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PETITIONER: INDU BHUSAN CHATTERJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/11/1957

BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  148            1958 SCR 1001

ACT:    Public servant-Prosecution-Sanction-Essentials of a valid sanction-Prevention  of  Corruption Act, 1947 (2  Of  1947), SS.5(2), 6 -Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), S. 161.

HEADNOTE: The appellant, a public servant, was convicted under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and under s.  161 of  the Indian Penal Code on a charge of accepting a sum  of Rs. 100 as illegal gratification.  It was contended for  the appellant that the conviction was bad on the ground that the sanction  for  his  prosecution was not  valid  because  the officer  competent to sanction the prosecution (1)  had  not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the  case but merely perused the draft prepared by the Police and  (2) did not investigate the truth of the offence’ The  evidence, however,  showed that he went through all the papers  placed before him which gave him the necessary material upon  which he  decided that it was necessary in the ends of justice  to accord his sanction : Held,  that the essentials of a valid sanction were  present in the case and that the conviction was valid. Gokulchand  Dwarkadas  Morarka v. The King, (1948)  L.R.  75 I.A. 30, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 18  of 1955. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated December 1,  1954, of  the  Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No.  322  of 1953,  arising out of the judgment and order dated  November 20, 1953, of the West Bengal First Special Court at  Alipore in Case No. 3 of 1953. N.   C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. B.   Sen  and  P.  K.  Ghosh  (for  P.  K.  Bose),  for  the respondent. 1957.  November 26.  The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM  J.-The  High Court of Calcutta  certified  under  Art.

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134(1)(c) of the Constitution that the case before us was  a fit one for appeal to this Court.  The 127 1000 ground for the granting of the certificate, as stated by the High Court, will be considered in due course. The appellant was convicted under s. 5(2) of the  Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), hereinafter  referred to as the Act, and under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code  by a  Special Judge who sentenced him under s. 161, to  undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine  of Rs.  500 in default to suffer further rigorous  imprisonment for  one  month.  No separate sentence was passed  under  s. 5(2)  of  the Act.  He unsuccessfully appealed to  the  High Court against his conviction and sentence. The charge framed against the appellant under s. 161 of  the Indian Penal Code, in substance, stated that on or about May 12,  1952,he had accepted Rs. 100 as  illegal  gratification from  V.  S. Doraiswamy as a motive or reward for  doing  an official  act  and showing in the exercise of  his  official functions  favour to Doraiswamy in seeing that a speedy  and favourable  settlement of the claim cases preferred  by  him against the Bengal Nagpur Railway, subsequently the  Eastern Railway.  The charge under s. 5(2) of the Act which  related to  the  same  transaction stated  that  the  appellant  had accepted the aforesaid sum of Rs. 100 by corrupt or  illegal means  or  by  otherwise abusing his position  as  a  public servant. It  is unnecessary to set out in any great detail the  story of  the prosecution as to how Doraiswamy and  the  appellant came into contact and how the process of giving bribe to the appellant began.  They met in 1950.  Rs. 10 was paid to  the appellant in October, 1951, and Rs. 15 in January, 1952,  as the  result  of  the appellant asking  Doraiswamy  for  some gratification  for  speedy and favourable  disposal  of  his claim  cases.   The  appellant was at  that  time  Assistant Supervisor  of Claim Cases of the Bengal Nagpur  Railway  of the  Vizianagram Section.  On some secret  information,  the Deputy    Superintendent   of   Police,    Special    Police Establishment  at  Puri directed Inspector G. N.  Brahma  to contact  Doraiswamy in connection with a report  of  alleged dishonesty by railway officials.  Brahma met Doraiswamy  and asked him to meet him again at 1001 Calcutta  on  May  10, 1952, after the latter  had  filed  a complaint along with some letters said to have been  written by  the appellant.  Permission was obtained from  the  Chief Presidency  Magistrate,  Calcutta to investigate  the  case. Thereafter  Doraiswamy met the appellant in Calcutta and  it was settled that the former would pay the latter Rs. 100  on May  12,  1952,  at  6 p. m.  at  the  India  Coffee  House. Doraiswamy  informed the police of the arrangement.   Marked tenrupee  currency  notes  were given  to  Doraiswamy.   The appellant  and Doraiswamy met at the India Coffee  House  as arranged.   There was a talk between them  about  expediting the claim cases which were being dealt with by the appellant and  a  list of them was given to him.  This  list  and  the bundle  of marked currency notes which Doraiswamy  gave  him were  put  in  the left upper pocket of  his  shirt  by  the appellant.   The Inspectors H. K. Mukherjee and S. B.  Mitra along with G. N. Gosh, an Assistant Director of Postal  Ser- vices  and Brahma came up to the appellant.  He was  accused by the police of having received 10 ten-rupee currency notes as  bribe  from Doraiswamy and was asked  to  produce  them. After  some hesitation the appellant produced  the  currency

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notes  as well as the list given to him by Doraiswamy.   The number of the currency notes were checked and found to tally with  the  previously noted numbers of  the  currency  notes given to Doraiswamy for handing them over to the  appellant. The case of the prosecution was found to have been proved by both  the courts below and the appellant was  convicted  and sentenced as stated above. It may be stated at the outset that the concurrent  findings of  fact arrived at by the courts below were not  questioned before  us.   The  only question  canvassed  before  us  was whether there had been a valid sanction given under s. 6  of the Act without which no court could take cognizance of  the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant. In order to appreciate the submission made by Mr. Chatterjee in  this connection, a few facts have to be stated and  some reference to the evidence of 1002 Mr.  Bokil, P.W. 5, Chief Commercial Superintendent  of  the Eastern Railway at Calcutta will be necessary. The appellant as Assistant Supervisor of Claim Cases of  the then  Bengal Nagpur Railway (later the Eastern Railway)  had the  power to deal finally with claims up to Rs. 75 and  for claims in excess of that sum to make a recommendation to his superior  officer, the Assistant Commercial  Superintendent. Doraiswamy was working on behalf of several persons who  had made claims against the Railway.  These cases were numerous. All these cases had to be dealt with by the appellant either by  passing final orders himself, if the value in each  case was  Rs.  75  or less, or by recommending  to  his  superior officer  the  cases where the value of the  claim,  in  each case, was more than Rs. 75.  The appellant, therefore, being incharge of all the claim cases played an important part  in their disposal either by passing final orders himself or  by making recommendations.  When the appellant was paid Rs. 100 at  the India Coffee House on May 12, 1952, he was found  in possession  of  the marked currency notes and  the  list  of cases,  in which claims had been made, which had been  given to  him by Doraiswamy.  Sanction for the prosecution of  the appellant    was   sought   from   the   Chief    Commercial Superintendent  Mr. Bokil, P.W. 5. There is no dispute  that Mr.  Bokil  was  competent to grant the  sanction.   He  had stated in his evidence that before according the sanction he went through all the relevant papers and was satisfied  that in  the  interests  of  justice  the  appellant  should   be prosecuted.   He, accordingly, gave the sanction in  writing and  this  document was marked as Ex. 6. Exhibit  6  clearly states  that the appellant had demanded on May 12, 1952,  as bribe  the sum of Rs. 100 from Doraiswamy and  had  accepted the  sum  as a motive or reward for  speedy  and  favourable settlement  of the claim cases, that Mr. Bokil  had  applied his mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case  and was  satisfied  that  in  the  interests  of  justice,   the appellant should be put on his trial in a Court of competent jurisdiction  for offences under s. 161 of the Indian  Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Act alleged to have been 1003 committed by him.  He, accordingly, under the provisions  of s. 6 of the Act, accorded his sanction that the appellant be prosecuted  in a competent court of law for the  offence  of having accepted illegal gratification as a motive or  reward for  showing  favour to Doraiswamy in respect of  the  claim cases filed against the Vizianagram Section of the Railway. Exhibit 6 on the face of it and the evidence of Mr. Bokil in examination-in-chief clearly establish that a valid sanction

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had  been  accorded by Mr. Bokil.  It  was,  however,  urged before the Special Judge, as it was urged in the High Court, that  certain  statements  made  by  Mr.  Bokil  in   cross- examination clearly showed that he had not applied his  mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the  sanction accorded  by  him was not a valid one.   The  Special  Judge rejected this contention and was satisfied that Ex. 6 on the face of it disclosed a valid sanction for the prosecution of the  appellant.   The learned Judges of the High  Court  who heard the appeal were also satisfied that Mr. Bokil had,  in fact, applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.  Regarding the statements made by Mr. Bokil in  cross- examination they were of the opinion that they did not  show that  he  did not apply his mind to the facts of  the  case. These  statements merely showed that he did not  investigate the  truth of the case presented against the appellant.   An application  was filed in the High Court under Art.  134  of the Constitution for the granting of a certificate that  the case  was  a fit one for appeal to this  Court.   The  order granting  the certificate shows that the learned Judges  who heard the application were of the opinion that the  sanction accorded in this case was not a valid sanction.  The learned Judges were of the -opinion that the question whether or not there  was  a  proper sanction in the case  was  a  question serious enough to justify the granting of a certificate. It  is  necessary therefore to decide whether  the  sanction accorded  in this case was a valid sanction.  The  substance of  the sanction has already been stated but in  order  that there may be no misunderstanding we quote the very words  of the sanction itself: 1004 "  Whereas  a complaint was made against  Shri  Indu  Bhusan Chatterjee,  Assistant  Supervisor,  Claims, of  the  B.  N. Railway  (now Eastern Railway) Garden Reach,  Calcutta,  who looked  after  the claims cases against the Railway  of  the Vizianagram  Section, that the said Indu  Bhusan  Chatterjee had demanded and on 12th May, 1952, accepted a bribe of  Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only) from Shri V. S. Doraiswamy  of the  Commercial  Claims Bureau, Vizianagram as a  motive  or reward  for speedy and favourable settlement of  the  claims cases  of  the Commercial Claims Bureau and  thereby  having committed  an offence punishable under Section 161 1. P.  C. and also the  offence of criminal misconduct by the  illegal and corrupt use of his official position as a public servant to obtain a pecuniary advantage for himself punishable under Section  5(2)  read  with Section 5(1), clause  (d)  of  the Prevention  of  Corruption Act II of 1947, 1, R.  K.  Bokil, Chief Commercial Superintendent, Eastern Railway,  Calcutta, having applied my mind to the facts and circumstances of the case,  am  satisfied,  and am of the  opinion  that  in  the interests of justice, Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, Assistant Supervisor, Claims, Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Calcutta, be put on his trial in a Court of competent jurisdiction for the offences alleged against him.  That as Shri Indu  Bhusan Chatterjee,  Assistant Supervisor, Claims, Eastern  Railway, Garden Reach, Calcutta, is removable from his office by  me; I therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me by  Section 6(c)  of  the Prevention of Corruption Act II  of  1947,  do hereby  accord sanction that Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee  be prosecuted  in a competent Court of law for the  offence  of having  accepted  an illegal gratification as  a  motive  or reward  for showing favour to Shri V.S. Doraiswamy,  in  his official functions viz., the settlement of the cases of  the Vizianagram  Section  of Eastern Railway,  punishable  under Section   161  I.P.C.  and  for  the  offence  of   criminal

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misconduct  for the corrupt and illegal use of his  official position  to  obtain  a  pecuniary  advantage  for   himself punishable   under  Section  5(2)  of  the   Prevention   of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947)." 1005 In  our opinion, this sanction clearly states all the  facts which  concern the prosecution case alleged against the  the appellant  with reference to his acceptance of Rs. 100  from Doraiswamy  on  May  12,1952,  in  circumstances  which,  if established, would constitute offences under s. 161,  Indian Penal  Code  and  s. 5(2) of the  Act.   The  sanction  also clearly  states that Mr. Bokil had applied his mind and  was of  the  opinion  that  in  the  interests  of  justice  the appellant  should be prosecuted.  The charge framed  against the  appellant at his trial was with reference to this  very incident  and none other.  What more facts were required  to be   stated  in  the  sanction  itself  we  are  unable   to understand.  Mr. Bokil in his examination-in-chief stated  " On  the  prayer of the police, I accorded  sanction  to  the prosecution  of  one  Shri  I. B.  Chatterjee  who  was  the Assistant Supervisor of Claims.  Before according sanction I went  through all relevant papers and was satisfied that  in the  interest  of  justice, Sri I.B.  Chatterjee  should  be prosecuted.  This is the sanction marked Ex. 6 ". In  cross- examination,  however,  he made the following  statement:  " This  sanction Ex. 6 was prepared by the police and  it  was put  before me by the personnel branch of my office.  I  did not call for any record in connection with this matter  from my office.  I did not call for the connected claim cases nor did I enquire about the position of those claim cases."  The learned Judges in granting the certificate, apparently, were impressed  by  the  statement of Mr. Bokil that  Ex.  6  was prepared  by the police and put before him by the  personnel branch  of  his office, because the  learned  Chief  Justice observed,  "I  can hardly imagine the duty of  granting  the proper sanction being properly discharged by merely  putting one’s  signature on a ready-made sanction presented  by  the police." It seems to us that Mr. Bokil’s statement does  not prove  that  he  merely put his  signature  on  a  readymade sanction  presented by the police.  It is true that  he  did not himself dictate or draft the sanction, but Mr. Bokil has stated  in the clearest terms, in his  examination-in-chief, that  before  be accorded sanction he went through  all  the relevant papers.  There is no 1006 reason to distrust this statement of Mr. Bokil, nor has  the High Court, while granting the certificate of fitness,  done so.  He was an officer of high rank in the Railway and  must have  been fully aware that the responsibility of  according the sanction against an official of the Railway  subordinate to him lay upon him.  It is inconceivable that an officer of the rank of Mr. Bokil would blindly sign a ready-made  sanc- tion  prepared  by  the police.   Apparently,  the  sanction already drafted contained all the material facts upon  which the  prosecution was to be launched, if at  all,  concerning the  acceptance  of the bribe by the appellant  on  May  12, 1952.  When Ex. 6 was placed before Mr. Bokil other relevant papers were also placed before him.  It is significant  that Mr.  Bokil  was  not  crossexamined as  to  what  the  other relevant  papers  were and in the absence  of  any  question being put to Mr. Bokil we must accept his statement that the papers placed before him were relevant to the only  question before  him  whether  he should or  should  not  accord  his sanction  to  the prosecution of the appellant.   Mr.  Bokil said,  and we see no reason to distrust his statement,  that

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before  he accorded his sanction lie went through all  these papers  and  after being satisfied that sanction  should  be given he accorded his sanction.  It is true that he did  not call  for any record in connection with the matter from  his office nor did he call for the connected claim cases or find out as to how they stood.  It was not for Mr. Bokil to judge the  truth of the allegations made against the appellant  by calling  for  the records of the connected  claim  cases  or other records in connection with the matter from his office. The papers which were placed before him apparently gave  him the  necessary  material upon which he decided that  it  was necessary in the ends of justice to accord his sanction. Reliance  was  placed on the case  of  Gokulchand  Dwarkadas Morarka  v.  The  King(1) and other cases, to  which  it  is unnecessary to refer, in support of the submission on behalf of the appellant that the sanction accorded was not a  valid sanction.  A careful reading, (1)  (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30. 1007 however,  of  Morarka’s  case  (1)  satisfies  us  that  the sanction accorded in this case in no way conflicts with  the observations  of their Lordships of the Judicial  Committee. On the contrary, in our opinion, it is in keeping with them. None of the other cases cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant assist us in the matter.  When the sanction itself and the evidence of Mr. Bokil are carefully scrutinized  and read  together there can be little doubt that  the  sanction accorded  was  a valid sanction.  The only point  which  had been argued before us and which was the expressed reason for the  granting of the certificate having failed,  the  appeal must  be  dismissed and the decision of the  High  Court  in upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant  must be upheld. Appeal dismissed.