INCABLE NET(ANDHRA) LIMITED Vs AP AKSH BROADBAND LTD..
Case number: SLP(C) No.-009110-009110 / 2008
Diary number: 9671 / 2008
Advocates: Vs
DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINHA
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.9110 OF 2008
INCABLE NET (ANDHRA) LIMITED & ORS. .. PETITIONERS Vs.
AP AKSH BROADBAND LTD. & ORS. .. RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. The Petitioners herein filed Company Petition
No.69 of 2006 before the Additional Principal Bench
of the Company Law Board at Chennai under Sections
397, 398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956,
alleging mismanagement and oppression by the
majority shareholders of the first respondent
1
Company. Various reliefs, including reconstitution
of the Board of Directors of the said Company, were
prayed for. By its order dated 17th December, 2007,
the Company Law Board, hereinafter referred to as
“CLB”, dismissed the Company Petition against which
the above-mentioned Company Appeal was filed before
the High Court under Section 10F of the aforesaid
Act. The said appeal was dismissed by the High
Court as being misconceived upon the finding that
the CLB had considered all the materials, applied
the law and recorded its findings correctly and no
question of law arose from the said order. This
Special Leave Petition arises out of the said order
of the High Court.
2. In order to appreciate the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties, the facts
leading to the filing of the Company Petition
before the CLB are set out hereinbelow.
2
3. With the intention of providing broadband
network connectivity to all Government offices
across the State of Andhra Pradesh, to connect
the State capital with the Districts, Mandals,
Blocks and Gram Panchayats, the State
Government with the help of Andhra Pradesh
Technology Services, hereinafter referred to as
“APTS”, identified a consortium of Companies,
led by the Respondent No.5 to form a Joint
Venture Company under the name of M/s AP AKSH
Broadband Limited, the Respondent No.1 herein.
M/s AP AKSH Broadband Limited, hereinafter
referred to as “APAKSH”, was contemplated as a
Special Purpose Vehicle to undertake and
complete the project.
4. The Petitioner No.1 was one of the companies
forming the consortium which entered into a
Share Holders Agreement with the Respondent
No.5, Aksh Broadband Ltd. (since merged with
3
Aksh Optifibre Limited), hereinafter referred
to as ‘AKSH’. The Petitioner No.1 is the
Company and the Petitioner No.2 is its Managing
Director. The Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are
Directors of APAKSH. The Respondent No.5 holds
57% of the fully paid up equity shares and in
addition it was allotted 12,41,62,500 partly
paid shares, giving the said Company a complete
majority control over the affairs of the
Respondent No.1 Company.
5. In terms of the Share Holders Agreement the
Petitioner No.1 was to acquire 21.10% of equity
capital, AKSH was to acquire 64.80% equity
capital and the balance 14.30% was to be
allotted to APTS. On 29.5.2006 the Board of
Directors of APAKSH passed a Resolution to call
upon the share-holders of the partly paid
shares to pay the balance of the call money of
Rs.2/- per share on or before 28.2.2006 (Date
4
to be confirmed). A second and final notice was
issued by the Respondent No.1 for payment of
the call money, but on the request of the
Petitioner No.2 the time was extended.
Ultimately, on 25.11.2006, yet another notice
was issued by the Respondent No.1 for payment
of the balance call money of Rs.2/- per share
on the partly paid shares.
6. The overall estimated cost of the project was
Rs.395 crores, out of which equity
participation by the three constituent partners
was Rs.175 crores. The balance Rs.220 crores
was to be mobilized as loan by the Respondent
No.1 Company, and, in the event the Respondent
No.1 failed to do so, the deficiency was to be
met by further equity contribution by the
partners.
7. As mentioned hereinbefore, APAKSH was
established as a Special Purpose Vehicle with
5
the sole object of implementing the
connectivity project in accordance with the
contract awarded by APTS on 21st April, 2003,
apart from which no other business was to be
undertaken by it. On 10th May, 2005, the
Respondent No.1 gave a turnkey contract to the
Respondent No.5 which is one of the principal
shareholders having a controlling interest in
the Respondent No.1 Company. The said
Engineering, Procurement and Construction
contract, hereinafter referred to as the ‘EPC’
contract, envisaged the completion of the
infrastructural facilities within a period of
65 weeks at a fixed cost of Rs.370 crores upto
the stage of commission and implementation of
the project.
8. Appearing for the Petitioners, Mr. Jaideep
Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that
the Schedule of work in the Agreement entered
6
into between APTS and APAKSH provided that the
project was to be completed and commissioned
within 65 weeks, which was to end on 31st
December, 2006. It also stipulated that
connectivity upto the district and all mandal
levels was to be completed in a phased manner
within a period of seven months from the date
of execution of the contract. Mr. Gupta
submitted that towards that end the Respondent
No.1 placed orders for supply of optic fibre
cables on its sister concern, AKSH Broadband
Limited, the Respondent No.5, which
subsequently merged with AKSH Optifibre
Limited, the substituted Respondent No.5,
represented by the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, for
completion of the project. Mr. Gupta submitted
that despite the fact that over a crore of
rupees had been contributed by the Respondent
No.1 to the Respondent No.5 towards the
execution of the EPC contract, it had not
7
achieved connectivity in any of the 23
districts of the State in terms of the
Agreement dated 21st April, 2005, executed by
APTS. Mr. Gupta submitted that AKSH Broadband
Limited had used its sister concern, AKSH
Optifibre Limited, prior to its merger, to dump
useless and defective cable and to store them
as part of the stores of AKSH Broadband Limited
and siphoned out the monies from APAKSH
Broadband Limited, purportedly for execution of
the EPC contract, but without any tangible
benefit to the Respondent No.1.
9. Mr. Gupta urged that the Petitioner had been
lured by the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to procure
finance for the purpose of investment in the
Respondent No.1 Company from Elegant Capitals
Private Limited, the Respondent No.6 herein,
which had promised to advance a loan of Rs.33
crores to the Petitioners towards capital
8
contribution in the Respondent No.1 Company.
Mr. Gupta submitted that taking advantage of
their stranglehold over the Company and its
officers, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 had by a
series of acts mismanaged the affairs of the
Respondent No.1 Company and rendered the
Petitioners completely ineffective inspite of
their investment, thereby attracting the
provisions of Sections 402 and 403 of the
Companies Act, 1956.
10. Mr. Gupta urged that the Respondent No.5 was
involved with the turnkey project in two
capacities. On the one hand, it is the
principal shareholder of the Respondent No.1
Company, holding and controlling more than 64%
equity of the Respondent No.1 and, on the
other, it is the EPC contractor who is
responsible for delivering goods and services
in accordance with the Agreement executed
9
between itself and the Respondent No.1 Company
on 10th May, 2005. Mr. Gupta submitted that it
was in this context that it was necessary for
the Company Law Board and the High Court to
have inquired into the conduct of the
Respondent No.5 in the matter of execution of
the turnkey project. Mr. Gupta submitted that
such omission has resulted in grave miscarriage
of justice in so far as the Petitioners were
concerned.
11. Mr. Gupta submitted that since the Petitioners
had not been permitted to adduce oral evidence
involving events which had occurred during the
pendency of the appeal, the only course left
open to rectify the injustice caused to the
Petitioners was to remit the matter to the
Company Law Board for a proper inquiry into
the various allegations made by the Petitioners
regarding the gross misconduct of the
10
Respondent No.5 in executing the turnkey
project which was the very substratum of the
existence of APAKSH Broadband Limited, the
Respondent No.1 company. Mr. Gupta submitted
that the aforesaid acts of the Respondent No.1
Company through the Respondent No.5 herein,
taking advantage of its complete control over
the management and affairs of the Respondent
No.1 already established that the Company’s
affairs are being conducted in a manner
oppressive to the Petitioners and the facts
justified the making of a winding-up order on
the ground that it was just and equitable that
the Company be wound up.
12. Mr. Gupta also submitted that after holding
that they lacked jurisdiction under Sections
397 and 398 and 10-F of the Companies Act,
neither the Company Law Board nor the High
Court should have commented on the merits of
11
the matter which has prejudiced the interests
of the Petitioners. It was urged that it is in
this context that the complaint made about the
failure of the principles of natural justice
before the Company Law Board assumes
significance. Referring to the decision of
this Court in Needle Industries (India) Ltd. &
Ors. vs. Needle Industries Newey (India)
Holding Ltd. & Ors. [(1981) 3 SCC 333], Mr.
Gupta submitted that in the said decision it
had been held as follows :-
“63. We appreciate that it is generally unsatisfactory to record a finding involving grave consequences to a person on the basis of affidavits and documents without asking that person to submit to cross-examination. It is true that men may lie but documents will not and often, documents speak louder than words. But a total reliance on the written word, when probity and fairness of conduct are in issue, involves the risk that the person accused of wrongful conduct is denied an opportunity to controvert the inferences said to arise from the documents………..”.
In the said judgment, this Court also observed
that many decisions had been cited in support of
12
the contention that issues of mala fides and abuse
of fiduciary powers are almost always decided not
on the basis of facts but on oral evidence.
13. Mr. Gupta also referred to the decision of
this Court in Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad vs. Shantadevi
P. Gaekwad [(2005) 11 SCC 314], in which the
question of oppression for the purposes of Section
397 and 398 of the Companies Act has been dealt
with in some detail. Their Lordships held that the
remedy under Section 397 of the Companies Act is
not an ordinary one. The cause of oppression had
to be burdensome, harsh and wrongful and an
isolated incident may not be enough for grant of
relief and continuous course of oppressive conduct
on the part of majority shareholders was,
therefore, necessary to be proved. It was also
observed that the jurisdiction of the Court to
grant appropriate relief under Section 397 was of
wide aptitude and in exercise of its powers the
13
Court was not bound by the directions contained in
Section 402 of the Companies Act if in a particular
fact situation further relief or reliefs were
warranted. At the same time, a word of caution was
introduced and it was also held that it had to be
borne in mind that when a complaint is made as
regards violation of statutory or contractual
rights, the shareholders may initiate proceedings
in a Civil Court or in a proceeding under Section
397 of the Act which would be maintainable only
when an extra-ordinary situation is brought to the
notice of the Court keeping in view the wide and
far reaching power of the Court in relation to the
affairs of the Company.
14. Mr. Gupta pointed out that several letters had
been written on behalf of the Petitioner-Company
objecting to the manner in which the funds of the
Company were being siphoned off by the Engineering
Procurement and Construction Contractor,
14
hereinafter referred to as “the EPC Contractor”,
without any progress in the project work. In the
first of such letters dated 22nd August, 2006,
addressed by Shri R.V.R. Chowdary, Chairman and
Managing Director of the Petitioner Company, to the
Chairman of the Respondent No.1 Company, the
financial indiscipline on account of payment of
commission to the EPC contractor was objected to as
the same ought to have been spent in proportion to
the funds earmarked for each category of
expenditure. The next letter referred to by Mr.
Gupta was the one dated 1st November, 2006,
addressed by the Vice-Chairman of the Respondent
No.1 Company to the Respondent No.5 complaining of
the fact that despite all the support received by
the Respondent No.5 as the EPC contractor and
payment of about Rs.100 crores, connectivity had
not been completed even in one district nor in the
State Secretariat which was the central hub of the
project. Various other shortcomings of the
15
Respondent No.5 were also pointed out and it was
also stated that A.P. Broadband Project had been
used by the Respondent No.5 to enrich itself using
the free right of way granted by the Government of
Andhra Pradesh. It was also mentioned that no
further infusion of funds was necessary and the EPC
contractor would have to make immediate measures to
make triple play completely operational in at least
4 to 5 districts.
15. Yet another letter dated 29th September, 2006,
addressed to Mr. V.K. Dhir, the Chief Executive
Officer of the Respondent No.5 was referred to by
Mr. Gupta from which it would be evident that the
work had not been completed nor had the timelines
indicated been followed. A letter on similar lines
addressed by the Department of Information
Technology and Communication, Government of Andhra
Pradesh, to Dr. Kailash Chowdary, Managing Director
of the Respondent No.5, expressing serious concern
16
with regard to the progress made, was also brought
to the notice of the Court.
16. Mr. Gupta submitted that it is only too obvious
that the Respondent No.5 had misused its control
over the Respondent No.1 Company in not only
securing the contract for the project which was
nothing but the modus operandi of the Respondent
No.5 in collusion with Respondent No.1 to siphon
off the funds of the Company, after having induced
the Petitioners to invest large sums of money in
the Respondent No.1 Company and rendering the
holding of the petitioners in the Respondent No.1
Company of little or no value. As against the
investment of Rs.112 crores by the Petitioner
Company, no connectivity had been achieved even in
Hyderabad, let alone in the 23 districts and all
the mandals and villages of the State or even in at
least one district.
17
17. Mr. Gupta submitted that this was a classic
example of oppression by majority shareholders
having a controlling interest, confined to unjust
enrichment at the expense of minority shareholders
of the Company. Mr. Gupta submitted that unless
appropriate orders were passed on the Petitioners’
application under Sections 397, 398, 402 and 403 of
the Companies Act, 1956, the Petitioner Company
would completely lose its investment in the
Respondent No.1 Company and would also be made to
face continuous litigation and harassment at the
hands of the Respondents Nos.2 to 6.
18. Appearing for the Respondent Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5,
Mr. K.G. Raghavan, learned Senior Advocate,
submitted that the conduct of the Respondent No.5
as EPC contractor and a shareholder in Incable Net
has been cited by the Petitioners in their
application under Sections 397 and 398 of the
Companies Act, as acts of oppression on the
18
Petitioner Company. Referring to the various
allegations made against the Respondent No.5 and
its purported control of the Respondent No.1, Mr.
Raghavan pointed out that the Petitioners had
deliberately suppressed the fact that the payments
made to the Respondent No.5 had been done under the
signature of the Petitioner No.2. Mr. Raghavan
submitted that having himself participated in the
Board meetings as Director of the Respondent No.1
Company and having chaired eight Board Meetings
between 14.2.2005 and 4.3.2006 and having been a
signatory to the minutes of the meeting dated 21st
April, 2005, in which the EPC contract had been
awarded in favour of the Respondent No.5, it did
not lie in the mouth of the Petitioner No.2 to
attribute acts of oppression by the Respondent No.1
as far as the Petitioners are concerned. Mr.
Raghavan submitted that apart from the above, the
Petitioner No.2 was also a member of the Managing
Committee and Audit Committee of the Respondent
19
No.1 Company and had also signed the Audit Report
and its Balance Sheet for the year 2005-06.
19. Mr. Raghavan submitted that during this period,
when the Petitioner No.2 was not only participating
in the affairs of the Company, but was taking an
active role in its management, no allegation as to
oppression or even mis-management was raised. It
was only after the call money for the balance price
of the partly paid shares was repeatedly demanded
from the Petitioners and the Petitioners failed to
pay the said amount, that all these allegations
began to surface for the first time after 1st
November, 2006. Mr. Raghavan submitted that
between 2003 and 2006, ten Board Meetings were
chaired by the Petitioner No.2 as Chairman.
Special reference was made to the meeting held on
21st April, 2005, which was chaired by the
Petitioner No.2, and wherein the EPC contract to be
given to the Respondent No.5, was approved. Mr.
20
Raghavan submitted that at no point of time was any
demand made for cancellation of the EPC Agreement
and even in the Company Petition before the CLB no
such prayer was made.
20. Mr. Raghavan submitted that the Director of the
Company stands in a fiduciary capacity to the
Company, but the same cannot be equated with his
duties towards the shareholders which stood on a
different footing and in case of conflict between
the two interests, the Company’s interests had to
be protected. A Director has to act in the
paramount interest of the Company. He has no
statutory obligation as far as individual
shareholders are concerned. Accordingly, the duty
of the Petitioner No.2 as a Director of the
Respondent No.1 Company was to the Company before
his combined interest as a Director in the
Petitioner No.1 Company, which was a shareholder in
the Respondent No.1 Company. Mr. Raghavan urged
21
that the Company Law Board had quite correctly
disallowed the claims of the Petitioners and left
it to the collective wisdom of the Directors of the
Respondent No.1 Company to take such action as was
deemed fit and proper in the course of management
of the day-to-day affairs of the Company,
particularly with reference to evaluation of the
quantum of work completed by AKSH and the
investments made by it towards the share capital of
the Company, realization of the final call money
from the shareholders, recovery of the security
deposits from the Petitioner No.1,, settlement of
the pending bills of the Directors, audit of the
accounts of the Company, etc. which were within the
lawful domain of the Board of Directors.
21. In this regard, Mr. Raghavan referred to the
decision of this Court in Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad
(supra), which had also been referred to by Mr.
Gupta, in support of his contention that the duties
22
of a Director to the Company and to the
shareholders stand on different levels, but while a
Director stands in a fiduciary capacity to the
Company, he does not have such a duty towards
shareholders.
22. As far as denial by the CLB as well as the High
Court to the adducing of oral evidence is
concerned, Mr. Raghavan submitted that Section
10E(5) of the Companies Act, 1956, indicates the
manner in which the Company Law Board has to
exercise its powers and to discharge its functions
under the Act.
For the sake of reference, Section 10E(5) is
set out hereinbelow :
“10E. Constitution of Board of Company Law Administration.- (1) …………………… (2) …………………… (3) …………………… (4) …………………… (5) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sections (4C) and (4D), the Company Law Board shall in the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its functions
23
under this Act or any other law be guided by the principles of natural justice and shall act in its discretion.”
23. Mr. Raghavan submitted that there was no
compulsion on the Company Law Board to record oral
evidence, when all that the Petitioners had to say
had already been said by them on affidavit. The
Company Law Board, therefore, did not commit any
illegality in disallowing the Petitioners’ prayer
for adducing oral evidence. Mr. Raghavan also
referred to the relevant portions of the decision
of this Court in Needle Industries (India) Ltd.
(supra), where an argument had been advanced that
under the Company Court Rules framed by this Court,
the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were
made applicable to proceedings before the Company
Law Board under Section 397 of the Act. Mr.
Raghavan pointed out that in paragraph 63 of the
judgment this Court had observed that, although, it
had to be appreciated that it is generally
24
unsatisfactory to record a finding involving grave
consequences towards a person on the basis of
affidavits and documents, without asking that
person to submit to cross-examination, but a total
reliance on the written word, when probity and
fairness of conduct are in issue, involved the risk
that the person accused of wrongful conduct is
denied an opportunity to controvert the inferences
said to have arisen from the documents. The said
submission was ultimately not acted upon on the
ground that such a submission was a belated attempt
to avoid an inquiry into the conduct and motives of
one of the Directors of the Company.
24. Mr. Raghavan reiterated his submissions that
where there was a conflicting interest between the
Company and the shareholders, the Director’s duties
would at first always be for the benefit of the
Company and that in the context of Sections 397 and
398 of the Companies Act, the Legislature in its
25
wisdom had left the procedure to be adopted in
these matters to the Company Law Board itself, with
special emphasis on due compliance with the
principles of natural justice.
25. Mr. Raghavan placed reliance on the decision of
this Court in V.S. Krishnan & Ors. vs. Westfort Hi-
Tech Hospital Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 3 SCC 363],
wherein, while considering the scope of the
expression “oppression” within the meaning of
Sections 397, 398 and 402 of the Companies Act, it
was held that in order to establish “oppression” it
would have to be shown that the conduct of the
majority shareholders towards the majority
shareholders was harsh, burdensome and wrong and
that such conduct was mala fide and was for a
collateral purpose where although the ultimate
objective might be in the interest of the Company,
the immediate purpose would result in an advantage
for some shareholders over others. It was also
26
observed that the action of the majority
shareholders was against probity and good conduct.
Once the conduct was found to be oppressive under
Sections 397 and 398, the discretionary power given
to the Company Law Board under Section 402 to set
right, remedy or put to an end such an oppression,
is very wide.
26. Mr. Raghavan submitted that even in the
decision of this Court in Dale & Carrington Invt.
(P) Ltd.& Anr. vs. P.K. Prathapan & Ors. [(2005) 1
SCC 212], this Court had held that when a majority
shareholder was reduced to a minority shareholder
by a mala fide act of the Company or its Board of
Directors, such act would amount to “oppression”
against the minority shareholders.
It was also submitted that it is only in such
circumstances that a decision was taken by the
Respondent No.1 Company to consider the question of
forfeiture of the partly paid shares held by the
27
Petitioner No.1. He also submitted that the call
money amounting to Rs.24,83,25,000/- had already
been deposited by the Respondent Nos.3 to 5.
27. Except to submit that the project had been
undertaken by the State Government to abridge the
digital divide which existed within the State, Dr.
Manish Singhvi, learned Advocate appearing for the
Respondent No.2, had little else to add.
28. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of
the respondents, Mr. Jaideep Gupta submitted that
the High Court had not decided the question of
jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the
Companies Act. The findings of misconduct by the
High Court against the Petitioners was not only on
the question of contractual obligation between the
Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.6, but also with
regard to the mala fide manner in which the
Petitioners were placed on account of the close
proximity between the Respondent No.1 and the
28
Respondent No.5. Mr. Gupta also submitted that the
participation of the Petitioner No.2 as a Director
in the affairs of the respondent No.1 Company was
prior to the implementation of the project.
29. It was lastly urged that “oppression” is a
mixed question of law and fact as was held in the
Needle Industries (India) Ltd.’s case (supra) and
the views expressed by this Court in the said case,
in fact, applies to the case of the Petitioners
necessitating the setting aside of the orders of
the Company Law Board as well as the High Court.
30. On the allegations contained in the Company
Petition filed by the Petitioners under Sections
397, 398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956,
the reliefs prayed for are as follows :-
“(i) To direct the 1st respondent company to incorporate the Shareholders Agreement dated 04.06.2005 in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 1st respondent company;
29
(ii) To reconstitute the Board of Directors of the 1st respondent company and provide that all policy decisions, and all decisions on key matters be decided by a Board of directors at a meeting where at only one nominee from each of the groups viz., 5th respondent, 1st petitioner apart from APTS nominee are present;
(iii) Appoint a Chartered Accountant to investigate into the investments made by the 5th respondent towards the share capital especially keeping in mind the source of funds for investments in share capital of the 1st respondent company;
(iv) Appoint a team of Chartered Accountants/ Chartered Engineers to evaluate the quantum of work done by the 5th respondent company, and declare that the investment of the 5th respondent company over and above the said quantum of work to have been issued without consideration and consequently annul the said shares and direct the modification of the shareholding of the 1st respondent company;
(v) Vest the day-to-day administration of the 1st respondent company in a Committee of Directors comprising of a nominee from each group viz., petitioners, APTS and 5th respondent; and pass such other order(s) as the Hon’ble Board deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”
31. The allegation on the basis of which such
reliefs have been prayed for basically is that the
30
EPC Contractor AKSH, the Respondent No.5, which is
also the majority shareholder in the Respondent
No.1 Company, had mismanaged the funds and
operations of the Company and the work on the
project was delayed on account of the various acts
of omission and commission on the part of AKSH.
The reliefs prayed for have been opposed on behalf
of the Respondents contending that the contractual
obligations under the EPC Contract did not fall
within the scope of Sections 397 and 398 of the
above Act and the right of the Petitioners as
shareholders was in no way affected, particularly,
when the Petitioner No.2 was a Director and Vice-
Chairman and a member of the Managing Committee
constituted to monitor the implementation of work
of the project and at no point of time had he made
any grievance with regard to the EPC Contract.
That apart, he had chaired the meetings of the
Board and operated the bank accounts and payments
made to AKSH by the Respondent No.1 Company had in
31
most cases been done by him on behalf of the
Company.
32. It is on the said foundation that a case of
oppression and mismanagement has been attempted to
be made out by the Petitioners. However, in the
facts of the case it becomes difficult to take a
different view as has been expressed both by the
CLB as also by the High Court.
33. Admittedly, the Respondent No.5 is a majority
shareholder in the Respondent No.1 Company and at
the same time the EPC Contract has also been given
by the Respondent No.1 Company to the Respondent
No.5, to which transaction the Petitioner No.2,
Shri R.V.R. Chowdary, was also a party in his
capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Respondent No.1
Company. Besides being a party to the decision to
give the EPC Contract to the Respondent No.5, the
Petitioner No.2 was also instrumental in payment of
large sums of money being made to the Respondent
32
No.5 which estops him from alleging that the
Respondent No.2 Company had been siphoning off the
funds of the Respondent No.1 Company without
diligently performing its part of the contract.
There is substance in Mr. Raghavan’s submissions
that the EPC Contract given to the Respondent No.5
by the Respondent No.1 was a commercial contract
and stands outside the ambit of Sections 397 and
398 of the Companies Act. Failure to act in terms
of the contract cannot be said to have amounted to
either oppression or mismanagement by the
Respondent No.1. At best it can be said that the
Respondent No.1 had been used as a tool or
mechanism by the Respondent No.5 to acquire
benefits for itself, which in the instant case,
does not appear to be so, having regard to the fact
that one of the Petitioners in the Company Petition
was himself responsible for such payments being
made.
33
34. Both the parties have placed reliance on the
decision of this Court in Needle Industries (India)
Ltd. (supra). Mr. Gupta relied on the said
decision in support of his submission that by
denying an opportunity to the Petitioners to adduce
oral evidence, the CLB had shut out vital evidence
which would have strengthened the case of the
Petitioners. The views expressed in paragraph 63
of the said decision is the expression of a general
principle of law and only confirms the principle of
adducing evidence, but does not lay down a hard and
fast rule that in all cases the Court or the CLB is
bound to allow oral evidence to be led as otherwise
there is a risk that the person accused of wrongful
conduct is denied an opportunity to controvert the
inference said to have been arrived at from the
evidence produced before the Court alone. As a
proposition of law there can be no disagreement
with the same, but the question is as to whether
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the same is required to be applied in the facts of
the instant case.
35. From the submissions made on behalf of the
respective parties and the materials on record, the
point which falls for consideration in this appeal
is as to whether a case of oppression and
mismanagement by the majority shareholders against
the minority shareholders had been established or
not.
36. Whether there is any truth in Mr. Gupta’s
submissions as to the siphoning of funds by the
Respondent No.5 Company from the Respondent No.1
Company, which had been set up as a Special Purpose
Vehicle and in which the Respondent No.5 was a
majority shareholder, holding about 60% of the
equity shares has not been properly established.
On the other hand, the materials on record indicate
that the Petitioner No.2, who is a Director of the
Petitioner No.1 Company, which is also a
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shareholder in the Respondent No.1 Company, had
functioned as a Vice President of the Respondent
No.1 Company and had also chaired 8 of its Meetings
including the Meeting held on 21st April, 2005, in
which the decision was taken to award the EPC
Contract to the Respondent No.5 Company. Further
more, the Petitioner No.2 had signed most of the
cheques by which payments were made to the
Respondent No.5 Company for supply of materials
under the EPC contract. It does not lie in the
mouth of the Petitioner to now contend that the
funds of the Respondent No.1 Company had been
siphoned by the Respondent No.5.
37. From the facts as revealed, the only conclusion
that can be arrived at is that the Respondent No.5
had committed a breach of contract in regard to
supply of materials to the Respondent No.1 Company
in terms of the EPC contract. Such lapse, in our
view, would not constitute the ingredients of a
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complaint under Section 397, 398, 402 and 403 of
the Companies Act, 1956. Such breach could give
rise to an action of breach of contract under
Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
38. The decisions cited on behalf of the respective
parties and in particular, the decision in Needle
Industries (India) Ltd. (supra), in support of the
claim of the Petitioners for being allowed to lead
oral evidence, does not really come to the aid of
the Petitioners, since from the materials on record
itself it has been established that at best the
Respondent No.5 had failed to abide by its
commitments in the EPC contract executed in its
favour by the Respondent No.1 Company.
39. We are unable to understand as to how the
decisions in the above case are of any help to the
Petitioners, since nothing concrete has been
established by them in regard to either oppression
or mismanagement by the Respondent No.5 as far as
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the Petitioners are concerned. On the other hand,
the conduct of the Petitioner No.2 provides a
different picture since at the relevant point of
time he was at the helm of affairs of the
Respondent No.1 Company, despite being a Director
on the Board of the Petitioner No.1 Company. The
decision in V.S. Krishnan’s case (supra) is more
apposite to the facts of the case. Quoting
Halsbury, this Court observed that the expression
“oppression” within the meaning of the Sections
398, 399 and 402 of the Companies Act had been
interpreted to mean that the conduct of the
majority shareholders towards the minority
shareholders was harsh, burdensome and wrong and
that such conduct was mala fide and was for a
collateral purpose which would result in an
advantage for some shareholders over others,
although, the ultimate object might be in the
interest of the Company. However, the facts
disclosed in this case do not establish such
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conduct on the part of the Respondent No.5. Until
the conduct of the majority shareholders was found
to be oppressive in terms of the above description,
under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act,
1956, the Company Law Board was not competent to
invoke its jurisdiction under Section 402 of the
said Act to set right, or put an end to such
oppression.
40. On an overall analysis of the facts involved
and the part played by the Petitioner No.2 in the
affairs of the Company at the relevant time, we are
not inclined to interfere with the orders of the
High Court or the Company Law Board, since we are
not satisfied that any act of oppression or
mismanagement within the meaning of Sections 397,
398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956, has
been made out by the Petitioners against the
majority shareholders of the Respondent No.1
Company which would justify the making of a winding
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up order on the ground that it would be just and
equitable to do so and to pass appropriate orders
to bring to an end the matters complained of.
41. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.
42. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
…………………………………………J.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
…………………………………………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)
New Delhi Dated:07.05.2010
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