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PETITIONER: ILLIAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/1968

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1065            1969 SCR  (2) 613  CITATOR INFO :  R          1971 SC1087  (15)  RF         1981 SC 379  (51)  C          1991 SC  45  (16)  D          1992 SC1795  (4,7)

ACT: Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 25--Police officer--If  customs officials   under  Customs  Act  52  of  1962   are   police officers--Test for determining.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  along with others was charged  with  various offences relating to transport of gold.  Their  confessional statements recorded by customs authorities under ss. 107 and 108  were sought to be given in evidence at the  trial.   On the  question,  whether the customs  authorities  should  be deemed to be police officers, and therefore, the  statements were inadmissible by reason of s. 25 of the Evidence Act,     HELD:  Under Customs Act, 1962, the customs  authorities have  been invested with many powers of a police officer  in matters relating  to arrest, investigation and search, which the  customs  officers did not have under the  repealed  Act namely,  the Sea Customs Act, 1878.  For example,  under  s. 104(3)  after arrest, the customs officer has the  power  of releasing  the arrested person on bail and for that  purpose has  the  same powers as an officer in charge  of  a  police station.   Under s.  107 a customs officer empowered by  the Collector  of Customs can require any person to produce  any document, which power is similar to those exercisable by  ’a police officer under ss. 160 and 161, Cr. P.C. Under s. 105, if the Assistant Collector of Customs has reason to  believe that  any goods liable to confiscation are secreted  in  any place  he may authorise any customs officers or may  himself search  for the goods. But, customs officers have  not  been invested with all the powers which an officer in charge of a police  station can exercise under Chapter XV, Cr. P.C.  The powers  conferred do not include the power of  submitting  a charge sheet  under s. 173, Cr. P.C., either expressly or by necessary  implication.   Therefore, in order  to  enable  a

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magistrate  to  take  cognizance of  an  offence  under  the Customs   Act,  (the  offences  under  the  Act   are   non- cognizable),   the  customs  officer will  have  to  file  a complaint before the magistrate under  s.  190(a), Cr. P.C., and  cannot like a police officer submit a report  under  s. 190(b).   Hence even though the customs officers  have  been invested with many of the powers which an officer in  charge of   a  police  station  exercises  when   investigating   a cognizable   offence he  does  not thereby become  a  police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act  and so  the confessional statements made by accused  persons  to customs  officials would be admissible in  evidence  against them. [617 C--D; 618 B-C. F-G; 621 C--D; 622 C--D]     Romesh  Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal. [1969]  2 S.C.R.  461 and Dad. v Adarji Fatakia v.K.K. Ganguly,  Astt. Collector  of  Customs & Anr., Cr. A. No. 46 of  1968  dated October 18, 1968, followed.     State  of  Punjab v. Barkat Ram,  [1962] 3  S.C.R.  338, Raja  Ram  faiswal v. State of Bihar, [1964] 2  S.C.R.  752. Badku  Joti Savant v. State of Mysore, [1966] 3  S.C.R.  698 and  P. Shankar  Lal & Ors. v. Asstt. Collector of  Customs, Madras,  Cr.  As.   Nos. 52  &   104/65   dated  12-12-1967. referred to. 614

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal  No.45  of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  9,  1966  of the Madras High  Court  in  Criminal Revision Petition 1350 of 1965. N.H.  Hingorani, R. Jethamalani and K. Hingorani,   for  the appellant. Niren  De, Solicitor-General, N.S. Bindra, R.H.  Dhebar  and S.P. Nayar, for the respondent. K.R.   Chaudhuri   and  K.  Rajendra  Chaudhuri,   for   the intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by (Grover, J. The main point in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the statements of the appellant and other accused persons  recorded  by  the  customs  authorities  under  the provisions  of   the  Customs Act 1962  (Act  52  of  1962), hereinafter  called  the  "New  Act",  were  admissible   in evidence  at their  trial for the alleged offences under  s. 120B  of the Indian Penal Code read with s. 135 of  the  new Act  and  ss,  23  (IA) and  23B  of  the  Foreign  Exchange Regulation  Act 1947 and under Rule 131-B of the Derrace  of India Rules.     The  facts  need  not  be stated  in  great  detail.   A complaint  was  laid by the Collector  of  Customs,  Madras, against to persons for having committed the above  offences. The  complaint  related  to  an  occurrence  which  involved transport of 750 bars of gold each weighing 10 tolls  valued at  more than 7 lacs from Bombay to Madras.  The  statements of  the  accused persons were recorded by the  Inspector  of Customs  and other customs authorities before the  complaint was  filed.   After  a  preliminary   enquiry  the    Second Presidency  Magistrate, George town, Madras committed  9  of the  accused  persons  to  stand their  trial  at  the  City Sessions   Court,   the  charges  being  confined   to   the transaction connected with 700 bars of gold only.  Seventeen charges  were  framed on October 29, 1965,  by  the  learned Sessions Judge against the appellant and eight other accused

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persons for the various offences mentioned above.  When  the hearing before ,the Sessions Court commenced the prosecution sought  to  file  the  statements  of  the  accused  persons recorded  by the customs authorities.   Certain  preliminary objections  were  raised  on behalf of the  accused  to  the admissibility  of those statements. The first was  that  the officers  of  the customs department who  had  recorded  the statements  must  be deemed to be police  officers  and  the statements   being  of  a  confessional  nature   were   not admissible in evidence by virtue of the provisions of s.  25 of  the Indian Evidence Act.  The second objection was  that the investigation                     615 conducted by the customs officer must be deemed to be  under Chapter  XIV  read with s. 5(2)  of the  Criminal  Procedure Code  and the statements thus became inadmissible  under  s. 161  read with s. 162 of the Code.  The third objection  was based   on   Art.  20(3)  of  the   Constitution   involving testimonial compulsion.  This objection was not mentioned in the  order of the learned Sessions Judge but it was  alleged to  have been raised before the High Court. The matter  went up  to  the High Court on the Revisional  side  because  the learned  Sessions  Judge took the view that  the  statements given  by the accused persons to the customs officers  could not be received in evidence.  The learned Single Judge,  who heard   the  Revision  petition,  referred   the   following questions to a full bench owing to their importance:                      "Are  statement recorded  by  inquiring               officers  of  the  Customs  Department   under               Section  107(108)of  the  Customs  Act,  1962,               inadmissible  in evidence in a criminal  trial               by reason of the bar under: (1 ) Section 25 of               the  Indian Evidence Act; (2) Section  162  of               the  Criminal  Procedure  Code; and  (3)  Art.                             20(3) of  the Constitution." The full bench answered all the three questions against  the accused persons.  Only one out of them, Illias, has appealed to this Court     Learned  counsel for the appellant has not  pressed  the second  point.  As regards the third point, it was  conceded before  the  full  bench of the High  Court  that  when  the statements  were recorded the investigation had not  reached the stage when the particular persons had been accused of an offence  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  20(  3  )  of   the Constitution.  In view  of  this concession learned  counsel for  the  appellant has submitted that the  matter  be  left undecided  so that it may be open to the appellant  to  make whatever  submissions  he wishes to make  before  the  trial court  when  any  such statement is  formally  tendered  for admission into evidence.     Adverting  to the first point the main endeavour of  the counsel  for  the  appellant  has  been  to  demonstrate  by reference  to  various  provisions  of  the  new  Act   that statements   recorded  by  the  customs  authorities  of   a confessional nature would be hit by the provisions of s.  25 of  the Evidence Act.  In State of Punjab v. Barkat  Ram,(1) it  was held by the majority that customs officers were  not police officers for the purpose of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and  the statements to customs officers were  admissible  in evidence at the trial of persons accused of offences,  inter alia,  under the Sea Customs Act, 1878,  hereinafter  called the  "old Act". It has been submitted that a later  decision on  this  Court in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State   of   Bihar(2) which  related   to   the   question   whether  an    Excise Inspector  exercising  powers  under  the  Bihar

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(1)  [1962] 3 S.C.R. 338.                     (2)  [1964]  2 S.C.R. 752 616 &  Orissa Excise Act was a police officer for  the  purposes of   s. 25  of  the  Evidence Act  goes  a  great   deal  in favour of the appellant particularly when the provisions  of the new Act wherein substantial departure has been made from those of the old Act are kept in view.  As will be presently seen there is yet a third decision of the constitution bench of  this Court in Badku Joti Savant v. Stale  of   Mysore(1) which  related  to the provisions of the Central  Excises  & Salt  Act which goes against the contention pressed  by  the counsel for the appellant.  At any rate, it does not  appear that the majority view expressed in Barkat Ram’s case(2) has been shaken in any manner so far as statements recorded by a customs officer under the old Act are concerned. Indeed in a recent  decision  of  this Court P. Shankar  Lal  and   Ors. v.Asstt.  Collector  of  Customs,  Madras,(3)  it  has  been reaffirmed that there is no conflict between the  cases   of Raja   Ram  Jaiswal(4) and Barkat Ram(2), the  former  being distinguishable from the latter.     Before  the  previous pronouncements of this  Court  are discussed it is necessary to compare the relevant provisions of the new Act and the old Act.     Under  the  old  Act  s.  173   provided   that  persons reasonably  -suspected of offences under that Act  might  be arrested  by  any officer of customs or other  persons  duty employed for the prevention of smuggling.  Under the new Act according  to s. 104 if an officer of customs  empowered  in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector  of Customs  has  reason to believe that  any  person  has  been guilty of an offence punishable under s. 135, he may  arrest such  person.  As regards the power to search, Chapter  XVII of  the old Act contained the relevnt  provisions.   Section 169   conferred the power on  a customs  officer to  search, on   a reasonable suspicion.  Under s. 170 when any  officer of  customs  was  about  to  search  any  person  under  the provisions of s. 169 such person could require that  officer to  take  him,  previous  to  search,  before  the   nearest magistrate  or  customs-collector.   Section  172  conferred power  on  a  magistrate to issue  search  warrants  on   an application  by the  customs-collector.  In the new  Act  s. 100  confers the power to search suspected persons  entering or leaving India.  Section 102 contains Provisions analogous to s. 170 of the lid Act with some minor differences.  Under the old Act every person arrested on the around that he  had been guilty of an offence under that Act had to be forthwith taken  to the nearest magistrate .or customs-collector,  (s. 174).   Under  the new  Act s. 104C2)  provides  that  every person  arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be  taken to  a  magistrate. Lastly s. 171A of the old  Act  conferred power on customs officers to summon persons to give evidence and (1)  [1966]  3 S.C.R. 608.                    (2)  [1962]  3 S.C.R.  338. (3) Cr. As. 52 & 104/65 decided on  12-12-1967. (4) [1954] 2 S.C.R. 752.          617 produce documents.  Under the new Act s. 107 gives the power to customs officers empowered by general or special order of collector  of customs  to examine  persons  acquainted  with the  facts and circumstances of the case or to  require  any person  to  produce or deliver any  document.   Section  108 confers  power  on a gazetted officer of customs  to  summon persons for giving evidence or producing documents. The   substantial  difference,  however,  between  the   two

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enactments  as  has  been pointed out  by  the  High  Court, relates  to  (1  )  the  procedure  after  arrest;  (2)  the procedure for enquiry or investigation and (3) the procedure for search. As  regards the procedure after arrest a significant  change which,  has been made in the new Act is contained in  sub-s. (3) of s. 104. It is provided thereby that where an  officer of  customs  has arrested any person under sub-s.  (1  )  he shall, for the purpose of releasing such person, on bail  or otherwise,  have the same power and  be subject to the  same provisions as the officer-in-charge of a police station  has and is subject to under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub- s.  (4),  however,  makes  an  offence  under  the  new  Act non-cognizable  notwithstanding anything contained  in   the Code of’ Criminal Procedure (the offences under the old  Act were  also  non cognizable).  In the old Act  there  was  no provision conferring the power of releasing a person on bail or  otherwise  on a customs, officer and only  a  magistrate could grant bail.  A great deal of emphasis has been laid by the counsel for the appellant on the power of granting  bail which has now been given to a customs officer under the  new Act.   It is pointed out that such a power goes a  long  way and assists a great deal in extortion of confessions against which   s.  25  of  the  Evidence  Act  contains  the   main safeguards.  It has also been contended that all the  powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station under the Code of  Criminal Procedure have been conferred on an officer  of customs  in the matter of releasing  an arrested  person  on bail  or  otherwise.   It has even  been  suggested  by  the appellant’s  counsel that  the word "otherwise" invests  the customs  officer  with all the powers which  an  officer-in- charge of a police station can exercise under Chapter XIV of the  Code.   It  may  be observed  at  once  that  the  word "otherwise"  clearly relates to releasing a person  who  has been arrested and cannot possibly be construed in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. In the old Act the provisions  containing  the procedure for enquiry were to be found in s. 171A.  As stated before,  any officer  of  customs  duly employed  in  the  prevention  of smuggling   had  the  power  to  summon  any  person   whose attendance he considered necessary either to tender evidence or  to produce a document in any enquiry which such  officer was  making   in  connection with smuggling  of  goods,  Any person  so summoned was bound to attend either in person  or by an authorised agent and he was also bound- 618 to state the truth upon any subject respecting which he  was examined  or make a statement and to produce such  documents and  other things as might be required.  Every such  enquiry was  by  a  deeming provision to be  a  judicial  proceeding within  the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 of the  Indian  Penal Code.   Under the new Act the enquiry can be of  two  kinds. Under  s.  107  any officer of  customs   empowered  by  the collector  of customs can require any person to  produce  or deliver  any  document  etc. or he can  examine  any  person acquainted  with  the facts and circumstances of  the  case. Section  108  contains the second set of  powers  which  are analogous to s. 171A of the old Act, the two sections  being almost  similar  in language.  The contention on  behalf  of the  appellant  is that s. 107  the new Act gives  power  of investigation  to  officers  of  customs  similar  to  those exercisable  by  a police officer under Chapter XIV  of  the Criminal Procedure  Code.  Now a police officer under s. 160 of  the  Code  can,  by an order  in  writing,  require  the attendance of any person within the limits of his own or any

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adjoining station and he can under s. 161 examine orally any person  supposed  to  be  acquainted  with  the  facts   and circumstances   of   the  case.   The  submission   of   the appellant’s counsel, therefore, is that s. 107 is similar to ss.  160  and  161 and the  customs  officer  conducting  an enquiry or investigation relating to offences under the  new Act  enjoys the same power as a  police officer  making   an investigation   under  Chapter XIV of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure.  It is pointed out that under the old Act no such powers were conferred on the customs officer and it was with reference  to  s. 171 A of the old Act that  this  Court  in Barkat Ram’s(1) case laid  emphasis  on  the judicial nature of   the   proceedings  held  under   that   section.    The distinction,  it  is said, no longer obtains  owing  to  the provisions of s. 107 of the new Act.     As regards the procedure for search the important change which  has been made in the new Act is that under s. 105  if the  Assistant  Collector of customs has reason  to  believe that  any goods liable to confiscation or any  documents  or things  are  secreted  in any place, he  may  authorise  any officer of customs to search or may himself search for  such goods,  documents  or  things.  Under the  old  Act  it  was necessary   to  obtain  a  warrant  from  a  magistrate   in accordance with s. 172 and the warrant could be executed  in the  same  way and had the same effect as a  search  warrant issued under the law relating to criminal procedure.     An  examination of the previous decisions of this  Court may  now  be  made  in order to test  the  validity  of  the argument raised on behalf  of the  appellant  that  owing to the substantial changes made in the new Act statements of  a confessional nature recorded by the customs officers  should be  excluded under s. 25 of the Evidence Act on  the  ground that these officers are police (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 338.          619 officers  within  the  meaning of that   section.   In   the majority  judgment  in Barkat Ram’s(1) case   a   comparison was  made between the duties and powers of police   officers and  customs officers which may be summarised as follows :--     (1  ) The police is the instrument for  the   prevention and  detection  of crime which can be said to  be  the  main object of having the police. The powers of customs  officers are  really not for such purpose and are meant for  checking the smuggling of goods and due realization of customs duties and  for determining the action to be taken in the  interest of  the  revenue of the country by way  of  confiscation  of goods  on  which  no  duty had been  paid  and  by  imposing penalties and fines.     (2)  The  customs staff has merely to make a  report  in relation  to  offences  which are to be dealt  with   by   a magistrate.    The  customs  officer,  therefore,   is   not primarily  concerned  with  the detection and punishment  of crime  but  he  is merely interested in  the  detection  and prevention  of  smuggling of goods   and   safeguarding  the recovery of customs duties.     (3)  The  powers  of  search  etc.  conferred   on   the customs  officers  are  of a limited character  and  have  a limited object of safeguarding the revenues of the State and the   statute   itself   refers  to   police   officers   in contradistinction to customs officers.     (4)  If a customs officer takes evidence under  s.  171A and  there is an admission of guilt, it will be too much  to say that statement is a confession to a police officer as  a police   officer  never acts judicially  and  no  proceeding before  him  is deemed to be a judicial proceeding  for  the

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purpose  of ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code or  for any other purpose.     Adverting   to   Raja  Ram  Jaiswal’s(2)  case   it   is significant that by virtue of s. 77(2) read with s. 78(3) of the  Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915, an Inspector  or  Sub- inspector was deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a  police station  and was  entitled to investigate any offence  under the  Excise Act.  He could exercise all the powers which  an officer-in-charge  of a police station could exercise  under Chapter  XIV  of the Code.  It was, therefore, held  by  the majority  that  a confession recorded by an  Excise  Officer during  an  investigation into an excise offence  could  not reasonably   be  regarded  as  anything  different  from   a confession  to  a police officer Barkat  Ram’s(1)  case  was distinguished  on  a  number of grounds. One  was  that  the excise  officer did not exercise any judicial power just  as the  customs  officer did under the Sea  Customs  Act  1878; secondly  the  customs  officer  was not  deemed  to  be  an officer-in-charge  of  a police station and,  therefore,  he could not exercise powers of such an officer under the  Code of  Criminal Procedure.  Further, the customs officer  could make  an enquiry (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R.  338.               (2) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 752. 620 but he had no power to investigate into an offence under  s. 156  of the Code.  Even though some or the powers set out  m Chapter XVII of the Sea Customs Act were analogous to  those of  the  police  officer  under  the  Code,  they  were  not identical  with  those  of a  police-officer  and  were  not derived   from  or  by  reference  to  the  Code.   it   was pertinently  observed  that  the  customs  officer  was  not entitled to submit a report to a magistrate under s. 190  of the Code with a view that cognizance of the offence be taken by a magistrate.  It was then said at p. 766:                   "The  test for determining whether such  a               person  is a ’police officer’ for the  purpose               of  s.  25 of the Evidence Act would,  in  our               judgment,  be whether the powers of  a  police               officer  which are conferred on him  or  which               are exercisable by him because he is deemed to               be  an officer in charge of a  police  station               establish a direct or substantial relationship               with  the prohibition  enacted by s. 25,  that               is,  the recording of a confession.  In  other               words,  the test would be whether  the  powers               are  such  as  would tend  to  facilitate  the               obtaining  by  him  of  a  confession  from  a               suspect. or a delinquent.  If they do, then it               is   unnecessary  to  consider  the   dominant               purpose  for  which  he is  appointed  or  the               question as to what other powers he enjoys." Emphasis was laid on the police officers having such  powers which enable them to exercise a kind of authority  over  the persons  arrested which facilitate the obtaining  from  them statements  which may  be  of  incriminating   nature.   The case  of Raja Ram jaiswal(1) came up for discussion  in  the third of series of these cases, namely, Badku Joti Savant v. State of  Mysore(2).   The appellant there had been found in possession  of contraband gold. He was prosecuted  under  s. 167(81) of the Sea  Customs  Act read with s. 9 of the  Land Customs  Act.  A  question  arose whether the statement made by the appellant  to  the  Deputy Superintendent of  Customs and Excise was admissible in evidence. The contention raised was  that  the  Central Excise  Officer  under  the  Central Excises  & Salt Act (Act 1 of 1944), hereinafter called  the

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"Central  Excise  Act",  was a  police  officer  within  the meaning  of  those  words in s. 25  of  the  Evidence   Act. Therefore  even though the Deputy Superintendent of  Customs and  Central Excise had acted under the power  conferred  on him  by the Sea Customs Act, he was still a  police  officer and the statement made to  him which was in the nature of  a confession   was  inadmissible  in  evidence.   This   Court referred to the difference of opinion among the High  Courts as  to the meaning of the words "police officer" used in  s. 25  of the Evidence Act. One view was that those words  must be construed in a broad way and all officers would be police (1)  [1964] 2 S.C.R. 752.              (2) [1966] 3  s  C.R. 698.           621 officers  within  the  meaning of those words  if  they  had powers  of the police officer with respect to  investigating of   offences  with which they were concerned even  if  they were   police   officers properly so called  or  not.    The narrow  view   was that these words in s. 25 meant a  police officer  properly  so  called  and did not include  officers of  other  departments  of  Government who might be  charged with   the   duty   to  investigate,   under  special  Acts, special  crimes like the excise or  customs   offences  etc. The  Court  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the  broad view was correct.  After examining  the  various  provisions of  the Central Excise Act and in particular s.  21  it  was observed that a police officer for the purpose of cl. (b) of s.  190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could only be  one properly so called. A Central Excise Officer had to make  a’ complaint  under  cl.  (a)  of s. 190  of  the  Code  to   a magistrate  to enable him to take cognizance of  an  offence committed  under the special statute. ’The argument  that  a Central Excise Officer under s. 21(2) of the Central  Excise Act had all the powers  of  an officer-in-charge of a police station  under Chapter  XIV of  the Code and, therefore,  he must be considered to be a police officer within the meaning of those words in s. 25 of the Evidence Act was repelled for the  reason  that though such officer had the  power  of  an officer-in-charge  of a police station he did not  have  the power  to  submit a charge sheet under s. 173 of  the  Code. Raja  Ram Jaiswal’s(1) case was distinguished on the  ground that s. 21 of the Central Excise Act was in terms  different from s. 78(3) of  the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915  which provided  that  for  the purpose of s. 156 of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure  the  Excise Officer empowered under  s. 77(2)  of  that Act shall be deemed to  be  the  officer-in- charge  of a police station.  The following observations  at page 704 are indeed important:                  "All  that s. 21 provides is that  for  the               purpose  of  his  enquiry,  a  Central  Excise               Officer   shah    have   the  powers   of   an               officerin-charge  of  a  police  station  when               investigating a cognizable case.  But even  so               it  appears that these powers do not_  include                             the power to submit a charge-sheet und er s. 173               of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for  unlike               the  Bihar  & Orissa Excise Act,  the  Central               Excise Officer is not deemed to be an officer-               incharge of a police station." It  was  reiterated  that  the  appellant  could  not   take advantage of the decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal’s(1) case  and that  Barkat Ram’s(") case was more apposite.  The  ratio of the   decision     Badku Joti Savant(3) is that even  if  an officer under the special Act has been invested with most of

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the powers which an officer- (1)  [1964] 2 S.C.R. 752.                     (2)  [1962]  3 S.C.R. 338. (3) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 698. Sup CI/69-7 622 in-charge of a police station exercises when investigating a cognizable  offence  he  does not thereby  become  a  police officer  within  the meaning of s. 25 of  the  Evidence  Act unless  he is empowered to file a charge sheet under s.  173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.     Learned  counsel for the appellant when faced  with  the above  difficulty has gone to the extent of suggesting  that by  necessary implication the power to file a  charge  sheet flows  from  some  of the powers  which  have  already  been discussed  under the new Act and that a customs  officer  is entitled  to exercise even this power. It is  difficult  and indeed  it would be contrary to all rules of  interpretation to  spell  out  any  such special  power  from  any  of  the provisions  contained in the new Act.  In this view  of  the matter  even though under the new Act a customs officer  has been invested with many powers which were not to be found in the  provisions of the old Act, he cannot be regarded  as  a police  officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the  Evidence Act.   In  two recent decisions of this Court in  which  the judgments  were  delivered  only on October  18,  1968  i.e. Romesh Chandra  Mehta v.  State  of West Bengal(1) and  Dady Adarji Fatakia v.K.K. Ganguly, Asstt Collector of Customs  & Ant.,(’2) the view expressed  in  Barkat Ram’s(3) case  with reference to the old Act has been reaffirmed on the question under consideration and it has been held that under the  new Act  also the position remains the same.  This is  what  has been said in Dady Adarji Fatakia’s(2) case:                     "For reasons set out in the judgment  in               Cr.  A. 27/67 (Romesh Chand  Mehta  v.   State               of   West  Bengal) and the  judgment  of  this               Court  in Badku Joti Savant’s(4) case, we  are               of  the view that a Customs Officer  is  under               the Act of  1962 not a  police officer  within               the  meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act  and               the statements made before him by a person who               is arrested or against whom an inquiry is made               are  not  covered  by  s.  25  of  the  Indian               Evidence Act."               This appeal fails and it is dismissed. V.P.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. (1)  [1969]  2  S.C.R. 461. (2) Cr. Appeal No.  46  of  1968 decided   on  18-10-1968.  (3)  r.  [1962]  3  S.C.R.   338. (4) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 698                    623