REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NOS.           9726-9727   OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 14520-14521 of 2010)

INDIAN  OIL  CORPORATION  LTD.  &  ORS.  

— APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

SUBRATA BORAH CHOWLEK , ETC. — RESPONDENT (S)

O R D E R  

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.

2. The  present  appeals,  by  special  leave,  are  directed  against  order  and  

judgment dated 29th January,  2010 passed by a Division Bench of the  

Gauhati  High  Court,  whereby  appellants’  application  seeking  

condonation of delay of 59 days in preferring the appeal was rejected and  

their writ appeal was dismissed in limine as being barred by limitation.

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3. The respondents  herein  filed writ  petitions  in  the  High Court  seeking  

regularization of their services from the dates of their initial appointment  

with consequential benefits. A learned Single Judge of the High Court,  

vide his judgment dated 29th April 2009, allowed the writ petitions, and  

directed appellant No.2 viz.  the Assam Oil Division of the Indian Oil  

Corporation to treat the respondents as having been regularly appointed  

from  the  date  of  their  initial  appointment,  and  to  give  them  all  the  

consequential service benefits.

4. Being aggrieved by the  said order,  the  appellants  preferred an appeal  

before the Division Bench of the High Court on 29th July 2009, along  

with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.  It was  

pleaded that the delay of 59 days had occasioned because of the time  

taken  by  the  company’s  consultant  at  Delhi,  mainly  on  account  of  

summer vacation.  

5. As afore-mentioned, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the  

appeal, on the ground of limitation, observing thus:   

“As such, the averments made in the application do not disclose  any  weighty  or  convicting  cause  to  construe  the  same  as  sufficient  within  the  meaning  of  Section  5  of  the  Act.  The  applicant  corporation  had since  the  delivery  of  the  judgment  and  order  involved  been  cavalier  and  nonchalant  in  its  approach. No urge or concern to act with expedition or dispatch  in view of the period of limitation prescribed is discernible in  

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its enterprise to decide the next course of action following the  decision of the Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of  the case, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the applicants are  not entitled to the equitable relief of condonation of delay, they  having  utterly  failed  to  offer  a  sufficient  cause  therefore  in  filing the accompanying writ appeals.”

6. As stated above, the appellants had pleaded that the delay in filing the  

appeal was unintentional and bona fide in as much as on receiving an  

uncertified copy of the judgment, they sought legal opinion from their  

local lawyer on 7th May 2009, which was received by them on 21st May  

2009. Thereafter, the same was forwarded to the General Manager (HR),  

Refinery  Headquarters,  New Delhi  on  28th May 2009.  Vide  his  letter  

dated 6th June 2009, the said General Manager sought some documents,  

including a certified copy of the judgment.  Subsequently, the General  

Manager forwarded the case file to the company’s legal advisors at New  

Delhi on 18th June 2009. The said legal advisors gave their opinion on 7th  

July 2009, advising the appellants to file an appeal against the judgment  

of the Single Judge; the proposal was approved by the headquarters of the  

appellants; whereafter the case file was handed over to the counsel for  

preparing and filing the appeal, which was ultimately filed on 29th July  

2009.    

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7. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant  

case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in  

filing  the  appeal  and  therefore,  the  High  Court  erred  in  declining  to  

condone the same.  It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a  

party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it  

is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a  

liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides  

can be imputed to  the party.  (See:  Shakuntala Devi  Jain  Vs.  Kuntal   

Kumari  &  Ors.1;  The  State  of  West  Bengal  Vs.  The Administrator,  

Howrah  Municipality  &  Ors.2;  N.  Balakrishnan  Vs.  M.  

Krishnamurthy3; Sital Prasad Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors.4)

8. In  Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal  Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.5,  this Court  

held that:

“In  construing  Section  5  it  is  relevant  to  bear  in  mind  two  important  considerations.  The  first  consideration  is  that  the  expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an  appeal  gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder  to  treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words,  when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree- holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat  the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has  accrued  to  the  decree-holder  by lapse of  time should  not  be  

1 (1969) 1 SCR 1006 2 (1972) 1 SCC 366 3 (1998) 7 SCC 123 4 (1985) 1 SCC 163 5 (1962) 2 SCR 762

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light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot  be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown  discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the  appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the  court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf  should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been  observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan6  “Section  5  gives  the  court  a  discretion  which  in  respect  of  jurisdiction  is  to  be  exercised  in  the  way  in  which  judicial  power  and  discretion  ought  to  be  exercised  upon  principles  which  are  well  understood;  the  words  ‘sufficient  cause’  receiving  a  liberal  construction  so  as  to  advance  substantial  justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is  imputable to the appellant.”

9. Similarly,  in  Ram  Nath  Sao  Alias  Ram  Nath  Sahu  &  Ors.  Vs.  

Gobardhan Sao & Ors.7, this Court observed that:

“But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with  the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject  the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal  drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule  and  refusal,  an  exception,  more  so  when  no  negligence  or  inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting  party.  On  the  other  hand,  while  considering  the  matter  the  courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps  within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the  other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning  delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic  and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished  should  not  be rejected  when stakes  are  high and/or  arguable  points  of  facts  and  law  are  involved  in  the  case,  causing  enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom  the lis  terminates,  either by default  or  inaction and defeating  valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit.  While considering the matter,  courts have to strike a balance  

6 (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 7 (2002) 3 SCC 195

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between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the  parties either way.”

10.In  State  (NCT  of  Delhi)  Vs.  Ahmed  Jaan8,   while  observing  that  

although no special indulgence  can be shown to the Government which,  

in similar circumstances  is not shown to an individual  suitor, one cannot  

but  take  a  practical  view of  the  working  of  the  Government  without  

being unduly indulgent  to the slow  motion of its wheels, highlighted  

the following observations of this Court in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok  

Ao & Ors.9:  

“It  is  axiomatic  that  decisions  are  taken by officers/agencies  proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing  the  files  from  table  to  table  and  keeping  it  on  table  for  considerable time causing delay—intentional or otherwise—is a  routine.  Considerable  delay  of  procedural  red  tape  in  the  process  of  their  making  decision  is  a  common  feature.  Therefore,  certain amount of latitude is not impermissible.  If  the appeals  brought by the State are lost  for such default  no  person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis  suffers,  is  public  interest.  The  expression  ‘sufficient  cause’  should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice- oriented  approach  rather  than  the  technical  detection  of  sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors  which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the  governmental  conditions  would  be  cognizant  to  and requires  adoption  of  pragmatic  approach  in  justice-oriented  process.”(See  also:  Special  Tehsildar,  Land  Acquisition,   

8 (2008) 14 SCC 582 9  (2005) 3 SCC 752

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Kerala  Vs.  K.V. Ayisumma10; State of Haryana  Vs.  Chandra  Mani & Ors.11)

11.It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages  

the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no  

distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a  

strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on  

the actions of its officials, who  

often do not  have any personal  interest  in its  transactions,  may lead to  

grave miscarriage  of justice and therefore,  certain amount of latitude is  

permissible in such cases.   

12.Examined on the touch-stone of the afore-noted observations,   we are of  

the view that in the present case, the conduct of the appellants does not  

indicate inaction, negligence or mala fides. The explanation furnished for  

the marginal  delay of  59 days,  in our opinion,  constitutes  a sufficient  

cause and therefore, deserves to be accepted.  10 (1996) 10 SCC 634 11 (1996) 3 SCC 132

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13.For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  appeals  are  allowed;  the    impugned  

judgment is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Division  

Bench of the High Court for consideration on merits.  There shall be no  

order as to costs.  

.……………………………………              (D.K. JAIN, J.)  

                             .…………………………………….             (H.L. DATTU, J.)

NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 12, 2010.

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