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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3989 of 2007

PETITIONER: Indian Bank & Anr

RESPONDENT: N. Venkatramani

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/08/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & H.S. Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3989                OF 2007 [Arising out of  SLP (Civil) No. 19062 of 2005]

S.B. SINHA, J :          1.      Leave granted.

2.     Meaning of the term "broken period" for the purpose of grant of  pension while implementing a voluntary retirement scheme is the question  involved herein.

3.      Respondent was working with the appellant \026 Bank.  The terms and  conditions of grant of pension to the employees of the Bank are governed by  the Indian Bank Employee’s Pension Regulation 1995 (for short "the  Regulation"); Regulation 28 whereof, as amended with effect from  8.06.2002, reads as under:

"28. Superannuation Pension                  Superannuation pension shall be granted to  an employee who has retired on his attaining the  age of superannuation specified in the Service  Regulations or Settlements.

       Provided that, with effect from 1st day of  September, 2000 pension shall also be granted to  an employee who opts to retire before attaining the  age of superannuation, but after rendering service  for a minimum period of 15 years in terms of any  Scheme that may be framed for such purpose by  the Board with the approval of the Government."

4.      A voluntary retirement scheme was floated by the bank on 9.11.2000.   Respondent requested for his voluntary retirement.  It was accepted by an  order dated 10.02.2001.  By then, he had completed 14 years, 9 months and  17 days of service.  He filed an application for grant of pension on the  premise that he was eligible therefor.  It was rejected on the ground that he  had not completed 15 years of service.  A writ petition filed by him was  dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court.  An intra- court appeal filed thereagainst has been allowed by a Division Bench of the  High Court by reason of the impugned judgment directing:

"Accordingly, while setting aside the order  impugned in the Writ Petition, we direct the  respondent to grant pensionary benefits under

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IBVRS 2000 as per the above referred to  Regulations.  The arrears of pension payable to the  petitioner are liable to be settled with interest.  As  far as payment of interest is concerned, inasmuch  as the petitioner ought to have been paid pension  on the date when he was relieved from the services  i.e. on 10.2.2001 and since for no fault of the  petitioner, he was deprived of the benefits of  pension, we are of the view that the petitioner is  entitled for interest on the arrears from the date of  his superannuation till the date of its payments..."

 5.      Mr. Raju Ramchandran, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the appellant submitted that the High Court committed a manifest error in  coming to the aforementioned conclusion as it failed to take into  consideration that qualifying service for obtaining a pension was minimum  fifteen years of service and Regulation 18 providing for ’broken period’  would not come within the purview thereof.  

6.      Regulation 28 of the Regulations provides for grant of superannuation  pension.  Regulation 29 provides for pension on voluntary retirement after  an employee has completed 20 years of qualifying service, clause (5)  whereof reads as under:

"The qualifying service of an employee retiring  voluntarily under this regulation shall be increased  by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the  condition that the total qualifying service rendered  by such employee shall not in any case exceed  thirty-three year and it does not take him beyond  the date of superannuation."

7.      Although the respondent has not superannuated in terms of the said  scheme, he has taken his voluntary retirement under the voluntary retirement  scheme in terms whereof an ex gratia payment equivalent to sixty days’  salary was to be paid apart from the other benefits, viz., gratuity payment or  leave encashment, which are as under:

"1.     Gratuity as per Gratuity Act/Service  Gratuity as the case may be

2       Pension (including commuted value of  pension) as per Indian Bank (Employees’)  Pension Regulations 1995/Bank’s  contribution towards PF as per rules.

3       Leave encashment as per rules."

8.     The matter relating to pension is governed by the pension regulations.   

9.      We may notice that although various provisions have been made  providing for qualifying service to which our attention has been drawn by  Mr. Raju Ramchandran, the manner in which the period of service is to be  measured is contained in Regulation 18 of the Regulations which reads as  under:

       "Broken period of service of less than one  year:-  If the period of service of an employee  includes broken period of service less than one  year, then if such broken period is more than six  months, it shall be treated as one year and if such  broken period is six months or less it shall be

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ignored."

10.     The term "broken lot" has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,  Sixth Edition, page 193, in the following terms:

"Broken lot. Odd lot; less than the usual unit of  measurement or unit of sale; e.g. less than 100  shares of stock."

11.     A person apart from being entitled to receive a superannuation  pension, was also entitled to pro-rata pension if he completes a period of ten  years of service.

12.     A circular letter was issued by the appellant itself on 11.12.2000  which is in the following terms:

       "VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT SCHEME  IN PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS-AMENDMENTS  TO BANK (EMPLOYEES’) PENSION  REGULATIONS, 1995

       Please refer to our circular letter No.  PD/CIR/76/G2/933 dated 31st August, 2000  conveying the No Objection of the Government to  banks adopting and implementing a voluntary  retirement scheme for employees on the lines of  what was contained in the Annexure to the  circular.

       As per the Scheme, an employee who is  eligible and applies for voluntary retirement is  entitled for the benefit of CPF, Pension, Gratuity  and encashment of accumulated privilege leave, as  per rules.

       Bank (Employers’) Pension Regulations,  1995 do not have provisions enabling payment of  pension to an employee who retires before  attaining the age of superannuation except under  circumstances as in Regulations 29, 30, 32 and 33.   We had, therefore, taken up Regulations by way of  amendments to Regulation 28 so that employees  who retire as above under special adhoc schemes  formulated by the banks after serving for a  prescribed minimum period would be eligible for  prorata pension.  

       Government of India has after examining the  proposal conveyed its approval and desires that  IBA advise banks to make necessary amendment  to their pension regulations as in the Annexures.   We request banks to take note accordingly.   

       Please note that with the above amendments  employees who apply for voluntary retirement  after having rendered a minimum of 15 years of  service under a special/adhoc scheme formulated  with the specific approval of the Government and  the Board of Directors, will be eligible for pro-rata  pension for the period of service rendered as if  they are to retire on attaining the age of  superannuation on that date."

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        13.     It may be true that various provisions of the Regulations as for  example Regulations 16, 17, 19, 23, etc. provided for qualifying service.   Regulation 18 is not controlled by any of the said provisions.  It does not  brook any restrictive interpretation.  It only provides for a rule of  measurement.  An employee, as noticed hereinbefore, was entitled to  pension provided he has completed the specified period of service.  How  such a period of service would be computed is a matter which is governed  by the statute.  It is one thing to say that a statute provides for completion of  fifteen years of minimum service, but if a provision provides for  measurement of the period, the same cannot be lost sight of.  Provision of  the Regulations which are beneficial in nature, in our opinion, should be  construed liberally.

14.     In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bathu Prakasa Rao and Others [(1976)  3 SCC 301], this Court held:

"35. The District Judge had reached the conclusion  that, quite apart from these technically prescribed  tests for the purposes of grading, by the  Directorate of Marketing and Inspection, the  commonsense test was that at least 50% must be  broken in order to constitute what could pass as a  marketable consignment of "broken rice". He had  also made the necessary allowances for foreign  matter. We do not think that the test adopted by the  District and Sessions Judge was either incorrect or  unreasonable. Indeed, we think that the High Court  was quite unjustified in interfering with this test on  what seems to us like metaphysical reasoning to  justify its view that, where the quantities of the  whole grains and broken grains in a consignment  cannot be accurately determined, the consignment  should be deemed to be no longer one of rice  which requires a permit. The learned Attorney  General has rightly pointed out to us that at no  earlier stage was it the case of the millers that mere  mixture of some broken rice with some whole rice  is enough to constitute the whole consignment into  one of broken rice or of substance which was not  "rice" at all. In our opinion, the High Court has  quite erroneously held that such mixtures do not  fall within the mischief provided for by the  Regulation Order of 1964."

       A person, thus, otherwise entitled to the benefit of a beneficial  provision of a statute should not ordinarily be deprived therefrom.

15.     Mr. Raju Ramchandran has relied upon a decision of this Court in  Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta [(2005) 2 SCC 271] wherein while  interpreting the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it was held:

"21. Sections 14A or 14D carve out an exception  to Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The said provisions  envisage recovery of immediate possession of the  tenanted premises by (i) the members of Armed  Forces, (ii) the Central Government and Delhi  Administration employees who have retired or  who would be retiring and (iii) where the landlord  is a widow. All the aforementioned provisions  refer to the immediate necessity of the landlord.  22. The provisions contained in Section 14A or  14D being in the nature of exception to the main  provision, they must be construed strictly."

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       But, in our opinion, Regulation 28, as such, does not provide for an  exception.  If it is to be a rule of measurement, there is no reason as to why a  literal interpretation would be impermissible.

16.    In Nathi Devi (supra), this court held:

"14. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a  statute, effort should be made to give effect to each  and every word used by the Legislature. The  Courts always presume that the Legislature  inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the  legislative intention is that every part of the statute  should have effect. A construction which attributes  redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted  except for compelling reasons such as obvious  drafting errors. .. 15. It is well settled that literal interpretation  should be given to a statute if the same does not  lead to an absurdity."

17.     In any event, it is not a case where we should exercise our  discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

       In ONGC Ltd. v. Sendhabhai Vastram Patel and Others [(2005) 6  SCC 454], this Court held:

"It is now well settled that the High Courts and the  Supreme Court while exercising their equity  jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 of the  Constitution as also Article 136 thereof may not  exercise the same in appropriate cases.  While  exercising such jurisdiction, the superior courts in  India even may not strike down a wrong order only  because it would be lawful to do so.  A  discretionary relief may be refused to be extended  to the appellant in a given case although the Court  may find the same to be justified in law.  [See  S.D.S. Shipping (P) Ltd. Vs. Jay Container  Services Co. (P) Ltd.]"

18.     For the reasons aforementioned, no case has been made out for  interference of the impugned judgment.  The appeal is dismissed with costs.   Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.