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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4678 of 2005

PETITIONER: ICICI BANK & Anr.                        

RESPONDENT: Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/08/2005

BENCH: P. Venkatarama Reddi & P.P. Naolekar

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 24215 of 2002)  

P.P. Naolekar, J.

               Leave granted.

               In the present appeal the appellants ICICI  Bank Limited has challenged the order of the Bombay  High Court whereby the High Court has dismissed the  writ petition filed by the appellant holding that the sign  boards fixed above the ATM Centers of the ICICI Bank  do amount to an advertisement and therefore the  action taken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay  by issuance of notice is in accordance with the  law.   The facts, in brief are that:         Sometime up to the year 2000 the appellant No.1,  ICICI Bank has installed ATM Centers and Extension  counters, Bank Branches at 64 locations in the city of  Bombay for the convenience of its depositors.  Certain  signboards were fixed above the entry of the ATM  centers and extension counters indicating their location.   They are illuminated to indicate the locations of the  ATM centers.  The Municipal Corporation did not  approve of putting up of the illuminated signboards of  ATM centers and therefore issued notice to the  appellant under Section 328 and 328-A of the Bombay  Municipal Corporation Act 1888 (hereinafter to be  referred to as ‘The Act’).  The contents of the notice  are that the appellant has displayed at its premises sky  sign/Glow Sign/Neon Sign/Illuminated Boards without  the permission of the  Bombay Municipal Corporation.   It was incumbent upon the appellant before putting up  such signboards etc., to have taken the permission and  made the  required payment.  The notice required the  appellant to make certain payment towards by filling  the prescribed form within three days of the receipt of  the notice, failing which BMC would take necessary  action, including defacing/removal of the boards at  appellant’s cost.  The notice was replied by the  appellant contending therein that the appellant does  not admit any of the allegations mentioned in the  notice and requested the BMC not to take any action as  contemplated in the said notice.  Thereafter in the  month of August 2003 the appellant filed a writ petition  in the High Court of Bombay alleging that the  impugned notices which were served on the appellant  bank  are wholly without jurisdiction and without the  authority of law and that the same violated the

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fundamental and other rights of the appellant bank and  therefore  the same are illegal, null and void.   According to the appellant the signboards fixed over  the ATM Centers  or Extension counters does not  amount to advertisement as specified in Section 328A  of the Act nor do they come under the definition of sky- sign as defined in Section 328 of the Act..  They merely  tell the existing account holder about the location of the  ATM booth.  The said signboards are only  for the  guidance of the public and that the services rendered  by the appellant bank are not advertised.  The  signboards are essential for the working and business  of the appellant bank and does not amount to  advertisement and therefore the notices issued  by the  Bombay Municipal Corporation, requiring the appellant  to make the payment of the amount is illegal.  The High  Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant  on the ground that the controversy involved in the case  is squarely covered by the judgment of the Apex Court  in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  Vs.  Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.  JT 2002 (3)  SC 452 and held that the signboards fixed above the  ATM Centers of the appellant Bank do amount to an  advertisement.  The impugned notices, therefore,  cannot be faulted.  In consequence thereof the writ  petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.         The learned senior counsel Shri R.F. Nariman  has  urged that the illuminated signboards of the appellant  Bank does not fall within the definition of sky-sign in  Section 328 of the  Bombay Municipal Corporation Act  1888 and therefore Section 328 of the Act has no  application.  Hence, the High Court committed an error  in applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the  matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay’s case (supra).  The signboards fixed on the  ATM Centers of the Bank  and its Extension Counters  only indicates to its  customers about the location of  the Bank/ATM Centers to facilitate them to carry out  the banking transaction at any time of the day or night  and is  in the nature of the in-house facility provided to  the customers of the bank and does not in any way  convey message  of commercial  or business activities  of the appellant bank.  The illuminated signboard  does  not relate to the business  or commercial activities of  the bank nor does  it propagate the ideas with regard  to the goods or services rendered by the party.  It  merely displays as to where the ATM Center is located  and therefore the action of the bank putting up the  illuminated signboards does not fall within the ambit of  Section 328A of the Act.  To counter this argument, Mr.  V.R. Reddy, learned senior counsel submitted that in  the facts of the case, the decision given by this Court in  the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay (supra)  is directly on point and the ratio  decided covers the case.   In any case, the illuminated  signboards at the entry of the ATM Center and  Extension Counter does not indicate their locations  alone but attract the prospective customers also to  open their accounts with the ICICI Bank and in that  manner it propagates ideas with regard to the goods or  the services rendered by  Bank and therefore would be  covered under Section 328A of the Act.         Before we consider the  respective submissions  made by the counsel, it would be fruitful to read the  relevant provisions of Section 328 and 328A of the Act.  

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The necessary extracts of the relevant  provisions for  adjudicating the question involved in this care are as  under: 328.    (1)     No person shall, without the written  permission of the Commissioner, erect, fix or  retain any sky-sign, whether now existing  or not,  [where a sky-sign is a poster depicting any scene  from a cinematographic film, stage play or other  stage performance, such permission shall not be  granted, unless prior scrutiny of such poster is  made by the Commissioner and he is satisfied that  the erection or fixing of such poster is not likely to  offend against decency or morality.  No permission  under this section shall be granted, or renewed,  for any period exceeding two years from the date  of each such permission or renewal]. \005\005\005\005\005 \005\005\005\005\005

       (3)     If any sky sign be erected, fixed or  retained contrary to the provisions of this section,  or after permission for the erection, fixing or  retention thereof for any period shall have expired  or become void the Commissioner may, by written  notice, require the owner or occupier of the land,  building or structure, upon or over which the sky- sign is erected, fixed or retained, to take down  and remove such sky-sign.

       The expression ’sky sign’ shall in this section  mean any word, letter, model, sign, device or  representation in the nature of an advertisement,  announcement or direction, supported on or  attached to any post, pole standard frame-work or  other support wholly or in part upon or over any  land, building or structure which, or any part of  which sky-sign, shall be visible against the sky  from some point in any street and includes all and  every part of any such post, pole, standard  framework or other support.  The expression ’  sky-sign’ shall also include any balloon, parachute,  or other similar device employed wholly or in part  for the purposes of any advertisement,  announcement or direction upon or over any land,  building or structure or upon or over any street,  but shall not include:

       (a)     any flagstaff, pole, vane or  weathercock, unless adapted or  used wholly or  in part for the purpose of any advertisement,          announcement or direction;

       (b)     any sign, or any board, frame or other  contrivance securely    fixed to or on the top of  the wall or parapet of any building, or on      the  cornice or blocking course of any wall, or to the  ridge of a roof.

328A.   (1)     No person shall, without the  written permission of the Commissioner erect,  exhibit, fix or retain any advertisement whether  now existing or not, upon any land, building, wall,  hoarding or structure.  [Where an advertisement  depicts any scene from a cinematographic film,

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stage play or other stage performance, such  permission shall not be granted, unless prior  scrutiny of such advertisement  is made by the  Commissioner  and he is satisfied that the erection  or exhibition of such advertisement is not likely to  offend against decency or morality;] \005\005\005\005\005\005\005. \005\005\005\005\005\005\005.

       (3)     If any advertisement be erected,  exhibited, fixed or retained contrary to the  provisions of this section after the written  permission for the erection, exhibition, fixing or  retention thereof for any period shall have expired   or become void, the Commissioner may, by notice  in writing, require the owner or occupier of the  land, building wall, hoarding or structure upon  which the same is erected, exhibited, fixed or  retained, to take down or remove such  advertisement

By virtue of Section 328 of the Act, no person  is  permitted without the written permission of the  Commissioner to erect, fix or retain any sky-sign, and  the permission granted by the Commissioner or the  renewal thereof shall be for any period exceeding two  yeas from the date of each such permission or renewal.   Sub-s.(3) authorizes the Commissioner by written  notice to direct the owner or occupier of the land,  building or structure upon or over which the sky-sign is  erected, fixed or retained to take down and remove  such sky-sign, if such sky-sign is fixed, erected or  retained contrary to the provisions of Section 328 of  the Act.    According to Sub-s.(3) "Sky-sign" shall mean  any word, letter, model, sign deice or representation in  the nature of an advertisement, announcement or  direction, supported on or attached to any post, pole,  standard frame-work or other support wholly  or in part  upon or over any land, building or structure which, or  any part of which sky-sign, shall be visible against the  sky from some point in any street and includes all and  every part of any such post, pole, standard framework  or other support.  The expression "sky-sign" shall also  include  any balloon, parachute, or other similar  device  employed wholly or in part for the purpose of any  advertisement, announcement or direction upon or over  any land, building or structure or upon or over any  street.  Sub-clause (a) and sub-clause (b) has a  reference to  what shall not be included to be the sky- sign.  The reading of this section gives a clear cut  indication that the sky-sign shall not be erected, fixed  or retained  unless written permission to that effect is  obtained from the Commissioner and the sky-sign shall  mean any word, letter, model, sign, device or  representation balloon parachute or other similar  device which is in the nature of an advertisement,  announcement or direction or employed for the purpose  of advertisement, announcement or direction, that is to  say, if it is in the nature of advertisement,  announcement or direction, it would be a sky-sign,  provided the sign is visible against the sky from some  point in any street which shall include part of any such  post, pole, standard frame-work or other support upon

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which the sky-sign rest.  For any advertisement,  announcement or direction to be a ‘sky-sign’, it is not  necessary that the sign-boards are illuminated.  The  necessary ingredient of the sky-sign are that it should  be in the nature of  advertisement, announcement  or  direction,  and should be visible against sky from some  point in any street.   So far as Section 328A is  concerned, no person is permitted to erect, exhibit, fix  or retain any advertisement upon any  land, building,  wall, hoarding or structure without the written  permission of the Commissioner.  Second proviso to  sub-s.(1) exempts the person from taking permission if  the advertisement is not illuminated or a sky-sign and  which is exhibited within the window of any building or  is related to the trade or business carried on within the  land or building upon which such advertisement is  exhibited or to any sale or letting of such land or  building or any effects therein or to any sale,  entertainment or meeting to be held  upon or in the  same building or to any  trade or business carried on  by the owner of any tram-car, omnibus or other vehicle  upon which such advertisement is exhibited.   Therefore, if the advertisement is not illuminated  advertisement nor is a sky-sign and is being put at a  place provided under clauses (a) and (b) of Section  328A of the Act, permission of the Commissioner is not  required.  The moment the advertisement is illuminated  or is a sky-sign, even if it is exhibited or rested on the  place mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 328A  of the Act, the permission of the Commissioner is  necessary.  Sub-clause (3) authorizes the  Commissioner to direct any person in breach of Section  328A to take down and remove such advertisement.                  For application of Section 328, it is necessary that  the word, model, sign or device or representation is in  the nature of advertisement, announcement or  direction.  If it does not fall within the exception  provided under the proviso, the permission of the  Commissioner is necessary.  It may be noted that  under Section 328 it is not merely the advertisement  but even something which is in the nature of  advertisement is comprehended whereas under Section  328A, it is the advertisement alone which would attract  the provisions of Section 328A of the Act.  The  language used in both the provisions make it explicitly  clear that these provisions operate in somewhat  different fields and the phrase ‘advertisement’ used in  both Sections in its context pronounces a  different  meaning   of the word.   The application of these  Sections depends upon the kind of the sign-boards or  the illuminated boards etc.         Both the counsel have extensively argued the  question of applicability of the decision rendered by this  Court in the matter of  Municipal Corporation of  Greater Bombay (supra), as decision of the High  Court is based on this decision. It is obvious from the  decision in the  case that the Court has adjudicated and  decided mainly the scope of sub-s.(3)  of Section 328  of the Act. The Court has not decided on the  applicability, scope and ambit of Section 328A  of the  Act.  The definition of ‘sky-sign’ came up for  consideration before the Court.  This Court laid  emphasis on the expression "in the nature of an  advertisement" in the definition of sky-sign in

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Paragraph 10 of the Judgment which expression is not  found in Section 328A of the Act.                  The decision  in the matter of Municipal  Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) has no  relevance to the facts involved in the case before us for  more than one reason.  In Paragraph 6 of the  Judgment, the Court says that although the relevant  statutory provisions are Section 328/328A of the Act,  the issues raised have to be considered and decided  mainly on the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 328  of the Act.  The paragraph makes it clear that the Court  has considered the scope and reach of Section 328 of  the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888.  That  apart, in Paragraph 10  of the Judgment the Court held  that "the indication given  by emphasis supplied to  some of the words used in the provision  in question as  well as the words "in the nature" of an advertisement,  announcement or direction’ would go to show that it is  not a must  to be that but is enough if it is ‘in the  nature of’  that which is specified.  The three words  required to be construed cannot  be said to admit of  any one particular meaning alone but capable of being  understood by their general or interrelated meaning  suitable for the context".  Thus, much emphasis was  placed on the expression "in the nature of." The Court  in Paragraph 9 of course has said that in common  parlance ‘advertisement’  means to make publicly  known an information by some device and to draw or  attract attention of public/individual concerned to such  information.  It need not necessarily  be to sell only or  solely for commercial exploitation.  Thus, it was pointed  out that the advertisement would not necessarily mean  the information supplied to the public or an individual  solely for commercial exploitation.  As it appears to us,  the observation of the Court is made in the context of  Section 328 of the Act where the phrase  ’advertisement’ is used in limited sense in as much as it  includes information to the public and is in the nature  of advertisement, although not an advertisement pure  and simple.                    In the present case we are not considering the  scope and ambit of Section 328 of the Act, as,  admittedly the advertisement in question  is not sky  sign within the meaning of Section 328 of the Act. The  ratio and effect of the judgment is required to be  ascertained with reference to the question of law as  decided by the Court.   The ratio of the judgment or the  principle upon which the question before the Court is  decided is alone binding as a precedent. The decision of  the Supreme Court upon a question of law is  considered to be a binding precedent, and this must be  ascertained and determined by analyzing all the  material facts and issues involved in the case.         In the matter of Paisner versus Goodrich  (1955) 2 All ER 330,332, Lord Denning in his  Judgment has held:                          "When the judges of this Court  give a  decision on the         interpretation of an Act of  Parliament, the decision itself is binding  on  them   and  their  successors  ( see  Cull v. Inland  Revenue Commissioners), Morelle, Ltd.  v.  Wakeling. But the words which the Judges used in

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giving the decision are not binding.  This is often a  very fine distinction,   which  will  best be only be  expressed in words.  Nevertheless, it is a real  distinction, which  will  best   be  appreciated  by   remembering that, when interpreting a statute,  the sole function of the Court is to  apply  the   words of the statute to a given situation.  Once a   decision  has  been reached on that situation, the  doctrine of precedent requires us to apply  the  statute in      the  same   way  in  any  similar   situation;   but not in a different situation.   Whenever a new situation emerges, not covered  by previous decisions, the courts must be  governed  by the   statute  and not by the words  of the  judges\005\005."  

       In Madhav Rao Scindia  Vs.  Union of India,  AIR 1971 S.C. 530 , this Court said that it is not  proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence  occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court,  divorced from its context, as containing a full  exposition of the law on a question when the question  did not even fall to be answered in that judgment.                  In the matter of C.I.T. Vs. Sun Engineering  works (P) Ltd, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 363 (Page 363),  Justice Anand (As His Lordship then was), speaking for  the Court, has said that it is neither desirable nor  permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the  Judgment of the Court, divorced from the context  of  the question under consideration and treat it to be  the  complete ‘law’  declared by the Supreme Court.  The  judgment must be read as a whole and the  observations from the judgment  have to be considered  in the light of the questions  which were before the  Supreme Court.  The decision on the question involved  in the case in which it is rendered and while applying  the  decision to the later case, the Courts must  carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by  the decision and not to pick out words or sentence from  the judgment divorced from the context of the question  under consideration   by the Court.          In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay (supra), Section 328A was not  at all  interpreted by this Court.  For the case to be a binding  precedent, fundamental requirement would be, that the  law pronounced should result from the issues raised  before the Court between the parties and argued on  both sides. In the matter of Municipal Corporation of  Greater Bombay the definition of ‘sky-sign’ under  Section 328 came up for consideration.  In reaching the  conclusion  that the huge metallic board exhibited by  BPC Petrol Bunk on a pole with the name of the  Company and its symbol (Shell symbol) was a sky-sign,  this Court laid emphasis on the expression "in the  nature of an advertisement" occurring in the definition  of ‘sky-sign’ in Paragraph 10  which expression is not  to be found in Section 328-A. While interpreting Section  328 and construing the words ‘in the nature of an  advertisement, announcement and direction’, this Court  held that the advertisement need not necessarily be  only or solely for commercial exploitation whereas  Section 328A of the Act speaks about ‘advertisement’   alone and not ‘in the nature of an advertisement’.  

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Normally the ratio of the case shall be deduced from  the facts involved in the case and the particular  provision of law  which the Court has interpreted and  the decision shall be read with reference to and in the  context of particular statutory provisions involved in  the matter.         In our considered opinion the decision rendered in  the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater  Bombay (supra) is not a decision on the question of  interpretation of Section 328A of the Act, particularly  the phrase ‘advertisement’ used therein.                    The next question that arises for consideration is  whether notices issued by the Corporation to the  appellant-ICICI Bank are per se illegal or without  authority of law as putting up the sign boards of ATM  centers at different places by the bank could out-rightly  be said not to be an advertisement and thus does not  attract the provision of Section 328A of the Corporation  Act.  To consider this aspect we have to see what shall  be an advertisement for the purposes of Section 328A  of the Act.  The dictionary definitions of the word  ’advertisement’ are  as under :- BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,8TH EDITION Advertising :  1..The action of drawing the  public’s attention to something to promote its  sale.  2.  The business of producing and circulating  advertisements

LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY Advertisement : Notice given in a manner  designed to attract public attention. Edwards v.  Lubbock Country, Tex Civ. App., 33, S.W.2d 482,  482.  Information communicated to the public, or  to an individual concerned, as by handbills,  newspaper, television, bill-boards, radio.  First  Nat. Corporation v. Perrine, 99 Mont 454, 43 P.2d  1073, 1077.

THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA VOLUME-I Advertising, the techniques used to bring  products, services, opinions, or causes to public  notice for the purpose of persuading the public to  respond in a certain way toward what is  advertised.  Most advertising involves promoting a  good that is for sale, but similar methods are used  to encourage people to drive safely, to support  various charities, or to vote for political  candidates, among many other examples.

COLLINS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH  LANGUAGE Advertisement \026 any public notice, as a printed  display in a newspaper, short film on television,  announcement on radio, etc., designed to sell  goods, publicize an event, etc. Advertising \026 1) the action or practice of drawing  public attention to goods, services, events etc., as  by the distribution of printed notices,  broadcasting, etc. 2) the business that specializes  in creating such publicity, 3) advertisements  collectively; publicity.

THE CHAMBERS DICTIONARY Advertisement  - the act of advertising;  a public

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notice with the purpose of informing and / or  changing public attitudes and behaviour; a short  performance recorded for radio, T.V. etc. to  advertise goods or services; news.

                 An advertisement is a matter that draws attention  of the public or segment of public to a product, service,  person, organization or line of conduct in a manner  calculated to promote or oppose directly or indirectly  that product, service, person, organization or line of  conduct intended to promote sale or use of product or  range of products.  An advertisement is an information  that producer provides about its products or services.   An advertisement tries to get consumers to buy a  product or a service.  An advertisement is generally of   goods and services and is an information intended for  the potential customers and not a mere display of the  name of the company unless the same happens to be a  trade mark or trade name.         It is well settled that ordinarily the words used in  the statute are to be understood in their natural,  ordinary and popular sense.  The broad principles  underlying the construction and interpretation of the  word or phrase in the statute is succinctly extracted  from the leading authorities and work of authors  and  compiled in the book "Principles of Statutory  Interpretation" (9th) Edn. 2004 by Justice G.P. Singh,  Chapter 2, page 86 which reads :-          "When it is said that words are to be understood  first in their natural, ordinary or popular sense,  what is meant is that the words must be ascribes  that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which  they have in relation to the subject-matter with  reference to which and the context in which they  have bee used in the statue. BRETT, M.R. called it  a ’cardinal rule’  that "Whenever you have to  construe a statute or document you do not  construe it according to the mere ordinary general  meaning of the words, but according to the  ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the  subject-matter with regard to which they are  used".  "No word", says PROFESSOR  H.A. SMITH   "has an absolute meaning, for no words can be  defined in vacuo , or without reference to some  context".  According to SUTHERLAND there is a  "basic fallacy" in saying "that words have meaning  in and of themselves", and "reference to the  abstract meaning of words", states CRAIES, "if  there be any such thing, is of little value in  interpreting statutes".  In the words of JUSTICE  HOLMES : "A word is not a crystal transparent and  unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and  may vary greatly in colour and content according  to the circumstances and the time in which it is  used."  Shorn of the context, the words by  themselves are "slippery customers".  Therefore,  in determining the meaning of any word or phrase  in a statute the first question to be asked is \026  "What is the natural or ordinary meaning of that  word or phrase in its context in the statute?  It is  only when that meaning leads to some result  which cannot reasonably be supposed to have  been the intention of the Legislature, that it is

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proper to look for some possible meaning of the  word or phrase".

                        Section 328A prohibits without prior permission of  Commissioner, erection, exhibition of advertisement.   The advertiser need not ask for permission if the  advertisement is not illuminated or is not a sky sign,  provided it  is exhibited in window of any building, or  relates to trade or business carried on within that land  or building or when it relates to sale or letting of that  property or in reference to any sale, entertainment or  meeting organized therein, or it relates to business of  railway company.  Exceptions referred in the provision  clearly has nexus  and relevance to the business or  trade or commercial activities.          The context in which the word advertisement has  been used in Section 328A of the Corporation Act and  in the commercial and ordinary parlance it must have   direct or indirect connection with the business, trade or  commerce carried out by the advertiser.  It must have  some commercial exposition.  The advertisement would  be for the purpose of directing or soliciting customers  to the product or service prominently shown in the  advertisement.  If ordinary parlance meaning is not  given to the word advertisement in Section 328A it will  create anomalous position, in as much as a simple  name board put on the house to indicate who is  residing in the premises, would also be an  advertisement; a name board or sign board of a trader  visible to the public or identifying the place of business  would also be an advertisement.  In our considered  opinion advertisement within the meaning of Section  328A of the Corporation Act must primarily have the  commercial purpose and should be indicative of  business activity of the displayer with a view to attract  the attention of people to its business.          In the present case the appellant has put up an  illuminated ATM board at various sites and as per the  appellant it has been put only to tell the existing  customers and others about the location of the ATM  centers, which in itself is in the interest of public at  large  and not to attract new customers for opening the  bank account.  Normally, the ATM centers enable the  customers to carry out the banking activities or  transactions at any time , day or night and even on  gazetted holidays.  They are in the nature of public  service as they enable the customers to do away with  the need to keep large sum of cash in their house ;  they are able to have access to the money in their  account even on holidays and emergency.  The ATM  centers have a sign board over them that are  illuminated and tell about the fact that there lies the  ATM Center of the bank in that premises.  The fact that  there is an ATM center in the premises tells  that the  appellant bank is providing Automatic Teller Machine  service there and hence the service provider is clearly  identified.  The communication in this is direct to the  account holders and also the prospective account  holders.  The kind of information supplied of the  location of the service provided may also be construed  of commercial exploitation indirectly, as  the sign  boards may not aim at the existing customers only but  they may also affect the decisions of the prospective  customers.  They tell the prospective customers that

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the service of the ATM round the clock is being made  available by the appellant bank which would influence  the prospective customers to make a decision about  which service provider he or she has to choose.  The  sign board also helps the people to find out which bank  is offering better services as compared to the other  bank.  The fact that a Bank has more ATM centers than  the other banks, in the competitive trade and business,  provides the incentive to the people to choose that  Bank.  The fact that one bank has an ATM center in the  given location helps them to get more account holders  in that area.  This also serves the commercial interest  of the bank.  Whether particular action is an  advertisement or not would depend on whether the  person wants to promote directly or indirectly his  product or service.  If by any communication, the  communicator tries to influence the people to buy his  product or service or attract towards his product or  service then it would be a guiding factor to identify  whether a particular communication of the  communicator tantamounts  to be an advertisement.           From the aforesaid analysis, in all fact situation  and circumstances, at the outset  it cannot be said that  the sign boards indicating ATM centers cannot have  commercial interest but would only tell about the  location of the ATM centers to the existing account  holders only.  Whether signboard of ATM Centre  tantamounts to be an advertisement or not would  depend upon the facts of each case, depending on the  number of ATM centers established by a particular bank  in a particular locality or place or even city, to have   the flavour of commercial or business interest of the  service provider.  In the present case no exercise was  undertaken by the municipal authorities or the Bombay  High Court before the High Court had reached to the  conclusion that the sign boards of the ATM center put  up by the ICICI bank at different locations would be an  advertisement within the meaning of Section 328A of  the Corporation Act.  In fact the notices issued by the  bank to the appellant are under Section 328, 328A of  the Corporation Act.  The  reach, ambit and scope of  these sections are quite different and they operate in  different fields.  They do not completely overlap. In the  circumstances, it was appropriate for the Corporation to  issue notices to the appellant either under Section 328  or under Section 328A of the Corporation Act and  notice should not  have been issued under both   Sections for the same sign board.  The Bombay  Municipal Corporation Authorities seem to be in a state  of doubt and hence the notices clearly do not specify  under which section they propose to take action.  As we  have made it clear that in the present case the sign  boards of ATM centers, which are not sky signs, are not  covered under the provisions of Section 328 of the  Corporation Act, the notices issued shall be deemed to  have been issued under Section 328 A of the  Corporation Act and the Corporation shall decide the  question of advertisement under Section 328A of the  Act after indicating the bank a fresh date of hearing.           For the reasons stated above the appeal is  allowed and judgment and order of the High Court is  set aside.  Fresh steps can be taken in the light of the  observations in this judgment. In the circumstances of  the case we do not impose any cost and the parties  shall bear their own costs.

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