02 May 1995
Supreme Court
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INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs TARAK SINGH .

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: C.A. No.-005645-005645 / 1995
Diary number: 88928 / 1993
Advocates: VIVEK GAMBHIR Vs NIRAJ SHARMA


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PETITIONER: INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TARAK SINGH & ORS. ETC.ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1828            1995 SCC  Supl.  (3)  25  1995 SCALE  (3)608

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:           O R D E R      Leave granted.      The  appellant   acquired  the   land  under  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 (for  short, ‘Central  Act’)  and  on reference under  s.18, the  District Judge,  Indore enhanced the  compensation   from  Rs.25,000/-   to  Rs.88,000/-  per hectare. Dissatisfied  therewith, the  appellant  filed  the memorandum of  appeal in  the High  Court and paid the fixed court fee. By order dated 27.10.93, the appellant was called upon to  pay the  ad valorem  court fee. Calling in question the order,  the appellant  filed these  appeals  by  special leave.      The High  Court has relied upon its Full Bench decision reported in State of M.P. vs. Goverdhandas 1993 JLJ 280. The principle  contention   of  Shri  V.R.  Reddy,  the  learned Additional Solicitor General, is that the appellant is not a claimant. Section  8 of  the M.P.  Court Fees Act, 1870 (for short, ‘the  Act’) has  no application  to the facts in this case. Article 11 of Schedule II of the Act is applicable and that, therefore,  they are  required to  pay only  the fixed court fee  prescribed thereunder.  He also  seeks to canvass the correctness  of the  judgment of  the Full Bench in that behalf.      Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the view  that the  Full Bench of the High Court of M.P. has laid down the law correctly. Section 3(d) of the Central Act defines the  ‘Court’ to  mean a  principal  Civil  Court  of original jurisdiction.  Section 18  of the Central Act gives right to  the claimant  or the owner of the land for seeking reference. The Collector is enjoined to make a reference for the determination  of the  objection raised  by the claimant regarding either  the measurement  of the land or the amount of compensation.  Thereafter, the  Collector is obligated to make the  statement to  the Court  in the  manner prescribed under s.19.  On receipt thereof, under s.20, the Court is to

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cause a  notice served as mentioned therein. Under s.22, the Court conducts the proceedings as a Civil Court. Sub-section (2) of  s.2 of the CPC defines the decree and s.2(14) of the Act defines ‘order’.      This Court  in C.G. Ghanshamdas & Ors. vs. Collector of Madras, AIR 1987 SC 180, considering the scope of the appeal under  s.11   of  the   Requisitioning  and  Acquisition  of Immovable Property Act (30 of 1952) and the liability of the State to  pay the  Court fee  under s.51  of the  Tamil Nadu Court-fees Act,  which is  pari materia  with 58 of the Act, considered the  controversy and  held that  the award of the arbitrator is  a formal  expression of  a decision made by a competent authority.  Further, it  is a  decision binding on the  parties  to  the  proceedings  in  which  it  is  made. Therefore, the  question whether  the order  in question  is executable or  not appears  to be irrelevant for the purpose of determining  the point  on the  payment of  court fee. On consideration of  s.51, of  the Tamil Nadu Court Fee Act and 2(2) and  2(14) of  the CPC,  this Court held that the order awarding compensation  under the  Act,  is  an  order  under s.2(14). When  it is  sought to be assailed by filing appeal under s.51  of Tamil  Nadu Court  Fee Act,  the appellant is definitely seeking  to avoid  the compensation awarded under the Act.  Therefore, that  is an order made by the statutory authority. Accordingly,  the appellants were required to pay ad valorem  court fee  on the  value of  the  memorandum  of appeal.      The case  on hand  stands on a higher footings than the one dealt with in Ghanshyamdas’s case. Here, the Subordinate Judge, who  deals with the reference, is a civil court under the Central  Act to  determine compensation. By operation of s.26(2), his  award is a decree within the meaning of s.2(2) of CPC.  It is a formal expression of an adjudication on the compensation awardable  or measurement  of the land acquired under the  Central Act.  It is  a final  adjudication  also, unless it  can be  avoided in  any other forum known to law; and it  could be avoided only by filing appeal as prescribed in s.54 of the Central Act.      In this context, it is relevant to note s.8 of the M.P. Court Fees Act which reads thus:           "Fee  on  Memo  of  appeal  against      order relating to compensation:-      The amount of fee payable under this Act      on a  Memo of  Appeal against  an  order      relating to  compensation under  any Act      for the  time being  in  force  for  the      acquisition of  land for  public purpose      shall  be   computed  according  to  the      difference between  the  amount  awarded      and   the    amount   claimed   by   the      appellant."      It is  true that the appellant is not the claimant. But when the  appellant seeks to avoid the decree, which is made by the  reference Court,  it  must  be  construed  that  the appellant  is   seeking  to   avoid  the  amount  of  higher compensation determined  by the  reference Court, as claimed by the  land owners. Therefore, the appellant is required to pay the  Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to the extent on  which   the  appellant   seeks  to   avoid  the   higher compensation  awarded  by  the  reference  Court  under  the Central Act.  When its  legaity is  challenged by filing the appeal under  s.54, the  difference of  the amount for which appeal is  filed, ad valorem court fee under s.8 is required to be  paid. Article  11 of  Schedule II has no application, since it  is expressly  covered by s.8 of the M.P. Court fee

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Act.      The decision  of this  Court in Diwan Bros. vs. Central Bank of  India, Bombay., 1976 (Suppl.) SCR 664, relied on by Shri V.R.  Reddy has  no application  to the  facts in  this case. Therein,  the Special  Tribunal was constituted and an application was to be made to the Tribunal for determination of the  disputes. In  view of  the specific  language,  this Court held  that the  criteria prescribed  under sub-section (2) of s.2 of the CPC has not been satisfied. Therefore, the order is not a decree and the application is not a plaint as required by CPC. Therefore, it was held that fixed court fee was required  to be  paid on  memorandum of  appeal. But, as stated earlier,  since the  Act has  treated the Court under the Central  Act as  an established  civil court of original jurisdiction and  conferred the  power and  jurisdiction  to determine   conclusively   the   objection   regarding   the measurement  or   compensation  or   title  to  receive  the compensation between  the contesting  parties, it is a Civil Court under  the CPC  and the  award of  the Civil  Court is deemed under  s.26(2) to  be a  decree within the meaning of sub-section (2) of s.2 of CPC.      So, the appellants are required to pay ad valorem court fee. The  appellants are granted two months’ time from today for payment  of the  deficit  court  fee.  The  appeals  are accordingly disposed of. No costs.