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PETITIONER: INDERJEET

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/08/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1867            1980 SCR  (1) 255  1979 SCC  (4) 246  CITATOR INFO :  R          1989 SC1011  (14)

ACT:      Statutory standardised sentence-Absolute liability with mandatory minimum sentence of six months’ R.I. of offender’s guilt of  sale of adulterated food, whether constitutionally bad, offending  Articles 14,  19 and  21-Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act, Section 7 read with Section 16, vires of.      Dismissing the Writ Petition, the Court

HEADNOTE:      HELD: Section  7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is constitutionally valid. [257G]      Policy is  for Parliament, constitutionality is for the Court. Protection of public health and regulation of noxious trade  belong   to  the   police  power  of  the  State  and Legislation like  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is of that genre. [256F-G]      If a  sentence, as in the instant Act, is prescribed as a mandatory  minimum and  that is  too cruel to comport with Art. 21  and too torturesome to be reasonably justifiable or socially defensible  under  Article  19,  then  a  case  for judicial review may arise. [256 G-H]      Judge-proof sentencing  is not  per se  bad.  Sometimes judicial  fluctuations  in  punishment,  especially  on  the softer side  where  white  collar  criminals  are  involved, induce legislative  standardization of  sentences, to  avoid giving societal protection in hostage to fortune. There is a wide play still left for the Court, and mandatory minima are familiar from the days of the Penal Code. [256H, 257A]      The prescription  of equal  protection is  not breached either, because  within the range of judicial discretion the Court deals  out to  each  what  he  deserves  according  to established principles. [257B] Observation           (a)  Public   authorities   entrusted   with   the                enforcement  of   regulatory  provisions   to                protect society may, in proper cases, examine                those prosecutions  which are  harassments to                the humbler  folk even  if  they  technically                violate the  law and  cause only minimal harm                to society  and decide whether they should at

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              all sanction their prosecution. [257D-E]           (b)  The Legislature,  in  its  wisdom,  may  also                consider the  advisability of  resting  power                somewhere to  reduce the sentence without the                bigger offender  escaping through these wider                meshes meant  for the smaller offenders. Even                otherwise, there  is a  general power  in the                Executive to commute sentences and such power                can be  put into action on a principled basis                when small  men get caught by the law. [257E-                F] 256

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 449 of 1979      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      R. K. Garg and D. K. Garg for the Petitioner.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA    IYER,    J.-The    adventurous    petitioner imaginatively challenges  the vires  of Section  7 read with Section 16  of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act and the relevant  rules framed  thereunder. The  gravamen of his charge is  that the  above provisions, read together, impose an  inflexible  minimum  sentence  of  six  months  R.I.  of offender’s guilty  of sale of adulterated food, excluding in the process  even the need to prove mens rea in the accused. This absolute  liability, with mandatory sentence, dependent on sophisticated chemical tests and complicated formulae, is oppressively  unreasonable   in  the   illiterate,  agrestic realities of  little  Indian  retail  trade.  Such,  in  one sentence, is the submission of counsel.      The primary  props to support this broad submission may be briefly  noticed. Counsel  complains  that  there  is  no classification as between injurious pollutants and innocuous adulterants while proscribing the sentence. Nor is there any intelligent differentiation  between petty dealers and giant offenders, and  vendors, big  and  small,  are  put  on  the Procrustean bed  of stern  punishment alike. Articles 14, 19 and 21  are the constitutional artillery employed by counsel to shoot down the said provisions of the Act.      Frankly, we  are not  impressed with  the consternation about  the  constitutionality  even  if  the  potential  for victimisation affecting  smaller  people  may  be  real  and elicit our  commiseration. We  may dwell for a moment on the latter grievance  against the  law a little later. First, we will repel the vice of unconstitutionality.      Let us  be  clear  about  the  basics.  Policy  is  for Parliament, constitutionality  for the  Court. Protection of public health  and regulation of noxious trade belong to the police  power   of  the   State  and  legislation  like  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is of that genre.      If a  sentence, as  here, is  prescribed as a mandatory minimum and  that is  too cruel  to comport with Art. 21 and too torturesome  to be  reasonably justifiable  or  socially defensible under Art. 19 then a case for judicial review may arise. But  we see  none here.  Nor can we agree that judge- proof sentencing is per se bad. Sometimes judicial 257 fluctuations in  punishment, especially  on the  softer side where  white   collar   criminals   are   involved,   induce legislative standardisation  of sentences,  to avoid  giving societal protection  in hostage  to fortune. There is a wide play still  left for  the court,  and mandatory  minima  are

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familiar from  the days  of the  Penal Code (Vide Sec. 302). The prescription of equal protection is not breached either, because within  the range  of judicial  discretion the court deals out  to each what he deserves according to established principles.      Shri R.  K. Garg  feelingly urged that the poor and the weak, who  are the  larger, lower  sector of retail traders, will have  to suffer  the standardised  imprisonment if Food Inspectors can  challan them  in Court  and, on  some  minor variation in the chemical composition of food sold, get them convicted sans  mens rea  merely because,  along the  chain, some bigger  trader has  fobbed off  inferior commodities on them. We  are disturbed  that it  is possible that small men become the  victims of  harsh law when there is no executive policy  which   guides  prosecution   of  offenders.   Petty victuallers and  big sharks  operate on society in different degrees and  draconian equality will be tempered by flexible policy.      This is  a matter  of penal policy in constitutionality and so it is, in a sense, out of bounds for judicial advice. Even  so,   we  feel   constrained  to   state  that  public authorities entrusted  with the  enforcement  of  regulatory provisions to  protect society may, in proper cases, examine those prosecutions which are harassments to the humbler folk even if  they technically  violate the  law and  cause  only minimal harm  to society  and decide  whether they should at all sanction  their prosecution.  The  Legislature,  in  its wisdom, may  also consider the advisability of resting power somewhere to reduce the sentence without the bigger offender escaping through  these wider  meshes meant  for the smaller offenders. Even  otherwise, there  is a general power in the Executive to  commute sentences  and such  power can  be put into action  on a principled basis when small men get caught by the law.      We  dismiss   the  Writ  petition  since  there  is  no constitutional invalidity made out and the grounds urged are more appropriately  an appeal  to  the  Parliament  and  the Executive. V.D.K.                                   Petition dismissed. 258