the subject registrations  

were in relation to goods without considering the wide definition of  

‘goods’ provided under Section 2(g) of the 1958 Act. Mr. Akhil Sibal  

argued  that  the  IPAB  committed  grave  error  in  relying  upon  the  

provisions of the 1999 Act and the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 when  

these provisions were not applicable as the applications were filed  

under the 1958 Act. According to him, the IPAB sought to rely upon  

‘computer  programming’  which is a ‘service’  enumerated in Class  

42,  without  considering  the  distinction  between  a  ‘computer  

programme’ and ‘computer programming’ and without  noticing the  

1 (2003) 11 SCC 92 2 (2008) 10 SCC 766

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entry ‘computer’ under Class 9 which falls within ‘goods’.  Learned  

counsel  would  submit  that  in  examining  the  question  of  non-use  

under Section 46(1)(b), the IPAB failed to consider that the requisite  

use  must  be  ‘in  relation  to  goods’  under  registration,  which  is  

extensively defined under Section 2(2)(b) of the 1958 Act.

18. Mr.  Akhil  Sibal,  learned  counsel  also  argued  that  the  

IPAB failed to have regard to the proviso to Section 46(1), in terms  

of which it is open to the registered proprietor to rely upon use of the  

registered trade mark during the relevant period in relation to ‘goods  

of  the  same  description’,  in  order  to  resist  an  application  for  

rectification.    He contended that  the IPAB failed to apply proper  

legal tests for determining ‘goods of the same description’ and had  

that been done it would be evident that ‘computer software’ amounts  

to ‘goods of the same description’ as ‘computer hardware’. In this  

regard,  he  relied  upon  M/s.  Eagle  Potteries  Private  Ltd.  v.   M/s.  

Eagle Flask Industries Pvt. Ltd.3; Lever Brothers, Port Sunlight Ld.   

v. Sunniwite Products Ld.4; The Ritz Hotel v. Charles of the Ritz5 and  

Australian Wine Importers’ Trade Mark6.

3 AIR 1993 Bombay 185 4 (1949) 66 RPC 84 5 (1989) RPC 333 6 (1889) 6 RPC 311

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19. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that in  

any view of  the matter,  the IPAB erred in exercising its  discretion  

under Section 46 of the 1958 Act without taking into consideration the  

aspect  of  public  interest.  He argued  that  the  IPAB ought  to  have  

considered whether use of mark ‘Infosys’ by the first respondent on  

computer  hardware  would  create  confusion  in  the  mind  of  the  

consumers that they might be led to believe that the said hardware is  

manufactured by the appellant. Learned counsel, thus, submitted that  

the impugned order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

20. On the other hand, an objection is raised in the written  

submissions on behalf of the first respondent — and reference was  

made in support of the objection to seven Judge Bench decision of  

this  Court  in  L.  Chandrakumar v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.7 — that  

challenge to the order of IPAB directly in the appeal before this Court  

under Article 136 of the Constitution is barred.  

21. In  reply  to  the  arguments  of  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant,  Mr.  Vaibhav  Gaggar,  learned  counsel  for  the  first  

respondent strenuously urged  that the plea of ‘aggrieved person’ is a  

new plea and raised substantially for the first time before this Court.  

He  argued  that  the  appellant  has  not  taken  the  plea  of  the  first  7 (1997) 3 SCC 261

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respondent not being a ‘person aggrieved’ with respect to filing of the  

applications for rectification before the IPAB; merely urging the plea  

that  the  first  respondent  has  no  locus  standi in  the  written  

submissions before the IPAB is not sufficient. Learned counsel would  

submit that the appellant has, for the first time, argued before this  

Court that the first respondent is not a person aggrieved and/or not  

capable of maintaining the rectification proceedings with respect to  

each and every good for  which the appellant  has been registered  

since the first respondent has not been registered for all the goods.  

Mr.  Vaibhav Gaggar  rather  asserted  that  the  first  respondent  is  a  

person  aggrieved   in  view  of  the  fact  that  various  suits  for  

infringement  have  been  filed  by  the  appellant  against  the  first  

respondent  and  on  the  date  of  the  applications  for  

rectification/removal of the subject registrations from the register, the  

suits  were  pending.  With  reference  to  the  affidavit  dated  July  14,  

2004  filed  by  the  first  respondent  before  the  Court  of  Additional  

District Judge, he submitted that the said affidavit has no relevance in  

consideration  as  to  whether  the  first  respondent  is  an  aggrieved  

person as Section 46 (1) of the 1958 Act relates only to the period  

upto the date of the filing of the rectification application and the rights  

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of the parties crystallized at that stage itself. In this regard, he relied  

upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Agha Hyder Hussain &  

Anr. v.  Omar Khayyam Wineries (Pvt.) Ltd. & Anr.8 He also placed  

reliance upon some more decisions viz;  Ritz Hotel Ltd.5, Philosophy  

Di Alberta Ferretti9 ;  Keystone Knitting Mills Trade Mark10 and Motor  

Terms Company Pty.  Limited. v.  Liberty  Insurance Ltd.11.  Learned  

counsel  for  the first  respondent  further  submitted  that  the  affidavit  

dated July 14, 2004 was not placed by the appellant before the IPAB  

nor any reference of the said affidavit has been made in the written  

submissions before the IPAB and the appellant also did not make any  

effort  to amend the pleadings that the first  respondent was not an  

aggrieved person.  It  was   contended by Mr.  Vaibhav Gaggar  that  

even otherwise in view of the fraud perpetrated by the appellant qua  

the   registrations  in  question,  the  issue  as  to  whether  the  first  

respondent  had  a  dispute  with  the  trade  mark  or  not  pales  into  

insignificance as the primary duty of the court is to maintain the ‘purity  

of the register’. He argued that in a case such as the present one  

since  the  allegations  against  the  appellant  relate  to  trafficking,  

8 AIR 1977 Mad 166 9 2003 R.P.C. 15 10 1929 (1) Ch.D. 92 11 1967 116 C.L.R. 177

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squatting and non-user, the scope of ‘person aggrieved’ has to be  

enlarged.  Learned counsel submitted that the fact that the appellant  

continues  to  allege  –   and  that  stance  has  not  changed  in  the  

pleadings in SLP as well—that the first  respondent is an infringer,  

pilfriger, defrauder, someone who wants to ride on the goodwill of the  

appellant or someone who wants to mislead the public at large, there  

is  no  question  of  the  first  respondent  ceasing  to  be  a  person  

aggrieved at any stage.   

22. Mr.  Vaibhav  Gaggar,  learned  counsel  for  the  first  

respondent  contended  that  the  appellant  is  registered  as  a  

‘manufacturer and trader’ under Classes 7, 9 and 16 even though, it  

is a company engaged in software only. Moreover, there is nothing on  

record to indicate linkage with the manufacturing or marketing of the  

goods for which the appellant is holding registration of subject trade  

marks. He vehemently contended that goods in Classes 7, 9 and 16  

for which the appellant obtained registration were never used in the  

manner contemplated by the 1958 Act for almost 30 years and that  

would  show the mala  fide  intention  of  the  appellant  in  having the  

same registered for the purpose of squatting and trafficking.

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23. Learned counsel  for  the first  respondent  further  argued  

that ‘Infosys’ is not an invented or a coined word; the said word is an  

abbreviation and combination of the words ‘information system’; the  

word ‘Infosys’ has been used by various companies abroad as well  

as within India prior to incorporation of the appellant itself and hence  

cannot be called an invented word. In this regard, he relied upon a  

decision of the Madras High Court in Nestle’s Products (India) Ltd. v.  

P. Thankaraja & Anr.12.  He submitted that  appellant  is primarily  in  

service industry which is unregistrable under the 1958 Act and since  

the  appellant  is  not  trading  in  the  goods in  respect  of  which  it  is  

registered,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  mark  of  the  appellant  is  

distinctive of its goods. In any case, learned counsel would submit  

that the expression ‘Infosys’ is not descriptive expression.

24. Insofar  as  discretion  exercised  by  IPAB  in  ordering  

removal  of  the  appellant’s  registrations  from  the  register  under  

Section 46(1)(b) of the 1958 Act is concerned,  learned counsel for  

the first respondent submitted that this Court should not overturn the  

discretion so exercised by the IPAB keeping in view the dishonest  

and fraudulent  conduct  of  the  appellant.  Lastly,  he  submitted  that  

although no cross objections or cross appeal has been filed, the first  12 AIR 1978 Mad 336

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respondent has some grievance with regard to the order of the IPAB  

in  not  considering  the  case  set  up  in  the  rectification/removal  

applications particularly with regard to Section 56 of the 1958 Act.  

25. Having regard to the order that we intend to make, we are  

not persuaded to accept  the objection raised on behalf  of  the first  

respondent that present appeal  preferred directly before this Court  

from the impugned order passed by the IPAB is not maintainable and  

must be dismissed as such.  Pertinently,  the notice was issued in the  

petitions for special leave to appeal to the respondents on November  

1,  2004.   In  response to  the said  notice the  first  respondent  filed  

counter  affidavit  before  this  Court  on March 11,  2005 wherein  no  

specific objection about invocation of jurisdiction of this Court directly  

has been taken. In the counter affidavit a very vague objection in the  

following terms was raised:

“that  the  present  petition  apart  from  being  false  and  misconceived  lacks  the  necessary  jurisdiction,  hence  deserves outright rejection.”   

We are afraid, this is hardly an objection about maintainability. Apart  

from it,  on September 12, 2005 after hearing both parties, special  

leave  was  granted  by  this   Court.    In  the backdrop of  these  

peculiar  facts,  in  our  view,  it  is  not  appropriate  to  relegate  the  

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appellant  at  this distance of time to challenge the impugned order  

passed  by  the  IPAB  in  writ  petition  before  the  High  Court.   The  

objection  about  maintainability  of  the  appeals  is,   accordingly,  

overruled.

26. The moot  question which has been debated before us is  

whether or not, the first respondent is an aggrieved person. That the  

first respondent filed composite applications under Sections 46 and  

56 of the 1958 Act for rectification/removal of the trade mark ‘Infosys’  

registered in Classes 7, 9 and 16  is not in dispute. Sections 46 and  

56  read as follows :

“S.  46.  Removal  from  register  and  imposition  of  limitations  on  ground  of  non-use.—(1)  Subject  to  the  provisions of section 47, a registered trade mark may be taken  off the register in respect of any of the goods in respect of  which it  is registered on application made in the prescribed  manner  to  a  High Court  or  to  the Registrar  by any person  aggrieved on the ground either—

(a)  that the trade mark was registered without any bona fide  intention on the part of the applicant for registration that it  should be used in relation to those goods by him or, in a  case to which the provisions of section 45 apply, by the  company concerned, and that there has, in fact, been no  bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to those goods  by any proprietor thereof for the time being up to a date  one month before the date of the application; or  

(b)  that  up  to  a  date  one  month  before  the  date  of  the  application,  a  continuous period  of  five  years  or  longer  had elapsed during which the trade mark was registered  

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and during which there was no  bona fide use thereof in  relation to those goods by any proprietor thereof for the  time being:  

Provided  that,  except  where  the  applicant  has  been  permitted under sub-section (3) of  section 12 to register an  identical  or  nearly  resembling  trade  mark  in  respect  of  the  goods in question or where the tribunal is of opinion that he  might properly be permitted so to register such a trade mark,  the  tribunal  may  refuse  an  application  under  clause  (a)  or  clause (b) in relation to any goods, if it is shown that there has  been, before the relevant date or during the relevant period,  as the case may be,  bona fide use of the trade mark by any  proprietor thereof for the time being in relation to goods of the  same description, being goods in respect of which the trade  mark is registered.  

(2) Where in relation to any goods in respect of which a  trade mark is registered—

(a) the circumstances referred to in clause (1) of sub- section (1) are shown to exist so far as regards  non- use of the trade mark in relation to goods to  be sold,  or  otherwise  traded in,  in  a particular   place  in  India  (otherwise  than  for  export  from   India), or in relation to goods to be exported to a  particular market outside India; and  

(b)     a person has been permitted under sub- section (3) of section 12 to register an identical or  nearly resembling trade mark in respect of those  goods  under  a  registration  extending  to  use  in  relation  to  goods  to  be  so  sold,  or  otherwise  traded  in,  or  in  relation  to  goods  to  be  so  exported,  or  the  tribunal  is  of  opinion  that  he  might properly be permitted so to register such a  trade mark,  

on application by that person in the prescribed manner to a  High Court or to the Registrar, the tribunal may impose on the  registration of the first-mentioned trade mark such limitations  as  it  thinks  proper  for  securing  that  that  registration  shall  cease to extend to such use.  

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(3)  An  applicant  shall  not  be  entitled  to  rely  for  the  purpose of clause (b) of sub-section (1) or for the purposes of  sub-section  (2)  on  any  non-use  of  a  trade  mark  which  is  shown to have been due to special circumstances in the trade  and not to any intention to abandon or not to use the trade  mark in relation to the goods to which the application relates.”

“S. 56. Power to cancel or vary registration and to rectify  the  register.—(1)  On  application  made  in  the  prescribed  manner  to  a  High Court  or  to  the Registrar  by any person  aggrieved, the tribunal may make such order as it may think fit  for cancelling or varying the registration of a trade mark on the  ground of any contravention, or failure to observe a condition  entered on the register in relation thereto.  

(2) Any person aggrieved by the absence or omission  from the register of any entry,  or by any entry made in the  register  without  sufficient  cause,  or  by  any  entry  wrongly  remaining  on  the register,  or  by any error  or  defect  in  any  entry in the register, may apply in the prescribed manner to a  High Court  or  to  the Registrar,  and the tribunal  may make  such order for making, expunging or varying the entry as it  may think fit.  

(3)  The  tribunal  may  in  any  proceeding  under  this  section  decide  any  question  that  may  be  necessary  or  expedient to decide in connection with the rectification of the  register.  

(4)  The tribunal,  of  its  own motion,  may,  after  giving  notice in the prescribed manner to the parties concerned and  after  giving  them an opportunity  of  being heard,  make any  order referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2).  

(5) Any order of the High Court rectifying the register  shall direct that notice of the rectification shall be served upon  the Registrar in the prescribed manner who shall upon receipt  of such notice rectify the register accordingly.  

(6) The power  to rectify the register conferred by this  section  shall  include  the  power  to  remove  a  trade  mark  registered in Part A of the register to Part B of the register.”

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27. The position that emerges from the above provisions is  

this. Whether the application is under Section 46 or under Section 56  

or a composite application under both Sections, it is a pre-requisite  

that the applicant must be a person aggrieved. Section 46(1) of the  

1958  Act  enables  any  person  aggrieved  to  apply  for  removal  of  

registered trade mark from the register on the ground of non use as  

stated in Clause (a) and/or Clause (b). To be an aggrieved person  

under Section 46, he must be one whose interest is affected in some  

possible way;   it must not be a fanciful suggestion of grievance.  A  

likelihood of some injury or damage to the applicant by such trade  

mark remaining on  the register may meet the test of locus standi. In  

Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (11th edition)  at page  

166, the legal position with regard to ‘person aggrieved’  has been  

summarized thus : The persons who are aggrieved are all persons  

who are in some way or the other substantially interested in having  

the mark removed – where it  is a question of removal  – from the  

register; including all persons who would be substantially damaged if  

the mark remained, and all trade rivals over whom an  advantage was  

gained by a  trader who was getting the benefit of a registered trade  

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mark to which he was not entitled. We accept  the above statement of  

law.

28. Insofar as Section 56 is concerned, it provides for varying  

situations in which the person aggrieved may apply for rectification  of  

the registered trade mark from the register. Although both Sections,  

namely, Sections 46 and 56  require ‘person aggrieved’  to apply for  

removal of the registered trade mark from the register or rectification  

of a trade mark in the register, the expression ‘person aggrieved’  for  

the purposes of these two Sections has different connotations.  The  

interpretation  of  the  expression  ‘person  aggrieved’   occurring  in  

Sections 46 and 56  has come up for consideration before this Court  

on more than one occasion.  In Hardie Trading Ltd.1, this Court stated  

as follows:    

“30. The  phrase  “person  aggrieved”  is  a  common  enough  statutory  precondition  for  a  valid  complaint  or  appeal.  The  phrase  has  been  variously  construed  depending  on  the  context in which it occurs. Three sections viz. Sections 46, 56  and 69 of the Act contain the phrase. Section 46 deals with  the removal of a registered trade mark from the Register on  the  ground  of  non-use.  This  section  presupposes  that  the  registration which was validly made is liable to be taken off by  subsequent non-user. Section 56 on the other hand deals with  situations where the initial registration should not have been or  was incorrectly made. The situations covered by this section  include: (a) the contravention or failure to observe a condition  for registration; (b) the absence of an entry; (c) an entry made  without sufficient cause; (d) a wrong entry; and (e) any error or  defect in the entry. Such type of actions are commenced for  the  “purity  of  the  Register”  which  it  is  in  public  interest  to  

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maintain.  Applications  under  Sections  46  and  56  may  be  made to the Registrar who is competent  to grant the relief.  “Persons aggrieved” may also apply for cancellation or varying  an entry in the Register relating to a certification trade mark to  the Central  Government  in certain circumstances.  Since we  are not concerned with a certification trade mark, the process  for registration of which is entirely different, we may exclude  the interpretation of the phrase “person aggrieved” occurring  in  Section  69  from  consideration  for  the  purposes  of  this  judgment.

31. In  our  opinion  the  phrase  “person  aggrieved”  for  the  purposes of removal on the ground of non-use under Section  46 has a different connotation from the phrase used in Section  56 for  cancelling  or  expunging  or  varying  an entry  wrongly  made or remaining in the Register. 32. In the latter case the locus standi would be ascertained  liberally, since it would not only be against the interest of other  persons carrying on the same trade but also in the interest of  the public to have such wrongful entry removed. It was in this  sense that the House of Lords defined “person aggrieved” in  the matter of Powell’s Trade Mark:

“...  although  they  were  no  doubt  inserted  to  prevent  officious interference by those who had no interest at all in the  register  being  correct,  and  to  exclude  a  mere  common  informer, it is undoubtedly of public interest that they should  not be unduly limited, inasmuch as it is a public mischief that  there should remain upon the register a mark which ought not   to  be there,  and by which  many persons may be affected,  who, nevertheless, would not be willing to enter upon the risk  and expense of litigation.

Whenever it can be shown, as here, that the applicant is in  the same trade as the person who has registered the trade  mark,  and  wherever  the  trade  mark,  if  remaining  on  the  register, would, or might, limit the legal rights of the applicant,  so that by reason of the existence of the entry on the register  he could not lawfully do that which, but for the existence of the  mark upon the register, he could lawfully do, it appears to me  he has a locus standi to be heard as a person aggrieved.”

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33. But if the ground for rectification is merely based on non- user  i.e.  under  Section  46  of  the Act,  that  is  not  really  on  account of any public mischief by way of an incorrect entry.  The non-user does not by itself render the entry incorrect but it  gives a right to a person whose interest is affected to apply for  its removal. An applicant must therefore show that “in some possible way he may be damaged or injured if the  trade  mark  is  allowed  to  stand;  and  by  ‘possible’  I  mean  possible  in  a practical  sense, and not  merely  in  a fantastic  view.... All cases of this kind, where the original registration is  not illegal or improper, ought to be considered as questions of  common sense, to a certain extent, at any rate; and I think the  applicants ought to show something approaching a sufficient  or  proper  reason  for  applying  to  have  the  trade  mark  expunged. It certainly is not sufficient reason that they are at  loggerheads with the respondents or desire in some way to  injure them”.

34. Addisons’ application was one under Section 46 and the  test  to  determine  whether  the  applicant  was  a  “person  aggrieved”  within  the  meaning  of  that  section  should  have  been the one laid down by Romer, J. in Wright case and not  the one propounded by the House of Lords in the matter of  Powell’s Trade Mark. The High Court and the Joint Registrar  fell into error in not drawing this distinction. However, it is not  necessary  to  dilate  on  this  aspect  of  the  matter  as  the  appellant has really argued on the second and third aspects of  Section  46  viz.  the  alleged non-use of  the  trade  marks  by  Hardie and special circumstances”.

29. In  the case of  Hardie Trading Ltd.1, this Court approved  

the test applied by Romer, J. in The Royal Baking Powder Company  

v. Wright, Crossley, and Co.13,   which has been reproduced in para  

33 of the report. We respectfully agree.  

30. Hardie Trading  Ltd.1   has been followed by this Court in a  

recent decision in the case of Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba2.  This Court  13  (1898) 15 RPC  677

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stated that Section 46 speaks for private interest  while Section 56  

speaks of a public interest.     

31. It  is  true  that  the  appellant  in   opposition  to  the  

applications for removal/rectification of trade mark did not specifically  

challenge  in  its  counter  affidavits   the  locus  standi of  the  first  

respondent  to  be heard  as  a  person  aggrieved.  Obviously,  in  the  

absence of any specific objection by the appellant to that effect,  no  

specific issue was framed by the High Court whether the applicant  

was an aggrieved person. The applications having been transferred  

to  the  IPAB in  terms  of  Section  100  of  the  1999  Act,   the  IPAB  

examined the matter in light of the issues that were framed by the  

High Court although in the written submissions before it, the objection  

was raised that the first respondent has ceased to have locus standi  

in view of the subsequent events, particularly change of the name of  

the first respondent   from Jupiter Infosys Ltd. to Jupiter International  

Ltd.   The  question  is,  whether  in  these  circumstances  it  was  

incumbent  upon  the  IPAB to  consider  and  satisfy  itself  about  the  

locus  standi of  the  first  respondent  to  be  heard  as  a  person  

aggrieved.  In our considered view, it was. In the first place, when the  

first  respondent applied for  rectification/removal  in respect of three  

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registrations in Classes 7, 9 and 16, it must have shown in respect of  

each of them that it is a ‘person aggrieved’ and the IPAB must have  

separately considered in respect of each registration the locus standi  

of the first respondent as the considerations for each entry might not  

have  been  common.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  during  the  

pendency of the applications, certain events had taken place which  

had  some   bearing  on  the  question  of  locus  standi of  the  first  

respondent insofar as invocation of Section 46 (1) of the 1958 Act is  

concerned. In the affidavit  filed by the first  respondent on July 14,  

2004  before  the  Court  of  Additional  District  Judge,  Delhi  an  

unequivocal and categorical statement has been made that now there  

is no dispute between the plaintiff (appellant herein) and defendant  

(first  respondent herein)  under the Trade Mark and that defendant  

has already changed the Trade Mark namely “Jupiter  International  

Ltd.” in place of “Jupiter Infosys Ltd.”

32. In terms of Section 46(1),  not only that the applicant has  

to  show  that  he  is  an  aggrieved  person  as  his  interest  is  being  

affected but  the IPAB must also be satisfied, before it  directs the  

removal of registered trade mark, that the applicant is an aggrieved  

person before it  invokes the power in directing the removal  of the  

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registered  trade  mark.  This  is  so  because  the  pre-requisite  for  

exercise  of  power  under  Section  46(1)  is  that  the  applicant   is  a  

person aggrieved.

33. The question then arises, whether it  is sufficient for the  

applicant to show that he is a  person aggrieved  when he makes his  

application or he must continue to remain a person aggrieved  until  

such time as the rectification/removal application is finally decided. In  

our  view,  the grievance of  the applicant  when he invokes Section  

46(1) must not only be taken to have existed on the date of making  

application  but  must  continue  to  exist  when  such  application  is  

decided.  If  during the pendency of such application, the applicant’s  

cause of complaint does not survive or his grievance does not subsist  

due to his own action  or the applicant has waived his right or he has  

lost  his  interest  for  any  other  reason,   there  may  not  be  any  

justification for rectification as the registered trade mark cannot  be  

said  to  operate  prejudicially   to  his  interest.  In  re  Apollinaris  

Company’s  Trade-Marks14,  while  dealing  with  this  aspect,  

Kekemich,J.  stated :  

“…..because that is a remedy given to the person aggrieved  through the interposition  of  the Court  for  the benefit  of  the  

14 (1891) 2 Ch. 186

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applicant, and if at the date of the trial  he has no cause of  complaint it seems to be monstrous to suppose that the Court  will rectify the register at his instance when it can do him no  good to rectify, and when the retention on the register can do  him no harm merely because at the date of his application he  may have had some grievance.”

We concur with the above statement.

34. In  the  circumstances,  we  are  satisfied  that  the  

applications made by the first  respondent for rectification/removal of  

the  subject  trade  marks  from  the  register  need  to  be  considered  

afresh  by  the  IPAB in  accordance  with  law and  the  observations  

made  above.  Since  the  first  respondent  has  also  grievance  in  

connection with the impugned order particularly with regard to non-

consideration of its case under Section 56 of the 1958 Act, we refrain  

from going into the merits of the diverse contentions raised before us  

and leave the parties to agitate these  contentions before the IPAB.

35. In view of the above, these appeals are allowed in part  

and the impugned order dated September 9, 2004 is set aside.  The  

applications being TRA Nos. 25 to 27 of 2003 (OP Nos. 764 to 766 of  

2001) are restored to the file of  Intellectual Property Appellate Board,  

Chennai for hearing and disposal afresh in accordance with law.  The  

parties shall bear their own costs.  

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……………….. J.     (Aftab Alam)

….……………. J.                                                                     (R.M. Lodha)

NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 9, 2010.

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