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PETITIONER: INDER MOHAN LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMESH KHANNA

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/08/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1986            1987 SCR  (3) 765  1987 SCC  (4)   1        JT 1987 (3)   246  1987 SCALE  (2)196  CITATOR INFO :  F          1987 SC1996  (9,13)  RF         1989 SC 162  (6)  APL        1989 SC 458  (9,11)  R          1990 SC 325  (18)  E          1990 SC1725  (19)  RF         1991 SC1233  (5)  R          1992 SC1555  (2,7,18)

ACT:      Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958:  s.   21--Requirements of--Permission    to   let   out   premises   for    limited period--Validity  of--Reason for landlord’s  non-requirement of    premises--Whether    to   be    stated-Agreement    in writing--Whether to be registered.     Practice & Procedure: View taken by the High Court  over a number of years----Should normally be adhered to.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant made an application before the Rent  Con- troller on or about July 15, 1976 to let out the premises to the respondent for residential purposes for a period of  two years under s. 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as  he did not require the premises for that period. The respondent agreed before the Rent Controller to the above statement  of the appellant and undertook to vacate the premises after the expiry  of  two years from July 15, 1976.  Accordingly,  the Rent Controller made an order allowing creation of a limited tenancy  for a period of two years from July 15,  1976.  The respondent  having refused to vacate the premises after  two years,  the  appellant filed an application under s.  21  on behalf of himself and his family members claiming possession of  the premises for their bona fide need and use. The  Rent Controller passed an eviction order and the Appellate Tribu- nal upheld the same.     The  High  Court allowing the appeal of  the  tenant-re- spondent  held that the order under s. 21 of the Act  was  a mindless  order inasmuch as no reason had been stated as  to why the premises in question was not required for a  limited period,  that  it was not stated as to how the  premises  in question was dealt with before creating the said tenancy and that there was no writing and no lease registered after  the

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permission was granted. Allowing the appeal by special leave, 766     HELD: 1.1 The permission granted by the Rent  Controller under  s.  21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was  valid.  The order  permitting limited tenancy was not a  mindless  order but  one passed by him after taking the relevant facts  into consideration. [780D] 1.2  In order to attract s. 21 of the Act, it  is  necessary firstly  that  the landlord must not  require  the  premises either  in whole or part for a particular period;  secondly, the landlord must obtain the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner; thirdly, letting of the whole or part of  the  premises must be for residence, and  fourthly  such letting  out  must be for such period as may  be  agreed  in writing. These and these alone are the conditions which  are required to be fulfilled. [772G-773B]     1.3 Section 21 only gives sanction if the landlord makes a statement to the satisfaction of the Court and the  tenant accepts that the landlord does not require the premises  for a  limited  period. This statement of the landlord  must  be bona fide. The purpose must be residence. There must not  be any fraud or collusion. There is a presumption of  regulari- ty. But it is open in particular facts and circumstances  of the case to prove to the satisfaction of the executing court that there was collusion or conspiracy between the  landlord and the tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was a fraud or that the tenant agreed because he was wholly unequal to the landlord. [776F-H]     1.4  In the instant case there was no permission  previ- ously.  This  was the first letting. There was  no  evidence that  when the landlord stated that he did not  require  the premises  in  question for a particular period, he  did  not mean  what he said or that he made a false statement.  There was no evidence at any stage that the tenant did not  under- stand  what  the  landlord was stating or that  he  did  not accept what the landlord stated. There was no evidence  that either the tenant was in collusion or perpetrating any fraud with the landlord or the tenant was unequal to the  landlord in  bargaining  powers. There was thus no evidence  to  show that  the  Controller did not apply his mind.  [779F,  776H- 777B]     S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 281; Nagindas  Ramdass v. Dalpatram Ichharam, [1974] 2  SCR  544; V.S.  Rahi  and another v. Smt. Ram Chambeli, [1984]  2  SCR 290; J.R. Vohra v. India Export House Pvt. Ltd. and another, [1985] 2 SCR 899 and Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986]  3 SCC 1, referred to 2. It is not necessary to state under s. 21 the reasons  why the 767 landlord  did not require the premises in question for.  any particular period. The landlord or the tenant may be able to show that cogent reasons did exist or were within the knowl- edge  of the parties as to why the landlord did not  require the whole or a part of his premises for a specified  period. [777BC, 782B]     3. There is no presumption that in all cases the tenants are  the  weaker sections. The presumption is, on  the  con- trary,  in favour of sanction. It is he who  challenges  the statement  and the admission of the landlord or  the  tenant who has to establish facts. In the instant case the onus was on  the tenant to show that the sanction under s. 21  was  a nullity.  He did not make any attempt to dislodge  the  pre- sumption in favour of the permission. [777C, 779F]

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   4.1  An  agreement in writing submitted along  with  the application  under  s. 21 of the Act is  really  a  proposed agreement.  It  comes into effect only after  the  grant  of permission. It does not require registration. [782CD]     S.B.  Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1981] 1  SCR  281, referred to.     Vijay  Kumar Bajaj v. Inder Sain Minocha, [1982] 2  Rent Control Reporter 392, approved.     4.2  It  has been consistently held by  the  Delhi  High Court  that  s. 21 is a code by itself, that  the  order  of permission  is  itself an authority and that  no  lease  was necessary. This view has been acted upon for long and trans- actions  have been completed in the Union Territory  on  the basis of permission and it was never doubted that there  was any requirement of any lease or any agreement subsequent  to the order and the same required registration. The view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally  be adhered  to and not to be disturbed. A different view  would not  only introduce an element of uncertainty and  confusion but it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which  might  have been entered into on the faith  of  those decisions. [780A-C]     Raj  Narain  Pandey and others v. Sant Prasad  Tewari  & others, [1973] 2 SCR 835 and Kasturi Lal v. Shiv Charan  Das Mathur, [1976] 8 Rent Control Reporter 703, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  468  of 1987. 768     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 19.7.  1985  of  the Delhi High Court in Second Appeal No. 374 of 1980.     Madan  Bhatia,  N.D.B.  Raju and Vineet  Kumar  for  the Appellant.     Dr. L.M. Singhvi, K.B. Rohtagi, Praveen Jain and  Baldev Atreya for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave  is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated 19th  of July, 1985. The appellant had. made an  application on or about 15th of July, 1976 before the Rent Controller to let out the premises for a period of two years under section 21  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter  called ’the  Rent  Act’). The Rent Controller after  recording  the statements of the appellant and the respondent made an order permitting creation of limited tenancy only for a period  of two  years for residential purposes to which the  respondent had  agreed  upon. It may be material to refer to  the  fact that  the appellant in his application under section  21  of the Rent Act had stated as follows:                        "1 do not require the premises for  a               period of two years from 15.7.76. The  purpose               of  letting shall be residential only and  the               premises  are shown in the site plan Ex.  A-1.               The  proposed  agreement is Ex.  A-2.  Limited               tenancy  under  section 21 of the Act  may  be               allowed to be created for the said period."                   The  respondent  agreed to  the  aforesaid               statement and stated as follows:               "I have heard the statement of the  petitioner               and  I accept it as correct. I have no  objec-               tion.  I shall vacate the premises  after  the               expiry of two years from 15.7.76. The  purpose

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             of letting shall be residential only".               Upon  this  the  Rent  Controller  passed  the               following order:                        "This  is an application filed  under               section 21 of the Act for permission to create               limited tenancy for a period of two years from               15.7.76. The-purpose of letting shall be               769               residential only and the premises is shown  in               the site plan Ex. A-1. The proposed  agreement               is Ex. A-2. From the perusal of the statements               of  the  parties  I am satisfied  that  as  at               present  the petitioner does not  require  the               premises.  Therefore, limited tenancy  is  al-               lowed to be created for a period of two  years               from 15.7.76."     The appellant filed an application on 6th November, 1978 for eviction of the respondent as the respondent had refused to vacate the premises in spite of his statement made before the  Rent Controller. The appellant filed an application  on the said date under section 21 of the Rent Act on behalf  of himself  and his family members claiming possession  of  the premises  for  their bona fide need and use.  The  appellant contended that he (the appellant) was a retired official and was living in a rented house while the respondent was a rich man doing business in jewellery and was also owning a  house in  Delhi. In the application made under section 21  of  the Rent Act the appellant had stated that the appellant owned a newly  built house in the New Friends Colony  comprising  of dining, drawing, three bed rooms with attached bath rooms, a study  room, family lounge and a garage. The  appellant  had further stated that he did not require the premises for  the personal residence for a period of two years. The  appellant had also stated in that application, that the appellant  had agreed to let it out to the respondent for the first time on the terms and conditions set out in the proposed lease  deed for a period of two years. It was stated that the respondent had  heard the statement and recorded that he had no  objec- tion  and  would  vacate the premises after  expiry  of  two years.  Subsequently, when the second appeal was pending  in the Delhi High Court, the appellant had filed an application for  early  hearing  in which he had stated  that  when  the construction  of  the house in question  was  completed  the appellant’s  father R.B. Nanak Chand, advocate, was old  and alone  (the  appellant’s mother had died earlier  and  other brother and sister being away from Delhi) and in view of his father’s ailing health the appellant was living with him  in the  rented  premises at 4-Flag Staff Road,  Delhi  to  look after  his  old and ailing father. It was in  those  circum- stances  that the appellant had decided to let out the  suit premises  for a limited period of two years only. It may  be mentioned that the appellant’s father died two months  after the Rent Controller had granted permission.     The  Rent Controller after hearing both the  parties  on the  4th of January, 1980 held, rejecting the contention  of the  respondent,  that section 21 of the Rent  Act  was  not ultra vires. Furthermore, he was 770 satisfied  that  a limited tenancy had been created  and  as such  he granted permission for eviction. Aggrieved  by  the aforesaid  order the respondent preferred an appeal  to  the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal. The Rent Control  Appellate Tribunal upheld the eviction order.     On  or about the 19th of July, 1985, being  further  ag- grieved, the respondent preferred a second appeal before the

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High Court of Delhi. The High Court of Delhi by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal on the ground that there was  no ground  stated  in the application under section 21  of  the Rent  Act  as to why a limited tenancy was  intended  to  be made. The High Court held that the order under section 21 of the Rent Act was a mindless order inasmuch as the respondent before  it had not disclosed as to how the demised  premises were  being  dealt  with before creating  the  said  alleged tenancy and why the respondent before it did not require the demised premises for the alleged period of two years and  as to why the same would be required by him after the period of two years.     The  High Court relying on the decision in the  case  of S.B.  Noronah  v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1  S.C.R.  281, held that the order in question in this case was a  mindless order and in that view of the matter the order passed  under section 21 of the Rent Act was not valid. The High Court was of the view that there was no inquiry for the Controller  to come to the conclusion on the basis of the material that the premises for which the permission was sought for creating  a limited  tenancy was in fact available for being let  for  a limited  period only and in the absence of that, this was  a mindless order.     The  appellant has come up in appeal before  this  Court from the said decision.     The  question, therefore, that arises for  consideration of  this  Court is whether in view of  the  requirements  of section 21 of the Rent Act, was the permission invalid?  The main points upon which the High Court has relied are: first- ly, on the materials put forward before the Rent  Controller for sanction under section 21 of the Rent Act, no reason had been  stated  as  to why the premises in  question  was  not required  for a limited period; secondly, it was not  stated as to how the premises in question was dealt with;  thirdly, the High Court was of the view that there was no writing and no lease registered after the permission was granted. So far as  the  second ground, namely, as to how  the  premises  in question was dealt with prior to the letting out in the 771 instant  case  the High Court was  obviously  and  factually incorrect.  It was stated in the application for  permission that  it was agreed to be let out ’for the first  time’  and secondly,  it  was stated that the  appellant  owned  ’newly built house’. Therefore two facts were clearly stated  name- ly, this was a ’newly built’ premises and further that there was  no  prior letting. In the aforesaid facts  and  circum- stances of the case therefore, it cannot be denied that  how the  premises in question was dealt with before the  letting out had been clearly stated.     It  is true however, that why the premises  in  question was stated by the appellant not to be required for a limited period  had  not been ’specifically’ stated at the  time  of seeking  permission under section 21 by the  appellant.  The appellant had stated that he did not require the premises in question for a period of two years. He had not stated as  to why he did not require the said premises for the said limit- ed  period  of two years. The question therefore is  was  it necessary  to seek a valid order under section 21  to  state that reason and if permission was granted on satisfaction of the Rent Controller on other conditions without being satis- fied as to why the landlord did not require the premises  in dispute  for a limited period, the order would  suffer  from the vice of being a mindless order. Such an order if  other- wise  the conditions are satisfied would not be  an  invalid order.  In order to determine that question it is  necessary

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to  bear in mind the parameters and the purposes of  section 21  of the Rent Act. The Delhi Rent Control Act  like  other Rent Control Legislations had been passed to provide for the control  of  rent and eviction. The Rent Acts all  over  the country  came  in  the Wake of partition  and  explosion  of population  in metropolitan and new urban cities. There  are acute shortages of accommodation. Very often these shortages and the demand for accommodation led to rack-renting as well as unreasonable eviction of the tenants. To meet that situa- tion  and  to facilitate proper letting the Rent  Acts  were passed  all  over the country ensuring fair  return  to  the landlords and giving the landlords the right of eviction for limited purposes and at the same time protecting the  tenant from  unreasonable eviction by the landlords. This led to  a series  of  litigations  leading to  long  delays  resulting specially  in metropolitan cities like Delhi,  Calcutta  and Bombay  in  reluctance  of many landowners  who  had  vacant premises  for  letting out only for  limited  period  either because of the family conditions or official commitments  as they  did  not require the premises immediately and  at  the same time who were reluctant to part with the said  premises on rent because of the long delay and the procedure that had to be followed to recover possession of those premises. 772     Section  21 of the Rent Act was an attempt to meet  that reluctance. Section 14 of the Rent Act controls the eviction of  tenants  and  gives protection to  the  tenants  against eviction. It stipulates that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises  shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against  a tenant unless certain specified  conditions  were fulfilled.  Those  conditions were laid  down  in  different sections  and provisos thereof. It is not necessary  to  set these out in detail. As mentioned hereinbefore that led to a good deal of reluctance on the part of the landlords to part with  the  possession of the premises  in  their  occupation because of the time and expenses consuming process  involved for  recovery of possession. In order, therefore, to  induce reluctant/potential  landlords to create tenancies,  section 21 was enacted for the benefit of the capital city of Delhi. This  is a new provision-the unique provision made  for  the metropolitan city of Delhi. Section 21 of the Rent Act reads as follows:               "21.  Where  a landlord does not  require  the               whole  or any part of any premises for a  par-               ticular  period, and the landlord,  after  ob-               taining  the permission of the  Controller  in               the  prescribed manner, lets the whole of  the               premises  or part thereof as a  residence  for               such  period  as may be agreed to  in  writing               between  the landlord and the tenant  and  the               tenant  does  not, on the expiry of  the  said               period,  vacate such premises,  then  notwith-               standing  anything contained in section 14  or               in  any other law, the Controller may,  on  an               application made to him in this behalf by  the               landlord  within  such  time as  may  be  pre-               scribed, place the landlord in vacant  posses-               sion of the premises or part thereof by evict-               ing the tenant and every other person who  may               be in occupation of such premises."     An analysis of this section makes it clear that in order to  attract  section  21, the first condition  is  that  the landlord does not require the whole or part of any  premises

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for a particular period. If that condition is fulfilled then the  said  landlord after obtaining the  permission  of  the Controller  in the prescribed manner lets the whole  of  the premises  or part thereof as a residence for such period  as may  be  agreed to in writing between the landlord  and  the tenant  and  the tenant does not on the expiry of  the  said period, vacate such premises, then notwithstanding  anything contained in section 14 or in any other law, the  Controller may,  on  an application made to him in this behalf  by  the landlord 773 within such time as may be prescribed, order the eviction of the  tenant. Therefore the first condition must be that  the landlord  must not require the premises either in  whole  or part of any premises for a particular period. Secondly,  the landlord must obtain the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner. Thirdly, letting of the whole or part  of the  premises must be for residence. Fourthly, such  letting out  must  be for such period as may be agreed  in  writing. Therefore, there must be an agreement in writing, there must be  a  permission of the Controller for letting  out  for  a limited  period, the landlord must not require the  premises for a particular period and letting of the premises must  be as  a  residence. These and these alone are  the  conditions which are required to be fulfilled.     In Nagindas Ramdass v. Dalpatram Ichharam, [1974] 2  SCR 544,the  question was whether a compromise decree for  evic- tion  could  be  passed because the Rent  Act  enjoined  the eviction only on the satisfaction of the court. The respond- ent-landlord in that case instituted a suit under the Bombay Rent  Act,  1947 for possession against the  tenant  on  two grounds,  namely, arrears in payment of rent and  bona  fide requirement of the premises for personal use and occupation. A compromise decree was passed.1 When the appellant  applied for  execution of the decree the tenant contended  that  the compromise decree had been passed by the Rent Court  without satisfying itself as to the existence of grounds of eviction under the Act and hence being a nullity was not  executable. It was held by this Court that the public policy  permeating this Act was the protection of tenants against  unreasonable eviction.  Construing the provisions of sections 12, 13  and 28 of the Act in the light of the said policy, it should  be held that the Rent Court under the Act was not competent  to pass  a decree for possession either in invitum or with  the consent of the parties on a ground which was de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statut- ory  grounds mentioned in sections 12 and 13 was a sine  qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court.  Par- ties  by their consent could not confer jurisdiction on  the Rent Court to do something which, according to the  legisla- tive  mandate,  it could not do. But if at the time  of  the passing  of  the decree there was some material  before  the Court  on the basis of which the Court could prima facie  be satisfied  about  the existence of a  statutory  ground  for eviction, it would be presumed that the court was so  satis- fied and the decree for eviction,though passed on the  basis of  the compromise would be valid. Such material may  be  in the  form of evidence recorded or produced or it may  partly or wholly be in the shape of express or implied admissions made in the compromise agreement. Sarkaria, J. speaking  for the 774 Court held that admissions if true and clear were by far the best proof of the facts admitted especially when these  were judicial  admissions  admissible  under section  58  of  the

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Evidence  Act. In that case the Court found because  of  the admission  to pay the arrears of rent and mesne  profits  at the ’contractual rate and the withdrawing of his application for  fixation  of standard rent, that there was  no  dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent and there was  an admission  that the rent was in arrears. The Court  observed at pages 552 to 553 of the report as follows:                        "From a conspectus of the cases cited               at  the  bar, the principle that  emerges  is,               that  if  at the time of the  passing  of  the               decree,  there  was some material  before  the               Court, on the basis of which, the Court  could               be prima facie satisfied, about the  existence               of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be               presumed  that the Court was so satisfied  and               the  decree  for eviction,  though  apparently               passed on the basis of a compromise, would  be               valid. Such material may take the shape either               of evidence recorded or produced in the  case,               or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of               an  express or implied admissiOn made  in  the               compromise  agreement, itself.  Admissions  if               true  and clear are by far the best  proof  of               the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or               judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of               the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their               agents  at or before the hearing of the  case,               stand  on  a higher footing  than  evidentiary               admissions. The former class of admissions are               fully binding on the party that makes them and               constitute  a waiver of proof. They  by  them-               selves  can  be  made the  foundation  of  the               rights  of  the parties. On  the  other  hand,               evidentiary admissions which are receivable at               the trial as evidence, are by themselves,  not               conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong."     The  aforesaid principle must be borne in mind in  order to judge the invalidity of the order passed under section 21 of  the  Act which was based on the statements made  by  the appellant  and  the respondent. The facts of the  case  upon which great deal of reliance was placed by the High Court in the  judgment  under  appeal and upon  which  the  appellant relied very heavily are mentioned in the case of S.B.  Noro- nah v. Prem Kumari Khanna (supra). There this Court  reiter- ated  that section 21 of the Rent Act carved out a  category for special treatment. While no landlord could evict without compliance with sections 775 14,  19 and 20 of the Act, a liberal eviction  policy  could not  be said to under-lie in section 21. The Court  observed that  the  Parliament  was ’presumably  keen  on  maximising accommodation available for letting, realising the  scarcity crisis.  One  source of such spare  accommodation  which  is usually  shy is potentially vacant building or part  thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period provided he had some credible assurance that when  he needed  it he would get it back. The law sought to  persuade the  owner of the premises available for letting for a  par- ticular period by giving him a special assurance that at the expiry  of that period the appointed agency would place  the landlord  in  vacant  possession. Section  21  confined  the special remedy to letting for residential uses only. Parlia- ment  had  the wholesome fear that if the section  were  not controlled  by many conditions it might open the  floodgates for wholesale circumvention of the rent control legislations

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by  ingenious  landlords exploiting the  agonising  need  of houseless denizens.     Section  21 of the Act over-rides section  14  precisely because it was otherwise hedged in with drastic  limitations and safe guarded itself against landlords’ abuses. The first condition was that the landlord did not require the  demised premises ’for a particular period’ only. That meant that  he must  indicate  to the authority before which  sanction  was sought for letting what was the particular period for  which he  could spare the accommodation. The Controller  exercised an important regulatory function on behalf of the community. The  fact  that a landlord and a potential  tenant  together apply, setting out the formal ingredients of section 21, did not  relieve the Controller from being vigilant  to  inquire and  satisfy himself about the requisites of the  landlord’s non-requirement  ’for a particular period’ and  the  letting itself  being ’as a resident’. A fraud on the statute  could not  be permitted especially because of the  grave  mischief that might be perpetrated in such event.     The  Court highlighted that it would be a terrible  blow to the rent control law if section 21 were freely  permitted to  subvert the scheme of section 14. Every  landlord  would insist  on  a tenant going through the  formal  exercise  of section 21, making ideal averments in terms of that section. The consequence would be that both the Civil Procedure  Code which  prescribed suits for recovery of possession  and  the Delhi Rent Control Act which prescribed grounds for eviction would be eclipsed by the pervasive operation of section  21. Neither  grounds for eviction nor suits for  eviction  would thereafter  be needed, and if the landlord moved  the  Court for a mere warrant to place the landlord, through the  Court process, in vacant possession of the premises, he 776 would  get it. No court-fee, no decree, no  execution  peti- tion, no termination of tenancy-wish for possession and  the Court  was at your command. The Court observed that  such  a horrendous  situation would be the negation of the  rule  of law in this area.      When  the application under Section 21 is filed by  the landlord  and/or tenant the Controller must satisfy  himself by  such  inquiry as he may make, about the  compulsive  re- quirements of that provision. If he makes a mindless  order, the Court. when challenged at the time of execution will  go into  the  question as to whether the  twin  conditions  for sanction  have really been fulfilled. Of course, there  will be  a presumption in favour of the sanction  being  regular, but  it will still be open to a party to make out  his  case that  in fact and in truth the conditions which make  for  a valid sanction were not present.     The  sanction granted under section 21, if it  has  been procured by fraud and collusion cannot withstand  invalidity because,  otherwise,  high public policy will  be  given  as hostage  to successful collusion. The doctrine  of  estoppel cannot  be  invoked to render valid a proceeding  which  the legislature,  has on grounds, of public policy subjected  to mandatory  conditions which are shown to be absent.  As  be- tween  unequals  the law steps in and  as  against  statutes there  is no estoppel, especially where collusion and  fraud are made out and high purpose is involved.     Law  that  non-performs stultifies the rule of  law  and hence the need for strict compliance. Or else, the  sanction is non-est. Collusion between the strong and the weak cannot confer validity where the mandatory prescriptions of the law are breached or betrayed.     An  analysis of this judgment which has been applied  in

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the various cases would indicate that section 21 only  gives sanction if the landlord makes a statement to the  satisfac- tion  of the court and the tenant accepts that the  landlord does  not  require the premises for a limited  period;  this statement  of  the landlord must be bona fide.  The  purpose must be residence. There must not be any fraud or collusion. There  is  a presumption of regularity. But it  is  open  in particular  facts and circumstances of the case to prove  to the  satisfaction  of  the executing court  that  there  was collusion or conspiracy between the landlord and the  tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was  a fraud  or  that  the tenant agreed because  the  tenant  was wholly unequal to the landlord. In the instant case none  of these  conditions  were fulfilled. There is no  evidence  in this case that when the landlord 777 stated that he did not require the premises in question  for a particular period, he did not mean what he stated or  that he  made  a false statement. There was no evidence  in  this case  at any stage that the tenant did not  understand  what the landlord was stating or that he did not accept what  the landlord  stated.  There  was no evidence  that  either  the tenant  was in collusion or perpetrating any fraud with  the landlord  or the tenant was unequal to the landlord in  bar- gaining powers. It is manifest that there is no evidence  to show that the Controller did not apply his mind. If that  is so  then on the principle enunciated by this Court in  Noro- nah’s  case, this sanction cannot be challenged. It  is  not necessary  to  state under section 21 the  reasons  why  the landlord  did not require the premises in question  for  any particular period. Nor is there any presumption that in  all cases  the tenants are the weaker sections. The  presumption is,  on  the contrary, in favour of sanction, it is  he  who challenges-the statement and the admission of. the  landlord or  the  tenant who has to establish facts as  indicated  in Nagindas’s case.     In V.S. Rahi and another v. Smt. Ram Chambeli, [1984]  2 SCR  290, this Court on the facts found that the  permission under section 21 of the Act had been obtained by her on  the basis of wrong statement, but for which the permission would not  have been accorded. These statements which were in  the nature of half truths were apparently made in order to  make good  the plea that there was only a temporary necessity  to lease out the building for a short period and that there was a  bona  fide anticipation that there would  be  a  pressing necessity to reoccupy the premises at the end of the period. which were the two crucial factors governing an order  under section 21 of the Act. It was stated that the appellants, in that  case, who were the weaker of the two parties  did  not question the truth of the statements made by the  respondent ,when  the  permission was granted. But such  collusion,  if any,  between  the two unequal parties did  not  confer  any sanctity on the transaction in question. The observations of this  Court in that case must be understood in the light  of the  facts mentioned by this Court. It was found  in  Rahi’s case that there were wrong statements made by the  appellant when  he  approached the Rent Controller.  It  was  admitted before this Court that it was a wrong statement. These  were mentioned in pages 295-296 of the Report. What was urged was that the appellants being the tenants had colluded with  the respondent.  It was reiterated by this Court, it  is  always open to the weaker of the two parties to establish that  the transaction  was  only a camouflage used to cover  its  true nature.  When one party could dominate over the will of  the other,  it would not be a case of collusion but one of  com-

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pulsion. The Court relied on the observations of Lord  Ellen borough in Smith v. Cuff, 778 [1817] 6 M & S 160 at 165 that it can never be predicted  as pari  delicto where one holds the rod and the other bows  to it. See the observations of this Court at pages 297 and  298 of the Report. There is no evidence in this case that  there was  any wrong or incorrect statement made by  the  landlord nor is there any evidence that the tenant-respondent  herein was  the  weaker side of the bargain. In that  view  of  the matter  the respondent cannot get much assistance from  this decision of this Court.     This question was again considered by this Court in J.B. Vohra v. India Export House Pvt. Ltd. and another, [1985]  2 S.C.R. 899 where Tulzapurkar, J. referring to Noronah’s case observed that section 21 carved out tenancies of  particular category for special treatment and provided a special proce- dure that would ensure to the landlord vacant possession  of the  leased  premises forthwith at the expiry of  the  fixed period of tenancy, evicting whoever be in actual possession. Such  being  the avowed object of  prescribing  the  special procedure,  service  of a prior notice on  the  tenant  upon receipt  of the landlord’s application for recovery of  pos- session and inviting his objections followed by an elaborate inquiry  in which evidence might have to be  recorded  would really frustrate that object. It will be vitiated because it is  procured by fraud practised by landlord for  creating  a limited  tenancy.  If  it is found that  the  initial  order granting  permission to create limited tenancy was  vitiated by  fraud  practised  by the appellant inasmuch  as  he  had suppressed  the  fact that an earlier application  for  such permission had been declined on the ground that premises had been  let  out for commercial-cum-residential  purposes  and then  there would be no executable order pursuant  to  which any warrant for possession could be issued under section  21 of the Act. In the instant case, there is no such  collusion and therefore, the principle of Noronah’s case would not  be applicable. The ratio of that decision must be understood in its proper light.     Section 21 of the Rent Act was examined by this Court in Smt.  Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 S.C.C. 1. There  was observed  by  Pathak, J. as the learned Chief  Justice  then was,  that it was possible for the owner of a  premises,  on looking  to the immediate future, to find that  for  certain reasons  he  was  unable to occupy  the  premises  forthwith himself but that he may do so later in the not very  distant future.  The mere fact that the owner has let out the  prem- ises after obtaining permission under section 21 of the  Act for  a limited period, and thereafter on the expiry of  that period  has found it necessary to obtain permission  to  let out the premises again for another limited 779 period  cannot necessarily lead to the inference  that  from the  very beginning the premises were available for  letting out  indefinitely. The Rent Controller and the Rent  Control Tribunal  should have examined the circumstances  prevailing on each occasion when an application was made under  section 21.  It was observed that assumption would not be  justified where  there is no positive material to indicate’ that  from the very beginning there was never any intention on the part of the landlord to occupy the premises himself. There was no such material in that case. On the contrary there was  mate- rial showing that the landlady had expectation that her  son and his family would be in Delhi after two years’ period  of tenancy. This is significant for the present issue. There is

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nothing  to show that the permission of the Rent  Controller Was obtained by practising fraud or that it could be regard- ed  as a nullity or that material facts were concealed.  The principle  of  that decision will apply much  more  in  this case. It is observed in that decision that it seems to  have been  ignored altogether that it is perfectly  possible  for the owner of a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find that for certain reasons, he is unable to occupy the premises  forthwith himself but that he may do so  later  in the not very distant future. It is not always that a man can plan  his life ahead with any degree of  definiteness.  Pre- vailing uncertainty in the circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear-sighted vision into the future. The circum- stances  might  justify  his envisioning his  need  for  the premises  two or three years later, and  therefore  applying for  permission under section 21 of the Act to let  out  the premises accordingly.     The  facts are more stronger and clearer in  support  of the  instant case. Here there was no permission  previously. This was first letting out. There was nothing which indicat- ed  that any statement was made which was incorrect. We  are of the opinion that sanction under section 21 in the instant case  was not a nullity. The onus was on the tenant to  show that it was so. He did not make any attempt to dislodge  the presumption in favour of the permission.     Learned  counsel for the appellant also stressed  before us  that section 21 of the Rent Act was a complete  code  by itself.  The order was under section 21 of the Rent Act.  No further question of lease or registered lease arose thereaf- ter.     This question has been settled by series of decisions of the Delhi High Court upon which people have. acted for long. See  the decision in Kasturi Lal v. Shiv Charan Das  Mathur, [1976]  Rent Control Reporter Vol. 8703 where at pages  708- 709, Misra, J. of the Delhi High Court 780 had clearly indicated numerous cases where it was held  that section 21 was a code by itself. The order of the permission is  itself an authority; no lease was necessary and if  that is  the state of law in Delhi, it is too late in the day  to hold  otherwise. See the observations of this Court  in  Raj Narain  Pandey  and others v. Sant Prasad Tewari  &  others, [1973]  2 S.C.R. 835, where this Court observed that in  the matter  of the interpretation of a local statute,  the  view taken  by the High Court over a number of years should  nor- mally  be  adhered to and not to be disturbed.  A  different view would not only introduce an element of uncertainly  and confusion  but it would also have the effect  of  unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. In Delhi transactions have been complet- ed on the basis of permission and it was never doubted  that there  was  any requirement of any lease  or  any  agreement subsequent to the order and the same required  registration. It  must  be observed that in Noronah’s case  there  was  no admission  on oath nor was there any question of  registered lease.     Numerous other decisions were cited before us but in the view we have taken on the two basic points that the  permis- sion was valid and the order permitting limited tenancy  was not a mindless order but one passed after application of the mind  taking the two relevant facts under section 21 of  the Act into consideration, it is not necessary to discuss these decisions  any further. In view of the fact that section  21 is  a code by itself, there was no question of  any  further agreement  in  writing which has to  be  registered  arises.

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There is no merit in the contention of the respondent.     There  is another aspect of the matter which has  to  be borne  in mind. The tenant not only failed to establish  any fact  impeaching the order, he waited for the full  term  to take this point and did not contest when the permission  was obtained on a misrepresentation.     It  was submitted by Shri Bhatia that in Delhi  most  of the  transactions  have been done under section  21  on  the assumption  that  after  order of the court  no  further  or separate  document or lease was required to be  executed  or that  such  document or lease had to be registered.  It  was submitted  that  numerous transactions have taken  place  on that basis. It was urged that if it is now found that is not the correct position and the correct position in law is that there  should be a lease containing the terms of  the  lease being for 11 months, such enunciation of law should only  be made  applicable  prospectively. Counsel for  the  appellant contended that otherwise it would have disastrous conse- 781 quences of unsettling numerous decisions and unsettling many settled transactions between the parties. He drew our atten- tion  to  the decision of this Court in 1. C. Golak  Nath  & others v. State of Punjab and another, [1967] 2 S.C.R.  762. If we had any doubt on the scope and ambit of section 21, we might have considered this submission urged on behalf of the appellant provided we were sure, factually that large number of transactions had been completed on the assumption that no further  lease was required after the permission under  sec- tion 21. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of the Privy Council and the observation of Lord Blanesburgh in the case  of  Dhanna  Mal and others v. Rai  Bahadur  Lala  Moti Sagar, A.I.R. 1927 Privy Council 102. If we were inclined to the  view that section 21 was not a code by itself  but  re- quired separate lease to follow it up then perhaps we  might have  considered  the effect of the aforesaid  decision  and observations.     In aid of the submission that in order to be entitled to eviction under section 14 of the Rent Act, the court had  to be  satisfied itself that the statutory ground for  eviction existed  and that application of satisfaction of  the  court could  not  be by-passed and circumvented  by  a  compromise decree,  reliance  was placed on certain observations  on  a decision in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and another, [1970] 3 S.C.C. 181. In view of the facts of the particular case,  we are  of the opinion that it is not necessary to discuss  the said  decision  in detail. Numerous decisions of  the  Delhi High Court were placed before us in support of or in respect of  contentions of the parties specially in support of  con- tention  that the Delhi Rent Act required a separate  lease. The scope and ambit of the Delhi Rent Act after the decision of  Noronah’s case came up for consideration before a  divi- sion  bench of the Delhi High Court in Vijay Kumar Bajaj  v. Inder  Sain Minocha, [1982] 2 Rent Control Reporter 392.  In that  decision,  in the light of section 21,  the  following questions were posed:     (1)  Whether the permission under section 21 of the  Act is  invalid in view of Supreme Court judgment in S.B.  Noro- nah’s  case (supra), if reasons for not requiring the  prem- ises  by the landlord for a particular period are  not  dis- closed  in his application or his statement before the  Con- troller?     (2) Whether before or after permission execution of  any agreement  in  writing  to let the premises  for  the  fixed period is necessary, if so, whether such a document requires registration?

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(3)  Whether  the proposed agreement of tenancy  in  writing sub- 782 mitted  along with the application under Section 21  of  the Act, in this appeal required registration? The questions were answered by the High Court as follows:     (1)  Not necessarily. The landlord or the tenant may  be able  to show that cogent reasons did exist or  were  within the knowledge of the parties as to why the landlord did  not require the whole or a part of his premises for a  specified period.     (2)  No  registration  is necessary.  The  agreement  in writing may be entered into either before or after grant  of permission.     (3)  An  agreement in writing submitted along  with  the application under section 21 of the Act is really a proposed agreement.  It  comes into effect only after  the  grant  of permission under section 21 of the Act. It does not  require registration. We are in agreement with the views of the Delhi High Court.     Large  number of decisions of this Court were  cited  in support  of  the contention that eviction decree  passed  in contravention of the statutory conditions or passed  without consideration whether the statutory conditions are fulfilled or  not are not binding and cannot be enforced. See  Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Dass and another, [1969]  2 S.C.R.  432 and Kaushalya Devi and others v. Shri K.L.  Ban- sal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048.     We  are,  however, of the opinion that in  view  of  the facts found in the instant appeal before us, these decisions are not of any relevance.     Similarly,  our attention was drawn to the  observations of this Court in Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and others,  [1984] 1 S.C.R. 139 and State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 62 1, In the view we have taken  and the  real  controversy in this case, this contention  is  no longer open.     On  the unregistered lease question, our  attention  was drawn  to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Jagat  Taran Berry v. Sardar Sant Singh, A.I.R. 1980 Delhi 7. As we  have held  that  section 21 was a code by itself and  no  further document  was  required, it is not necessary to  pursue  the matter any further. 783     Similarly,  our attention was drawn to a division  bench judgment  of  the  Calcutta High Court in the  case  of  Ram Abatar  Mahato v. Smt. Shanta Bala Dasi and  others,  A.I.R. 1954 Calcutta 207 on the question of the terms and extent of section  107 of the Transfer of Property Act and  whether  a document in performance of an agreement had to be registered or not. As mentioned hereinbefore in the view we have taken, it is not necessary for us to pursue this aspect any further as  to the question whether oral evidence should  be  intro- duced  to explain the terms of a document embodied in  writ- ing.     Our attention was drawn to certain observations of  this Court  in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and  oth- ers,  [19641 4 S.C.R. 485 but the same are not relevant  for our consideration in the present controversy in the light in which we have understood it. Equally same is the decision in respect  of the observations of Fazal Ali, J. of  the  Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ishwar Dutt and another v.  Sunder Singh  and others, A.I.R. [1961] J & K 45 and  the  observa- tions  of  this Court in Sri 5 Sita Maharani and  others  v. Chhedi Mahto and others, A.I.R. [1955] S.C. 328.

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   In  the aforesaid light we are of the opinion  that  the High Court was in error in the view it took in setting aside the decision in the second appeal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed  and  the order and judgment of the  High  Court  of Delhi  dated 19th of July, 1985 are set aside and the  order and judgment of Rent Control Tribunal dated 28th of  August, 1980 are restored. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal. P.S.S.                                                Appeal allowed. 784