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PETITIONER: INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL THROUGH PRESIDENT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K .AGARWAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/11/1998

BENCH: SUJATA V.  MANOHAR, & G.B.  PATTANAIK,

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT Mrs.Sujata, V.Manohar, J, ------------------------ A public interest Writ Petition No.2350 of 1996  was filed  in  the Bombay High Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Bar Association through its  Secretary  challenging the  validity  of  a  letter  dated  5.11.1996 purporting to modify  the  powers  of  the  President  of  the  Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding posting and transfer of Members of the  Income-tax  Appellate  Tribunal.    The  petitioners contended that they were interstd  in  fair  and  impartial administration  of  the  income-tax law and in upholding the independent working of the Income-tax.  Appellate  Tribunal, the   Rule   of  Law  and  independence  of  the  income-tax Judiciary.  By an interim order, the High  Court  restrained the  Under  Secretary,  Ministry of Law, Government of India and the Union of India who were respondents 1 and 2  therein from  Interfering  with  the  powers of the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to assign work to any  Member, to  constitute Benches and to require a Member to sit on any Bench wherever situate, and for such  duration,  as  he  may deem necessary.    This  petition  was  transferred  to this Court.  This Court by -its order dated  31.3.1997  conflrmed the Interim order passed by the High Court.  Another similar petition  filed  before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was also transferred to this Court.  Both  these  petitions  are pending. In  the pending petitions the present application is being made Dy the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal through  its President.   The  occasion  for  making this application has arisen on account of an order dated 23rd  of  October,  1997 passed  by  a  Bench  of  the Income-tax Appel late Tribunal consisting of two Members, one judicial and one  accountant. The said  order was passed in the case of Smt.  Neerja Birla v.  Assistant Commi ssioner of Income Tax for the assessment year 1992-93.  As a result of the said order,  the  assesses who claimed a benefit amounting to Rs.1,50,00,000 was denied that benefit by the Tri buna.  1 which decided the appeal in favour of the revenue. Thereafter the President of the Tribunal received  a

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letter  dated  30th  of December 1997 from Shrl V.K.Agarwal, who was then the Law Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Tncna.  Tn the letter, the then Law Secretary, who is tha first respondent before us, referred to  the  dec is  Ion  of  the  Tribunal  -in the case of Neerja Birla v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax heard  and  decided  by Shri R.V.Easwar,  Judicial  Member  and Shri M.V.R.  Prasad, Accountant Member sitting together.  He  observed  that  the Judicial  Member  dictated this judgment in this matter some time in August, 1997 and dul  y  corrected  and  signed  it. However,  a  contrary  order  dated  23rd October, i 997 was pronounced by the Accountant Member which was signed by both the Members.  Copies of both  the  "orders"  were  enclosed. The  first  respondent then went on to say, "...........Thus the two orders  have  taken  a  contradicting  stand.    The aforesaid  circumstances  disclose  judicial  impropriety of highest degree.    It  is   intriguing   as   to   how   two contradicting  orders got dictated in the same matter by the two Members, while one order is by the Judicial Member,  the other is  by  the Accountant Member and signed by both.  You may like to enquire into the matter and send a report to the Government within 10 days from the date of  the  receipt  of this letter.    You may also tiKe to suggest the action that may be taken in the matter and the Members agai nst whom  it may be taken.  Further, while submitting the report,, a copy of  the ’file order sheet’ indicating the name of the Menber to whom the case was allotted for writing the  judgment  may also please be sent to the Government." On receipt of this letter, the appi icant  addressed a  letter  dated 7th of January, 1988 to both the Members of the said Bench  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  letter  he  had received  from the f-irst respondent, and requesting them to send their comments.  Both the Members have separatel y sent their replies to the applicant pointing out  that  the  only order  which  was passed In the said case is the order dated 23rd of October, 1997 which has  been  signed  by  both  the Members constituting  the Bench on 23.10.1997.  The Judicial Member has pointed out.  that after hearing the above  case, he  had  prepared  a  draft order which was in favour of the assessee.  When he sent the draft to the Accountant  Member, the  Accountant  Member  expressed  n-is reservations on the views expressed in the draft order.   Thereafter,  both  the Members met  and  discussed the issues involved.  At the end of the discussion, the Judicial Member agreed with the  view taken  by the Accountant Member and requested the Accountant Member to prepare an order on those lines.   The  Accountant Member  thereafter  sent  a draft order signed by him to the Judicial Member.  The Judicial Member fully agreed with  the draft order sent by the Accountant Member, put his signature on the draft order and the final order dated 23rd of October 1997 was  issued with ooth the signatures.  Both have stated that there are no two orders.  Tne so-called first order was only a draft prepared by the Judicial Member which  was  not agreed  to  by  the  Accountant  Member and ultimateiy after discussion a new draft order was prepared by the  accountant Member  which is signed by both the Members on 23rd October, 1997.  This was the only order which was issued  and  copies were  sent  to  the  assessee  as well as to the department. Both the Members also expressed surprise and distress  at  a confidential  document  like a draft judicial order reaching the first respondent. Before the appl-icant could send any  reply  to  the first   respondent  after  ascertaining  the  views  of  the concerned Members, on  3rd  of  February,  1998,  the  first respondent wrote another letter to the applicant which 1s as

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follows:         "Please refer to my D.O.  letter of even No.         dated 30.12.1997  regarding the case of Smt.  Neerja         Biria Vs.  Asstt.  Commr.  Bombay, disposed of by  a         bench consisting  of  Shri R.V.  Easwar, JM and Shri         M.V.R.  Prasad, AM.         The matter involved two contradicting orders         being  dictated  in  the  same  matter  by  the same         members constituting the bench.  You were  reauested         to  reply  within  10  days  of  the  receipt of the         letter.  In spite of this, I have not  received  any         report from you in the matter even after a month.         You  would  appreciate  that as President of         the Tribunal you have the responsibility  to  ensure         that  the  judicial  functions  of  the Tribunal are         discharged by its members properly and in  a  manner         conducive  to  instilling confidence in the minds of         the taxpayers.  The irregularity pointed out  in  my         letter  relates  to  a Bench which is functioning at         Mumbal, where you, as the head of the Tribunal, have         your regular headquarters.  Under the circumstances.         silence on your part may invits  adverse  inferences         in the metter.         It is threfore reauested that your report in         the matter may be sent  to  the  Government  without         further  delay  and  in  any case not later than 6th         February, 1998.  in case no report -is received from         you by that date, it will be presumed that you  have         nothing to say "in the matter and Government will be         constrained to taKe such action in the matter as may         be deemed f-tt accordi ng to law.         This may please be accorded TOP PRIORITY.         With kind regards,         Yours faithfully,              Sd/-         (Dr.  V.K.  Agarwal)         Shri T.V.  Rajagopala Rao,         Presdent, ITAT,         101, Old DGO Bidg., M.K.  Marg,         Mumbai - 400 020.  " The appilicant replied to this letter by his  letter of  6th of February, 1998 In which he pointed out that there was no impropriety in  the  passing  of  the  order  by  the Members  of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal -in the matter of Neerja Biria v.  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Income-tax. He  went  on to state that the appliant’s letter amounted to gross  interference  in  the  judicial  functioning  of  the Tribunal, and  he  had no authority to do so.  The applicant also stated that the  contents  of  the  first  respondent’s letter pertaining to himself smacked of vindictiveness.  The applicant  has  viewed  the  letters as serious interference with the  administration  of  justice  particularly  in  the context of  the  pending  petitions.  Thereafter the present application has been filed. A.K.   Sonik, Deputy Secretary in the Department, of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and  Justice  has  also  been made  a  party-respondent in this application because of the letter dated 29th of December, 1997 received from the Deputy Secretary just before the letter from the  first  respondent dated 30th  December,  1997.    In  the  letter  of  29th of December, 1997, the applicant was told that on a perusal  of the  summary  statement  showing  institution,  disposal and pendency of appeals before the Tribunal during the month  of October, 1997 it appears that disposal has considerably gone down  during  the month of October, 1997 and the appi -icant

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should look into the matter and send a report on the reasons for this.  According to the appi -icant the  disposals  were within  the  norms,  but  were less than the previous month. And the letter was merely to intimidate  him.    The  second respondent  has,  in  his affidavit, stated that this letter was issued on the instructions of the first  respondent  and the  letter  was  handleed by the first respondent directly. IN view of the statements  made  in  his  affidavit  by  the second   respondent,  the  applicant  has  not  pressed  the application against the second respondent. In the application, the applicant has requested this court  to  issue a show cause notice to the first respondent why action should not be  taken  against  him  in  contempt, inter alia, for interfering with judicial functioning of the Tribunal.   He  has also prayed for a direction to the first respondent  not  to  interfere  in  any  manner   with   the independent judicial functioning of the Income-tax appellate Tribunal.   On  the  basis  of  the  application, this Court issued a suo motu contempt notice to both  the  respondents. Since  the  application  is  not  being  pressed against the second respondent in view of his explanation for the  letter of 29th of December, 1997, we have to examine the conduct of the  first respondent who was, at the material time, the Law Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice. Undoubtedly, in the application  before  us  it  was also  contended  that  the two letters can be looked upon as interference with the interim orders  of  this  Court  dated 31.3.1997 and 9.5.1997 in the pending petitions.  This would then amount  to  civil  contempt.    But the basic charge is interference with the judicial functioning of the  Tribunal. The  prayer  in this petition was amended after is was filed to make it clear that the grievance related to  interference with administration  of  justice.   The respondents at their request were given sufficient time to reply to the charge of criminal contempt.  There can, therefore, be no grievance on this score. Before  examining   the   conduct   of   the   First respondent.   we  would  like  to  deal  wi th the technical objections which were raised before  us  on  behalf  of  the first respondent.     The  first  respondent  had  initially contended that the income-tax Appellate Tribunal was  not  a court,  and  was also not a court subordinate to the Supreme Court.  Hence the Supreme Court had no Jurisdiction to issue a suo motu  notice  of  contempt  in  respect  of  a  matter pertaining to  the  Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.  However, subseauently,  learned  senior   counsel   for   the   first respondent  conceded  that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal did perform judicial functions and was a  court  subordinate to the  H^gh  Court.  Hence, there is no need to examine any further, the contention that the  said  Tribunal  is  not  a court. Article  129  of  the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have  all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of   itself.      This  Article  has  come  up  for consideration on  numerous  occasions.    This   Court   has consistently  held  that  the  Supreme Court has power under this Article to punish, not merely for contemut  of  itself, but also for contempt of all court and Tribunals subordinate to it.    In the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi  v.    State  of  Gujarat  and  Ore. ([1991]  3 SCR 936), this Court examined at length the power of this Court under Article ’129  to  punish  for  contempt. This  Court  first  examined the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and held, (at page 970) "There is.    therefore.    no

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room  for  any  doubt  that  this  Court  has  wide power to interfere and correct the Judgment and orders passed by  any court or  Tribunal in the country.  In addition to the appel -late  power  the  Court  has  special  residuary  power  to entertain  appear  against  any  order  of  any court in the country.  The plenary jurisdiction of this  court  to  grant leave  and  hear  appeals  against  any  order of a court or Tribunal, confers power of judicial superintendence over all the courts and Tribunals in the territory of India including subordinate courts of Magistrate and District Judge.    This Court  has,  therefore,  supervisory  jurisdiction  over all courts in India."  Examining  the  powers  of  a  court,  of record, it came to the conclusion tnat a court of record has inherent  power  to  punish  for contempt of at 1 courts and tribunals subordinate  to  it  in  order  to  protect  these subordinate courts  and tribunals.  This power to protect is founded on the inherent  power  of  a  court  of  record  to correct the  judicial  orders  of  subordinate courts.  This Court further observed, (pages 976-977, 979.) "The  Suprerne Court  being  a court of record under Article 129 and having wide power of judicial supervision over all  the  courts  in the  country, must possess ana exercise similar jurisdiction and  power  as  the  High  Courts  had  prior  to   contempt legislation in 1926.  Inherent powers of a superior court of record  have  remained unaffected even after codification of contempt law.......  Article 129 declares the Supreme  Court a  court  of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such  a  court  including the power to punish for contempt for itself.  The expression used  In  Article  129  is  not  restrictive,  instead it is extensive in nature.  If the  Framers  of  the  Constitution intended  that  the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt of itself only,  there  was  no  necessity  for inserting  the expression "including the power of punish for contempt of -itself".  The  Article  confers  power  on  the Supreme  Court  to  punish  for  contempt  of  itself and in addition, it  confers  some  additional  power  relating  to contempt  as  would  appear from the expression "including". TUe expression "inc1uing" has been -interpreted  by  courts to extend  and  widen  the  scope  of  the power.  The plain language of the Article clearly indicates that this Court as a court of record has power to punish for contempt of Itself and also something else which could fall within the inherent jurisdiction of a court of  record.    In  interpreting  the Constitution,  it is not permissible to adopt a construction which would render any expression superfluous or  redundant. The courts ought not to accept any such construction.  While construing Article 129, it is not permissible to ignore the significance  and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the Supreme Court.  Since, the Supreme Court is designed  by the  Constitution  as  a court of record and as the Founding Fathers were aware that  a  superior  court  of  record  had inherent power to indict a person for the contempt of itself as  well  as  of  courts  inferior  to  it,  the  expression "including"  was  deliberately  inserted  in  the   Article. Article  129  recognised  the  existing  inherent power of a cor the contempt of inferior courts". This view was reiterated and reaffirmed in the  case of In  re:    Vinay  Chandra Mishra ([1995] 2 SCC 564) where this Court affirmed the decision in Delhi  Judicial  Service Association, Tis  Hazari  Court,  Delhi v.  State of Gujarat and Ors.  (Supra).  After quoting extensively from the  said judgment this Court held that since this Court has the power of  judicial superintendence and control over all the courts and  Tribunals  functioning  in  the  country,  it   has   a

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corresponding duty to protect and safeguard the interests of inferior  courts  to  ensure  that the flow of the stream of justice in the courts remains unsullied by any  interference or attack  from  any quarter.  The amplitude of the power of this Court can not oe curtailed by a law made by the Central or a State Legislature.  This Court’s Jurisdiction and power to take action for contempt of  subordinate  courts  is  its inherent juriediction, and is protected under Misra has been partially  set  aside  in  Supreme  Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.  ([1998] 4 SCC 409) on the question of power  to  suspend  an  advocate’s  licence  under  contempt jurisdiction,   this   part   of   its  basic  reasoning  is unaffected.  In  fact  it  is  reaffirmed.      There   can, therefore,  be  no doubt that this Court has jurisdiction to punish for contempt of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. It  was  also  submitted before us by learned senior counsel for the first respondent that  although  this  Court may   have   jurisdiction   to  punish  for  contempt,  that jurisdiction should not be exercised in  the  present  case. The  appropriate  authority to take action would be the High Court.  We do not see much force in this  submission.    The Income  Tax Appellate Tribunal, although It may have Benches in different parts of the country, is  a  national  Tribunal and  its  functioning affects the entire country and all its Benches.  Appeals also lie ultimately to this Court from the decisions and References made by the Tribunal, The mere fact that by  this  Court  taking  suo  motu  cognizance  of  the contempt,  the  first respondent would not be able to appeal to any other court, cannot be a ground  for  not  exercising the power to punish for contempt of a national Tribunal. In  the  present  case the President of the Tribunal has sought directions and orders from  this  Court  and  has placed  all  relevant  information concerning the conduct of the first respondent before us, on the basis of  which  this Court has,  suo motu, issued notice.  Section 15 of contempt of Courts  Act  which  deals  with  cognizance  of  criminal contempt, also prescribes that the Supreme Court or the High Court may  take  action on its own motion.  Rule 3(a) of the Supreme Court Rules regulating proceedings for  contempt  of the  Supreme  Court, similarly provides for the court taking action suo  motu.    In  the  cass  of  Supreme  Court   Bar Association v.  Union of India and Anr.  (1998 (4) SCC 409), after  reiterating  the posit-ion that Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with power to punish not only for contempt for itself but also contains the -inherent jurisd-iction of  the court  to  punish  for  contempt  of suborch nate courts and Tribunals In  order  to  prevent  interference  in  the  due administration  of  Justice,  this  Court also clarified the position of a party which brings the contumaci  ous  conduct of the  contemner to the notice of the court.  It said (page 429) that the party which brings such conduct to the  notice of  the  court,  whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status  of a litigant  in  the  contempt  of  court  case.  The case of contempt is not stricto  seneu  a      cause   or  a matterr between the parties, inter se. It is a  matter  between  the court and the contemner. Whenever an Act adversely affects the aamT-istration of  justice  or  tends to impede its course, or shake public confidence in a  judicial  institution,  the  power  can  be exercised  to  uphold  the  dignity  of the court of law and protect its proper functioning.  It is in the light of these principles that one has to examine  Section  2  (c)  of  the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.  Section 2(c) is as follows:-         Section 2(c):  "Criminal contempt " means

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       the publication (whether by words,         spoken or written, or by signs, or by         visible representations, or otherwise )         of any matter or the doing of any other         act whatsoever which -         (  i  )  scandalises  or  tends  to scandal i se, or         lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court;         or         (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere         with, the due course of any judicial proceeding ; or         (iii) -interferes or tends  to  interfere  with,  or         obstructs  or  tends to obstruct, the administration         of justice in any other manner". The  et scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to  lower  the  authority  of  any  court  [Section 2(c)(i)]  or  interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with, or obstructs  or  tends  to  obstruct,  the  administration  of justice in  any  manner [Section 2(c)(iii)].  Therefore, any act which tends to  interfere  with  the  administration  of Justice  or tends to lower the authority of any court can be punished with contempt. In the present case the President of the Income  Tax Appellate  Tribunal  has  considered  the letters of 30th of December, 1997 and  3rd  of  February,  1998  of  the  first respondent as interference with the Judicial decision-making process of  the  Tribunal.    The  concerned  Members of the Tribunal from whom  the  President  invited  comments,  a1so looked  upon  the  letter  of  30th  December, 1997 as gross interference in the judicial discharge of their duties;  and they were  justified  in  so  viewing the letter.  The first respondent had jumped to the conclusion  that  the  Judicial Member  had  issued two contradictory orders or the Tribunal had issued two contradictory orders, and had demanded action against erring members.  Coming as  it  did  from  a  senior officer holding the rank of Law Secretary, the applicant was justified in taking a serious view of the first respondent’s conduct. Learned senior counsel for the first respondent then contended that the two letters were written after the should not   be   construed   as   interference    with    judicial decision-making. This contention is without any merit. It is quite  clear  that  by  writing  the  two  letters the first respondent was questioning the judicial decision arrived  at by the Tribunal. The first respondent had commented upon the two  so-called  "orders"  and  had  said  that the so-called contradictory orders disclosed judicial impropriety  of  the highest  degree.  He had demanded action against the Members of the Tribunal.  Questioning  of  a  decision  given  in  a particular  case, or the conduct of a Member of the Tribunal in deciding a case by the Law Secretary who has  thee  power to  write  confidential  reports of the Tribunal Members, is bound to be perceived by the Members as an attempt to affect their decision  making.  It  is  a  clear  threat  to  their independent  functioning. The letter also tends to undermine confidence in the judicial functioning of the Tribunal. In re  Hira  Lal  Dixit  and two Ors.  (1955 (1) SCR 677), this Court observed that it  was  not  necessary  that there  should  be  an actual interference with the course of administration of justice.  It is enough  if  the  offending act or  publication  tends  in  any way to so interfere.  If there are insinuations made  which  are  derogatory  to  the di’gnity  of  the  court and are calculated to undermine the confidence of the people In the integrity of the Judges, the conduct would amount to contempt.    In  the  case  of  C.K. Dapntary ana ors.  v.    O.P.    Gupta and Ors.  (1971 Supp.

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SCR 76) this Court negatived the contention  that  once  the case  1s  decided, even If the judgment is severely and even unfairly criticised, it should not be treated  as  contempt. The Court  said,  "We  are  unable to agree .,...,..  that a scurrilous attack on a Judge in respect  of  a  judgment  or past conduct has no adverse affect on the due administration of justice.    This sort of attack in a county like ours has the inevitable effect of undermining the confidence  of  the public in  te  judiciary.    If confidence in the judiciary goes, the due administration of justice definitely  suffers" (page 97). Our  attention  was  drawn  to  Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which  excludes  innocent  publications  as specified  in  that  Section,  published  when  the civil or criminal proceeding concerned is not pending, from the realm of contempt.  The present case,  however,  deals  with  acts which  lower the author-ity of a court and tend to interfere with the administration of  justice.    Sect-ion  3  has  no application in  the  present case.  ^he letters of the first respondent insinuate a d-ishonest conduct on the part of the two mennbe.rs, oresuftiably because the  view  expressed  by the Judicial Member in the first alleged order is changed by him  in favour of the revenue when he concurs with the order which was actually pronounced.  This kind of an attack based on access to a  confidential  draft  exchanged  between  the Members  of  the  Bench  is bound to affect free exchange of Ideas between the two Members wno have to judicially  decode a case.      It   "is   a   clear   obstruction   to  proper decision-making and to proper administration of justice. In the case of Delhi Judicial  Service  Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi etc.  etc.  v.  State of Gnjarat and Ors.  etc.   etc.   (Supra) it has been he}d that the defini -tion of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere  with  justice  or which would lower the authority of a court.  The public have a  major  stake  in  effective and orderly administration of justice.  A letter from a  high  officer  such  as  the  Law Secretary  which  questions the bona fides of the Members of the Tribunal in deciding a case and asks them to explain the judicial order which they have passed, unfairly tampers with the  judicial   process   and   interferes   with   judicial decision-making. The  first  respondent  has  tried  to  justi fy his conduct by saying that the letters were written by him  bona fide in the exercise of his right to control the functioning of the  Tribunal.    He  has  pointed  out that the Tribunal functions under the Department of  Law  and  Justice.    The Rules  of Recruitment prov-ide that the Law Secretary should be a member of the Selection Board which selects the Members of  the  Tribunal.   The confidential reports of the Tribunal’s Members are written by the Law  Secretary.    The Ministry  of  Law  and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, exercises  disciplinary  powers  over  the  Members  of  the Tribunal.    The   Allocation   of  Business  Rules  of  the Government of India place the Income Tax Appellate  Tribunal under  the  Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice.  He contends that the two letters were  written  by him in a legitimate exercise of his power of supervision and control:  and  these could not be construed as contempt.  In this connection, the first respondent  has  placed  reliance upon  a  decision  of this Court in Rizwan-UI-Hasan and Anr. v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh  (1953  SCR  581)  where  the Court  said that since the alleged contemner had the duty to supervise the work of the  trying  Magistrate,  the  alleged contemner  was only doing his duty as a superior officer and

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this would not amount to contempt.   In  the  present  case, however,  the  Rules  of A1 location of Business as also the supervisory control of the Department of Legal Affairs  over the   Income   Tax  Appellate  Tribunal,  is  administrative supervision and control.  It does not extend to control ting or duestloning judicial decisions of the Appellate Tribunal. The entire conduct of the  first  respondent  leaves much to   be   desired.    He  claims  to  have  received  a pseudonymous complaint dated 15th of November, 1997 from one K.   Prassd  with  which  copies  of   "two   separate   and conflicting orders passed by the ITAT Mumbai Bench A, in ITA No.9013/Bonn./1995" were   enclosed.      The   pseudonymous complaint stated that  while  one  order  was  dictated  and signed  by  the  Judicial  Member in August, 1997, the other order was per pro the Accountant Member and signed by  both. The  letter  says,  "The  aforesaid  circumstances  disclose judicial impropriety of the highest degree".  On  ths  basis of this pseudonymous complaint, and the receipt of copies of two  separate  orders,  the  first respondent claims to have written the letter of 30th of December, 1997.  Before  doing so,  he  did  not  check whether there was any person of the name K.  Prasad existing at the address given in the  letter and  whether  what  had  been  stated  in the letter had any factual basis.  He did  not  even  check  whether  aoth  the orders  or  any  of them had been pronounced by the Bench or not.  He should have been  aware  of  an  Office  Memorandum dated  29th  of  September, 1992 issued by the Department of Personnel  and  Training,  Government  of   India   to   all departments,   giving   instructions   about   dealing  with anonymous and  pseudonymous  complaints.    The   Memorandum states  that before taking cognizance of such complaints the Chief Vigilance Officer of the  Department  or  organisation concerned should obtain specific orders from the Head of the Department.   A copy of all such complaints shal 1 fi rst be made available to the officer concerned  for  his  comments, and   only   thereafter  further  action  should  be  taken. Precaution should be taken to take into custody all relevant documents.  In the present case the first respondent did not send a copy of the complaint which he had  received  to  the President of  the  Tribunal  for investigation.  Although he was the Law Secretary, he seems to be unaware  of  Rules  34 and  35  of  the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules of 1961 which regulate the  procedure  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal. Under Rule 34 which deals with final orders to be passed, it is provided as follows:-         "34(1):  The order of the Bench shal 1 be in writing         and  shall  be  signed  and  dated  by  the  Members         constituting it."         Rule 35 provides as follows:         "35:  The Tribunal shall, after the order is signed,         cause it to be communicated to the assesses  and  to         the Commissioner." Therefore, unless the order of a Bench i s signed by all Members constituting it and is dated, it is not an order of the Appellate Tribunal.  Secondly, this signed and  dated order has to be communicated both to the assessee and to the Commissioner.   The first respondent has noted in the letter of 30th December 1997, that the first so-called "order" only bears the signature one Member.  It is  not  signed  by  the second Member,  nor does it bear any date.  He ought to have verified whether this  so  called  first  "order"  had  been communicated to the assessee or to the Commissioner.  Had he done  so,  so  he would have found that such an "order" does not exist and no such order has been communicated either  to the assessee  or  to the Commissioner.  Had he been aware of

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Rule 34, he would have realised that  if  the  copies  which werre  sent to him were authentic, then the only order which could be construed as an  order  of  the  Tribunal  was  the second order which was signed by both the Members and bore a datge.   Had  he ascertained from the Commissioner of Income Tax or the assessee which order  had  been  communicated  to them, he would have found that the only order which had been communicated  was  the  order signed by both the Members and bearing the date 23rd  of  October,  1997.    Therefore,  he should have realised that there could not possibly have been any misunderstanding  about  the order passed.  What appears from the letter is that  the  first  respondent  seems  have taken  umbrage  at  the fact that the judicial Member, whose initial draft order was  in  favour  of  the  assessee,  was changed  and  the judicial Member, after discussion with the Accountant Member, ultimately agreed with the view taken  by the  Accountant  Member  and decided the appeal in favour of the Revenue.  Certainly, the language of the letter of  30th of December,  1997  is  wholly  unwarranted.  Curiously, the statement fn the letter that, the aforesaid  ci  rcumstances disclose   judicial   impropriety   of   highest  degree  is reminiscent  of  the  language  used  in  the   pseudonymous complaint.   Instead  of even waiting for an explanation, ho has straightway asked the  President  to  enquire  into  the matter  and  send  a  report to the Government, and that too peremptorily within ten days.  All this is wholly unbecoming of  a  person  holding  the  rank  of  tha  Law   Secretary. Moreover,  without waiting for some time for a response from the President, immediately on the lapse of a month, he wrote a second letter of 3rd  of  February,  1998  in  an  equally peremptory  fashion pointing out that although the President was requested to reply within ten days, he had not  received any report even after a month!  He admonished the President, pointing  out  that  the President had the responsibility to ensure that the judicial functions are discharged  properly, he  referred to the so called irregularity, and even went to the extent of  saying  that  silence  on  the  part  of  the President may  invite  adverse inferences in the matter!  He demanded a report from the President not later than  6th  of February,  1998,  when his letter was dated 3rd of February, 1998.  The entire tone of the letter is highly  unwarranted, offensive  and tends to undermine the dignity of the post of the President of the Appellate Tribunal.  It  is  unbecoming of  the  Law  Secretary  to  issue  such  "commands"  to the President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ordering  him to  send  reports  within  a  few  days and threatening that adverse inferences would be drawn if the report  is  not  so sent  - and all this without even bothering to check whather the complaint received by him was  a  genuine  complaint  or not! The  first  respondent,  although  he  received  the pseudonymous complaint of 15th of November, 1997,  seems  to have  written  a  letter  to  the  so-called  sender  of the complaint only on 12th of January, 1998, and that too asking only for a confirmation whether the complaint  was  made  by that person.    When  he  wrote the letter of 30th December, 1997, he had not even checked the veracity of the complaint. Thereafter, although the first respondent had  not  received any  response to his letter of 12th of January, 1993, he did not hesitate to address the letter of 3rd of February,  1998 to the President of the Tribunal. In  our  view  this kind of conduct and that, too on the part of the Law Secretary, who is expected  to  maintain the  Independence  of  the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and not interfere with  its  judicial  functioning,  amounts  to

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gross contempt  of court.  It is a deliberate attempt on his part to question the judicial functioning  of  the  Tribunal coming as it does from a person of his rank.  It is rightly peresived by the President as  well  as  the  two  concerned Members  of  the  Tribunal  as a threat to their independent funct-ioning in the course of  deciding  appeals  coming  up before them. The  first  respondent  has  offered  his  apology  to   us. However,  looking  to  all  the circumstances of the present case we cannot accept the apology offered.  He has travelled far  beyond  exercising  administrative  control  over   the Tribunal.   He  has  tried  to  influence  or  question  the decision-making process of  the  Tribunal.    Anapology,  in these circumstances,  cannot  be  accepted.   We, therefore, hold the first  respondent  guilty  of  contempt  of  court. Looking,  however,  to the fact that he has since retired as the Law Secretary and -is  not  in  a  position  to  inflict further  damage,  the  ends  of justice will be met if he is fined a sum of Rs.2,000/- as punishment for  contempt.    We order accordingly.