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PETITIONER: INDIAN & GENERAL INVESTMENT TRUST LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI PURNA CHANDRA MARDARAJ & CO.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/1966

BENCH:

ACT:      Orissa  Estates Abolition Act 1951 (Act I of 1952),  s. 20(1)  &  (2), and Orissa Money Lenders Act 1939, ss.  10  & 11--Claims Officer required under Abolition Act to determine amount of debt ’legally and justly due’--In doing so whether can take into account provisions of Money Lenders Act.

HEADNOTE:      The   appellant   company  advanced  a  loan   to   the predecessor-in-title  of the respondents against a  mortgage of land in 1906.  In 1953 the said land vested in the  State of  Orissa  by virtue of a notification under s.  3  of  the Orissa  Estates Abolition Act 1951.  Under s. 18 of the  Act the  appellant filed a claim in respect of the  loan  before the Claims Officer.  The mortgagor contended that since  the appellant  had realised more than double the amount  of  the loan  as interest, the debt stood extinguished according  to ss.  10  and 11 of the Money Lenders Act 1939.   The  Claims Officer and the High Court held against the appellant though on different grounds.  The appellant came to this Court  and contended  that  the procedure for determining  a  claim  as provided  ;in s. 20 of the Abolition Act was exhaustive  and recourse  to  the provisions of the Money  Lenders  Act  was unjustified. HELD:     The  Claims Officer cannot under s. 20(2)  of  the Abolition Act determine the principal and interest due under a  mortgage without considering the question as  to  whether the claim is true or whether it is barred by any other  law, or  whether  the claim is still subsisting.  These  are  all matters which properly arise for consideration by the Claims Officer.  The expression ’legally and justly due’  occurring in  s.  20(1) clearly indicates that the first  and  initial duty  of  the  Claims Officer is to  find  out  whether  any principal  amount is at all due to the creditor.   For  this purpose  he would be perfectly justified in relying  on  any provisions  of other statutes bearing upon  that  subject-in this  praticular  case the provisions of the  Money  Lenders Act.   Taking  section  10 and 11 of  the  latter  Act  into account  it  was  clear  that  no  amount  was  due  to  the appellants as they had already received more than double the amount of the original loan. [224 F; 225 A-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 850 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 4, 1963 of the Orissa High Court in Misc.  Appeal No. 94 of 1960.

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B.   Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. G.   L. Sanghi, for respondent Nos.  1 and 2. Deepak Dutta Choudhuri and R. N. Sachthey, for respondant No. 3. 246 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam,  J. This appeal, on certificate,  is  directed against the judgment of the Orissa High Court, dated January 4, 1963, and rendered in Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 94 &  95 of 1960. The  circumstances, under which this appeal arises,  may  be briefly stated.  The predecessor-in-title of the respondents had  executed  three mortgages in favour of  the  appellant- company, which is registered in London.  The first  mortgage was  executed on October 23, 1903, securing a sum  of  pound 1,35,000/-.   Inasmuch as, according to both  parties,  this mortgage  has  been completely redeemed in 1935, it  is  not necessary to make any further reference to this transaction. The second mortgage was executed on December 18, 1906, under which a sum of pound 77,500/- was borrowed by the mortgagor. Even  according to the appellant, in respect of  this  mort- gage,  the  respondents  had  paid  a  total  sum  of  pound 1,77,349/-, by way of interest which is more than twice  the principal  amount  covered  by  the  mortgage.   The   third mortgage was executed on October 21. 1935, under which a sum of pound 65,0001- was borrowed by the mortgagor. The  appellant  demanded the repayment of  the  amounts  due under  these  mortgages, but the mortgagor, so  far  as  the mortgage  of 1906 was concerned, repudiated the same on  the ground  that the entire transaction had been wiped  off,  by virtue  of  s.  10 of the  Orissa  Money-Lenders  Act,  1939 (Orissa  Act  III of 1939) (hereinafter  called  the  Money- Lenders  Act), inasmuch as he had paid more than double  the original principal amount, as admitted by the mortgagee. The appellant, however, did not accept this repudiation and, in consequence, the company took legal proceedings in London and  obtained an. ex parte decree.  But attempts to  execute the  decree in India did not succeed, as will be  seen  from the  decision of the Calcutta High Court in I G.  Investment Trust v. Raja of Khalikote(1).  The High Court held that the decree   obtained  by  the  appellant  in  London  was   not executable in India. In  the  meanwhile, the mortgaged properties vested  in  the State  of  Orissa, under the Orissa Estates  Abolition  Act, 1951 (Act I of 1952) (hereinafter called the Abolition Act), on June 1, 1953, by virtue of the notification issued by the State  Government  under  s. 3  thereof.   Inasmuch  as  the appellant  had  not realised the dues under  the  two  later mortgages,  they  filed a claim petition before  the  Claims Officer, under s. 18 of the Abolition Act. Under  s.  18(1) (a) of the Abolition Act,  every  creditor, whose debt is secured by the mortgage of, or is a charge on, any estate or (1)  A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 508.  247 part thereof, which has vested in the State Government under s.  3,  has  to file a claim  within  the  period  mentioned therein,   to  the  Claims  Officer,  for  the  purpose   of determining  the amount of debt ’legally and justly  payable to each such creditor in respect of his claim’.  Though  the claim  included the third mortgage dated October  21,  1935, also,  there does not appear to have been much of a  serious contest  about  the  liability  under  that  mortgage   and, therefore,  both  the Claims Officer, as well  as  the  High Court,  on appeal, have substantially accepted the claim  of

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the  appellant.  Therefore, the rights of the parties  under that mortgage, do not also arise for consideration, in  this appeal. So far as the mortgage of December 18, 1906, under which the mortgagor   had  borrowed  a  sum  of  pound  77,500/-,   is concerned,  in  the claim petition the  particulars  of  the properties   mortgaged  were  all  given  in  detail.    The appellant  had  also  admitted having received,  by  way  of interest,  in  respect  of this mortgage,  a  sum  of  pound 1,77,34918-0  and he had given, in a statement,  details  of this  receipt.   The  rate of  interest  payable  under  the mortgage was 6 % per annum.  It  is  also  seen,  from  the  said  statement,  that  the appellant  has  given credit to payment of a  sum  of  pound 29,000/-  towards  the  principal amount  and,  as  such,  a balance  of  E48,500/-  remained  due  as  principal.    The appellant had claimed this amount, as well as the balance of interest payable, in the sum of E17,460/-, as being due upto May  1, 1953.  The appellant had also claimed certain  other amounts which, according to him, were payable as  commission and premium as per the terms contained in the mortgage deed. The equivalent of all these amounts, in Indian currency, was also  given  by the appellant in the  claim  petition.   The appellant,  in  consequence,  prayed for  payment  of  these amounts, stated to be due to him under this mortgage. The  mortgagor contested the claim of the  appellant  before the  Claims  Officer.   He pleaded that  the  claim  of  the mortgagee, under the mortgage, was no longer subsisting  and that the mortgage liability had been discharged by  payments and  by  operation  of law.   The  mortgagor  pleaded  that, inasmuch  as the appellant had realised interest  which  is, admittedly,  far  greater than the amount  of  the  original loan,  the liability under the mortgage had  become  exting- uished, under s. 10 of the Money-Lenders Act. The mortgagor further contended that the mortgage  liability must be considered to have been extinguished, under s. 17 of the   Money-Lenders  Act,  inasmuch  as  the  mortgage,   in question,  is  a possessory mortgage and the  mortgagee  had been  in possession and enjoyment of the mortgaged  security for a period of 15 years. 248 There  were  also certain other objections,  raised  by  the mortgagor  to  the  claim made by the mortgagee  by  way  of commission and premium. The  Claims Officer accepted the plea of the mortgagor  that the mortgage of December 18, 1906, is a possessory  mortgage and  the mortgagees were in possession and enjoyment of  the properties  for 15 years from the date of the mortgage.   In consequence, the Claims Officer held that, in terms of S. 17 of  the  Money-Lenders Act, the mortgage of 1906  should  be deemed  to have been extinguished on the expiry of 15  years from  the date of the mortgage, i.e., long before 1953,  and even  long  before 1947, when the mortgagor  repudiated  his liability  under the mortgage.  But the Claims  Officer  was not prepared to accept the plea of the mortgagor that  under ss.  10  and 11 of the Money-Lenders  Act,  the  transaction should  be considered to have been extinguished.  So far  as the applicability of ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders  Act is  concerned, the view of the Claims Officer appears to  be that  those provisions can be invoked only when a  claim  is made by the mortgagee in a ’suit’, and when a ’Court’ has to adjudicate upon the same.  According to the Claims  Officer, he  is  not  a  ’Court’  and  the  proceedings  before  him, initiated  by  the mortgagee, by way of a claim,  under  the Abolition  Act,  is  not  a ’suit’, so  as  to  attract  the

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provisions of ss. 10 and 11. Therefore,  the Claims Officer held that ss.  10 and 11,  of the  Money-Lenders Act, did not apply.  But, inasmuch as  he held  in  favour  of the mortgagor, applying s.  17  of  the Money-Lenders   Act,  that  the  mortgage  claim  had   been extinguished,  no  relief  was  granted  in  favour  of  the appellant, so far as this transaction was concerned. Both  the appellant and the respondents, had  filed  appeals under  s.  21 of the Abolition Act to the Board,  which,  in this  case, was the High Court, as provided under s.  22  of the  Abolition  Act.   The  appellant  had  challenged   the rejection of his claim, in respect of this mortgage, by  the Claims Officer, relying upon s’ 17 of the Money-Lenders Act. Certain  other reliefs, which had been denied by the  Claims Officer,  were  also  the  subject  of  this  appeal.    The respondents  had  filed their appeal,  similarly,  regarding certain  claims  which  had been allowed in  favour  of  the appellant;  and, in particular, challenged the  decision  of the  Claims Officer regarding the non-applicability  of  ss. IO and II of the MoneyLenders Act, to this transaction. Both  the appeals have been disposed of by the Board,  by  a common  judgment,  dated January 4, 1963.  So  far  as  this mortgage  is concerned, the Board has held that the view  of the Claims 249 Officer, that it has been extinguished, in view of S. 17  of the MoneyLenders Act, is not correct.  The Board has,  after a  consideration  of  the evidence on record,  come  to  the conclusion that the mortgagee has not been in possession for the  requisite period referred to in s. 17 and that, on  the other  hand, the mortgagor himself had been  in  possession. Therefore, the Board, differing from the conclusions arrived at by the Claims Officer, has held that the mortgage  cannot be  considered  to have been discharged under S. 17  of  the MoneyLenders Act. But, the mortgagor, pressed before the Board the  contention that,  applying ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act,  the mortgage  claim,  in any event, must be considered  to  have been  extinguished.   Though  this contention,  as  we  have pointed  out,  did not find acceptance at the hands  of  the Claims  Officer, the Board, ultimately, upheld this plea  of the mortgagor.  No doubt, the Board was of the view that the Claims Officer, though not a ’Court’, could exercise  larger powers  and grant relief to the mortgagor, because it  is  a tribunal  and  its  jurisdiction must be  considered  to  be wider.   On  this basis, the Board, after  reference  to  S. 20(1)  of  the  Abolition Act,, was of  the  view  that,  in considering the question whether the amount was ’legally and justly due’, to the appellant, the Claims Officer could have due regard to the provisions contained in the  Money-Lenders Act.   In  this  view,  the  Board,  ultimately,  held  that inasmuch as, even according to the appellant, the  mortgagee had  paid a sum of pound 1,77,349/-, the entire  balance  of principal  and interest claimed by the mortgagee  should  be considered  to have been fully paid.  The Board was also  of the  view  that certain claims made, by way of  premium  and commission,  had  also been paid off by the  excess  amounts paid  by  the  mortgagor.  Therefore, the  Board,  like  the Claims  Officer, ultimately. held that no amount at all  was payable under the second mortgage. It will be seen that both the Claims Officer, as well as the Board have come to an identical conclusion in favour of  the mortgagor,  viz.,  that  no  amount  is  payable  under  the mortgage of December 18,1906.  While the Claims Officer came to  the  conclusion by applying S. 17 of  the  Money-Lenders

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Act,  the  Board,  on  the  other  hand,  reached  the  same conclusion,  by applying ss. 10 and 11 of the  Money-Lenders Act read with S. 20(1) of the Abolition Act.  The mortgagee- appellant has come to this Court, challenging this  decision of the Board that no amounts are due by the mortgagor  under the mortgage of December 18, 1906. Though,  in this Court, on behalf of the  mortgagors-respon- dents, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, learned counsel, has challenged the correctness  of  the decision of the Board  about  the  non- applicability of S. 17  of the Money-Lenders Act, we do  not think it necessary to go 250 into  that aspect, because we are accepting  his  contention that  the Board was justified in holding that  the  mortgage has  been  extinguished under ss. 10 and It  of  the  Money- Lenders Act. Before  we advert to the contentions of Mr. B. Sen,  learned counsel  for the appellant, it is necessary to refer to  the material provisions of the two Acts, referred to above. The  Money-Lenders  Act has been enacted in  1939;  and  the preamble   says  that  it  was  found  expedient,   by   the Legislature,  to regulate money-lending transactions and  to grant  relief to debtors in the State of Orissa.  Section  9 provides the maximum rates at which interest may be decreed. Sub-ss.  (1)  and (2) of s. 10, which are relevant  for  our purpose, are as follows :                "10.  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  to  the               contrary  contained  in any other  law  or  in               anything  having  the force of law or  in  any               other  contract, no Court shall, in any  suit,               whether  brought by a money-lender or  by  any               other  person, in respect of a  loan  advanced               before or after the commencement of this  Act,               pass  a decree for an amount of  interest  for               the  period preceding the institution  of  the               suit  which, together with any amount  already               realised   as   interest  through   Court   or               otherwise,  is greater than the amount of  the               loan originally advanced.                (2)  Where, in any suit, as is referred to in               sub-section  (1), it is found that the  amount               already realised as interest through Court  or               otherwise,   for  the  period  preceding   the               institution  of the suit, is greater than  the               amount  of  the loan originally  advanced,  so               much  of the said amount of interest as is  in               excess  of  the  loan  shall  be  appropriated               towards  the satisfaction of the loan and  the               Court  shall pass a decree for the payment  of               the balance of the loan, if any." Sub-s.  (3)  of s. 10 gives jurisdiction  to  the  executing Court  to  grant similar appropriate  relief.   Section  11, again,  enables  the Court to re-open  the  transaction  and appropriate excess interest towards the loan. In particular, it will be seen, that under sub-s. (2) of  S. 10, extracted above, if it is found that the amount  already realised  as interest through Court, or otherwise,  for  the period  preceding  the institution of the suit,  is  greater than  the  amount  of the loan originally  advanced,  it  is necessary  to  appropriate towards the satisfaction  of  the loan, so much of the said amount of interest as is in excess of  the loan, and the Court can pass a decree only  for  the payment  of the balance of the loan, if any.   Pausing  here for a moment, 251

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it  may be stated that, in this case, the mortgagor, when  a demand was made for payment of the amount by the  mortgagee, has, by his letter dated September 14, 1947, repudiated  his liability, relying on these provisions of the  Money-Lenders Act. Coming to the Abolition Act, S. 18 provides for a  creditor, whose  debt is secured by a mortgage or is a charge  on  any estate  or any part thereof vested in the State  Government, to apply to the Claims Officer for determining the amount of debt  ’legally and justly payable’ to each such creditor  in respect  of his claim.  Sub-sections (1) and (2), of s.  20, of the Abolition Act, which are material, are as follows :                "20.  (1)  The  Claims  Officer,  shall,   in               accordance   with   the   rules    prescribed,               determine  the  principal amount  legally  and               justly  due to each creditor and the  interest               (if any) due at the date of such determination               in respect of such principal amount.                (2)  In determining the principal amount  and               interest  under  sub-section (1),  the  Claims               Officer shall, notwithstanding the  provisions               of  any  agreement  or law  to  the  contrary,               proceed in the following  manner                (a)  he  shall  ascertain the amount  of  the               principal  originally advanced in  each  case,               irrespective  of  the  closing  of   accounts,               execution  of fresh bonds, or decree or  order               of a Court;                (b)  he  shall  ascertain the amount  of  the               interest  already paid or realised  and  shall               set  off towards the amount of  the  principal               any amount paid or realised as simple interest               in  excess of six per centum per annum or  the               stipulated  rate  of  interest  whichever   is               lower;                (c)  he  shall separately specify the  amount               of  the  principal  and  the  amount  of   the               interest,  if any, due to the  creditor,  such               interest   being   calculated  at   the   rate               mentioned  in clause (b) and being limited  to               the   amount  of  the   principal   originally               advanced;                (d)  if  he  finds,  that  in  any  case  the               creditor  has received or realised by  way  of               interest  an amount equal to or more than  the               amount  of the principal, he shall  not  allow               any further interest to run on such principal;                Explanation : In the case (if a  usufructuary               mortgage,  or a lease executed in lieu  of  an               advance  made of an estate or in the  case  of               possession of such estate or part thereof by a               widow  in  lieu  of her dower  debt,  the  net               amount of rents and profits accruing from such               estate shall be deemed to be the ;Interest for               the purposes of this section. 252                (e)  in  other  cases,  the  amount  of   the               principal   ascertained  to  be  due  to   the               claimant shall carry interest at such rate not               exceeding  six per centum per annum as may  be               prescribed by the State Government;                (f)  no  future  interest shall  run  on  any               interest ascertained to be due to a creditor." Mr.  B. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant, attacks  the order of the Board, applying the provisions of ss. 10 and 11

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of  the MoneyLenders Act, to the transaction in question.  . According  to the learned counsel, these provisions  do  not apply,  when a claim is made by a secured creditor before  a Claims Officer, and which claim is adjudicated upon by  that Officer  exercising  his  special  jurisdiction  under   the Abolition Act.  According to learned counsel, the  Abolition Act  is a self-contained Code and, in particular,  has  very elaborately laid down, in s. 20, the various matters,  which alone could be taken into account, by the Claims Officer, in determining  the  principal  amount  and  interest  that  is payable  to a creditor.  Counsel points out that the  Claims Officer,   exercising   jurisdiction  under   this   special enactment,  viz.,  the Abolition Act, can have,  and  should have, recourse only to the provisions of that statute.   Mr. Sen  also points out that there is absolutely no  indication in the Abolition Act that the Claims Officer can, take  into account  provisions  contained  in  the  Money-Lenders  Act. Inasmuch  as the Legislature has not made the provisions  of the  Money-Lenders Act applicable to proceedings  under  the Abolition  Act,  Mr.  Sen points out, the  Board  has  acted illegally  in applying the provisions of  the  Money-Lenders Act and, in consequence, holding in favour of the mortgagor. Counsel  also  points  out that the provisions  in  the  two statutes   cannot  be  applied  in  respect  of   the   same transaction;   because,   the   provisions   regarding   the adjudication  of  a claim under the Money-Lenders  Act  will have  to  be done on a basis entirely  different  from  that contained  in  the  Abolition  Act.   Therefore,  the  short contention,  of the learned counsel, is that ss.  IO and  II of the Money-Lenders Act should not have been applied at all so as to non-suit his client. Mr.  Sanghi,  learned counsel for the  respondents,  on  the other hand, pointed out that the mortgagor had, as early  as 1947,  repudiated his liability under the mortgage,  relying on the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act.  In the  absence of any indication in the Abolition Act that a debtor  cannot avail   himself  of  relief  granted  to  him  under   other ameliorative measures-in this case, the MoneyLenders Act-the Board,  according  to the learned  counsel,  was  perfectly, justified in applying ss. 10 and 11 of the Money-Lenders Act to  find out whether at all any principal amount was due  to the mortgagee.  Counsel also points out that the object of a claim  being filed by a creditor, like the appellant is,  as indicated in S. 18(1)(a) 253 of  the  Abolition Act, for the purpose of  determining  the amount of   debt, ’legally and justly payable, to each  such creditor  in respect of his claim’.  Counsel further  points out that, even under s. 20(1) of the Abolition Act, the duty of the Claims Officer is to determine  the principal  amount ’legally and justly due’ to each creditor.  For the  purpose of  adjudicating on the claim of the appellant, and  finding out what is the principal amount, ’legally and.justly due to him,  the Board was perfectly justified in relying upon  the provisions  of the Money Lenders Act.  Counsel  also  points out that if, by applying the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act,  the liability of the mortgagor is extinguished,  that, certainly,  will  clearly show that there  is  no  principal amount  ’legally  and justly due’ to the appellant.  If  the appellant  had  instituted a suit in the  Orissa  Courts  to enforce  his claim on this mortgage, the Courts  would  have certainly  applied the provisions of the  Money-Lenders  Act and  held  that the appellant’s claim  had  been  satisfied. Because  of  the  fact  that the claim  is  made  under  the Abolition  Act,  counsel points out that it could  not  have

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been  the intention of the Legislature to make the  position of  creditors, like the appellant, better than it  is  under the MoneyLenders Act. Though  we are not inclined to accept the reasons  given  by the  Board for applying the provisions of ss. 10 and  11  of the  MoneyLenders  Act, we are, nevertheless,  in  agreement with the views expressed by the Board that those  provisions can  be  applied- If so, the conclusion arrived  at  by  the Board, that the mortgage liability has been extinguished, is correct.   We do, no doubt, see force in the  contention  of the  learned  counsel, for the appellant, that there  is  no specific provision in the Abolition Act making any reference to  the Money-Lenders Act.  We are also conscious  that  the Abolition  Act does lay down some principles in clauses  (a) to  (f)  of  sub-s.  (2) of s. 20, as  to  how  exactly  the calculation  has  to  be  made.   There  is  also  a  slight difference  in  the  method of calculation  adopted  by  the Money-Lenders Act and the Abolition Act.  But, notwithstand- ing these circumstances, we are of opinion that, in order to determine  ’the principal amount legally and justly  due  to each  creditor’  as laid down in s. 20(1) of  the  Abolition Act,  it  is  the duty of the Claims  Officer  to  find  out whether,  in respect of a claim that is made by a  creditor, there is a legal impediment for recognising the same,  i.e., whether  the  claim is such which will be  recognised  by  a Judicial Tribunal. The  legislature  emphasises  upon this aspect  even  in  s. 18(1)(a) of the Abolition Act.  The purpose of a claim being made by a secured creditor, under s. 18(1)(a) is, as we have already  pointed  out, ’for the purpose of  determining  the amount of debt legally and .justly payable to each  creditor in  respect  of  his  claim’.   The  same  idea  is,  again, reiterated by the legislature in s. 20(1) of the Aboli- 254 tion  Act when it makes it obligatory on the Claims  Officer ’to  determine the principal amount, legally and justly  due to each creditor’.  No rules, as contemplated under s. 20(1) of the Abolition Act, have been brought to our notice.   The expression  ’legally and justly due must, certainly, in  our opinion,  mean  that  before a claim is  recognized  by  the Claims  Officer  he  must be satisfied  that  the  principal amount  covered  by that claim is ’legally and  justly  due’ i.e., that such a claim, if sought to be enforced in a Court or  Judicial  Tribunal, will find recognition on  the  basis that it does not suffer from any legal infirmity. In this case, even according to the appellant, in respect of the  principal amount of pound 77,500/- advanced  under  the mortgage  of December 18, 1906, admittedly, a sum  of  pound 1,77,349-18-0  has been received by him as  interest.   This amount is more than two times the principal amount  advanced under  this  mortgage.  If, in spite of  this,  the  present claim had been made for recovery of further amounts, on  the basis  of this mortgage, by the appellant, in any Court,  it is  needless to state that the Court would have applied  the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act.  By applying ss. 10 and 11 of this Act, the Court would have come to the  conclusion that  the  appellant  is not entitled to  recover  any  more amounts  inasmuch as the entire claim must be considered  to have been satisfied by the respondent, having paid a sum  of pound  1,77,349-18-0  by way of interest.  That  means,  the Court  would  have come to the conclusion  that  no  further amounts,  by way of principal, are ’legally and justly  due’ to the appellant; and, quite naturally, the further finding, would be that no interest at all is due.  If no Court  would have recognized the present claim of the appellant, the same

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principles  must  be applicable when the Claims  Officer  is also  called upon, under s. 20(1) of the Abolition Act,  ’to determine the principal amount legally and justly due’.  For the  purpose of determining whether the principal amount  is ’legally and justly due’, he would be perfectly justified in relying  on  any provisions of other statutes  bearing  upon that subject-in this particular case, the provisions of  the Money-Lenders Act. Mr.B.Sen,  learned  counsel,  has urged  that  in  order  to consider a claim made by the  creditor, the jurisdiction  of the Claims Officer is restricted, by the various  provisions contained in clauses (a) to (f) of s. 20(2) of the Abolition Act.  We are not inclined to accept this large contention of the  learned counsel for the appellant.  For instance, if  a plea  of  discharge is raised by a debtor in  a  claim  pro- ceeding, or, if a plea is raised by a debtor that the  claim is barred by the law of Limitation, no provision is made  in clauses  (a) to (f) of s. 20(2) giving jurisdiction  to  the Claims  Officer  either to entertain such  objection  or  to investigate the same.  Acceptance of the contentions of the’ learned counsel for the appellant, will lead to this 255 conclusion  that  when a claim is made under  the  Abolition Act,  the  Claims  Officer  will  have,  straight  away,  to determine  the. principal amount and interest  under  sub-s. (2) of S. 20 without considering the question as to  whether the claim is true or whether it is barred by any other  law, or  whether  the claim is still subsisting.  These  are  all matters   which,   in  our  opinion,  property   arise   for consideration  when  a Claims Officer has to  determine  the principal  amount under S. 20(1) of the Abolition Act.   The expression ’legally and justly due’, occurring in S.  20(1), clearly  indicates  that the first and initial duty  of  the Claims  Officer is to find out whether any principal  amount is  at  all  due to the creditor which  he  is  entitled  to recover  either  in law or justly.  It may  be  that,  after arriving,  on this aspect, at a conclusion, one way  or  the other, and depending upon that decision, the Claims  Officer will  have  to adjudicate upon the rights  of  the  parties, having  due  regard  to the  various  matters  mentioned  in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-s. (2) of S. 20.  We are therefore satisfied  that the Board is correct when it, held that  the provisions  of  the  Money-Lenders Act  can  be  taken  into account  by  the  Claims  Officer, under  S.  20(1)  of  the Abolition  Act.  If the provisions of the  MoneyLenders  Act apply,  as they have been applied by the Board, there is  no controversy  that the claim under the mortgage  of  December 18,  1906, must be considered to have been extinguished  and that no further amounts will be due, as held by the Board. The  result is that the appeal fails and is  dismissed.   In the .circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. G.C.                               Appeal dismissed. 256