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PETITIONER: IN RE: SHRI S. MULGAOKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT:

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/02/1978

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  727            1978 SCR  (3) 162  1978 SCC  (3) 339

ACT: Contempt of Court--Newspaper article criticising the  judges of   Supreme  Court--If  contempt--Tests   for   determining contempt of Court.

HEADNOTE: In  its  issue  dated  December  13,  1977,  Indian  Express published a news item that the High Courts had reacted  very strongly  to  the  suggestion  of  introducing:  a  code  of judicial ethics and propriety and that "so adverse has  been the  criticism that the Supreme Court Judges, some  of  whom had prepared the draft code, have disowned it." In its issue dated December 21, 1977 an article entitled "Behaving like a Judge"  was  published  which inter alia  stated  that  the, Supreme  Court  of India was "packed" by Mrs.  Gandhi  "with pliant  and  submissive judges except for a  few".   It  was further  stated  that the suggestion that a code  of  ethics should  be formulated by Judges themselves was  "so  utterly inimical to the independence of the judiciary, violative  of the Constitutional safeguards in that respect, and offensive to the self-respect of the Judges as to make one wonder  how it  was conceived in the first place." A show  cause  notice had been issued to the Editor-in-Chief of the Newspaper  why proceedings for contempt under Art. 129 of the  Constitution should not be initiated against him in respect of the  above two news items. Dropping the contempt proceedings HELD: Per Beg, C.J., Proceedings  before the Court should be dropped without  any finding against any individual. [171 H] 1.   National  interest requires that all criticisms of  the judiciary  must  bestrictly rational and sober  and  proceed from  the  highest  motives without being  coloured  by  any partisan  spirit  or  tactics.  This should  be  a  part  of national ethics. [169 G-H] 2.   The   comments  about  Judges  of  the  Supreme   Court suggesting  that  they lack moral courage to the  extent  of having  "disowned" what they had done or in other words,  to the  extent of uttering what was untrue, at least  verge  on con-tempt.   None could say that such suggestions would  not make Judges of this Court look ridiculous or even  unworthy,

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in  the  estimation of the public, of the very  high  office they  hold  if they could so easily "disown" what  they  had done after having really done it. [166 A-B] 3.   Editors of responsible newspapers should be, aware that it  is courts of law and not newspaper readers who  have  to try  certain  issues  which Courts alone  are  empowered  to determine.  The character and the legal consequences of  any publication  about conduct of Judges are  certainly  matters for Courts to determine.  Editors of newspapers are expected to know also something of the special place of this Court in the Republic’s Constitution which amply protects its  Judges so  that they may not be exposed to opprobrious  attacks  by either malicious or ignorant persons. [166 B-D] 4.   The  judiciary cannot be immune from  criticism.   But, when  that  criticism  is based  on  obvious  distortion  or grossmis-statement and made in a manner which seems designed to  lower  respect  for the  judiciary  and  destroy  public confidence  in it, it cannot be ignored.  Though action  for contempt  of  Court, which is discretionary, should  not  be frequently  or  lightly taken the Court should  not  abstain from  using  this  weapon even when its  use  is  needed  to correct 163 standards  of behaviour in a grossly and  repeatedly  erring quarter.   It may be better in many cases for the  judiciary to  adopt  a  magnanimously charitable  attitude  even  when utterly uncharitable and unfair criticism of its  operations is made out of bona-fide concern for improvement.  But, when there  appears  some  scheme and a  design  to  bring  about results which must damage confidence in the judicial  system and  demoralize  Judges  of  the  highest  Court  by  making malicious  attacks,  anyone interested in  maintaining  high standards of fearless, impartial, and unbending justice will feel perturbed. [170 A-C] 5.   Although,  the question whether an attack is  malicious or  ill  intentioned, may be often difficult  to  determine, yet,  the  language in which it is made, the  fairness,  the factual  accuracy,  the logical soundness of  it,  the  care taken in justly and properly analysing the materials  before the maker of it, are important considerations.  Moreover, in judging  whether it constitutes a contempt of Court  or  not the Court is concerned more with the reasonable and probable effects  of  what is said or written than with  the  motives lying  behind  what  is done.  A decision  on  the  question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of  Court should  be exercised in one way or the other must depend  on the totality of facts and circumstances. [170 F-H] Per Krishna Iyer, J. concurring Precedentially validated judicial norms relating to contempt powers  of  Courts  are  :  (1)  The  Court  will  act  with seriousness  and severity where justice is jeopardized by  a gross  and/or  unfounded  attack on the  judges,  where  the attack  is  calculated to obstruct or destroy  the  judicial process;  (2)  The Court must harmonise  the  constitutional values of free criticism, and the need for a fearless curial process  and  its  presiding  functionary,  the  judge.   To criticise a judge fairly albeit fiercely, is no crime but  a necessary  right.   Where freedom  of  expression  subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag  it  or manacle it; (3) The Court must  avoid  confusion between  personal  protection  of  a  libelled  judge   and. prevention   of  obstruction  of  public  justice  and   the community’s confidence in that great process.  The former is not  contempt,  but later is,  although  overlapping  spaces abound;  (4) The fourth functional canon is that the  Fourth

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Estate  should be given free play within responsible  limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the  court, including  the  highest  Court;  (5)  The  fifth   normative guideline   for   the  Judges  to  observe  is  not   o   be hypersensitive   even  where  distortions   and   criticisms overstep  the limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation  by dignified  bearing and (6) The sixth consideration is  that, if  the  Court considers the attack on the judge  or  judges scurrilous,  offensive,  intimidatory  or  malicious  beyond condonable  limits, the strong arm of the law must strike  a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of  law by fouling its source and stream. [173 E, F 174F, 175 D,  E, F] R.   v.  Brett  [1950]  C.L.R. 226,  Queen  v.  Gray  [1900] Q.B.D., 36, Mcleod v. St.     Aubyn [1899] A.C. 549,  Ambard v.  Attorney-General  for Trinidad [1936] A.C.  322,  R.  V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex. p. Blackburn [1968]  2, W.L.R.  1204, Sambhu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha  &  Ors. [1972] 3 SCR   183  it 189, Perspective Publications Ltd.  v State of Maharasthra[1971] 2 SCR   779 R. C. Cooper v. Union of  India  [1970] 2 SCC 298, 301=[1970] 3  SCR  230,  Brahma Prakash  Sharma &’Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh  [1953] SCR  1169 at 1178-1180 C. K. Daphtary & Ors. v. O. P.  Gupta [1971]  Supp.  SCR 76 at 92-93, Shri Baradak-anta Mishra  v. The  Registrar  of Orissa High Court and Anr. [1974]  1  SCC 374=[1974] 2 SCR 282, Bridges v. California [1941] 319  U.S. 252 at 279, 283, 284 Sheopard V. Maxwell [1966] 384 u.s 333, Nebraska  Press Association v. Stuarts [1976] 96  Sup.   Ct. 2791  Los  Angeles Times’ Case’(314 U.S. 263) and  Craiq  v. Harney (331 U.S. 367) referred to. Per Kailasam, J. concurring Without  hearing the parties concerned, it is not right  and proper  to  make any comments about the facts of  the  case. Contempt  proceedings were dropped without calling upon  the counsel for the respondents. [189G] 164

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : In Re : S. Mulgaokar. V.   M. Tarkunde and A. N. Goyall for the alleged contemner. S.   N.  Kacker Solicitor General, Mr. R.  N.  Sachthey  and Miss A. Subhashini for the Sol.  Genl. Dr.   L.  M.  Singhvi, D. Bhandari and S. K.  Jain  for  the intervener. The following Orders of the Court were delivered BEG, C. J.-The matter before us arises out of a  publication in the Indian Express newspapers dated 13th December,  1977. Some people perhaps believe that attempts to hold trials  of everything and every body by publications in newspapers must include those directed against the highest Court of  Justice in this country and its pronouncements.  If this is done  in a   reasonable   manner,  which  presupposes   accuracy   of information  about  a  matter  on  which  any  criticism  is offered,  and  arguments  are directed  fairly  against  any reasoning adopted, I would, speaking for myself, be the last person  to consider it objectionable even if some  criticism offered is erroneous.  In Bennett Coleman & Co. & Others  v. Union of India & Ors.(1) I had said (at p. 828)               "John Stuart Mill, in his essay on  "Liberty",               pointed   out  the  need  for  allowing   even               erroneous  opinions  to be  expressed  on  the               ground  that  the  correct  ones  become  more               firmly  established by what may be called  the

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             ’dialectical’ process of a struggle with wrong               ones  which  exposes errors.  Milton,  in  his               "Areopagitica" (1644) said :               ’Though  all  the winds of doctrine  were  let               loose  to play upon the earth, so Truth be  in               the field, we do injuriously be licensing  and               prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her               and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth  put               to  the  worse, in a free and  open  encounter               ?......  Who knows not that Truth  is  strong,               next  to the Almighty; she needs no  policies,               no  stratagems,  no  licensings  to  make  her               victorious; those are the shifts and  defenses               that error makes against her power.........               Political  philosophers  and  historians  have               taught  us that intellectual advances made  by               our  civilisation would have  been  impossible               without freedom of speech and expression.   At               any rate, political democracy is based on  the               assumption that such freedom must be jealously               guarded.   Voltaire  expressed  a   democrat’s               faith  when he told an adversary in  arguments               ’I  do  not agree with a word you say,  but  I               will  defend  to the death your right  to  say               it’.   Champions of human freedom  of  thought               and  expression  throughout  the  ages,   have               realised  that intellectual  paralysis  creeps               over a Society which denies, in however subtle               a form, due freedom of thought and  expression               to its members.               (1)   [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757 @ 828-29.                165               Although  our Constitution does not contain  a               separate  guarantee of Freedom of  the  Press,               apart  from  the  freedom  of  expression  and               opinion contained in Article 19(1) (a) of  the               Constitution, yet, it is well recognised  that               the  Press provides the principal  vehicle  of               expression of their views to citizens.  It has               been said ’Freedom of the Press is the Ark  of               the  Covenant  of  Democracy  because   public               criticism  is essential to the working of  its               institutions.   Never has criticism been  more               necessary  than  today, when  the  weapons  of               propaganda are so strong and so subtle.   But,               like  other  liberties,  this  also  must   be               limited’." I find, however, that gross distortions of what was actually held  by  this Court in what is known as the  Habeas  Corpus case (Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. S. Shukla) (1)  are  being made presumably to serve  ulterior  objects. Some  of  these  distortions have been exposed by  me  in  a separate statement of detailed reasons which place on record my difference of opinion with the order ultimately passed by a  majority in this Court upon a case resulting from a  news item  published  in the Times of India  recently.   I  have, unfortunately,   now  to  take  notice  of  a  much   milder publication  in the Indian Express newspaper, in  which  the following  sentence  occurs  about  the  supposed  code   of judicial ethics assumed wrongly to have been drafted by some Judges of the Supreme Court :               "So  adverse has been the criticism  that  the               Supreme   Court  Judges,  some  of  whom   had               prepared the draft code, have disowned it". Judges of this Court were not even aware of the contents  of

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the  letter  before it was sent by me as  Chief  Justice  of India to Chief Justices of various.  High Courts suggesting, inter-alia, that Chief Justices could meet and draft a  code of  ethics  themselves  or  through  a  Committee  of  Chief Justices  so as to prevent possible lapses from the path  of rectitude and propriety on the part of Judges.  The error of the assumption that Judges of the Supreme Court had any hand in drafting a code which I could have had at the back of  my mind  when I sent my suggestions to Chief Justices  of  High Courts was pointed out to the Editor of the Indian-  Express in  a  letter  sent  by the Registrar  of  this  Court.   No question of disowning the supposed code by any Judge  could, in  the circumstances, arise.  And, I had  never  "disowned" the  suggestions made by me.  The Registrar of  this  Court, therefore,  wrote to inform the Editor of  the  misstatement which ought to have been corrected.  In reply, the Registrar received a letter from the Editor showing that the  contents of  my letter to Chief Justices of High Courts,  which  were confidential,   were  known  to  the  Editor.   Instead   of publishing  any  correction of the  misstatement  about  the conduct  of  fudges  of this Court, the  Editor  offered  to publish  the  whole material in his  possession,  as  though there  was  an issue to be tried between the Editor  of  the newspaper  and this Court and the readers were there to  try it and decide it. (1)  A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207. 166 Comments  about Judges of the Supreme Court suggesting  that they  lack moral courage to the extent of having  "disowned" what  hety had done, or, in other words, to. the  extent  of uttering what was untrue, at least verge on contempt.  I  do not think that anyone could say that such suggestions  would not  make  Judges  of this Court  look  ridiculous  or  even unworthy, in the estimation of the public, of the very  high office they hold if they would so easily "disown" what  they had  done  after having really done it  The  readiness  with which  possible  correctness of such a suggestion  could  be accepted   by  the  Editor  of  a  newspaper  has  its   own implications about the general fall in standards and  values in life which Judges ;Are supposed to share. It  seems  to  me  that  Editors  of  at  least  responsible newspapers should be aware that it is Courts of law and  not newspaper  readers  who  have to try  certain  issues  which courts  alone  are empowered to determine.  Courts  adopt  a procedure  designed to prevent, as far as  possible,  unfair prejudices,  irrelevancies, and untruths creeping  in.   The character  and  the legal consequences  of  any  publication about conduct of judges are certainly matters for Courts  to determine.  Editors Of newspapers are expected to know  also something  of  the  special  place  Of  this  Court  in  the Republic’s  Constitution which amply protects its judges  so that  they  may  not be exposed to  opprobrious  attacks  by either malicious or ignorant persons. This  Court  is armed, by article 129 of  the  Constitution, with very wide and special powers, as a Court of Record,  to punish its contempts.  Elsewhere, I have said in an  attempt to   explain  the  principle.  of  the  Supremacy   of   the Constitution which this Court represents and expounds:               "Thus,  the  principle  of  Supremacy  of  the               Constitution  requires for its maintenance  in               full  force and vigour; firstly, an  executive               which respects the judiciary and its  verdicts               and does not take away, by the exercise of its               constitutional powers, judicial powers to deal               with  the  rights  of  citizens  even  against

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             executive actions of the State; and,  secondly               the  absence of any  legislative  interference               with   judicial   functions   in   a    manner               characterised   by   Dean  Roscoe   Pound   as               "legislative lynching" of threats of any  kind               held  out for reaching particular  conclusions               however  unpalatable  they may be to  any  one               Articles  121  and 211  of  our  Constitution,               prohibiting  discussion  of the conduct  of  a               Supreme  Court  or a High Court Judge  in  the               discharge of his duties even by Parliament  or               a State Legislature, except upon a motion  for               his removal by the constitutionally prescribed               procedure of addresses presented by each House               of  Parliament  after  proved  misconduct   or               incapacity  of a Judge and resolutions by  2/3               majorities  of each House present and  voting,               are there in our Constitution to ensure  this.               Can  ordinary  citizens  do  elsewhere,   with               impunity, what members of Parliament cannot do               in  Parliament and legislators cannot do in  a               State Legislature, and, if so, to what  extent               ?               167               Such  questions  will have to be  answered  by               Courts   with  reference  to  the   facts   of               particular cases if and when brought to  their               notice.               I also said there               "’It  would be a sad day for the supremacy  of               the  Constitution  and for the  Rule  of  Law,               which it implies, if malicious or ill informed               persons,   filled   with   the   irrationality               involved  in  the spirit of  what  Dean  Pound               called   "lynching"  or  misguided   zest   or               vindictiveness, acting in a manner freed  from               the restraints of law or reason, were  allowed               to  take upon themselves the task  of  passing               judgments on actions of others particularly of               Judges  performing judicial  functions.   That               would certainly sound the death knell of  what               Dean Roscoe Pound calls "judicial justice" and               the  Rule  of  Law.   The  supremacy  of   the               Constitution can only be maintained when there               is a spirit. of law abidingness and discipline               amongst citizens so that principles of law can               be  applied scientifically to facts by  Courts               of  Justice, which are the custodians of  what               has  been described by political  philosophers               as  the abiding or continuing "Real  Will"  of               the whole nation embodied in the  Constitution               as contrasted with the will or wishes of  some               or  majority  of citizens for the  time  being               expressed   in  legislatures   or   elsewhere.               Judges, who have taken oaths of allegiance  to               the  Constitution,  are bound  to  uphold  it,               conscientiously   without  fear   or   favour,               affection  or  illwill’.  They  have  to  give               their  honest  judgments  without  caring  for               popular approval or disapproval." It   seemed   particularly  necessary  to  point   out   the protections enjoyed by this Court and its Judges in order to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule  of law,  which  speak  through pronouncements  of  this  Court, because  it was found that, soon after the  incorrect  stand

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taken  by  the Editor of the Indian Express, in  the  manner mentioned  above,  an article appeared,  entitled  "Behaving like a Judge", in this very newspaper.  The suggestion  that a  code of ethics should be formulated by judges  themselves was  characterised :in this article as "so utterly  inimical to  the  independence  of the judiciary,  violative  of  the Constitutional safeguards in that respect, and offensive  to the self-respect of the Judges as to make one wonder how  it was  conceived  in  the, first place".  The  writer  of  the article  asserted a right of the public to know what  1,  at any rate, would be quite willing to tell him it the came  to me   as   a  citizen  wanting,  ’in  good   faith,   correct information. The writer of an article of a responsible newspaper on legal matters is expected to know that there is no  constitutional safeguard  or provision realing to the independence  of  the judiciary  which  could possibly prevent  Judges  themselves meeting  to  formulate  a  code of  judicial  ethics  or  to constitute  a  committee  to formulate a  code  of  judicial ethics  and etiquette.  This is what was suggested to  Chief Justices  of High Courts.  Indeed, in America, the  American Bar  Association has forniulated a code of this kind.   None has been formulated so far in this 168 country.   A  purported  enactment which  tried  to  prevent Judges  from meeting and formulating such a code  of  ethics and  etiquette so as to be clear about points on  which,  at times,   there  is  uncertainty  in  the  minds  of   Judges themselves, would not be valid.  Such a purported law  would offend   against  article  19(1)(a)  of  the   Constitution. Neither  out Constitution nor our law, could conceivably  be infringed if Judges were to meet to device means to  prevent situations  arising  in which an accusing  finger  could  be raised  against  the conduct of a judge, whether  inside  or outside  the  Court,  let  alone  involving   Constitutional provisions  of Article 124 for his removal after an  inquiry by a body constituted under the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968.  A code  of  this  kind, if scrupulously observed  by  all  the Judges, could only enhance their independence and  prestige, and not injure these in any way whatsoever. This  article  proceeds  on the  assumption  that  there  is already  a  formulated  code of ethics  sent  to  the  Chief Justices.   In fact, nothing more than some  suggestions  or examples of the kind of conduct which a possible code  could deal  with  were sent to the Chief Justices.  If  there  was anything  inappropriate,  which  could be  found  in  those, suggestions,  that  could  be criticized and  set  right  or discarded.    Better   suggestions   could   be   made   and incorporated  in  a  proper  code  of  judicial  ethics  and etiquette,  if  that could be framed.  Indeed, in  case  the Judges felt bolder, it was suggested that they could  formu- late  a  mode of action to deal with allegations  which  are sometimes made baselessly or maliciously against Judges.  If a  Committee of Chief Justices or Judges could consider  the allegations  made  against any individual Judge and  was  to find  them  baseless  or  malicious  it  would  protect  the unfortunate  Judge  who  was  made  a  victim  of  malicious onslaughts.   On the other hand, if there was  substance  in the  very  serious  allegations  which  are  sometimes  made against  Judges of High Courts (I am glad to say that  their number is extremely small and limited), the Committee  could itself  forward  its findings for appropriate  action  under Article  124 of the Constitution, to the Central  Government which  could  then set up a Committee of Inquiry.   In  this way,  in  serious  cases, the Judge concerned  would  get  a

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consideration  from  his peers as well as by  the  Committee provided by the Judges’ Inquiries Act, 1968. The article of 21 December, 1977, referred to above, ends by attempting  to  make  a distinction  between  the  wonderful performance  of  High Court Judges and  the  "disappointing" record  of the Supreme Court.  It was suggested  there  that this was due to the fact that the Supreme Court is  "packed" by the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi,, With pliant  and submissive judges except for a few".  Questions,  naturally, must  arise  in the, public mind : To what  do  they  become "pliant"  ?  is  it to the dictates  or  directions  of  the Executive?   When  and  how have they done  so  ?  Had  such insinuations  any factual basis-which they, fortunately,  do not  have  would, at any rate, be among those who would  say that  the sooner this Court is wound up the better it  would be for the country. 169 The  supposed writer of the article was evidently  so  shaky about  his ability to substantiate his suggestions,  on  the strength  of  his  own knowledge or opinion,  that  he  took shelter  behind views alleged to have been expressed by  Mr. Jayaprakash  Narayan on some occasion to the effect  alleged by  him  in the article.  We cannot pass any  judgment  upon such views without giving notice to other parties, and with- out taking evidence about the circumstances and the context, which  largely  determine  the real meaning,  in  which  any opinion to that effect may or may not have been expressed by anybody. Mr.  Jethmalani appearing for A. G. Noorani, to whom we  had issued  no  notice, tried to convince us that there  was  no intention  on the part of the writer of the article  or  the editor to injure the. dignity or position of this Court  but the intention was only to direct public attention to matters of  extreme  importance to the nation.  If this were  so  it would  be a desirable object.  But, as we should  all  know, there  are proper and permissible ways of carrying out  such an object and others which are not permitted by law, or,  at least by, elementary rules of fairness. A reason which has also weighed with me in dropping this and a  similar earlier proceeding is that, we have been  passing through  a  period  of exceptional  strain  and  stress  and excitement  in  this country in which unusual  remarks  made have  not  been  confined to  what  appears  in  newspapers. Indeed,    extraordinary    and    surprisingly    erroneous ’statements,  which could not be there if rules of  judicial ethics  were formulated and strictly adhered to, have  found place  even in solemn pronouncements of this Court  on  rare occasions.   However,  I do not want to  expatiate  on  that theme  here.   AR I can say is that, if this  is  a  correct observation,  it  would also disclose a need  for  rules  of judicial ethics or propriety for judges of even this  august Court. The   statement   made  above  by  me  should   remove   the misapprehension,  if  there was really any in  the  mind  of whoever  wrote  the article in the Indian  Express  of  13th December,  1977, condemning my proposals for framing a  code of  judicial ethics on the ground, inter alia, that  it  was proposed  to have one only for High Court Judges.   I  think that  there should be codes of ethics not merely for  judges but  for  occupants  of every  office-high  or  low-and  for members  of  every  profession and  calling.   Without  such codes,  progress in right directions in any  sphere  becomes more  uncertain and problematic than it could be  with  such codes of ethics. National  interest  requires  that  all  criticisms  of  the

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judiciary  must be strictly rational and sober  and  proceed from  the  highest  motives without being  coloured  by  any partisan  spirit  or  tactics.  This should  be  a  part  of national  ethics.   Newspapers,  in  particular,  ought   to observe such a rule imbued with what Montesquieu  considered essential for a healthy democracy : the spirit of  "virtue". They  should, if they are interested in  promoting  national welfare and progress, support proposals for framing  correct rules of ethics for every class of office holder and citizen in the country.  And, the judiciary must, in its actions and thoughts and pronouncements, bold aloft the values and 12-21 1 SCR 178 170 the   spirit   of  justice  and  truth  enshrined   in   the Constitution  and soar high above all other lower  loyalties and alignments if it is to be truly independent. The  judiciary cannot be immune from criticism.   But,  when that  criticism  is  based on obvious  distortion  or  gross misstatement  and made in a manner which seems  designed  to lower   respect  for  the  judiciary  and   destroy   public confidence  in  it, it cannot be ignored.  I am not  one  of those who thinks that an action for contempt of Court, which is  discretionary,  should be frequently or  lightly  taken. But at the same time, I do not think that we should  abstain from  using  this  weapon even when its  use  is  needed  to correct  standards of behaviour in a grossly and  repeatedly erring  quarter.   It may be better in many  cases  for  the judiciary to adopt a magnanimously charitable attitude  even when  utterly  uncharitable  and  unfair  criticism  of  its operations is made out of bona fide concern for  improvement But, when there appears some scheme and a design to bring  a results which must damage confidence in our judicial  system and  demoralize  Judges  of  the  highest  court  by  making malicious  attacks,  anyone interested in  maintaining  high standards of fearless, impartial, and unbending justice will feel  perturbed.  I sincerely hope that my  own  undisguised perturbation  at  what  has been taking  place  recently  is unnecessary.   One may be able to live in a world  of  logic detachment when unjustified abuses are hurled at one’s  self personally,  but,  when  the question is  of  injury  to  an institution,  such  as the highest Court of justice  in  the land,  one cannot overlook its effects upon national  honour and prestige in the comity of nations.  Indeed, it becomes a matter deserving consideration of all serious minded  people who  are  interested  in  seeing  that  democracy  does  not flounder or fail in our country.  If fearless and  impartial courts  of justice are the bulwark of a  healthy  democracy, confidence  in  them cannot be permitted to be  impaired  by malicious  attacks  upon  them.  However,  as  we  have  not proceeded further in this case, I do not think that it would be  fair  to characterize anything written or  said  in  the Indian Express as really malicious or ill-intentioned and  I do not do so.  We have recorded no decision on that although the  possible constructions on what was written  there  have been indicated above. My opinion on matters touched by my learned brother  Krishna Iyer  is that, although, the question whether an  attack  is malicious  or  ill intentioned, may be  often  difficult  to determine,  yet,  the  language in which  it  is  made,  the fairness, the factual accuracy, the logical soundness of it, the  care  taken  in  justly  and  properly  analysing   the materials   before   the   maker  of   it,   are   important considerations.  Moreover, in judging whether it constitutes a  contempt of Court or not we are concerned more  with  the reasonable  and probable effects of what is said or  written

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than with the motives lying behind what is done.  A decision on  the question whether the discretion to take  action  for contempt  of  Court should be exercised in one  way  or  the other   must   depend   on  the  totality   of   facts   and circumstances. After I had drafted my reasons for dropping the  proceedings I have had the benefit of perusing the views expressed by my learned  brother  Kailasam.  I would like to make  it  quite clear that there is, 171 as I have already mentioned above, no finding given here  by me  against any person.  I entirely agree that it would  not be, fair or legal, without giving opportunities to be  heard to any persons against whom any aspersions are to be cast or any remarks are to be made to record findings against  them. But,  I think that we axe entitled to express  our  separate and  individual  opinions for dropping the  proceedings  now before  us.   Indeed,  my  separate  judgment  in  the  case relating  to  the recent publication in the Times  of  India case was a dissenting one.  It was, therefore, all the  more necessary for me to record my reasons for a dissent.  In the case  now before us, we are all agreed that the  proceedings should  be dropped.  Nevertheless, I think that we are  com- pletely  justified  in  giving  and are  free  to  give  our separate  reasons  why this should be done  either  with  or without comment so long as we do not give any finding  which may  be unfair to anyone.  I would, therefore, like to  make it  clear once again that, as the matter has  not  proceeded beyond  putting the cause of the notice to  learned  counsel and hearing only their prima facie reactions on whether  the proceedings  should be dropped or not, we have accepted  the submissions  of  Mr.  Tarkunde and Mr.  Jethmalani  that  we should  not  proceed  further,  there  is  no  question   of recording any finding against anyone and I have not done so. It was, however, necessary to indicate the way in which  and reasons  for  which the notice was issued.  It seems  to  me that  it was also necessary for me to refer to  the  reasons why  I  consider  codes  of  ethics’.  and,  in  particular, judicial  ethics  are  necessary.   That  is  a  matter   of conscience  and of my understanding of what is right  for  a judge to do "without fear or favour, affection or ill will". The need for appropriate standards relating even to what our judgments  should or should not contain is so great  that  I think  this  matter  has  to be  taken  up  soon  by  Judges themselves  at some stage or other.  Even the difference  of views  between  learned  judges  of this  Court  on  such  a question  illustrates  that.   If  we  had  clear  rules  of judicial  practice  and  ethics on  even  such  matters  our judgments  would no, be encumbered with what should  not  be there.   If such rules are absent there may  be,  sometimes, serious disagreement as to what a judgment should or  should not  contain.  In such a case, the only sound rule  I  could follow is to bear all those who are to be beard according to law  but  no- others and then to express the  opinion   feel bound by my conscience to express without allowing any other consideration to weigh with me. As  I have already Pointed out above, I think that the  need for appropriate norms of conduct exists in practically every sphere of life in which enlightened people strive to  attain exalted ends irrespective of consequences.  If our  separate statements of reasons for dropping the proceedings before us succeed  in  at least emphasizing that need they  would  not have  been  made in vain.  I concur in the  order  that  the proceedings  before us be dropped at this stage without  any finding against any individual.

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KRISHNA IYER, J.-Silence is no sanctuary for me when  speech from  the  Chief Justice persuades my pen into  a  divergent course. 172 profoundly  appreciate and deeply respect his sense of  hurt and  obligation for explanation but prefer to  travel  along another  street  in  stating why   agreed  to  jettison  the contempt  proceedings.  My judgment is more  an  explanation than an expostulation and certainly not a reflection on  the respondents. We  had unanimously directed that the above  proceedings  in contemplation  of  contempt action be dropped but  the  fact that we had converged to this conclusion did not rule out-as is no* appellant our divergence in the process of reasoning. Minds differ as rivers differ Such, perhaps, in part, is the case here. The  contempt  power,  though  jurisdictionally  large,   is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise.  Every  commission of contempt heed not erupt in indignant committal or  demand punishment, because judges are judicious, their valour  non- violent  and their wisdom goes into action when played  upon by  a  volley  of values,. the least of  which  is  personal protection-for  a wide discretion, range  of  circumspection and rainbow of public considerations benignantly guide  that power.   Justice is not hubris; power is not  petulance  and prudence  is not pussilanimity, especially when  judges  are themselves prosecutors and mercy is a mark of strength,  not whimper of weakness.  Christ and Gandhi shall not be lost on the  judges at a critical time when courts are on trial  and the  people ("We, the People of India") pronounce the  final verdict on all national institutions.  Such was the  sublime perspective, not plural little factors, that prompted me  to nip  in the bud the proceeding started for serving a  larger cause  of  public  justice than punitive  action  against  a publisher, even assuming (without admitting) he was  guilty. The preliminary proceeding has been buried publicly; let  it lie  in  peace.  Many values like free  press,  fair  trial, judicial   fearlessness   and  community   confidence   must generously enter the verdict, the benefit of doubt,  without absolutist  insistence,  being extended  to  the  defendant. Such   are   the  dynamics  of  power   in   third   special jurisdiction.     These   diverse   indicators,    carefully considered,  have  persuaded  me  to go  no  further.  by  a unilateral  decision  of the bench.  This  closure  has  two consequences.   It puts the lid on the  proceedings  without pronouncing  on  the  guilt or  otherwise  of  the  opposite parties.  In a quasi-criminal action, a presumption of inno- cence  operates.  Secondly, whatever belated reasons we  may give for our action, we must not proceed to substantiate the accusation,  if  any.  To condemn unheard is  not  fairplay. Bodyline bowling, perhaps, is not cricket.  So my reasons do not reflect on the merits of the charge. Poise  and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential  to the judicial temper that huff, ’haywire’ or even humiliation shall  not besiege; nor, unveracious provocation,  frivolous persiflage   nor  terminological  inexactitude  throw   into palpitating   tantrums  the  balanced  cerebration  of   the judicial mind.  The integral yoga of shanti and neeti Is  so much the cornerstone of the judicial process that criticism, wild  or valid, authentic or anathematic, shall have  little purchase  over the mentation of the court.  I quite  realise how hard it is to resist, with 173 sage  silence, the shafts of acid speech; and, how  alluring it  is to succumb to the temptation of  argumentation  where

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the  thorn,  ’not  the  rose,  triumphs.   Truth’s  taciturn strategy, the testimony of history says, has a higher  power than  a  hundred  thousand  tongues  or  pens.  in  contempt jurisdiction, silence is a sign of strength since our  power is wide and we are prosecutor and judge. Why did I concur in the short order ? Why do I now strike  a variant note to that of the learned Chief Justice ? I do not take  up the position that wandalising the Judges  does  not come within the contempt clutches of the court.  The Court’s jurisdiction   to  initiate  proceedings  and   punish   for constructive   contempt   suo  motu  crystallized   in   the eighteenth century even though it is clear that the  Court’s inherent powers in this regard were not as wide as Wilmot J. made them out to be in his posthumously published opinion in R. v. Almon [1765] published in (1802) Wilmot’s opinions(1). Fortunately,   the  attacks  on  the  judiciary  have   been comparatively  few in most countries, having regard  to  the character assassination of the personnel in the other  great branches  of  Government.  Even so, the law  which  punishes those  who  scandalize judges is as old as  the  Common  Law itself.  The existence of the contempt power, however,  does not obligate its exercise on every occasion but triggers  it only in special situations, not routinely. What  then are the complex of considerations  dissuasive  of punitive action ? To be exhaustive is a baffling project; to be pontifical is to be impractical; to be flexible is to  be realistic.   What,  then, are these broad  guidelines-not  a complete  inventory, but precedentially  validated  judicial norms’? The  first rule in this branch of contempt power is  a  wise economy  of  use  by  the  Court  of  this  branch  of   its jurisdiction.   The  Court  will act  with  seriousness  and severity  where  justice is jeopardized by  a  gross  and/or unfounded  attack  on  the  judges,  where  the  attack   is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process.  The court  is  willing  to ignore,  by  a  majestic  liberalism, trifling and venial offenses-the dogs may bark, the  caravan will  pass.   The  court will not be prompted to  act  as  a result of an easy irritability.  Much rather, it shall  take notice look at the conspectus of features and be guided by a constellation  at  constitutional and  other  considerations when  it chooses to use, or desist from using, its power  of contempt. The second principle must be to harmonise the constitutional values  of free criticism, the fourth estate  included,  and the  need  for a fearless curial process and  its  presiding functionary,  the judge.  A happy balance has to be  struck- the benefit of the doubt being given generously against  the judge,  slurring over marginal deviations but severely  pro- ving  the  supremacy of the law  over  pugnacious,  vicious, unrepentant  and malignant contemners, be they the  powerful press,  gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists  or’ olympian  establishmentarians.  Not because the  judge,  the human symbol of a high value, is personally (1)  See  further  R. Dhavan : "Contempt of  Court  and  the Phillimore  Committee  Report" (1976) 5 Anglo  American  Law Review, 186 at 194 and the literature cited there. 174 armoured  by  a  regal privilege  but  because  ’be  you-the contemner--ever so high, the law-the People’s expression  of Justice-is  above you.  Curial courage  overpowers  arrogant might  even  as  judicial  benignity,  forgives  errant   or exaggerated critics.  Indeed, to criticise the judge fairly, albeit  fiercely, is no crime but a necessary  right,  twice blessed in a democracy.  For, it blesseth him that gives and

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him   that  takes  Where  freedom  of   expression,   fairly exercised, subserves public interest in reasonable  measure, public    justice   cannot   gag   it   or   manacle    it,. constitutionally  speaking.  A free people are the  ultimate guarantors of fearless justice.  Such is the cornerstone  of our  Constitution;  such is the touchstone of  our  Contempt Power,  oriented on the confluencer of free speech and  fair justice  which is the scriptural essence of our  Fundamental Law.  Speaking of the social philosophy and philosophy,,  of law  in  an integrated manner as applicable to  contempt  of court,  there  is  no conceptual  polarity  but  a  delicate balance,  and  judicial ’ sapience’ draws the line.   As  it happens,  our  Constitution-makers  foresaw  the  need   for balancing  all these competing interests.  Section 2(1)  (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides :               "Criminal  contempt"  means  the   Publication               (whether  by words, spoken or written,  or  by               signs,  or  by  visible  representations,   or               otherwise)  of any matter or the doing of  any               other act whatsoever which-               (i)   scandalises  or tends to scandalize,  or               lowers or tends to lower the authority of  any               court.’ This  is  an extremely wide definition.  But, it  cannot  be read  apart  from  the  conspectus  of  the   constitutional provisions   within  which  the  Founding  Fathers  of   the Constitution  intended all past and future statutes to  have meaning.   All  laws  relating to contempt  of  court  had,. according  to  the  provisions  of  Article  19(2),  to   be ’reasonable  restrictions" on the exercise of the  right  of free  speech.  The courts were given the power-and,  indeed, the responsibility-to harmonize conflicting aims,  interests and  values.   This is in sharp contrast to  the  Phillimore Committee Report on Contempt of Court in the United  Kingdom (1974)  bund.  5794  prs. 143-5, pp.  61-2)  which  did  not recommend the defence of public interest in contempt cases. The  third principle is to avoid confusion between  personal protection of a libeled judge and prevention of  obstruction of  public  justice and the community’s confidence  in  that great process.  The former is, not contempt, the latter  is, although overlapping spaces abound. Because  the  law  of  contempt  exists  to  protect  public confidence  in  the administration of justice,  the  offence will  not  be  committed  by’  attacks  upon  the   personal reputation  of  individual judges as  such,.   As  Professor Goodhart has put it :               "Scandalising  the  court  means  any  hostile               criticism of the judge as judge; any  personal               attack  upon him, unconnected with the  office               he  holds,  is dealt with under  the  ordinary               rules of slander and libel."                175               (See ’Newspapers and Contempt of Court  (1935)               48, Harv.  L. R. 885, 898.)               Similarly,  Griffith,  C. J. has said  in  the               Australian case of Nicholls(1) that :               "In  one  sense, no  doubt,  every  defamatory               publication concerning a judge may be said  to               bring  him into contempt as that term is  used               in  the law of libel, but it does  not  follow               that everything said of a judge calculated  to               bring him into contempt in that sense  amounts               to contempt of Court." Thus in In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Island(2) the Privy Council advised that a contempt had  not

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been committed through a publication in the Nassau  Guardian concerning  the  resident  Chief Justice,  who  had  himself previously  criticised  local sanitary  conditions.   Though couched  in highly sarcastic terms the publication  did  not refer  to the Chief Justice in his official, as  opposed  to personal,  capacity.  Thus while it might have been a  libel it was not a contempt. The  fourth  functional canon which  channels  discretionary exercise  of  the contempt power is that the  Fourth  Estate which is an indispensable intermediary between the State and the  people and necessary instrumentality  in  strengthening the  forces of democracy, should be given free  play  within responsible  limits  even  when the focus  of  its  critical attention is the court, including the highest Court. The  fifth normative guideline for the judges to observe  in this  jurisdiction  is not to be hypersensitive  even  where disortions  and  criticisms  overstep  the  limits,  but  to deflate   vulgar   denunciation   by   dignified    bearing, condescending  indifference  and  repudiation  by   judicial rectitude. The  sixth  consideration  is  that,  after  evaluating  the totality  of factors, if the court considers the  attack  on the  judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory  or malicious  beyond condonable limits, the strong arm  of  the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike  a  blow on him who challenges the supremacy  of  the rule of law by fouling its source and stream. Speaking  generally, there are occasions when the  right  to comment   may  be  of  supreme  value  (for  instance,   the thalidomide  babies  cases in England) (3) and  the  law  of contempt  must adjust competing values and be  modified,  in its  application by the requirements of a free  society  and the  shifting  emphasis on paramount public  interest  in  a given situation. (1)  (1911) 12 C.L.R. 280, 285. (2)  (1893) A.C. 138.  (3) 1  prefer  the judgment of Lord Denning M.  R.  in  the Court of Appeal to those in the Divisional Court or House of Lords  in  the  Thalidomide  case  :  Att.   Gen.  v.  Times Newspapers  Ltd. (1972) 3 All.  E.R. 1136 (D.C.) ; (1973)  1 All.  E.R. 815 (C.A.) ; (1973) 3 All.  E.R. 54 (14.L.).  176 Indeed,  there is an interesting Australian decision  R.  V. Brett(1) which has a meaningful relevance for our case and I quote from the Australian Law Journal               "In R. v. Brett, the publisher of a  newspaper               was called on to show cause why he should  not               be  committed  for  contempt  of  court.    It               appeared that the newspaper, under the heading               "Mr.    Justice   Sholl-Diehard   Tory"    had               criticized  the  appointment, of  Mr.  Justice               Shall  and inferentially of all  his  brethren               except  one not specified, because  they  were               out of touch with the- life of the people  and               had  no  experience (it was  alleged)  in  the               Criminal  Court "the only court where  even  a               semblance  of  the  problems  of  the   people               arise". and it concluded that his  appointment               showed that the judiciary was "an  institution               forming  an  integral part of  the  repressive               machinery of the State".               "O’  Bryan, J. pointed out that the fact  that               the  article made ridiculous mistakes of  fact               and  that its logic was greatly at fault,  did               hot  prove  that  it  was  a  contempt.    The

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             question  was  whether the  article,  honestly               though mistakenly and offensively,  criticised               the  policy  of  this  and  previous  adminis-               trations  in appointing judges, or whether  it               did  indeed set out to lower the authority  of               the Court as such and to excite misgivings  as               to   its   partiality.    With   very    great               hesitation, his Honour came to the  conclusion               that  a  case for the exercise of  the  extra-               ordinary summary jurisdiction of the Court had               not been made out and he discharged the  order               nisi."               Another    useful   illustration   from    the               Australian jurisdiction is contained in  short               report  made of a decision in  Australian  Law               Journal, 1928-29, Vol. 2, 145-146 :               "The  Tasmanian  case (The  King  v.  Ogilvie)               concerned statements made by the respondent at               public meetings, imputing lack of impartiality               to  Mr. Justice Crisp, and asserting that  the               respondent  was  personally  disliked  by  his               Honour,  and that respondent’s  clients  could               not get justice from him.  Nicholls, C. J., in               delivering  the judgment of the Court,  agreed               with  the  authorities that  fair  comment               on  judicial actions is not only  justifiable,               but beneficial.  He then pointed out "that  we               regard these proceedings as instituted and our               powers conferred, not for the benefit or  com-               fort of the Judges personally, to protect them               from criticism or even from libel, but  simply               to  secure that this institution, the  Supreme               Court,  which  in the final  analysis  has  to               declare  and enforce the rules which hold  the               community  together, shall be challenged  only               in  the proper ways, which are two" first,  by               appeal, and secondly by approach in the proper               form to ’Parliament."               (1)   (1950) C.L.R. 226.                177               A  quick flash back to English decisions  also               is instructive.  A, early as 1900 in  Queen,v.               Gray(1).   Gray  published in a  newspaper  an               article  which was "personal scurrilous  abuse               of a judge as a judge" Lord Russel of Killowen               C. J. observed :               "It  is  not  too much to say that  it  is  an               article of scurrilous abuse of a judge in  his               character  of  a  judgescurrilous  abuse,   in               reference  to the conduct of the  judge  While               sitting  under  the  Queen’s  Commission,  and               scurrilous  abuse published in a newspaper  in               the  town in which he was still sitting  under               the Queen’s Commission.  It cannot be doubted-               indeed it has not been argued to the  contrary               by  the learned counsel who represents  Howard               Alexander    Gray-that   the   article    does               constitute a contempt of Court; but, as  these               applications  are,  happily,  of  an   unusual               character, we have thought it right to explain               a little more fully than is perhaps  necessary               what does constitute a contempt of Court,  and               what are the means which the law has placed at               the  disposal of the Judicature  for  checking               and punishing contempt of Court.  Any act done

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             or  writing  published calculated to  bring  a               Court  or a judge of the Court into  contempt,               or  to lower his authority, is a  contempt  of               Court.    That  is  one  class  of   contempt.               Further,  any  act done or  writing  published               calculated  to obstruct or interfere with  the               due course of justice or the lawful process of               the Courts is a contempt of Court.  The former               class  belongs  to  the  category  which  Lord               Hardwicke L. C. characterized as "scandalizing               a Court or a Judge."               The  learned Law Lord, however..  indicated  a               guideline which is extremely important :               "Judges   and   Courts  are  alike   open   to               criticism,  and  if  reasonable  argument   or               expostulation is offered against any  judicial               act as contrary to law or the public good,  no               Court  could or would treat that as,  contempt               of  Court.  The law ought not to be astute  in               such  cases to criticise adversely what  under               such circumstances and with such an object  is               published; but it is to be remembered that  in               this  matter  the liberty of the press  is  no               greater and no less than the liberty of  every               subject of the Queen.  Now, as I have said, no               one has suggested that this is not a  contempt               of  Court and nobody has suggested,  or  could               suggest  that  it falls within  the  right  of               public   criticism   in  the  sense   I   have               described.   It  is not criticism :  I  repeat               that  it  is personal scurrilous  abuse  of  a               judge as a judge........               (emphasis, added)               ,The  tone  of  R.  v.  Gray  (supra)  sharply               contrasted  with  the much more  liberal  tone               adopted by the Privy Council in McLeod v. St.               (1)   (1900) Q.B.D. 36.               178               Aubyn(1)  even though certain aspects  of  the               latter decision assume a somewhat  imperialist               tone.  Dr. Rajeev Dhavan has observed :               "For  some  strange reason the  Privy  Council               judgment was neither referred to by the  Chief               Justice or even cited to the Court even though               a  time lag of nine months separates  the  two               judgments".(2)               A harmonious blend and a balanced co-existence               of   a   free  press  and   fearless   justice               desiderates  that the law ought not to be  too               astute in such cases and that public criticism               has  a part to play, even if it oversteps  the               limit, in preserving the democratic health  of               public institutions.  But. beyond a point, the               wages of contempt is committal.               In Ambard v. Attorney-General for  Trinidad(3)               the  Privy  Council pronounced on  a  case  of               public criticism of the administration of jus-               tice.   Lord  Atkin  stated,  with   admirable               accuracy,  the law on this branch of  contempt               of Court :               "But whether the authority and position of  an               individual judge, or the due administration of               justice,  is concerned, no wrong is  committed               by  any member of the public who exercise  the               ordinary right of criticising, in good  faith,

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             in  private or public, the public act done  in               the seat of justice.  The path of criticism is               a public way : the wrong headed are  permitted               to err therein : provided that members of  the               public abstain from imputing improper  motives               to those taking part in the administration  of               justice, and are genuinely exercising a  right               of  criticism,  and not acting  in  malice  or               attempting  to  impair the  administration  of               justice,  they are immune.  Justice is  not  a               cloistered  virtue  : she must be  allowed  to               suffer  the  scrutiny  and  respectful,   even               though  outspoken comments of  ordinary  men."               Indeed,  Lord  Morris in Mcleod v.  St.  Aubyn               (supra) has commented               "Courts  are  satisfied  to  leave  to  public               opinion  attacks  or  comments  derogatory  or               scandalous to them.  But it must be considered               that  in  small colonies,  consisting  princi-               pally,    of   coloured    populations,    the               enforcement  in proper cases of committal  for               contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may               be absolutely necessary to preserve in such  a               community  the dignity of and respect for  the               Court." In  will  not condemn the Indian people  with  the  contempt manifest   in  Lord  Morris’  observation  regarding   small colonies  and coloured populations.  We are cultured  people with  traditions and canons and may at least be  equated  in these matters with English men. (1)  [1899] A.C. 549. (2)  See  R. Dhavan : "Contempt of Court and the  Phillimore Committee Report" (1976) 5 Anglo American Law Review 186  at 205. (3)  (1936) A.C. 322. 179 A  very  valuable  and remarkably  fresh  approach  to  this question of criticism of Courts in intemperate language  and invocation  of  contempt of court against the  contemner,  a person of high position, is found in Regina v.  Metropolitan Police  Commissioner ex. p. Black,burn(1).   Lord  Denning’s judgment  is particularly instructive in the context of  the obnoxious  comments  made  by Queen Hogg in  an  article  in "Punch"  about  the  members of the  Court  of  Appel.   The remarks about the Court of Appeal were highly obnoxious  and the  barbed  words  thrown  at  the  judges  obviously  were provocative.  Even so, in a brief but telling judgment, Lord Denning  held  this  not to be contempt  of  court.   It  is illuminating  to excerpt a few observations of  the  learned judge :               "This  is  the first case, so far as  I  know,               where  this  court  has  been  called  on   to               consider  an  allegation of  contempt  against               itself.    It   is   a   jurisdiction    which               undoubtedly  belongs to us but which  we  will               most  sparingly exercise more particularly  as               we ourselves have an interest in the matter.               Let me say at once that we will never use this               jurisdiction  as  a means to  uphold  our  own               dignity.  That must rest on surer foundations.               Nor  will  we use it to  suppress.  those  who               speak  against us.  We do not fear  criticism,               nor  do we resent it.  For there is  something               far  more important at stake.  It is  no  less               than freedom of speech itself.

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             It is the right of every man  in Parliament or               out of it. in the Press or over the broadcast,               to make fair comment, even outspoken  comment,               on  matters  of public  interest.   Those  who               comment  can deal faithfully with all that  is               done in a court of justice.  They can say that               we are mistaken, and our decisions  erroneous,               whether  they  are subject to appeal  or  not.               All  we would ask is that those who  criticise               us will remember that, from the nature of  our               office  we cannot reply to  their  criticisms.               We  cannot  enter  into  public   controversy.               Still  less into political.  We must  rely  on               our conduct itself to be its own vindication.               Exposed  as we are to the winds of  criticism,               nothing which is said by this person or  that,               will  deter us from doing what we  believe  is               right; nor, I would add, from saying what  the               occasion   requires,  provided  that   it   is               pertinent  to the matter in hand.  Silence  is               not an option when things are ill done. The  Indian  precedents must naturally  receive  referential attention  from us and so  switch over to the cases of  this Court  which have relevance to that branch of  the  contempt jurisprudence bearing upon scandalising the judges.  After a brief  survey, I will summarise the conclusions.  In  Sambhu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha & Ors.(2) (1)  (1968) 2 W.L.R. 1204. (2)  [1972] 3 S.C.R. 183, 189. 180               "  It  would follow from the  above  that  the               courts  have  power to take action  against  a               person who does an act or publishes a  writing               which is calculated to bring a court or  judge               into contempt or to lower his authority or  to               obstruct  the  due course of  justice  or  due               administration  of law.... in such cases,  the               court   would  exercise   circumspection   and               judicial  restraint  in the matter  of  taking               action  for contempt of court.  The court  has               to   take   into   account   the   surrounding               circumstances  and the material facts  of  the               case  and on conspectus of them to come, to  a               conclusion    whether    because    of    some               contumacious conduct or other sufficient  rea-               son  the  person proceeded against  should  be               punished for contempt of court."               ’In Perspective Publications Ltd. v. State of,               Maharashtra(1) Grover, J., speaking on  behalf               of the Court, reviewed the entire case law and               stated  the  result of the discussion  of  the               cases on contempt as follows               "(1)  It  will  not  be  right  to  say   that               committals  for contempt few scandalizing  the               court have become obsolete.               (2)   The  summary  jurisdiction  by  way   of               contempt  must ’be exercised with  great  care               and  caution  and only when  its  exercise  is               necessary for the proper administration of law               and justice.               (3)   It  is open to anyone to  express  fair,               reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act               or conduct of a judge in his judicial capacity               or  even to make a proper and fair comment  on               any decision given by him because "justice  is

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             ’not  a  cloistered  virtue and  she  must  be               allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful,               even  though outspoken, comments  of  ordinary               men.’               (4)   A  distinction  must be made  between  a               mere  libel or defamation of a judge and  what               amounts to a contempt of the Court.               The  test  in each case would be  whether  the               impugned  publication  is  a  mere  defamatory               attack   on  the  judge  or  whether   it   is               calculated to interfere with the due course of               justice or the proper administration of law by               this  Court.   It is only in the  latter  case               that it will be punishable as ’Contempt.               (5)   Alternatively  the test will be  whether               the  wrong is done to the judge personally  or               it is done to the public.  To borrow from  the               language  of.Mukherjee,  J. (as he  then  was)               (Brahma  Prakash Sharma’s Case) (1953)  S.  C.               R.,  ’1169) the publication of  a  disparaging               statement  will be an injury to the public  if               it  tends  to create an  apprehension  in  the               minds  of the people regarding the  integrity,               ability               (1)  [1971] 2 S.C.R. 779.                       181               or fairnes of the judge or to deter actual and               prospective  litigants from  placing  complete               reliance  upon the court’s  administration  of               justice or if it is likely to cause embarrass-               ment  in the mind of the judge himself in  the               discharges of his judicial duties."               Hidayatullah, C. J., in R. C. Cooper v.  Union               of India(1) observed :               "There  is  no doubt that the Court  like  any               other institution does not enjoy immunity from               fair criticism.  This Court does not claim  to               be always right although it does not spare any               effort  to be right according to the  best  of               the  ability,  knowledge and judgment  of  the               judges.   They  do  not  think  themselves  it               possession of all truth or hold that  wherever               others  differ from them, it is so far  error.               No  one is more conscious of  his  limitations               and  fallibility than a judge but  because  of               his training and the assistance he gets,  from               learned  counsel he is apt to  avoid  mistakes               more than others........ We are constrained to               say   also  that  while  fair  and   temperate               criticism  of  this Court or any  other  Court               even   if  strong,  may  not  be   actionable,               attributing  improper motives, or  tending  to               bring   judges  or  courts  into  hatred   and               contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly               with  the  functioning of  Courts  is  serious               contempt  of  which notice must  and  will  be               taken.   Respect  is expected  not  only  from               those  to  whom the judgment of the  Court  is               acceptable  but also from those to whom it  is               repugnant.   Those who err in their  criticism               by   indulging   in   vilification   of    the               institution   of  courts,  administration   of               justice and the instruments through which  the               administration acts, should take heed for they               will  act at their own peril.  We  think  this

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             will be enough caution to persons embarking on               the path of criticism."               In  Brahma  Prakash Sharma and Others  v.  The               State of Uttar Pradesh(2) this Court said :               "It  seems,  therefore,  that  there  are  two               primary considerations which should weigh with               the  court when it is called upon to  exercise               the  summary  powers  in  cases  of   contempt               committed by "scandalising" the court  itself.               In  the  first place, the  reflection  on  the               conduct  or character of a judge in  reference               to the discharge of his judicial duties  would               not be contempt of such reflection is made  in               the   exercise  of  the  right  of  fair   and               reasonable   criticism  which  every   citizen               possesses  in respect of public acts  done  in               the  seat of justice.  It is not  by  stifling               criticism  that  confidence in courts  can  be               created.   "The path of criticism", said  Lord               Atkin (Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad               and               (1)   (1970) 2 S.C.C. 298, 301.               (2)   (1953) S.C.R. 1169, 1178, 1180.               182               Tobago,  (1936) A.C. 322 at 335) is  a  public               way.   The wrong headed are permitted  to  err               therein;  provided that members of the  public               abstain from- imputing motives to those taking               part in the administration of justice and  are               genuinely exercising a right of criticism  and               not acting in malice, or attempt to impair the               administration of justice, they are immune."               In the second place, when attacks or  comments               are made on a judge or judges, disparaging  in               character  and  derogatory to  their  dignity,               care  should be taken to  distinguish  between               what is a libel on the judge and what  amounts               really to contempt of court.  The fact that  a               statement is defamatory so far as the judge is               concerned  does  not  necessarily  make  it  a               contempt.   The distinction- between a  libel,               and a contempt was pointed out by a  Committee               of the Privy Council, to which a reference was               made by the Secretary of State in 1892 (In the               matter of a special reference from the  Bahama               Islands  (1893)  A.  C. 138).  A  man  in  the               Bahama  Islands,  in a letter published  in  a               colonial   newspaper  criticised   the   Chief               Justice  of  the Colony in an  extremely  ill-               chosen   language  which  was  sarcastic   and               pungent.  There was a veiled insinuation  that               he  was an incompetent judge and a shirker  of               work and the writer suggested in a way that it               would  be a providential thing if he  were  to               die.   A  strong  Board  constituting  of   11               members  reported that the  letter  complained               of, though it might have been made the subject               of  proceedings  for libel, was  not,  in  the               circumstances,   calculated  to  obstruct   or               interfere  with the course of justice  or  the               due  administration of the law  and  therefore               did  not constitute a contempt of court.   The               same principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in               the  case of Devi Prashad v. King Emperor  (70               I.  A.,  216)  referred  to  above.   It   was

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             followed and approved of by the High Court  of               Australia in King v. Nicholls (12 Corn.  L. R.               280),  and has been accepted as sound by  this               Court  in Reddy v. The State of Madras  (1952)               S.  C.  R., 452).  The position  therefore  is               that  a defamatory attack on a judge may be  a               libel so far as the judge is concerned and  it               would  be open to him to proceed  against  the               libeller in a proper action if lie so chooses.               If,   however,   the   publication   of    the               disparaging   statement   is   calculated   to               interfere  with the due course of  justice  or               proper administration of law by such court, it               can be punished summarily as contempt.  One is               a wrong done to the judge personally while the               other is a wrong done to the public.  It  will               be  an  injury to the public if  it  tends  to               create  an  apprehension in the minds  of  the               people  regarding  the integrity,  ability  or               fairness of the _judge or to deter actual  and               prospective  litigants from  placing  complete               reliance  upon the court’s  administration  of               justice,   or  if  it  is  likely   to   cause               embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself               in  the discharge of his judicial duties.   It               is well               183               established that it is not necessary to  prove               affirmatively  that there has been  an  actual               interference   with  the   administration   of               justice   by   reason   of   such   defamatory               statement; it is interference with the  proper               administration of law."               Mookerjee  J.  in In re :  Motilal  Ghosh  and               Others ILR, 45, Cal., 269 at 283.)               There  is  no  doubt that  condign  and  quick               punishment  for scandalising  publication  has               been awarded by this Court, (Vide C. K.  Daph-               lary & Ors. v. O. P. Gupta(1)                Another one is Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The               Registrar  of Orissa High Court-and Another  (               2).  In  the latter case, I  had  occasion  to               examine the root principles of Indian Contempt               jurisprudence and I summed up thus :               "Judges  and Courts have diverse duties.   But               functionally,         historically         and               jurisprudentially, the value which is clear to               the community and the function which  deserves               to be cordoned off from public molestation, is               judicial.   Vicious criticism of personal  and               administrative  acts of Judges may  indirectly               mar  their image and weaken the confidence  of               the   public   in  the   judiciary   but   the               countervailing good, not merely of free speech               but  also  of greater faith generated  by  ex-               posure to the actinic light of bona fide, even               if  marginally over-zealour, criticism  cannot               be  overlooked.   Justice  is  no   cloistered               virtue."               "The  Court  being the  guardian  of  people’s               rights,  it has been held repeatedly that  the               contempt  jurisdiction  should  be   exercised               "with  scrupulous care and only when the  case               is clear and beyond reasonable doubt"."               I  relied  on an observation made  by  Justice

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             Gajendragadkar, C.J., In Special Reference No.               1  of 1964 and proceeded to state the  key  to               the jurisdiction :               "We  ought never to forget that the  power  to               punish  for  contempt, large as  it  is,  must               always  be exercised cautiously.  wisely,  and               with circumspection.  Frequent or  indiscrimi-               nate use of this power in anger or  irritation               would  not  help  to sustain  the  dignity  or               status of the court, but may sometimes  affect               it  adversely.  Wise Judges never forget  that               the best way to sustain the dignity and status               of their office is to deserve respect from the               public  at  large  by  the  quality  of  their               judgments,  the  fearlessness,  fairness   and               objectivity  of  their approach,  and  by  the               restraint,  dignity  and  decorum  which  they               observe in their judicial conduct."               if  judges decay the contempt power  will  not               save them and so the other side of the coin is               that Judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above               suspicion.               (1)   (1971) Supp.  S.C.R. 76, 92-93.               (2)   (1974) 1 S.C.C. 374.               184               To  wind  up, the key word is  "justice",  not               "judge";  the key-not thought is  unobstructed               public  justice,  not  the  selfdefence  of  a               judge; the cornerstone of the contempt law  is               the   accommodation  of   two   constitutional               values-the right of free speech and the  right               to  independent  justice.   The  ignition   of               contempt action should be substantial and mala               fide   interference  with  fearless   judicial               action,    not-fair   comment    or    trivial               reflections  on the judicial process and  per-               sonnel."               Indeed,   I  am  convinced   that   democratic               institutions,  including the Court system  and               judges, must suffer criticism and benefit from               it This approach has been emphasised by me  in               that case :               "Even  so, if Judges have frailties-after  all               they  are human-they need to be  corrected  by               independent criticism.  If the judicature  has               serious  shortcomings  which  demand  systemic               correction  through  socially-oriented  reform               initiated through constructive criticism,  the               contempt  power  should not be  an  interdict.               All this, far from undermining the  confidence               of  the public in Courts, enhances it and,  in               the  last  analysis, cannot  be  repressed  by               indiscriminate resort to contempt power.  Even               bodies  like  the Law Commission  or  the  Law               Institute    and   researchers,   legal    and               sociological, may run ’contempt’ risks because               their  professional  work  sometimes  involves               unpleasant   criticism  of  judges,   judicial               processes and the system itself and thus hover               perilously around the periphery of the law  if               widely  construed.  Creative legal  journalism               and activist statesmanship for judicial reform               cannot   be   jeopardized  by   an   undefined               apprehension of contempt action." American legal history has lessons for us but when  national

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conditions  vary adaptation, not imitation, is the  creative alternative,  to avoid breakdown on the rock of  real  life. New  York  is not New Delhi and New York  Times  deals  with different  customers from the Times, of India.  The  law  of contempt  fluidly flows into the mould of life.   This  fact once  noted,  there is instructive thought in  the  American cases. Their lofty approach, grounded on constitutional values, has an  appeal for us.  The issue is one of the  gravest  moment for free peoples and to choose between the cherished  basics of free expression and fair hearing is a trying task.  For a free press it may be argued as did the U. S. judges               " What is at stake here is a societal function               of  the  First Amendment  in  preserving  free               public  discussion  of  governmental   affairs               Public debate must not only be unfettered;  it               must  also be informed.  For that reason  this               Court   has  repeatedly  stated   that   First               Amendment  concerns encompass the  receipt  of               information and ideas as well as the               185               right  of  free expression......  An  informed               public  depends  on  accurate  and   effective               reporting  by the news media.   No  individual               can. obtain for himself the information needed               for the intelligent discharge of his political               responsibilities.    For  most  citizens   the               prospect   of   personal   familiarity    with               newsworthy events is, hopelessly  unrealistic.               In  seeking out the news the  press  therefore               acts as an agent of the public at large.               It  is the means by which the  people  receive               that  free  flow  of  information  and   ideas               essential  to intelligent selfgovernment.               By  enabling the public to  assert  meaningful               control over the political process, the  press               performs  a crucial function in effecting  the               societal purpose of the First Amendment.  That               function  is recognized by specific  reference               to the press in the text of the Amendment  and               by the precedents of this Court.               The   argument   further   asserts   that    a               curtailment  of  press freedom  is  a  serious               matter.   If they can be justified at all,  it               must  be in terms of some serious  substantive               evil  which they are designed to  avert.   The               substantive evil here sought to be averted has               been variously described below.  It appears to               be  double disrespect for the  judiciary;  and               disorderly   and  unfair   administration   of               justice.  The assumption that respect for  the               judiciary can be won by shielding judges  from               published  criticism  wrongly  appraises   the               character of American public opinion.  For  it               is a prized American privilege to speak  one’s                             mind,  although  not always with  perfect  goo d               taste,  on  all public institutions.   And  an               enforced  silence, however limited, solely  in               the  name  of preserving the  dignity  of  the               bench,  would  probably  engender  resentment,               suspicion,  and  contempt much  more  than  it               would enhance respect."               We  may glance at the vigorous dissent of  Mr.               Justice  Frankfurter  to  this  reasoning   in

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             Bridges v. California(1)               "Our whole history repels the view that it  is               an  exercise  of one of  the  civil  liberties               secured by the Bill of Rights for a leader  of               a  large  following or for a  powerful  metro-               politan  newspaper  to attempt  to  overawe  a               judge in the matter immediately pending before               him.   The  view  of  the  majority   deprives               California  of  means  for  securing  to   its               citizens justice according to law-means which,               since  the  Union was founded  have  been  the               possession, hitlierta unchallenged, of all the               states.    This   sudden   break   with    the               uninterrupted course of constitutional history               has   no  constitutional  warrant.   To   find               justification  for  such  deprivation  of  the               historic   powers-   of  the  states   is   to               misconceive the idea of freedom of thought and               speech      as     guaranteed      by      the               Constitution......"                (1) [1941] 319 U.S, 252, 279, 283, 284.               13-211 SCI/78               186               A trial is not a "free trade in ideas," nor is               the  best  test of truth in a  courtroom  "the               power of the thought to get itself accepted in               the  competition of the market   A court is  a               forum   with  strictly  defined   limits   for               discussion. It. is circumscribed in the  range               of  its,  inquiry and in its  methods  by  the               Constitution,  by laws, and by age-old  tradi-               tions.   Its  judges are restrained  in  their               freedom of expression by historic  compulsions               resting  on no other officials of  government.               They  are so circumscribed  precisely  because               judges  have in their keeping the  enforcement               of  rights  and the  protection  of  liberties               which,  according to the wisdom of  the  ages,               can   only  be  enforced  and   protected   by               observing such methods and traditions.               continue  the historic process of  prohibiting               expressions  calculated to subvert a  specific               exercise of judicial power.  So to assure  the               impartial accomplishment of justice is not  an               abridgment of freedom of speech or freedom  of               the  press  as these phases, of  liberty  have               heretofore been conceived even by the stoutest               libertarians.    In  fact,   these   liberties               themselves   depend   upon   an    untrammeled               judiciary   whose   passions  are   not   even               unconsciously aroused and whose minds are  not               distorted by extra-judicial considerations.               Of  course freedom of speech and of the  press               are  essential to the enlightenment of a  free               people  and  in restraining  those  who  wield               power.   Particularly should this  freedom  be               employed  in comment upon the work of  courts,               who  are  without many  influences  ordinarily               making for humor and humility, twin  antidotes               to  the corrosion of power.  But the  Bill  of               Rights  is not self-destructive.   Freedom  of               expression can hardly carry implications  that               nullify  the guarantees of  impartial  trials.               And since courts, are the ultimate resorts for               vindicating  the Bill of Rights, a  state  may

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             surely authorize appropriate historic means to               assure  that the process for such  vindication               be not wrenched from its rational tracks  into               the  more  primitive  melee  of  passion   and               pressure.   The need is great that  courts  be               criticized,  but  just as great that  they  be               allowed to do their duty."               The representative thinking on the subject  is               neatly summed up by John R. Brown, Chief Judge               :               "Thus   does  Alexander  again  confront   the               Gordian  Knot.  For our history  demands  that               breaches  of ’the unqualified commands of  the               First   Amendment  cannot  be  tolerated   and               freedom of the press must be given the  broad-               est  scope  that a liberty-loving  people  can               allow  On  the  other  hand,  our  fundamental               concepts   of  absolute  fairness  in   trials               dictate that the environment within which jus-               tice,  is  administered  must  be   maintained               unpolluted by ’the                187               potential   infamous  notoriety   and   biased               predilections  which a  completely  unfettered               but omnipresent press can irrevocably engender               in an age of the mass media.........." It is apparent from this long discussion that the future  of Free Press and of Fair Justice desiderates a juristic socio- political national debate, not ex-cathedra admonitions  from the  Bench  or assertions from the Bar.  We  must  evolve  a know-how  for  the  co-existence of  free  speech  and  free justice   in  tune  with  the  Preamble  and   Article   19. Scurrilous attacks on judges or on parties to pending  cases foul the course of justice.  Mischievous half-truths, brazen untruths and virulent publicity by partisan media, political organs  and spokesmen for vested interests can be  traumatic to the cause of social justice. In an area of competing social values absolutist  approaches are sure to err.  And yet benign neglect of courts to arrest injurious publicity may be misread as importance and  timely affirmative  action  may stem the rot.   Sheppard(1)  is  an American  case in point Remember, a ’free’ press is often  a monopoly  press  and  has been  made  gargantuan  by  modern technology.   Of course, we must also remember, courts  work in public and publishing their proceedings fairly cannot  be taboo.  Please remember, further, that those who cry  ’wolf’ against Contempt Power are more often the Proprietariat, not the Proletariat, with exceptions which prove the rule. Prejudicial  publicity, indulged in by a ’free’ press  owing no  institutional responsibility or  public  accountability, cannot  be  all  that  good,  especially  when  judges   are personally vilified, assured that the robes’  traditionally, and  for  good reasons, do not and should not  wrestle  with calumniating columnists or yellow journalists.  Likewise,  a litigant  or  judge, run down by powerful  vested  interests wearing  the mask of mass media owned by them or hiring  the pen   of   arch   spokesmen   of   political   or   economic reactionaries, cannot run riot, raising the alarm that  free speech  is  in peril and get away with it.  Heroism  on  the face  may  often  be villainy at heart and  the  law  cannot retreat   from  its  justice-function  scared  by   slogans. Balancing    of   values   is   difficult,   delicate    but indispensable.   Neither the Press nor the courts are  above the People.  Otherwise, even gutter talk or, to borrow   the phraseology  of  justice  Stevens  in  Nebraska(2),  shabby,

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intrusive  or perversely motivated media practices,  may  be dignified as free press and given protective  constitutional status, leaving the citizen litigant demoralized and citizen judge   powerless,  panicked  by  the  ballyhoo   of   Press restraint. The  Court  is  not an inert abstraction; it  is  people  in judicial  power.   And when drawing up standards  for  Press freedom  and restraint, as an ’interface’ with  an  unafraid court, we must not forget that in our constitutional  scheme the  most fundamental of all freedoms is the free quest  for justice by the small man.  ’When beggars (1)  Sheppard  v.Mawell [1966] 384,U.S.,333. (2)  Nebraska  Press Association v. Stuarts [1976]  96  Sup. Ct. 2791. 188 die,  there  are comets seen’ and ’when the  bull  elephants fight, the. grass is trampled’.  The contempt sanction, once frozen by the high and mighty press’ campaign, the sufferer, in  the  long  run, is the small  Indian  who  seeks  social transformation through a fearless judicial process.   Social justice  is at stake if foul press unlimited were to  reign. As Justice Frankfurter stated, may be ’judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater  immunity from  criticism  than  other  persons  or  institutions’  (a question  I  desist from deciding here),  but  when  comment darkens  into coercive imputation or  calculated  falsehood, threats  to  impartial  adjudication  subtly  creeps.    Not because  judges  lack firmness nor that the dignity  of  the bench  demands  enhanced  respect by  enforced  silence,  as Justice Black observed in the Los Angeles Times(1) case  but because  the course of justice may be distorted  by  hostile attribution.  Said Justice Jackson in Craige v. Harney(2) :               "I  do not know whether it is the view of  the               Court  that  a judge must be  thickskinned  or               just thickheaded, but nothing in my experience               or  observation confirms the idea that  he  is               insensitive to publicity.  Who does not prefer               good to ill report of his work?  And if fame-a               good public name-is, as Milton said, the "last               infirmity of noble mind," it is frequently the               first infirmity of a mediocre one. I do not dogmatise but indicate the perils.  Of course,  the evil must be substantive and substantial, not chimerical  or peripheral. A   concluding  note.   I  have  launched  on   this   long, inconclusive  essay  in contempt  jurisprudence  bearing  on scandalizing  the  judge& qua judges, aware  that  not  high falstaffian  rhetoric but hard-headed realism, illumined  by constitutional values, must set the limit and interpret  the statute.  It is a disturbing development in our country that the  media  and some men in the, trade  of  traducement  are escalatingly scandalizing judges with flippant or  motivated write-ups  wearing  a  pro bono publico  veil  and  mood  of provocative  mock-challenge.  The court shall  not  meditate nor   hesitate   but  shall  do  stern   justice   to   such ’professional"  contemners,  not  shrink  because  they  are scurrilous,  influential  or incorrigible.  Even so,  to  be gentle  is  to  be  just and the quality  of  mercy  is  not strained.   So,  it is that a benign  neglect  not  judicial genuflexion, is often the prescription, and to inhibit hapha zardness  or injustice it is necessary that the Bar and  the Press  evolve a dignified consensus on the canons of  ethics in  this area, with due regard to the Constitution  and  the laws,  so that the Bench may give it a close look  and  draw the  objective line of action.  The process of  arriving  at

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these  norms  by those mighty forces  who  influence  Public opinion, cannot be delayed and until then the law laid  down in precedents of this court will go into action when  judge- baiting  is  indulged  in by masked  ’men  or  media  might. Freedom  is what Freedom does and Justice fails when  Judges quail. (1)  314 U.S. 263. (2)  331 U.S. 367. 189 For  sure, my plea is not for judicial pachydermy,  but  for dignified detachment which ignores ill-informed criticism in its tolerant stride, but strikes when offensive excesses are established.   Frankly, all these are hypothetical and  have no  specific reference to the present case.   These  obiter- dacta  are  intended to indicate the pros and cons,  not  to pontificate  on the precise limits for exercise of  contempt power  and  to emphasize what Chief  Justice  Warren  Burger mentioned in Nebraska Press Association(1) as ’something  in the  nature  of  a  fiduciary duty’  of  the  press  to  act responsibly and I may add, respectfully. An afterword.  An  afterword  has become necessitous because  the  learned Chief  Justice  has,  in his  reasons,  made  some  critical observations   on  men  and  matters  based  on   his   rich experience,  high responsibility and urge to  right  wrongs. While respecting his feeling of hurt and attempt to set  the ’record straight regarding his prior judgment and letters on canons  of  judicial ethics, I desist from comments  on  the author  or  the  article,  including  its  correctness   and propriety,   for   fear  that  an   indelible   word,   writ incautiously,  may fester into an incurable wound.  I am  in no  mood  to pronounce on these subjects or to  judge  these generalities.  Many an arrow at random sent hits a mark  the archer never meant, and ex cathedra generalizations run  the genetic risk of notice imperfections.  The Almighty does not share His omniscience with the Judiciary. KAILASAM, J.-I had the benefit of reading the Judgments pro- posed  to  be  delivered by My Lord the  Chief  Justice  and Justice Krishna Iyer. I  would have been contented with stating that, in my  view, on  taking into account the facts and circumstances  of  the case  this is not a fit case to be proceeded with under  the Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971.  But  now  it  has  become necessary for me to state whether I agree with the judgments to be delivered. MY  learned Brother Justice Krishna Iyer in  his  concluding note  has  expressed  that  he had  launched  on  this  long inconclusive  essay which relates to hypothetical  questions and  has  no specific reference to the  present  case.   The Judgment which lie himself characterizes as obiter dicta may be left alone without any comments. When  the matter was taken up in the Court on 27th  January, 1978, the contempt proceedings were dropped without  calling upon   the  learned  counsel  who  was  appearing  for   the respondent  in response to the notice.  Without bearing  the parties  concerned, it is not right and proper to  make  any comments  about  the  facts of the case.   In  this  view  I refrain  from  referring to the publication in  "The  Indian Express" or about the article in the newspaper by Shri A. G. Noorani. Contempt proceedings will stand dropped. P.B.R.                           Proceedings dropped. (1)  96 S. Ct. 2803. 190

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